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PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1905

IOTYSE OF REPREENTATIVE,
CoMMriT
ON TIE JUDTCTARY,

Washington, DI.

The conimittee met at 10 n.m., pursuant to call, in room 346, Cannon Buildingt, lon. Emanuel Celler (chairman) presiding.
Present: representatives Celler Rodmo, Rogers, Donohue, Brooks
lKastonmeier, Cormani, Mc('ullovi,, ('ramer, Litusay, Ma thins, and
I hit(eh i soB.
Also present: William I. Copenhaver, as.6ciate counsel; William
R. Foley, general counsel.
The ('A
RMAN. The meeting will omue to order.
The Chair will read an opening statement, followed by a statement
to be read by our esteemed Representative from Ohio, Mr. MA[eCulloch.
SOpening statement, Chairman Emanuel Celler:)
Today, tie full committee of the house Committee on the ,Judiciary
initiates hearings on 32 proposals relating to the problem of presidential inability. We are confronted wit l one of tie most difficult
problems thit has ever challenged a Congress. It is a problem which

ias exist ed sice the adoption of the Constitution and on more than

one occasion it has been a stark real it.y.
There is no doubt. that this problem has many difficult, facets-legal,
political, and constitutional. A mere review of the congressional at.
tempts to find a solution is adequitte proof of the complexities and
difficulties involved. Moreover, the history of the Presidency and the
Vice-Presidency indicates the necessity for meeting this problem headon. Eight of our Presidents have died in office hnd on 16 different
occasions the office of Vice President has been vacant.. We are very
fortunate that at no time have both offices been vacant simultaneously.
It is interesting to note also that public interest in a solution to the
problem of presidential inability reaches its peak when the situation
arises, but subsides once the emergency has passed. The recent tragic
death of President Kennedy has served to arouse public interest in the
problem. We cannot permit this interest to languish into apathy
again.
I for one, have had a deep and probing interest in solving the
problem which arises from the vague language of article II, section 1,
clafuse 6 of the Constitution relating to presideitial inability. In 1955,
as chairman.of this committee I ordered a staff study of this problem
and T appointed a special subcommittee of the ranking members to
further the study. This study sought out the views of t select group
of leading constitutional law professors and leading political scientists
by way of a questionnaire. These answers and an analysis of them
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If it is believed, however, that. the President's inability continues,
the amendment. provides that tile Vice President, with the concurrence
of a mtority of the (abinet, or such other body as designated by (Iontjress, shill within 2 days declare in writing thtt such liability contillies.

Up to this point, my proposed amendment is identical to the administration's proposal. At tis pohit, however, 1 hutive made a major
change.
Whereas, the aministration's proposal only provides that Congress
shall immediately act upo the Vice President's declaration, I propose
that it. must act within 10 datys of the President's declaration of termination of inability, which would be at least 8 days after the Vice President's declaration of the President's continuing inability.
In both proposals, the President shall be refused the right. to resume
office only if the Congress, by ittwo-thirds vote, determines that the
President's inability continues. I am of the opinion, however, that a
definite time limit should be phced upon the right of Congress to determine the issue.
For, right or wrong, we are providing a means for taking away
the President's office. Tihe burden should thereby be phlced upon
the Vice President and, indirectly, the Congress to have the issuo docided without unnecessary delay. I am not. wedded to itWitr-ticular
time period, but. I am of th opinion that a definite time period should
be estAtblished.

In our history, we havo had instamces where R PrOsident was faced
with a hostile congress. Such hostility should not bo prmitted to
indefinitely keep a President from his rightful office. In our history,

we have also had instances where the President and the Vice P1re7dent were not on friendly terns. If such a case were to exist again,

we could permit an occasion to exist where itVice President
could prevent the President's resumption of office by falling to reconvane an adjourned Congress.
Under my proposal, Coniress would have to face the isque within a
specifled period of time. If-t,were adjourned, tie Vice President must
recall it. If procedumll delays or fiibtistors were attempted in the
House or Senate, the Vice President would need to generate two-thirds
support in Congress to break the logjam which by the way, is no
greater support tani the two-thirds vote lie would iavo to obtain to up.
,old his declaration of the President's continuing disability. If those
hurdles were not overcome, the President would automatically resume
his office, which is ]low it should be. I nilit also point out that my
proposal will permit Congress to avoid taking sides when in doubt
about the President's or the Vice President's de ration. By refusing
to take action within the prescribed time, the President would thereby
receive the benefit of the doubt and automatically resume office.
Turning to the other basic problem of maintaining effective Executive leadership, my Droposed amendment and that proposed by
the administration provides that, when t yacano occursIn the Office
of the Vice President, the President shll appol nt a Vice President
who shall be confirmed by Congress.
Today, far more than in eArlier times, the Vice President has an
active part inleadership of the Nation. He participates in Cabinet
meetings. Hie has been designated a statutory Member of the Na.
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quest ions luld
ISSUPtS Which I litvt fte 'oiiiil itteei should wonderr if it is t'o fiullIy

CXOxl e Iothis sllhjt't Iiuitt t'i.

4irsf t 11111(1of'
iitih'
qustiouls ars
tists to thle met hod of alpml) linid
(10li1pleteiiess of' hut
lie iii1io'itus pri'OJ)051l.
1. WouIld it hbe mloret de.si'ulih'e to eliate all ftuitliiitiiit gliig
Congress the generall aut hority to 1)1155 h'gislat ion oil this hi)jtet,
111111tt('i-t herebyN nuot, locking ii a1
1 siuigle aippi'oli ?
2. Should tli
he 1.4ieslet I )ct given I lio authointy to itoilitte it
nlow V'ice Ilre.sideult ?
3. Should thle Vice Presidentf. he givenl tlie Ight (ot'i t'o buridenu)

to declare thle I'gidlit's iltit

01, t'oltitillg Iuulillty ?
4. oShould the P~residenit hie givenl the right to select tli body to
pass 11 )01 his iiility ?

5.111dli e loet rille of sepauratlioui of' iowoi's, shiouild Collgre-48 he given filie right. to pr'eveint, the lPrt's1(elitrsC l'T'Sliuut Ion1 of

Oflkeo?

Secondly, I. number of situtiis may arise which will not he cov-.
ered,. by th1e aidminist i-11li'm )10l )Oed itet
1. The simitlltaiewous (1it hi ity of11dllient:
tih' Pre.4idefit and Vice 1President.6
2. Trhe disability oIf the President, wh'eni there is no Vice ProsWoent'.

I. The denth1 of thle livsidenIt -elect, ors bothltthe Presideit-eleot
and Vidueiet-lc,(tring thle period between election (Ilily
and1( the uIeetinm of tile electoral college; between tle meeting of
the Olectorill college and1( Congress counting of tho electoral votes;
and between th~e counting of the electoral votes and inugura.

T recognize flint. all of the-se -issutes auld questions eainflot. orl, at lest
should iWo he settled through the, adoption of it single constit'litiolaI
amendment..
As a.miltter of fact-, I believe somne of them can he better lhandled
through an amendment, relating to it iango In thte electoral college
system,.

1,11 1-1,sl

Ali INA111LITY

I (do believe, ))oo~vo')', that de'filih'I 1111d St'llolatI('il !'4colidl(Wttiou
1111st. htw gi veti to I111111Itty of t hest, issues, a11d quest ionls as possile',
dtuillr t hese hei ngs, so that tho 11Judiahry Commit tee 11111 Send to
tho I ollst thle ht'st ('onsIdell(1 proposal to aliildU( the ('imsi it it ioul
1lt. elpilhilit it's f)QI'ilit*

0th

The
n~i~n~.x
ihe ist spean ker (his inIiilf is tilhe (list illguishled
StIuat
lIon. liiWli EL.Hayh1 1, of
a (o(iellted legislator. Who
itdan
1111s lahored long to gret. at provision ill the ('oulstitlitioul vouetiing
President ill illitility, to foril li)itlt
11)11ileut, itiu
n lllltor, wve givo
you it warmil weleomne here this nioriting. W~e arm glad to hear froint

you.

pitM, Senlatorl, I would like to lui*( thle reeord shlo~v the Variouls
pi'oJposlls we halve--soilei 818 hl~ls, and allso the mlesage of the IPresi(Messalge f roml thle 1Presidoll Cof te Ilted Stalt es:)

MRM IN$(1'
PRO1M TIIN4 PIIIDE
iFN'T OF '11110 1IXITI-il) S'PATHOM VTHAN
MIT'VINO A 1)lA FVOF PllOl'OS4i-) LF4O ISOLATION JHXiON'I
4 EI), "AJOI N'T
1tESOLlITTON l'lOPI'O NO AN' A1.1iiND I)MiNT1 TO '1111 C
CONSTITUTIONN
OF TI!!) VNITHI) STA''HS UIIATINO TO TH~E 1411
1 0EC'ION OF~ THEIF
11ISI1)NIN AN) VIVE PRISI~DEN'r"
To tho Oong1prczs of the til tedI Mato'*
ltn 1787, Blenjamifn Franklin remaorked near the o'onelusion of the(' conlstitu.tional Conventiou at Phtiadeiphiii, "It * 'fltoilsihes mae, Sir, to find 01hi4
One hiudred atuo meventy-eight years litter the( relevance of fliat. Cost itut ion
of 1781) to our sooliety of 10M1 Is reniarkaei
Yet It Is truly astonishing thint,
over thi sian, we hanve inelther pierfeetedl the( provisomis for orderly continuity
lit thle executive dlirectioin of our system nor, a" yet. paid thle price our continuing fiction so early Invites ando so recklessly risks.
I reft~r, of course, to three conspicuous and loug-retognizeol defets in thie Constitutlin relating to) the offiep of the Presidency:
1. The lack of a toiistilttionalpi'oi'lion a*HIwifp the' orderly discharge, of the
powrers and dieties of the Presiilent-otamnedr it O(ef-in the oecit of the
disabilityor ittcapacity of the iceinmiet.
2. The lack of a eonstiteitioiial pro 'isin assuri eontinuity it the oflev of the
Vie PresNident, apt offce which itself ia proved trithin our splen for the,
prInaru plirpose of assluring#cninuity11.
8, The laeAk of a ieotltutional proisoiautip that the votes of oleo~ers
ti the elecoral college sthallt without quesoMM reflect th# ea'pMrced 111111 Of the
people in the actual eleotion.- of their Presiet atid Vice President.

Over the years, as I have noted, we, hove Peaped the( wisehief these obvious
than of any prutdoec on our piart. For It 1o not necessary to conjure thle ni1ghtmare of nuclear holocaust or other national catastrophe to Identify these oulissions as ohasmis of chaost Into which normal humnu frailiight plunige UP
at any titte.
On at least two occasions lin our history, and perhanps others, Amierican
Presidents-James Oarfteld and Woodrow Wilson-halve, for prolonged periods,
been, rendered Incapale of disehariig their Presidential duten. Ont 1ff occiisiona
In our .10 adinistrations, thle oflle of Vice President haso been vacnt-and
over the two perilous decades siune the end of the Rpeond World War, thtt
vital office has bepen vicntt the equivallent of 1 year out of 4, 1Pinailly, over
recent years, comilex hunt cncerted camipaigns hoive bepen opeonly udertakenfortutntely without sueses, a yet-to sublvert the electoral college so that
It would register not the will of the peple of individual States hut, rather,
the wisheps of the electors themstelves,
The potential of paralysis9 itplicit int theme olidtiott cet it cites all 11edefecesible
folly for our t'mspoible society it these ltieo. frotnmoemsene Iipela, dutyi
reqniret us to act-and to net ioto, tolhoit fuirther delay.

omisions invite aind perit. Our peape hno been more the( result of providence

1011CSIVENTIA),

INAIJILITY

1W1illul ilf tot# furctucorst,-- 8inct nitdilmt(ii orftits ''111 oPt
.11('tI(iin ht,
I liliitinttiis to our ('onstif tit Ion-t --I f fli's 11 subs'qwiw
Ul~glts''"- hfli s i11,8
aliteulthlls invt' relittiololl1rt'o'l y olther Ito the oilh-ex (or flu1tr'lioxf4 II- itild
it iii 1lig jirovetssi's (to fit!
'ii'to-Prei'tolt'iii of' tit itiIsiriig tlit, r'juiloiti'su
willI of' tlits' livopit. AN lotig ligo its I S0 I it l its lo'vitf ly its 1l1411, Aliwtoiclils
hitP 1111114-i1i14.4l IIIP r ('0isIfoil hut hiIlst rivling f'ou It.% greo'ilo' psriel-Aou141 itll Ilu'st
-'lt lu l ifrells.
it i t s ilis It Iv IIt d oIII
shiouldi
ff)(~
he s0i g1111(1Pvellilig willi (Pf flis jIN'uijp' 11111O Ihtwis
[ li10lmv1%It Is Ow
clf110
flow
1
4 lt tiit1'01 ht'si' uniiiippy )pIPS!lillilt's ltilii'rett lit olur system'iii m It
fill f ill oveli'r lliliig tituijotrity
tio%% exists, lslki'wlse, I hltllo've It I4 flilt' vouulist
Weffi-eti loiti beo fnku'it
(Pt flit' ('oiigres's-witivlfli thotight (Pr iiut Inuishi tin t
thisH comus~idelIPIDliotoboth iiiii,'ii
lpromplttly. 1 ant0, arleeordiDlf/l, adlu xi(ng4If
l1 l wich irould i'i'~cf the
to fiskiA thul thiIHprerstIffily~ 11,111 he'lraiiiaiti luit neti
touofrei-twolcc tlc*'
joe'fople. thr'ougfh thel prowess.i.' oficoolil.-t111111afi mtiiill list#cen,
soocdoig
nsViP
-No l'll0I
fl'dh lit
oDil
sysi~item,.

I. PRSDETAtL I NAit1'T'
I)I11' Coitsf II 1luilec
1aly jirest'ribits flit' ori (it'i
(Pror~tltlit for assuring eti .
fnil or t(lie Itit'itill4'iit,
t'it (Pofht it,
Ititly Ill fils 0W1e t ffit' lt'11isldeuicy Il flit ('1
Thi'lt provIslins haiiv iet fheir f reugit It,,fs uueeet-A4uiy. Our systtiii. untlikes
i it fny of trs, ho itnev exps'rlenit'ed the vatast rophie of (hdifuil sucession or Ilie
i'linom oft uiueerflit coninti d.
Ou
hit stiilllty Is. jtoiitellss, mtore Hloiorlllia thant sure. While %vt%tire purepftt10t:(1 tor-w lu' li
blllfy or it President's de'athi we art' fill htd'eitls
fil hAt'll
t to rollaitfy of it 'egd'u
Ilniapa'olty, fy injury, Illnlem., senili1ty,
lit, oilto
ieu' iitl llltbt. A1 ititiolli blW?'ifl the~ D'ro-i~iAbIlich-e
are
tl''plit'Ih'tpt'd
to
hear /tit, oup' ouwn seecti -andiu
the .secer1ty of lice free w'orld- -canni~ot juestlify tho
lipolitlcy penllei of ccte'untint; Its Renrccity to tihe Itum~obitlred icd opt ficomprco'ccdhinpc iced of a0
tcatder,Nc (hc1f eccable Ito collitilaid.
flit ilph'ptelt'r 21). 104 fit'%
W-untue licssed Seltaft' Joint liteoultitfll 1,49, propxo.
Ilig ii ut Iutlialnieittlient ti deal with this puerpulexintg olstlout o; 1'realIlettlifiill stiillty-acs wet'll i ti lt' qullii'50ll, Wic(h 1 shiull1 dl18stuss lo ',wof fling
t'iit'cttelt's lit ft' otfle of Vicee President. T'lt,%sanie uwecsouro has b'eli Iintrodhuced
t flits ('m
ongrems am; Senat o oluit. Re~soluioii n I d ouse Joit lti'5t~hill 21.

''110 l~'prvIMi5ll

out flim4

un1custri's have

bueein carefully conllered anio are the

many
l,1 of our lhint coititiitiouIi
and)0 legal iitidi. )ktblepip as I
dto. that S~enate :1i~t Rewholton I aced 1hoise Jocel Resolutiont I wldc t'C8poflis.
bcl t cn(et lice pc'e.spipc tied I lucre oititced, I urge lice Coce pceas to appc'oro
lproduclt of

theec forth with foor eutnnlsson to rtIlfteato& by the S~tates.
11. 1'A(ANMY IN

'THE

OFI'CR OF TJiE V'iF I'untNT

Inlutoltlbo 1wersoii c'xjk1eunio siunlpresseol upon ine the fitdlapiufuublo logic
attol ltnpet'at lye uieo'essHlt3 of assuiring flint tilt, SeL'ooo Office oft our system shall
like tii' Fit's Officts lit, ait aill tues oct'l)It'( 113 lil ltue'tiliilit Who Inable
antd who
1
1Is

reuul1\* to ammslilit liowerm Muidl dittles ot this CIef

Il Chief.

14x ecttive and Commnandier

litour11 history, to tOil point, fip office of flis'miendenity tils never dlevolved
helow the first clearly prescrilk'd1 step of Conistittionatl sticessiltut. lit iui01)ii1ta
of uaeed., there has always beeuoi t 1e Presideunts yet V'lce P'residenits tire no less
Mortal thuam Presidenit. Seven uneti linvo (died lit the offce ondo one( hati resignedlit addition to the eight Wh'lo left tite,offe init, to succeed to the P1realdency.
We rovognized long ago flue tueepm-sity of assuring niiitoitifltle stiecesslout lit the
uiiuetep *of i Vimc Premidett W'rlous statutpo htav i'eco iacted ait variousm
tilt%(* prescr'hiing ordi'r. of succesion fromt antotug either flue prenllog officers
or flit' 1Iloust's of Congress or tlie heads of execttIve dlepartntts who, together,
eoonulise the tradItional Cabinet of the 11toesloleut Iut these tinues4, such orders
our sutto'csslou aire lit)
sublsf Ituto's for ail oflep oft sietimmoii,
141liice thet last order of 8iict't'ssloi wao irerlbted by flie CongremlA Iii 104?,
tti office of thp Vice, Preslit'ijcy lins unider'gone flue inuot.t mIgnficant t raliuifornma
t lot antd wuiargt'uent oft titls lin ifs hilstor'y.
Presidentg 'rruiaui, lEsetihonet', aind Kilunnedy have sueo'esslvely exIManded the
role of t ie Viep Presidenit, even ast I expect to dot lin OhN odiilttiltiit loti.
Ouit'e only fill apeudige, the offieo out Vice l'reffitlet Is nit integral part of
the'
fo'iiiti
anitt
du Ifts oevltiauey onl a fuhlIfito basIIs i mprative.

P111ESIDENTIIAh INABILIITY
For this reusolt, I mmst

honqg/ly

itorsr the objvetive of both $#little Iollt

Resolution .1and Itit 1s Joint 1?eolutlt I lit providin

that whenrrer there Is

a 'aeumlithn the oflee of I'e' President, pror/shum shall ,rist (m, Itll ofiee to
be f1lhuuI with is permmn quti//ed to sa cried to the Preslhemr.
111. R|EFORM,\

COLO11,.Rt,
OF T111E |1111,E(ITOiRAI.

HYRTI'E

We believe that thl people should elet their President11 al \'ihi I'restlellt.
One of th earliest ii11ieiitiiiieiits to our constitutioni Wis sutiited aind ratilled
InI rtspoliso to the u1111happy exlperience of an elet-toral college stalenuate whihh
college systein the
Jeolairl.ed this principle. Today there lurks in tihe electoral
overpresent possiblity that eleftors wely sulstituto their own will for ithe
I elhevo that I)ossibilIty sho111d be foreclosedl.
itople.
will (if the I
Our present system of comit lindidawairding electoral voles by 1utes Is
provisions of olr Ciinstit u.
ill essential comnterlirt of our Federal system iad ithle
of Siites. It 8iilq)orts
to which retogii/l le 1111111illilt our Natio t11it n11tl4111
ttio two-party syst lmi which hias served oulr ,N'ioll well. I Illeve tlls systeill
slolld helretall)ned. But It Is limierlltl\e that lit, eletoral Votes of it8elate be vast
for those lI'50sots who reelve tlit' giatest numbhier of VOtes fo Prlsideilt 111d
t'lst,
Vihe lresidlenit-liil(l for l)till(*
the omisslionlit our present
At the sf11110 time, I beIleve we should elliltie
systemii wilhll leaves the cout htllty of t he oihlthes of P'resldent fnd V4le President
protected If the 4ersomis ret-elviitg ft majority of the electoral voles for either

or both of these offices should die after the election lit Novemltier aini before
the Inaugurat ion of the Presidnt.
.Electors tire now legally free to ehoote tlie Presdi itt without regi'td to tile
I belhev'e thait If the '1resdeulel,'ct dies tinder lhiest
Outcome of the lectio.ll
lret1nsta1ces, our laws should provide tlat. tliee-l'residelt.-'het should litenew teri Ieglius. ('onversely, if diealh shoul( come
eOnie President when tilte
to the VIle.President-uteh ot di1ring this Interim, I believe the Preidnele.
should, upot taking offlhe, he rr111111ed to follow the I roctvlures olherwise pre.
serlied for filling the mnexl)hred lerm of tioe Vice Preshidett. Ithoth should die
or become unable to serve -lit this Interlim, I believe tIe C(ongress sholldlieiiiade
respinsilo for providing tie metlod of seleehtiig olhliilas for Iloth IositiollmR, I
am trtt11mitittiig herewith a draft a11n1ient to the Constittllon to resolve these
problems,
Favorable aet.lom by tho Congress ot thle measures here rtcomuaenlded will,
I believe. assure the orderly .mitltiuilty In the Presidey, thyt.is imperative to
Action on these measures now will alliy
the succ14ess alnd stability Of Our system.
futuiro anxiety among our own 1-itllo--ftiun among th leeopl's of the world--1i11
the eveni1t selseless tragedy or 11foresteeable dllsiilhlty should strike agalit at
If we at
either or both of the IrInelpal offlees of our 'ngstitlltIhiilal system.
closer to aellevilg e1erfeelton
11W, without indlle delay, we shall have miove1
of tle great constitutional document on1 whilh the strength and siteess of our
systei1 have rested for nearly two centuries.
1HIi.
Jo07Hi
-1
1OI.Ill28, 10i18.
*h.lfII rl28;t
o'!
rS ,t:
Till: WV it S Tum~~LNIO

JOINTIr

Propoili ni itt1ultent Iqthe Contltltion of the United States
U
IION
SOl
Prosidelit ani Vie Prishi'nt
relat'tlg to the eAection of the

Rfeolix'r byf 1thSenate anut 11o.,C of ReprirsenItatlt's of the Unitetd states of
Amerlca Ig Coipress wsaenmbled (tfeo.thlrds of ecth House enmeurrtitg theren,
That the followilng artlele is prpOSloso a an a111endment to th1e Constltlltlo11
'if

the United States, whiehl shall be valid to all intents and puitrposes as part of the
Collslttlo1
states:

whoe1 ratlfiled by the heglshltures of thre-fourt his of tle several

u Presilent of the Uilted
"SEC'roTON 1.The executive power shall be vested Ili
Io slall hohl his offiee during a tern of four years, and
together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected as provifled
In this ConstItiltlon. No person conlittitonally ineligible for the otitee of
President shall he eligible for that of Vice Prosldent of the Uiltel States.
"11ach State shall be entitled to cast for President and Vice President a number
of electoral votes equal to the whole nuniber of Senators and Ilepresenltatlves to
which such State may entitled In the Congress, Sucheletoral votes shall be

States of America.

east, ln the manner l)rovided by section 2 of this article, upon the basis of an

III

mtuill fiat
o

tir

esliti
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mlik Vioi'l4 fit i'll

I
SlillI lilii
'le'0
'
SI i11111 il.%'i 4-141111

tlutitelghaltimitre,
lortmt ofth
1441111 Wh114-h S111111 lit- theP
di'e'tiitu fi' f time or sti 'i~'
t'otagress t.41i1111
Sl'ith
ltivley
lii'(otgrt'ss,
1'attll of il'twi.' dcic
11(wii
throuighlout he I'itl Stialft',
ie It''iiyslit' iixI nti ftie hi'st Mouty In Noveaillie
,4iililt'i't lieu shl 1W110d on'il
"Scei. ". In such vt'lfIonl wit bin filly 8t 1i1i'.. c'li0 v'oti'a Ily edit' liii1o sloti II.1'a81
Is v'ot' i."t'l f'c'sliin will Is vote for VIe i'rt'slihitit. Ti'w 1a11u11e f filly%pmt'sui
oly with tile
'le itI1fiit liuty lialiot f'ir f~rei'5ltiw i iat' vie.' l't'-slilf-'nt
fii'lit
il I
It'fed it) cost
'ousmtf icr stioh liosiu. ''1w t'lft rn I oles wlil' einch 8$tt'S I

eltrevi'cve tilt' grenttest 11autuahir or vole's for I';eslidint and Vie
vilt'ionl Itlint at
PIes'llft, rl'tsji''tIViy, exci'tf Ilint If 0Il lM'ti for whoma iy Hfn i' costs Ifs
Ol of t hat St t', Its let'torti I votes for
eli'dtorat I voftts for Pr'tsldit'n Is tint hilwitim
A'iVi' l'4111111ui
liuth
lt
for tfill- p.'rsoan not lilt 11ial1i0l11ltnuir 11111
t ilai
$ ii whto
Its fliti' ( '0ngiu'Ss slifill
lout.
III't'
oschfti'l
. 111
''Witllii foi'ty'li'e ulyg nifft't' hi'(
oft10
' sh1o
11 l frparv'.
fo
t'ttSl tathlai i of Iht'h (1 '' iatioret iluits ori'o t
d11rect, I hl 4114I1
Slgti, cea-ll fy, Jill( t ritui1t slil le to te smilt of the( 4levm*'u'nlneuit fof tow. n ilt'
Stes, dlritfed tlo the PI'rtlillf tflit' ntteljj. It list f till Ilslls for' Wh1011
st of all uw'rsouis fori wiom v'otes
Vot ibs wis't' cast forl I 'i'eslilt 0 nil it stint i'I
wtti't' cast for Vle%Prlietitl 1'rnt i'tc sti list 4 1111'i't' situ I icw et ill- filte
piirsotas. 11t1id flh
;tu1it11i1m' f v'otes cast flat' till rime
f1 lt 'oral voites sucht Staff%aire eost.

1i't.

f

flat' lift'tsoti fort whomi

'Ifte. 3. Oit tile 11th (Ily tat Jnnuatiy folloawing the selection unless tlti Congzre"s
by law llppoliif t a lIfft''t't (lay itt mirctr f'lumt the -lil iy oetitt111i11y atid Hti
latet' thoui the 10th day of .Jiiualry, lte l'rt,4dtt f fl'- 4etiiat shoall, Int tile

I I's, openi till Olw certIlleates and
of the(, Sentit ut houlse (of lh'jartisi'uttt
Thet pers-on haintg the( gretfes nmbiier
h ltetetoral vottes shall then lie counted.
of votes ftor President Mshall be flu'i Presidenmt, and tilt* petrsou mavig thie greatest
twenle

All'resident, If sucht nuitler be
number of votes for Vie Preshlieut shall he( th it(i'
l amajiority of
t utmjority of the( whole number of electoritl votes. Itno person hat
the whole nmbler of eleetoratl votes fotr President or ii'Paresident, tOwnt front
the peotis ntot t'xci't'litg three, having tte, highest number of electoral votes
for suchi offce, the Sentate Rod( the Hiouse of Ileprissentfatlves Hittitng In joint

sess4lon shall chtoose sueh, officer Immtedlotely by ballot. The( v'ote of each Memher of each House 811011 he puialely aniounceil atnd recorded. A fluaru for this
purpose slili consst of three-fonrths of the whole number of thec Senators id
Riepr'esentatives, andli the person) ree'(l1'itg titi' greatest atttiihtir of v'otes shall
be ,chosen.
Smi~. 4. If. ait thet time fixed for the( eoutttg of thes cht'fot'al 'oti's ats p~ro.
viled l i sefitan 31,the presldetitiil Ciliiitte Who WO'uUlil have bV0eu eltIttled to
receive a ntojorlty of the electoral vote's for Presideltit lis dled, 'thet- vic'e presldoiltial catjiltlati' w~hto In entitled to reeve the maitjority of thte t'let'toral v'ote's
tot 'Vie President-sholh hcvomp PresIdlent-elect.
5. Tito Cmngress itay%by low -provide for the( ease of the death f atny
of the persons from whom thle Reniate atud House of Iteir~bentuintivem unity choome
a Pr'esideunt or at Vice PresIdent w'leneive' the right of 0htolt144 shall have devolved
11po)n tHt, an11d for tlt ease Of death of both the Iarlsidt'ifieil mtid vice prei'sdeit'
tii catudiduifes Who, excepit for their death, would halve bieena entitled to ree've
n injorlt, of tite 'lectora i vote for Pr'esidenit stud for Vke President.
118w. (0. Theo first, second, third, nod fourilth piturngrit pls of section 1, airtileo 11,
of the Constitution, thle twvelfth article of itittetidaitetit to tile Constitution, andti
section 4 of thle twentiethi article of aincuidwenit to ti Con-stitultion, tire ht'rehy
repealled.
1$s0m. 7. This artile shall be Inoperative titless It shall have been ratified ats
an ttuuendtnt to tile Constitution by thle legislatures of three-fourths tat thle
States within seven years from thle date of Its Fitt hilaI slon to flt' $tates by the

Congress."
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(Proposed bills ILJ. Res. 1, Hf.J. Res. 3, TL.J. Res. 29, H.J. Res. 33,

.J'. Res. 41, lI.J. Res. 53, TIJ'. Res. 7, H.J. Res. 118, l.J. Res. 119,
ILL Res. 129, I1J. Res, 139, I.. Rez, 140, H1.J, Res. 143, HJ. Res
154, H.J'. Res. 158, Ht.J. Res. 183, U.J. lRes. 219, -. J. Res. 220, H.J.
lies. 224, HT.J. Res. 235, H.J. les. 236,
IL. lies. 248, iJ. Res. 250,'IJr.,. Res.
265, H-.J. Res. 274, 1.J. lRes. 280, H.J.
Res. 302, HJ. les. 310, H..). Res. 312,
H.R. 3792 are as follows:)
(H..

H.J. Res. 239, HA.J. Res. 240,
254, IT.J. Res. 264, r.
lies.
Res. 293, H.J. Res. 294 t.J.
H.J. Res. 329, H.R. 83, tind

Res, 1, 80th Cong,, lt sess.l

JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States

relating to succesion to the Presidency and Vice Presidency and to eases where the
President is unahio to discharge the powers and dutles of his office

Resolri bi the Senato and House of R epicentotIves of the United status
of Anortea lit Qotiross assembled (two-thirds of e(ach House colwurrhng thor'hei,
That the following arthle is proposed as an alel(lllpeilt to tie Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and puorlwses as piar-t of the

Colstitution when ratified by the, leglslatqrea of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTIOLE

"SCTION 1. It case of the removal of the President from office or of his deatil
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President,
"SFc. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President wiho shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SEo. 3. If the President declares in writing that he Is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, suell powers mid ditties shall be distharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
"*SEc. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress
his written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume tile powers
and ditties of the office as Acting President.
"SEc. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with tile written concurrence of a majority of tile
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration tiat
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. There.
upon Congress shall Imulediately decide the issue. It the Congress determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to dischargo tile
powers and duties of the office, tile Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and
duties of his office,"
[it,.i. Res. a, 80th Cong,, litt sessl
JOINT 1I1MROLUTION Topropose an amendment to the Conptitution of the United States
rating to tile succession to the Presidency and Vice Presidency and to cases where
the President in unable to discharge the powers and duties of hi office
Resolved by the Senato and Motse of Representatives of the Utilted States of
America In Cofgross asnbled (two-thirds of each House concurring thercn),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of Its submission by the Congress:
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"18wQrjo 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"18io. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall promptly nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress,
"SEo.3. If the President declares in writing that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vce President as Acting President.
"SEo. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the discharge
of the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
"Sr~c. 5, Whenever the President makes a public announcement in writing that
his inability has terminated, he shall resume the discharge of the powers and
duties of is office on the second (lay of making such announcement, or at such
earlier time after suwh announcement as he or the Vice President may determine,
except that if the Vice President with the written concurrence of the majority
of the heads of the executive departments in office at the time of such announcement or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his written declaration that the President's inability has not terminated,
the Vice President shall continue to discharge the powers and duties of the office
as Acting President, If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the Vice
President's written declaration, determines by two-tiirds of both Houses that
the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice
President shall continue to discharge the sane as Acting President; otherwise
the President shall re'sumv the discharge of the powers and duties of his office."

([.J.

Res, 29, 89th Cong,, 1st sess.I

JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice Presideny and to cases where the
president Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office
Resolved by tho Senate and House of Reprcsentativcs of the United States of
America in Qongreos aspect bled (two-thirds of ealh Hoso conctirring therein),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"AnTICLc

-

"SEorToN 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"SEc. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress,
"Sr. 3.If the President declares in writing that he Is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting President,
"SEa. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his

written declaration that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and
dutties of his, office, the Vice President shall Immediately assume the powers and

duties of the,dffice as Acting President.
"Sc. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaratIon that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law

12

PR ESIDENTIIAL, INABILITY

provide, transmits within two days to tho Congress his written detlaratlon that
Whe Presidenilt Is utllt)l to discharge tile powers an dillies of ils otilee. There.
upon Collgretis shll ImIIllatetly deelde tlip Is.ell{, If tho Collgress detlermines by
two-thlrds vote of both Houses that the Presidelt Is unable to discharge the
power aid duties of the ofileo, the Vive President shall continue to disehargo
tile 111 as Acting President; otherwise the Presidentt shall esume the Iowers
4nd duties of is ollce."
IIIJ.Ites, 1:, 8901h ('olg, Ist, $s, . I

JOINT ItI-18OIATION l1roosllgt all

iiiitlieilt,,wlt to hlt, (oiitlt
ltll1 of
reloillig ti
to l'rstih' till Ihiltillty

thm 11ltild 1ltes

Resolved by the Scllate, find lii,
eof Reprsetftltit I (s of thw I1ted States of
America (a Congres assembled (I to-thirds of Ciech I1oetst emomrring thert-ill).
That. tle following article Is lrolpsedl a4 all lntnnlllenllt to the CollstitItion of
the United Statls. alld Shall bp valld to all intents amnd purloses as part. of tlt
Constitution wtenl ratified by lith Iegisltilres of thret,-fourths or ltlh steerail
slatcs:
",tr.IIE "HtrrzosJ 1. In case of tw remaovll of tho president from otlhie, or his deat or
resignation, the said olce swhlll devolve onl the V'ie lreihillt. in casl of the iability of the President to discharge tih Iswters ind dolls of the silld olio th
sild i owtrs and duties shall devolveo til lhe Vh'e I'reshhili,
itil the Inability be
removed, 'The Congress may Iew lw provide for the case tofremoval, death,
resignation or Inability, Ioth of the Prtsidt and Vice 'resident, dtlaring what
officer shall thitit b Presidelt, or Ilii ciSt, of Inability, act 1 P
1 president, aInd such
officer shall be or act as Presideit accorllingly, until a Presiden shall ie, electetl
'w, In case of Inability, 11til tle iniblilty shall lbe earlier removed. 'The count.
mencement, Un termination of any inability shall ho determined by sich metllhod
as Colgres sliall by law prove.
"Hsv:. 2. This article shall be Inoix,rativo unless It slall have ben ratilthed as
ali lllndltmnt to the Constitution by the legislatures of thre-tourtls of tile
several States within seven years front the dato of its subnissioi to tie Sutts
by the Congress."
IJl.J. ites. 41, 80th Col., let sess.1
TOIN'

ItHROTleTON Proposlig niltnnllnilinnt to the

ollstItlilloll of t

United StatIh

relating to sut'ce ssiotto the Preosidnoy anid V1ce-l'reIdencv and to Camels where the
P'reiel ittIUnable to discharge the lowvre owl ditlh, of his otlte

Resohccd bi the SetlatO mi3d 11um.8 of RepresentatteRs of the United Httvs of
A wrlca it Conyress assembled (two-thirds of (c'tl(h Ioum
1
cntrring
t8
therein),
That the following article is prop)oseId as a ant11d01th ".to the C(rolttttution of
the Unilted states , which shall be valid to all lintelts ald liIS;os 11a part of tile
Constitution whelt ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
$tates:
XKOIoxN 1 In caO of ti removal of the President from office, or of Is death
or resignation, tile Vice President shall become Pretsidnt for the itmexpired porHotI of the thenr current. term. Within at period of thirty days thereafter, tile
now President shall
oninato a Vice President who shall take oMco ipoll collfirnuaton by both Hfouses of Congress by a niajority of those present and voting.
"8c, 2, li case of tile removal of tile Vic-e Presidnt from offle, or of his death
or resignation, the President, within a period of thirty days thereafter, shall
nominate a Vice President who shall take ofnce upon continuation by both H1ouses
of Congress hy a majority vote of those present and voting,
"W, 8. If the President shall declare Iln writing thathe IAUnhable to discharge
the powers and duties of his omee, such powers and dutles shal be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President,.
"to. 4. If tile lPrmident does not so declare, the Vice President, It satisfied
that such Inability exists, shall, upon the written approval of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments it offleo, fiesmU3o the discharge of the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President. "8io. 5. Whenever the President wnakes public atinouncemnent i writing that
his Inability has terminated, he shall resume the discharge of the powers and
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or t
tt) ste tol daly aftpr 1tiiiidiig "llitatitietet
(11ti411 Of 110is11c O)i('
such eurler I late after suell aitottet itas h0 Mill the, Vice President miay
determine. lut, If thet 1Vico PremPidenti, With the writteti sipJrovlI of a niajori
of muchlll)tt~'lilt
efit ft(%
tittit'
1
of thliit'tdo of exectitlle dClariltelltm fitii'
tratimtiit to thip Congress im wrItten olvehtrittou that III him opii thle, Presi.
(etOO's itllt3' has not teriutlinted, t he, Congress shallh thteroupi vommnider fteissue,. If thle COngres4 i.4 110t, theti III session, It shal11 11ssenthle III $jw'Mill sessflt
oil the c'all of Mhe Vice President. It tihe Coiigres.4 determines, 113' e()ineurreilt
resolut ou, adojpted4 with the ljtjrovit (if two-tiirdis (of the Membeinrs present inI
eneb Hlouse', thint t ho liability of the Presi1det bas tnot termitntod, t ipretilwit
taltw~lit latttlig atty furt her mmiioitClt by3 the Ptvs~ditt, thle A'ie.' PremId('it
sghall iseh toge siach powers and dutloes its Ac.ting President 11110II the oemii'llice
of flitp following events4 (1) tile Aetling Premidetit proi-lthtns thant
tit theO eaivi.
the, Iresident.'m linahiflty Itas ended.1 (2) f lie ('otgressm (ltprttln(' by conicurrett
resoitt bi, nIdopitl %%-ith the approval tit aititajority of the Mlet't4m lremeilt In
each'I Ilottse. that. (toe P'resident.'s inailitly himt ee, (or (3) thep 'resitolt'
term etds4,
'I$tl. 0I. (a) (1) if, by reasoti of dealnt I it'sigi oti, retiovi from office, In-~
itloility, 01r futhilre to ilifly. there Is tteitlitr at President nor Vi(e l't't'si'it to
iisciiiiige t lie powes$aild 111114t
lOf (fthi'oile0COfr Prsldeiit, tht'nI theP OWNe' of the0
PUMAte MtOWS Wvho i1411ighest8 oii the following list. mtid who isinot under'l disaitlityh
Pros)'ito ischarge tilhOt'
po111(wil dtl(' of the otfice, of Pi'esidell 5111111 liut Its
den'it.: Secretary of State, Secretary (of 'Preamstry. Secretary of I~etense, Attorney
(letlerat, I'ost tanster (loeral, Swre'i' lr3 oIf Iltierior, Secretary oif Agrietult Ore,
Hicretary of Commerc(1'te, Seretary (If Labor, Sec'retary of H health, I4',ducat bit, and
,

Welfare, andt~ stitit other' liieds (If e~xeitthi'e de-pirimilis as iiity bpe ('1tiblislui
ht'reater amid InI order of their 'staOil ishmimit.
1(49111 t'il01OIaiI
''(2) ''hte stie rtle shall itlpjly fitl the, vase of ti10 4ett010 esin.
from office, or Inability of iti luitidiiitlitietlug Its Pi'tsidi'tt thithr this seciloti
to(3) tPu qtlltfy under01 thim section, anit 1tiliiditll 1111.t, havlle bleeu aIJollitet].
resigitatflot remiovaul from oIffice, or inaiall3 (If the Prt'sItleit ill Vice P'resideint,
mtidt
must not lhtundert't
bylot'ileit1
the H~olm of Itellremen ittlvem akt. the

thne thle piowers andt duties of the fleo of Pres4(idot dlevolve, 1t XIII 11i1t,
1'(b) III case (of thll death, l'esigitloi, t, 1' rnoval of lioth tile P'resident 1111
Vice Presideint, his successor shahil be President until thip expirattiol oIf tho then
cuirrenlt prooilentill termii. Ill case of the, limiaty (of the P~residenit wil1l Vice
P.remidelt (41 (list'ltrgo the ptowers and duties of the ofile (if Presidehlt, him mtle.
ceso$S),
it" dtesigttitt'ti fi t him sectioni, alll hotsub)jet to the pr1oviilsi of mee*
flsm 3, 4,1111(1IS of this art ice as If )1(o were a V'ice' Presdent act itug fit nc of
disablifty of thle President,
11(e) rPho~ taking of tilt
oath of omeev by nit ilidvidual HiwX'itht'd fit tile lit; (If
hpitragratph (1) of stihsectiolt (at) shall be hold( to const;itutp hifts m'?$gtitioti from
tiit ofilce bly virtue of tile holdings of which hit quaitiet to actt;aa; President.
1(d) D~uring the poorind (lint any Individual acts as President under tis mee.
tioli, his t'onipt'nsatloii shatll lie ait the rate then provided 113 law III tile cameC of
the lPref dent.
148ro. 7. TIl article shall be( Inoperative ullless4 It WhaI hiave heeni ratitied as
oit atiiendmnit to the Constitutioll by the legislatures (If three-fourtils of the
Aevernl Stilteo within sevenI years froml~ thle date of its imundssiou."
111J. fleo. M380th Cong., let sees.)
JOINT ltiHOLUTION I'!maolitltg ntil aittpidlnt t9 thn Conititui on to pro'twjte for thle
et w hoedr there In,a va ctic)y III tito ot e of Vice
of a now 00ie1'ret'ii
fPallthW'Jt
Pio'sdent

Rcetolvocl by the Sontato awl )Hotlm of JRcpreecntatlvoe of tho Unit1d Slates of
.4gircca hii Congre aaectnbled (Iwo-thirde of each Holme coilen 141rIng thel'0ln)
Thatt thle follow intg article is proposed no at) anentllnet to tile COnsktitlitl oi
the Uited States, and shall he valid to till Intents atid purposes ais patrt. of tim
Constitutiooly3 if ratified by3 tile legislatures of throefourtils of the several
StAtes within seven years troll) the (Ite of its stub lo5i1 by the Congress:

44-201-.05--2
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-

"lKrtrox1. Whenever the offlco of Vlep President becomes vaIant lit any time.
more than thirty lays before the exl)iraton of tile ternt for wh, h the Vice
Preshlent was elected, because of tile death, removal front orate, or resigna-

tion of the Vice President or the death Rt a Vice

nthleit before the the

fixed for the beginning of his term, or because of tile tlssiulltiol by the Vice
President or a Vice-PresIdent.elect of the powers and duties of President by
renson of the death, removal from office, or resignation of tile President or the
death of a P'reslent.oleet before the tlme fixed for the beginning of Ills term,
the person diseharging the liow'i's and duties of President slall nominate and,
subjec-t to conflrmatloll by the Stnte and the Ilouse of Rlepresentatives acting
it Joint session, shtll appoint a person to act its Vice President.

"9:c,, 2. Th person dischargingt the Io)Wer, and dutles of the President shall
convene the Senate and Inluse of Tlepreseuttitive In Joint session for tihe pur.
pose of carrying out the provis19ns of this article, A quorum of each Iouse of
the Congress being present at sucih Joint session, the person nominated to net as
I',eo Preshlent under the first secllol of this artlie shall be conlirmied by
nmajorlty vote of the Members of the Senate and of the Iouse of lepresentatives
lrement mid voting, health
sll Mtnier having one vote,
"Svc. 3,No person constitutlonally ineligible to the oflh'e of lPresident shall be
aollited under this article. A persou appointed under this artlele to act as
Vico l'resident shall act accordingly until it'o end of tie term for whleh the
Vieo Presldent or Vice.President-elect whom he sueeplls was elected.
While
so acting Ito shall have In all respects the saine status, powers, ntind
duties as nu
elected Vice President."
1r11. Res. (17,Stth Color.. 114t slm41.1

JOINT lR5OTU1'TON Proposlnti no ninendment to the Couitlntloni of the Uited RtSim
reInting to msccesilon to the Prsidency ond Vieo.Prpsidhev and to cases whlro the
President It uiable to discharge the powers mid duties of hIs office
Resolhed by the Senate and Honseo of Representativex of the Unteed Statos
of America In. Oonpress assembled (two.thirds of each Houlso conefirrhfn
thercltL). That the following article Is proposed as an amendnlent to the Contitution of the United States, which slhall be vnlid to all Intents and purposes an part
of the Constttition when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of tile several States within seven years from the (late of its submission by the Congress:

"AnTMTr

-

"S.CftON 1, In Pase of the removal of tile President from office or of his death
or resignation, tile Vice President shall become President.
"So. 2. Whenever there Is a vacancy In the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress,
"SE. 3. Ifthe Presilent declares in writing that he Is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
"SPe. 4. If the President does not so delare, and the Vice President wIth the
written concurrence of a mnjorily of tile heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress nmy by law provide, transmits to tie Congress his
written declnration that the President Is unable to discharge tile powers and
duties of hIls office, the Vice Pre.ident shall innediately assume the powers and
duties of tile omce ns Acting President.
"Si. 5l, Whenever the President trainits to the Oongress his written declara-

tion that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers nod duties of hts of(,(
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a mnjorlty of the beads
of the executive departments or mch other body na Congress nny by law provide,
transmit within tio dnys to the Congress Ills
written declnratlon thNt the Pres dent Is umble to discharge the powers nnd duties of hls office. Thereupon, Congres sll1 inmedlntely deelde tle Issue. If the Congress determilnes by twothirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to disehnrge the powers
nnd duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to disclarge the shnle
ns Acting President; otherwise the President shall resuine the powers and duties
of hils oflee,"
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(Il.J. Sites. 118, 80t Conig., lt memr.J
states
.tOINT itN1HOLUTION Proot.sifll
an l1leldn nollt to th Iroiitltitlk of tilt, UI1lttS
4i

1'resuhthuil power itial sueessflol

1, of ReprtcnOtativo# of tho U0ited States of
blithe Wiiat andt 11ots
.11iitrivEl It (Ytkmuret'a u(1miJhkd (iwo.tlirds o/ epeh lloime fonwurring thorct&),
1111 ittlullnellt to tile Constitution of
Tliat tile following artile Is prosl)ed11
adlllrposes as part of tile
the llited States, which shall be vlldl to till Intents 111!
Colltitltion when ratilled by thle legislatures of threo-fourths of the several
&YtVol.!4

"AIRTI.

-

"H'TION 1. The Vice 'resident shtil assist the President
silll issign to the Vice Il'reshlnt Stll diuti
ls hs
he sees lit.

alti tiI' Preshilent

"S8I.2. In ellme of the, removal of the President from office, or of i. death
ow reignillttoll, tie Vice Presileit slill become Preslent, llnd( shall serve am
sllh inttil ihe end
tilhl
teri tfor whilich the Preshtlent was elected. Il came of
ll in1bi1ity or disablity of the Presidelit to discharge the powers and dtltes
of hls office, t1o1e flowers and didllem shall be discharged by tile Vlce President
ulltll the inlllillty or disabilly of the I'resIdent has eCt.se(I.
"(rc. 3. The members of the Julihitry Committees of the Senate and the
l(puse of Iti'remeltllt Iv e 4 shll constitute a pernlllnent Commission on IPreven .
tioi of IlljI$se (it JHimeetitive Power.

llder sulth rlles ps the Congress shall -pro.

srlbe by contirrent resoIlutioll, the Comnmisslon shill determine by a two.thirds
vote thereof, all questions concerning tile inability or disability of the President
to discharge tile ownerss and duties of Ilis office, aml( determine when such Ill.
ability or distbility ceases. Ulpon such determination, tile President and Vice
President shall resumnie their former powers antl

ditties.

"Sm(. .1. When a Vice President becomes President by tile removal, death,
or resignation of tile President, the new President shall recommend to Congress
a candidate for Vice President. The Congress, by majority vote thereof, shall
elect stroll candidate. If tile Congress does not elect such canllte within it
reasmable tlme, the new President shall submit tie name of another candidate
and repeat tile Itldivilulal reconlnd('n(Iations until the Congress shall elect, one
of such (indlldltes for tile office of Vice President to serve until tile end of tile
President's term.
"1$c.Ml. The Vice President shrill not preside over tile Senate. The Senate
shall choose a President of tile 8emate from Members of tile Senate, a P'resldent
pro tempore who shalliact Intile absence of the President of tile Senate or during
Is partlclilatloll as a Member of the Senate In tile deliberations of tile Senate,
and other ofIcers of tile Selate.
"Sr.o. (I. Tile Congress shalll have power to carry this article Into effect by
appropriate legislation.
"r.:c. 7. Tills article shall be inoperative unless It shall have been ratified as
tiln amidnient to the Cotistttltion by tile legislatures of threeOfourths of tile
States within sevet years from the date of Its submission to the States by the
C(Imgress."
([.J.Res, 110, 89th Colg., lot ses".l
JOINT II-,l8OLTUTION Proposlg ailamidei nt to tile Constitution of the United Stales
relathig to succession to the Presidency anti Vice-.Presidecy and to eases where t1e

President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of hIls office

leesolvel by tho Sonate anti Ho11s of Reprcscnltatives of the U1ted Statcs of
Amcrica, iftConCTS8 tseeombld (tio.thirds of each 1M0usm oonciorrlng therein)
That the followilig article Is proposed as till amendment to the Constitution 01
the Unlited States, Whlich shall be valil to all Intelits and purposes ispart of
tile Constitltion when ratified by the legislatures of threo.foulrths of tile several
States within seven years from tile (ate of Its sublnisslou by the Collgress:
"ARTICLE

"Sm tcoN 1. In case of the removal of M6lPresident fromi offlce or of Ilis death
or resignation, tile Vice President shall become President.
"Scu. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy In tho omeo of tle Vice President, the
President slll n1omnn1ate a Vice Pe'esidenit who shall take office upon collflrllA.
tloll by a majority vote of both HoTuses of Congress.
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"Sc. 8. It the President declares in writing that he Is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office,, such powers and dtites shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
"S4e. 4, It the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive delartments or
sueh other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that tie President Is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall Immediately assume the powpro and
duties of the office us Acting President.
"SKo. 5, Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declare.
tion that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers mid dutks of his office
on the second day following the transmittal of such declaration to tile Congress
unless, prior to fits resumption of such powers and duties, the Vice President
transmits to the Congress his written declaration that the President Is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, in whlch case the Congress
shall immediately decide tie Issue. If the Congress determines by two-thirds
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge tile same as
Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and duties of
lils office on the tenth day following the transmittal to the Congress of his
declaration that no inability exists. Any declaration by the Vice President
that the President Is unable to resume the powers and duties of his office
inny be transmitted to the Congress only with the written concurrence of a
majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide,"
([H.J. Rtos. 120, 80th Cong., 1st seas.]

JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amenduIent to the Constitution of the Unlid States
to e-stablish a Conhission to determine the Inability of a Preident to discharge tho
powers and duties of the offlee of President
Resolved by the Senate and House of Reprsontatives of the United States of
Anmcritca in Conpress assembled (tivo.thirds of eao& House ooiwurring thron),
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as a part of
the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States:
"ARTIOLI

-

"SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired portion of the then current term,
"SEc. 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he Is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the individual next in line of succession to the Presidency as Acting President:
after any such declaration the President shall forthwith resume the powers and
duties of is office by declaring lit writing that his disability has terminated.
"SEo, 3. There Is hereby established n Commission to be known as the President
Inability Commission, hereinafter referred to as the 'Commission', Subject to
conditions contained herein, the Commission shall have ttie responsibility and
authority in the manner prescribed herein to relieve the President or Acting
President of the United States of his powers and duties as such, upon a deternilnation that he Is not able to discharge properly the powers and duties of the
office of President, and after any such action, to restore the President or Acting
President to the assumption of such powers and duties upon a determination
within the same term of office that he is able to discharge properly the powers
and duties of the office of President.
"Sio, 4. The Commission shall be composed of eight members as follows:
"(1) The Chief Justice of the United States shall serve as Chairman of the
Commission. The Chairman shall have no vote In the proceedings of the Coinmission except in the case of a tie.
"(2) The Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

(31)The Secretary of State.

(4) The Secretary of the Treasury.
"() The Speaker of the House of RepresentatIves.
() The leader in the Iouse of Representatives of the political party having
the second greatest number of Members of the House of Representatives,
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"(7) The leader In the

8anato of the political

larty having the greatest, number

of Members of the Senate.
"(8) The leader in the Senate of tile political party having the second greatest
number of Members of the Senate.
"8:o. i. Five mombors of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. The
concurrence i writing of at least five nenbers shall be required for any
determination made by the (onimisslon.
'"te. 0. Members of the Conmission shall serve as sucl without couil)eIilsolon:
but they shall lw reinbursed for travel, subsistene, aund other necessary exl)eses
incurred by then it the performance of the ditties vested lit the (Commilssion.
"8Exc. 7. The Chalrian shall convene the Commission without delay u!)on
receipt by him of a communication in writing from any two numbers of the
('onmisslon stating that they have sufficient cause to believe that the President
Is unable to discharge prolierly the lmwers and duties of the office of 'resident,
The Commission shall seek (emnletent medical advice as to the condition of the
President and his ability to discharge lroperly the powers and duties of Iis
office. If the Conmisslon shall determine that the President Is unable to dis.
,harge irolerly the powers and duties of the offlh, of Presldent, It shall so
notify by written communication the House of Itepresentatives and tits Senate
(if Congress Is then in session), the President and tile individual next in line of
succession to tile 'residency and such powers and duties of the office of President
slall thereupon devolve upon the Individual next in line of succession to the
Presidency as Acting President.
",8:c. S. Whenever the Chairman receives In writing a communication from any
two members of tho Connission during the unexpired portion of a disabledd
President's term stating that they have sufficient cause to believe that the Presi.
dtint is able to discharge properly the powers and duties of the office of President,
the chairman n shall convene tie Comnlmssion without delhy. The Comnnmission
shall seek comietent n~edlcal advice as to the condition of tie President amid his
ability to discharge jIroperly tile powers and duties of that office. If the Con
mnissmi shall determine that tile disahlity no longer exists and that ti President
Is able to discharge properly the lowers and duiles of tie office of President, It
shall notify the House of Itepresentatives and the Senate (if Congress Is thmi in
session), the President, and the Acting President of its decision by written
comnunlcation, and the President shall forthwith reassumne the Itwers and
duties of the office of President. The provisions of this section shall ieo applicable
in restoring nit Acting President to the assumption of tile powers and duties of tile
office of President.
"S o. 9. This article shall be Inoperative unless It shall have been ratified as
nul nnendnient to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
sweral States within seven years from the date of Its submisshmi."

(H.J. Res. 130, 80th Cong., 1st sess.
JOINT
Pro
nit anmenmiontto
Contittution
of the United
States
retiet IMMeTAttIlO
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where poing
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Ills office
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ReCsoled by the &#late and House of Represenltutlirs of the Ulitcd States
of America In Oongress assNembld (two.thirds of each House concurring therein )
That the following article Is Ipropoted as an amendlment to the Constitution Of
the United States, which shall lie valid to all intents and purposes as part of
the Constitution when rattlel by the legislatures (if three-fourths of tile several
States: "ARTIOI

"-

4,e:rxON

1, In. ease of the removal of the President from office, or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired

pmrtion
the then current term,
"8F.o, of
2. If the President
shall declare In writing that he Is unable to discharge

the powers and duties of his office, such powers and ditties shall be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President.
"S:e. .. If the President does not so (leclare, the Vice President, If satisfled
that s1ch Inability exists, shall, upon the written fapproval of n majority of the
heads of the executive departments in office, assume the discharge of the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
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"Sc. 4. WVhenever the President makes public alnolinceni(int In writing that
ils inabil(y has terminated, lie shall rescue the (lischarge of tie powers and
(lutles of Ills office on the seventh day after making suelh announ.elnent,
lit
if the Vice President, with the written approval of a majority of the heads of
executive departments In office at the tnt of such announcement, transmits to
the Congress his written declaralon that in his opinion the President's Inability
has not terminated, the Congress shall thereupon consider the Issue, If the
Congress Is not then In session, It shall assemble Ilspelal session on the call
of the Vice President. If the Congress determines by concurrent resolution,
ad6lt)ed with' the approval of tWo-thirds of the Memlers presenting each lonse
that the Inability of the President has not terminated, thereupon, notwithstand
Ing any further announcement by the President, the Vice President shall assumen
the discharge of such powers and duties as Acting President until the occurrence
of the earliest of th folloMng events: (1) the Acting President proclaims that
the President's inability has ended, (2) the Congress determines by concurrent
resolution, adopted with the approval of a majority of the Members present I
each House, that the President's Inability has ended, or (8) the President's term
ends.
"S1:o. f5.
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the removal, death.
resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring
what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly
until the disability be removal, or a President shall be elected. If at any time
there Is no Vice President, the powers and duties conferred by this article upon
thte Vico PrOhsIl6nt shall devolvbi'ioh the- officer eligible to act as President next
in line of succession to the office of President, as provided by law.
"SEc. 0. This article shall 4e Inoperative unless It shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States within seven years from the (late of Its snbmission."
(I11.. Bes, 140, 89th Cong., 1st sss.1I
JOINT RESOIUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide for thtselection of a new Vice President whenever there is a vacancy in the office of Vice
President

Reaolfted byi the Sona to and Hou8 of Rcprescatatit'e of the Vii-Itcd States of
America Its
Congreee assembled (two-thlrds of eiwft House ootwurrin9 therviln),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and sall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part of the Con.
stitution only if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven yearb from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE "--

"FA8o'Eo 1,Wherever the office of Vice President becomes vacant at any time,
more' than thirty days 'before'the expiration of the term for whtch" the Vice
President was elected, because of the death, removal from "ofl1de,' dr resignation
of the Vice President or the death of a Vice-President-elect before the time fixed
for the beginning of his term, or because of the assumption by the Vice President
or a Vice-President-elect of the powers and duties of President by reason of the
death, removal from office, or resignation of the President or the death of a President-elect before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, the person discharging the powers and duties of President shall convene the Senate and the
House of Itepresentatives In joint session to select a person to act as Vice President. The person discharging the powers and duties of the President sIall have
the right to veto any selection made by the Senate and the House of Representatives acting In such joint session,
"SEe. 2. The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall preside over such
joint -session. A quorum of each House of the Congress being present at such
Joint session, such person shall he selected, subject to the right of veto' by thi,
person discharging the powers and duties of the President, by majority vote (if
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives present 1nd votIng, each such member having one vote. The selection under this article shall
be made from persons who at the time of such Joint session are heads of executive
departments of the Government, Mombers of the Congress, or the OovernorA of tht
several States, The person so selected shall vacate his office as the lead of an
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executive department, as a Memober of tile Congress, or as the Oovernor of a
State,
"SEe. 3. In any case in which the person discharging the powers and duties of
the President slall veto any selectlon inado under this article, he shall again con.
veoe the Senate and House of representatives Ili joint session to make another
selection In accordance with section 2 of this article, except that no srson whose
selection Is vetoed shall again be eligible for selection so long as the person discharging the powers and duties of President is the saine person who vetoed such
selection.
"18c,4. A person selected under this article to act as Vice President shall act
accordingly until the end of the term for which the Vice President or Vice.
President-elect whon he succeeds was elected. While so acting he shall have in
all respects the saine status, powers, and duties as an elected Vice President.
"Sic. 5. Nothing contained in this article shall prevent the Congress from providing by law, consistently with the provisions of this article, for the designation
of an officer who shall act as President at any time at which vacancies exist in
the offices of both President and Vice President."

[llJ.

lets.

143,

89th Cong.,

Ist selv,.)

JOINT

EHhOItUTION lropoislng e| ntetidinelit to tiw' Constltutloii of the United Stutpts
relatingto sucesslon to theI relewnidy and Vlee-I'rceldency and to cases where
the
sPreoldent Is untible to discharge the power nid dutli's of his ofMiet

Resolved by the Renate and House of Rlepresentatlves of the Uiited Stales of
America In Congress assembled (two-thirds of each 1u10 i
onourring therein),
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as pMrt of
the Constitution when. ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from tie date of its submission by tile Congress:
"ARTICLE

-

",8t(rIo,1
I. in case of the removal of the President front office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"SEu. 2. Whenever there Is a vacancy In the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"S5c, 3, If the President declares in writing that he Is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of is office, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President.
"Six. 4. If the President does not declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress
Ils written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of Ills office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
"So. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no Inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his
office on the second day following the transmittal of such declaration to the
Congress unless, prior to htis resumption of such powers and duties, the Vice
President transmits to tile Congress his written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, In which case the
Congress shall Immediately decide the issue. If the Congress determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to discharge
powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers
and duties, of his office, on the tenth day following the transmittal to tile
Congress of his declaration that no Inabilty exists. Any declaration by the
Vice President that the President is unable to resuine the powers and duties of
his office may be transmitted to the Congress only with the written concurrence
of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body
as Congress may by law provide."
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1114, ites. 154, 89t Conu., lot sess.]
JOINT tIMSOTI,'i'ION Proposilg n anllmiuinent to thie Constittlon of the ulited states
oli Presidentlal power lnd outeeslson
Rcsohcd byl the Senate and House
Reprcs'ntthtrcs of the United states
of Amerlca In Congress asseibled (two.th lrds of eh Houtse concurring thereiln),
Thltt tle following article Is proposed am nil amendllelit to tile Constitutio of
the United states, which shall be valld to al Intents and purposes as part of
the Constitution whien ratified by tile legislatures of three-fourths of the several
states:
"ARTI. -"S(I'mox 1, The Vi(e Presidenit shall assist the President and tie Presldent

shall assign to the Vice President sueli dittles as he sees fit.
"Ne.2. In case of tie removal of the President front office or of his death
or resignation, tile Vice President shall beconie President, and shall serve ns
4ucht until the end of the term for which tlip President was elected. In case of
the Inability or disability of the Preshlent to diseharge the powers and dlties
of his office, those Ilowers and ties
shall be discharged by the Vice President
until theinability or disability of the President has ceased.
"Sc. 3. Tie members of tile Judiciary Committees of the Senaite and tile
House of representatives shall constitute a permanent Commission on Prevention
of Lapse of Executive Power. Under such rules as the Congress shall prescrile
by (.oncurrent, resolution, the Commission shall determine by ittwo-thirds vote
thereof, all questions concerning the Inability or disability of tle President to
(ischarge the powers and duties of his office, and determined when such lnablillity
or disability ceases. Upon sueh deterinalntion, the President. and Vice Presldent shall resuno their former powers and duties.
"SEQ. 4. When a Vice President becomes President hly tie removal, dentil or
resignation of tle President. the now President shall recolitend to Congress
a (,andllate for Vice President. Tie Congress by majority vote thereof shall
elect stch (,an(lidlite. If tile Congress does not elect such (,andidate within a
reasonable time, the new President shall submit the name of another candidate
and repeat the Indlividual recommendations intill the Congress shall elect one
of such candidates for the office of Vice President to serve until the end of tit(
President's term.
"Su,' . 1.'The Vice President shal not preside over tile Senate. The Senate
shall (hooSe a President of the Senate from Members of the Senate, a President
pro teinll)re who shall act in the absence of the President of the Senate or
during his participation as a Member of the Senate in the deliberations of the
Senate, and other officers of the Senate.
"S1:c, 0. The Congress shall have power to carry thi article Into effect by
appropriate legislation.
"Mi:c. 7. This article shall be Inoperative unless It shall have been ratified
as an nlendinlent to the Consttittlon by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States hy the
Congress,"
[MA,3. lies. 158, 89th Cong., lst mess.)
JOINTP ItIE LTION Propoplng an amendment to tie Constittitnl of this United Rtates
relting to s1etcexsmlon to the Presidency and Vice.Presideney and to eases where the
,resident Is unable to discharge the powerit and ditties of his oee

Resolved by the Senate and Houseo of Representatives of the Utited states of
America in Congress assetbted. (two.tht*de of caoh 1eo11s conoutrring thercin),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which shall be vald to all Intents and purposes as part of the Constitution wlhen ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:
%
"ARTICLE "Sc:cqiro 1, In ease of the removal of the President from office, or of his death
or resignation, the Vies President shall beome President for the unexpired portion
of tile then current term. Within a period of thirty days thereafter, the new
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by both Houses of Congress by a majority of those present and voting,
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#Saw. 2. In case of the removal of the Vice President from offie, or of ils death
or resignation, the Presilent, within a period of thirty days thereafter, shall

nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by both Houses
of Congress by a majority vote of those present and voting.
8r~c, 3.If the President shall declare in writing that he Is unable to dishfarge
tile powers and duties of ils office, such powers and ditties shall be dischargby the Vice President as Acting President,
"So,4. If the President does not so declare, the Vice President, If satisfMed that
such inability exists, shall, upon the written approval of a majority of the heads
of the executive departments In office, assume the discharge of the powers and
duties of tile office as Acting President.
"H:o, 1$.Whenever the President makes public anniounctinent in writing that

his Inability has termnlnated, lie shall resume the discharge of the powers and

duties of his office oil the seventh day after juaking stch annutiouceent, or at
such earlier time after such annotncement its lie and the Vice 'resllent may deterline. But If the Vico President, with the written approval of a majority of the
heads of executive departments in office at the tie of such announcement, traitsmits to the Congress Ills written declaration that it his opinion tle President's
inabilit¥' has not termilnate~l, the Congress slhll thereupon consider the issue.
If the Congress Is not then iln
session, It shall assemble lit
special session oil the
call of the Vice President. It the Congress determines by concurrent resolution,
adolted with the approval of two-thirds of the Members present iteach IHouse,
that the Inability of the President has not terminated, tllereupon, notwithstalnding
any furhesr announcelient by tile President, the Vice Presldent shall dlimhrge
sucl powers and ditties as Acting Preslent until the occurrence of the earliest of
tit, following events: (1) the Acting President lprochlls that the P'residenlt'"
Inability has ended, (2) the Congress determinhes by concurrent. resolution,
aido)ted with tell)approval of a nimjority of tile Mellhers lreselt in each House,
that the President's Inal)llty 1an ended, or (3) the President'i teri endt1s.
"SKo. 0. (a) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, Inability, or failure to qualify, tlere Is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the officer of tie
United States who is highest on the following list, an1 who is not under (ilsabillty
to discharge tile lowers and duties of tile office of 'residet, s11all act as Prest-

dent : Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of defense, Attorney
general , Postnmster generall, $e(,retory of litterlor, secretaryy of Agricuilture.
Seen,tary of (ouierce, Sctretary of Labor. Secretary of lefalth, Udctation, and

AVelfare, ant1d sich oilier heads of execlltlve deplartttielts ax iay I)e established

hereafter s111( in order of tihlr extblishllent.
"(2) The sane rule shall alply lit
tile ease of the death, resignlatiol, retioval
frot office, or Inability of nil
Individual aetil g as President under this setioll.
"(3) To qualify under this section, aniIndividulal nlU t .have been appIointed, by
and with the advice and consent of tile Senate. prior to the tit of tile deatil.
resignation, removal from office, or inability of tIle Preirdent and Vice President,
and must not be under inpeachinelt by the House of Representatives ut tie tioe
tile pov ors and duties of tie office of President devolve upon him.
"()) In case of the deatl, resignation, or relnoval of both the President and
Vice President, ifis successor shall be President until the expilratio of tie then
current presidential tern
liease of the inability of the President and Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of tile office of President, hls successor,
its designated in this seetion, shall be subject to tihe provislls ot sections 3, 4, and
5 of tills article as if lie were itVice President acting it Case of disability of tile
President.
"(c) The taking of the oath of office by an individlal slpeliled i the list of
paragrapll (1) of subsection (a) shall be held to constittuit lis resignation froll
the office by virtue of the holding of which lie qualifies to act as President.
"(d) During tile period that any Individual acts as President under this section,
lis conlpensato1 shall be at the rato then provided by law i tile case of tile
President,
"Sto. 7. Tills article shall be inoperative unless It shall lave been ratified as an
aneldnlent to the Constitution by the legislatures of threefourthe of thie several
States within seven years front tile date of its subluilselon."
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new. 183, 80th Cong., lot sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an aluetluent to the Constitution of the United States
relating to succession to the Presiuency and Vicm Presidency and to cases where the
President Is unable to discharge the powers and dut eoof his office
Re~olved by th 2Sonato and Mimeso of R0proaentatives of the United Statve of
onourrlhp therein),
Amerlca itnongres8 assembled (two.thirds of each H ouo ,c
That the following article Is proposed as an amendnent to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years front the (late of its submission by the Congress:
"A.RTIO.E "1SEcirov I,In case of the removal of the President front office or of its death
or resination, the Vice President shall become President.
"SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress
"Sr.o. 3. If the President declares fit
writing that he Is unable to discharge the
)owers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged
y the Vice President as Acting President.
"S w. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice l'resihllit with the
written concurrence of a majority of the h(qds of the executive deplrtments
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the ('ongress
written declaration that the President is unable to discharged the powers
lils
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall Immediately assume the jinwers
and duties of the office as Acting President,
"SEC. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declarntion that no Inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his ofihi,
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of aWmajority ofth0i' heads
of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law Ifrovide,
transmits within two days to the Congreq, his written declaration that th Presldent Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon ('otgress shall Immediately decide the Issue. If the Congress determines by twothirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the sam,
as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and
duties of his office."

(IH.J. Res. 210, 89th Cong., lot s ess.]
JOINT RIUSOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency and to cases where the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office

Resolvcd by the Senate and Hotse of Rcpreentativee of the United States of
America fit Co ngress assembled (two-thirds of each Horse conolrri g therint),
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years from the date of Its submission by the Congress;
"ARTICLE -

"SECTIoN 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"Silo. 2. Whenever there Is a vacancy In the office of the Vice. President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SE. 8. I? the President declares in writing that lie Is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, such powers and ditties shall be disclfrged by the
Vice President as Acting Prteldent.
"SEC. 4. Ifthe President does not so declare, and the Vice Preldent with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress file
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
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duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
"SEo. 5, Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written decla.
ration that no Inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads
of the executive deoprtments or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of is office. Thereupon Con.
gress will immediately decide the issue. If the Congress determines by two-thirds
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office. the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as
Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and duties of
is office."
IlIJ. 1ios. 220, 891h Cong., lot sess.]
JOINT tESOLUTION Proposing an 11nnondeent (0 the Constitution of the Uilted Stites
tin Presidential power and suceesslon
Resolved by the Senate and Hou-se of Representatives of the United States of
.America in Oonigrcss assem bled (two.th frds of each Houme concuprring therein),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be volld to all intents and purposes as part of
the Constitutioi when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States:
"ARTICLE

-

"SECTION 1. The lVice President shall assist the President and the President
shall assign to the Vice President such duties ats he sees fit.
"68ve, 2, In case of the removal of the President from office. or of his death
or resignitlon,'.tho 'Vice President shall become President, and shall serve as
suich until the end of the term for which the Presidont was elected. In case
of the inahiblity or disability of the President to discharge the powers and duties
of his otflce, those powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President
until the Inability or disablilty of the President has ceased.
"gc. 3. The members of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall constitute at permanent Commission on Prevention
of Lapse of Executive Power. Under such rules as the Congress shall prescribe
hy concurrent resolution, the Commission shall determine 1y a two.thirds vote
thereof, all questions concerning the inability or disability of the President to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, nnd determine when such Inability
or disabilityy ceases. Upon such determination, the President and Vice President
shall resume their former powers and duties,
"$f.o. 4. When a Vice President becomes President by the removal, death, or
resignation of the President, the new President shall recommend to Congress
a candii~ite for Vice President. The' Congress by majority vote thereof shall
elect such candidate. If tho, Congress does not elect suchcandidate within a
reasonable time, the new President shall submit the name of another candidate
and repeat the Individual recommendations until the Congress shall elect one
of such candidates for the office of Vice President to serve until the end of the
I .
President's term.
"SEc. 5,The Vice President shall not preside over the Senate. The Senate
shall choose a President of the Senate from Members of the Sennte, a President
pro tempro who shall act in the absence of the President of the Senate or during
lis participation as a Member of the Senate in the deliberations of the Senate,
and other officers of the Senate.
"Se, 0. The Congress shall have power to carry this lrticle Into effect by
appropriate legislation.
"Scr.. 7. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constltutln by the legislatures of three.fourths of the
States within seven years from'the date of Its submission to the States by the
Congress."
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(HJ.Res 224, 89th Cong., lst se",M.
JOINT IESOLUTION ProposinL an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to succession to the-Presidency and Vce Pr denj and to cases where the
President in unable to diasharge the powers and duties oroal oe

Resolved by the Senate an. House of Repreeentatives of the United States of
America, in Congress assembled (two-thirde of each House concurring therein),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which hall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of Its submission by the Congress:
"ARTIOMJ

-

"STv.ir;o 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"So. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy In the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SEc. 3. If the President declares In writing that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President,
"SEo. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with thewritten concurrenceof a majority of the heads of the executive departments or'
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress
his written declaration that tie President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume tile powers and
duties of tile office as Acting President.
"Szo. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration that
the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall immediately decide the issue. If the Congress determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and
duties of his office."
IJ, Rnes. 285, 89th Cong., 1st sess.J
JOINTi RIESOLUTION Proposting an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to succession to the Presidency an4 Vice.Presidency and to cases whore the
President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office

Resolved. by the Sonate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America its Congress aoscmbled (two.thirds of each House conourri i therei,
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of tile several
States within seven years from the date of Its submission by the Congress:
"ATrots -

"SHiOTroN 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice Preident shall become President
"Rico. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy In the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"Rio. 8. If 'the President declares in writing that he is unable to disclarge
the powers and duties of his efoee, s,,oh powers and dutlen shall 'be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President,
"Rio. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress
his written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
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.and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
"Sgo. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no Inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
,unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. 'hereupon Congress shall immediately decide the Issue. If the Congress determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers
and duties of his office."
11. Res, 230, SOtW Cong., let ses,]
JOINT RESOiUTION Proposing an ampndniput
the Conktitution of the United States
relating to succession to the P esidency and. Yice.Preeldency and to cases where the
Glresident tsunable to discharge tl'e powers unI duties of his otlice
Resolved by the Senato an4 Mott-so of Repraesntatirie of the United States
-of America in Oonpress assembled (two.thlrds of each olbso concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitu.
tion of the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes
.as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States within seven years from the date of Its submission by
the Congress:
"ARTMIE -"Sl:lrzot 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
-or resignation, the Vice President shall become President,
"18r.. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirm.
tion by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SEe. 3. If the President declares in writing that he is unable to discharge the
,powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
"Sco. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President, with
the written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive depart.
ments or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the
Congress his written declaration that the President Is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President,
"SE. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declara.
tion that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
-on the third day following the transmittal of such declaration to the Congress
unless, prior to the end of the third day, the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his writ.
'ten declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
-of his office, in which case Congress shall immediately decide the issue. If the
,Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice President
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the Pres.
'Ident shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
[H.. Res. 89, 89th Cong., lit mse.
-JOINT RhOLUTION Prop6,sing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
plating to succeston to the Presidency and Yic-Presidency and to easee where the
President Is unable to discharge the powers an duuies of his omce
Resolved by the Senate ant House of Representatives of the United States
-of America itn Cogress assembled (Irivo.thk'ds of eaoh House conourring there.
Int), That the following article I proposed as an amendment to the Constituttilon of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part
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of the Cnstitution when rtillied bly tile legislatures of three.fourths of the
several Sates within seven years from the date of Its submisson by the Congress:

"Arli*"H*erioNr 1. In case of the removal of the Presldent from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall becone President,
"48.r, 2. Whenever there Is a vacancy In the office of the Vice Presilent, tile
President shall nominate a Vice Presilent who shall take office upon confirnts.
tlon by a majorty voti, of both Houses of Congress,.
"8w.8. If the President declares In writing that he Is unable to disharge
the powers and ditties of his office, such powers and duties shall be charged
by tile Vice President as Acting President.
"Sv.c. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written coneurreneo of a mnJority of the heads of the executive detArtments or
such other body as Congress ay by lIiw provide. transmilts to the Congress
his written declaration that the President Is unable to (lsehAtrge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall lmmnedintely assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President,
"Spx'.t ,Whenever the President transmits to the Cottress his written declare.
tion that no Inability exists, Ie shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a nmjorlty of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to tile Congress his written deflnrallon tlt
the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. There.
upon Congress shall immediately decide the Issue. If the ogllres determines
l)y two.thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to (ls(liarge the
powers and duties of the office, tile Vice P'resident shall eonttnue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the Presldent shll resmne the powers and
duties of his office."

t1r.J. Ree. 240, 8Oth Cong., lot mps.)
JOINT RESOL',UTION Proposing an amendment to the C(onstitnttnn of the Pnltr.d Atatrs

rotating to succession to the Preidency and Vice Presidenec and to canes where the
President I unable to discharge the powers and ditties of hi oWee

Resol'ed bi the Renate and Uouse of Reprcaentathrr8 of the UVnted States,
of A tnerlca in Oongress asembled (two.thirds of caeh Minuse conetirrng thenn:
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes ns part of the
Constitution when ratified hy the legislatnres of three-fourths of tie several
States within seven years front the date of Its sutbmisslon by the Congress:
"ARTOIO

--

"Scono 1.In case of the removal of the Presldent from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vie President shall become President.
'$SFc. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy ilnthe office of the Vice President, the
President halt nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon eonfilrmntion
by a naJority vote of hoth Houses of Congress.,
"Pite. ,.If the President dIeelares In wrItIno-thst he Ismhuable to dilsehrge the
powers Ahud utlexs, of his office, si1cl poWOrs and duties shall be dlischarped by
#
the Vleo Presldent as Acting President.
"Sv.o. 4. If the Presildeit hoes not so deelAro, atnd-.the Vlce Ireodent., with tile

written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departtetts or
sulh otlter body as Congress may by lnw iprovile, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that tie Presldoott As. tiahlo,,toA is(harge the powers and
duties
of the
his office, the Vice President.
,,powers and
dutties of
officeas Acting President shall lfinediately assume the

"So, l,
Whenever thePre sident tranmnits to the Congress )iswritten
deelara-

tion tlint no inability exists, Io shall restite t06 powers ndi dttths of his office

utiless tile Vjce,,Prejldnt. with tlq writtont cotwurreneq, of a.majorlty of the

bends of tltq oxecutive depart ments or such other body as Congress may by law

provide,, transuilts withIntwo days to ,thiqCongroW itis wrltte) delaratontHint
tlo of, his fftee,, Therethe PresidentIs unalol tPodlargith pd

upon Coligrei s will linmiedlitely decide tle Issue. If te(Congress deternelnost Iy
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two-thirds vote of both 11ouses that tile President is unable to dismharge the

powers and duties of tile offiM, the Vice President shall continue to diseliai'ge tilt
sane as Acting prp'shmt; otherwise tile President shall rcsilllO tile powers and
duties of his once.",
(IiJ. lies. 248, SUMth Cong., 1st 14.41,-

JOINT
IM0I1J.8
UTION To propoe
an amendment
to the ConsltutIon of the United State
resting to tie sliectso0l
Itt i'resldel$y
and Vice 1rideutcy mni to cities where the
Preildent is uisnble to divharge tile
Iowers nd dutlis of ls offleo
Resolved by the Senato and Houwe of Reprean tlve of 1.he United Slates of
America in oosgres assembled (lwo-thirds of each House conourrtig therein),
That the following artleo Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
tile United States, whih6 shall be valid to all Intents and Irioses its part of the
Constitution when ratiled by tile legislatures of threefourths of tile several
States within seven years from the date of Its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICL, "--"

"SEUOTION 1. Ilitie case of the removal of til(, 'resident frol office-or of his
death or resignltiolln, tie I'lee
lrtshent shall becomee President.
"$H'c. 2. Wllenever there is itvacancy ill the office of the Vie President, tile
President shall promptly nomlonato a Vice P'resident Wle) shall take office upon
confirmiationt by a majority vote of Ith Ifouses of Congress.
"SEv, 3.If the President declares ill writing that he is unable to discharge the
powers Sand duties of life office, such powers md duties shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
"Hpm. 4. If tie Presidelt does not so declare, and tile Vice Presldent with the
written concurrence of a majority of tie heads of the executive deartlelts or
such other body as Coigress may by law provide, tritnsmits to the Congress Ills
written declaration that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of Ills office, tile %'icePresilent shall Immediately assumno the discharge
of tile powers and duties of tile office as Acting President.
"SEe. (S, Whenever the Presilent makes a pubik' announcement it writing that
his Inability has terminated, he shall resuie the discharge of the powers and
duties of hls office oi tile second day of making such annoueneent, or a such
earlier time after such announcement as h or tile Vice President may determine,
except that if the Vice President with tile written concurrence of the majority
of tile heads of the executive delartments Iii office at tilte thne of such anllouncement or such other body its Congress inny by law provide, tralumlts to the Coilgress his written (lecialatiol that the Iresident's unllillity ha not tersninnted,
the Vice President shall continue to discharge tile powers and duties of tile office
as Acting President. If the Congress, within ten days after recelpt of tile Vice
President's written declaration, deternilncs b two.thlrds of bothllouses tlit the
president is unable to discharge tile powers nd duties of tile office, the Vice
President sl11 contltW to disclilrge the sai e as Acting President ; otherwise
tile President shall resume tile dlsdllarge of the powers and duties of Ills office."
(lI.J, lites.
250, $0111 Coli,, lot soms.
JOIN'pr REsorMI'rIoN Proposilln al nIendnelr to the Cnn1titlitloll of tIlt
United States
rphithin to siecm'inn to thoevrolidney nrid Vleo I'resilieney ond to CliSCS where tie
Presidentt Is tunhle to discharge the powers anu duties of ils voice

Ikeolte(d bt' th
tiante anid Itouso of 1epr ecntatlre of IttUntledtc
lee of
Aerlea fIts (oi'oresa asomblcd (two-IhIrd# of each HoUse conour,'ig thtoln),
That the fdilow ivng article Is proposed as an umendlletit to thp Constituton 44
th'0Jidite4 States, whcl shall bo valid to all intCnts 1id( pilrloses as imrt of
the 0ohstitutlon when ratilfled by tile leglslature6 of thlree.fturths of tile several
States within seven years from tile lats.of Its stlbllission by the'Collgress
i
"Ammt
"SEr.oTin 1. In case of the' removal of tile President froni offlte or df his dehth
or resignation, the Vice Presldent shall b~tome President.'
"Smte. 2. Whenever there Is a vacancy ill tile office of the Vice Presldent, the
Paesidelit hsitll nominate a Vice President who btlinl take office upon contiruation
bmy a 3m1joritp voto of Ioth loutSes of Congres,,
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"l8Ko. 8, It the President declares In writing that he Is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
"8zo. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of it majority of the heads of the executive delmrtments or
such other body as Coigrtss maity by law provide, transmilts to the Congress is
written declaration that the Preeident is unable to discharge the lowers and
duties of lis office, the Vice President shall luitediately assume the powers and
duties of the office of Acting President.
68zo, i5. Whenever the President tranlsmls to the Congress his written declare.
tion that no Inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of IIIs officv
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body its Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congresm his written declaration thah
the President. is unable to discharge the powers and (tittles of his office. Thereupon Congrem shall Immediately dcida the Issue. If the Congress determine
by two-thirds vote of both houses that the President is unable to dlseharge the
ixwers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the,
same as Actlng President ; otherwise the President shall resume the powers
and dutties of his office."
Il.J. lIes. 204, 801h COIn., 1st sess.l
JOIN'T 1It1,OI,4 1TION lroposlng an omendinent to tin, ColnstitutioI of the Unite HttMalls
relating to swecesilon to the Presthleny anti Vice.Prsldwwlu
and to cases where the
l'resdhnt In unable to discharge tilt, Iwerm and dilies of hils olnce
of Representatlecs of the Mlled Statle of
therein),
That the following article is prolomed as an antemlnent to the Constlitutio of the
United States, whihh shall be,vilid to all Inltents id purpose s nit part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of thro.fmurths of the several
States within seven years from the dinte of Its sithliission by the Congress:
Rcsoh'ed bpi the S¢emile ad Hlol,

Amrlea lit ('onltres assenibled ( tWo-thlds of et'tuh liliste coneairri

"ARTICI,1 "8tyriox 1. In case if the relinoval of the President, from office or of his death
or re signation, the Vice President shall bevone President,
"R1o. 2. Whenever there is a vitcncy lit tie office of flit, Vhi President, the
President shall noninate a Vice President. who shall take offie itpm confirnatlon
by it majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"Stie, 3. If the President declares in writing that lie Is unable to dtitcharge the
powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be tishargetl by
the Vice President as Acting President
"%o. 4. If the President (loes not so declare, and the Vice Presldent with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departlonts or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congrets
his written declaration that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall inimediately assume the powers and
duties of the office is Act ing President.
"Sety. f. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no nnbility exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of ils
office unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of
the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may he
law provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration
that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of Is office.
Thereupon Congress will immediately decide tie iue. If the Congres deter.
mines by two-thirds vote of both Ilouses that the President Is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall regime the powers
and duties of his office."
i .lJ,
Res. 284, 89th Cong., lot s1PN.
JOINT RIHOOLUTION Proposlnr an amendment to the Constitution to provide for the
seleetion of a now Vice President whenever there to a vacancy In the otee of Vice
President
Resolved bly the Senate and House of Repiresotatlvees of the United States
o/ America to Oon gress assembled (twt.thirda of each House vonourriti therein),
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Tht the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of

tie isdited states , and shall be valid to all hiltents and purposes as part of

the Constittlon otnly If ratified by the legislatures of tbree-fourtls of the
several $tates within seven years from the date of Its submission by the Congress:
"ARTIC1.8 -

"8c'rloiN 1.Whenever the offlco of Vice President becomes vacant at any
tine, more than thirty days before tile expiration of tile term for which the
Vice irshdellt was ehli
ted, because of the death, removal from ofite, or resign.
tin of fh
'ho, Presildvt or the death of a VfIceIPresdf (Ientehct before the time
lixed for tHie beglinning of his term, or because of the assumption by the Vice
1'r.'shhilet or a Vi e~l rcshlent~elect of the powers and duties of President by
reason of ile death, removal from office, or resignation of tie
treosltent or
tile delith of itl'residentelect before the time fixed for tie beginning of his
term, tile lerso.ll illchargig the lowers and duties of President shall convene
tie enite and lose of Itepresentatives In joint session to select a person
to lit its Vice lPresident, The person disclnrging the powers and duties of
the I'lilsdellt sluall have the right to veto any selection made by the Senate
aild tie iloilSe of IteliresentatIves acting in sich Joint setssilon, but Stich veto
most lie exercised wit in Ihree days after such spiccto) is tnmade.
"Sre, . The Spcaker of tie Houseoif lepresentatives shllal preside over such
jlit
ses ion. A quori (if each lloulse of the Congress being present at such
ollit Session, sitch personal11111 lie selected, subject to the right of veto within
three dlays by tei person dlscharging the powers and duties of the Presldent,
by imiJorily vote of the Members of tile Senate and of the house of Representa.
tives present ind voting, each such MIeubers having one vote.
"Smeo. 3. In oiy easme In which tile person discharging the powers and duties
of tile l1resldent shell veto tny selection made under this article, the Senate
nd llouise itltepresenttives shall coltill I joint session to make another
section lit accor(lalce with section 2 of til article, except that no person
whilos' spieletion Is vetoe(l shall again lie eligible for selection so long as the
person dlschargilg tlie powers and duties of President is the same person who
veloed lsucli
select h.,
"Sr.(, 4. No person constitutionally Ineligible to the office of President shall
be eligible to that of Vice President under this article. A person selected under
this article to act as Vice President slail act accordingly until the end of the
terin for which the Vice Preshleit or Vice.resildent.elect whom he succeeds
was elected. While so acting lie sh1 have in all respects the same status,
powers, and duties as ain elected Vice Preslent."

[Il,J. ies. 205, 80th Coi., 1st sem.J
JOINT IH tJUTIO,. Proposing an nmenldnie"t to the Constlltuton of the United states
[hillng to succeiatloli to the Presldency and Vlce.l'realdency and to cases where the
]'reaildilt Is illliible
to discharge the powers amid duties ot lts offie

Resolved by the Senate and Holmo ot Repre8tattves of the ttled States of
Anerica It tmonress assembled (tiro.thlrds of colh Ilotao contmrrhni therein),
Thit the following article is proposed as an amnendnient to tile Constitution of
the hllited 1.tls, willcl $hall be valid to all iltents and purposes ns port of the
Constilutlon when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years front the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTIOLM "
"801orton. 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his
denth or reslgnntlon, tile Vice President siall become President.
"18ro. 2, Whenever there Is a vacancy in tile oice of tile Vice President, the
Presdent Atllhl nilnte a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"8Ko. S. If the President declares Inwriting that he is unable to discharge
'the poweers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
tile Vice President its Acting President.
"8o, 4. Ifthe President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
44-201-05-8
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written declaration that the President Is unable to discharge tile powers and

President shall Immediately assunie the power tld
duties of his office, the Vice President,
duties of the office as Acting
"So. 6.Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declara-

tion that no Inability exists, lie shall resume the powers and dilties of hlis office

on the second day following the transmittal of such declaration to the Congress

unless, prior to his resumption of such powers and duties, the Vice President

transmits to the Congress lis written declaration that the President Is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office , in which case the Congress shall
imtdillately decide the Issue, If the Congress determines by two.thirds vote of
both Houses that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting
President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and duties of Ilis
office oi the telth day following the transmittal to the Congress of his declari.
tior that no Inability exists. Any declaration by the Vice President that the
President Is unable to resume the powers and duties of his office may be trans.
initted to the Congress only with the written concurrence of a niajority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide."
[tJ,

It-0. 274, S9111 (80t1t1., 1st s,se.l

JOINT tEsIO UTION Ill'ollosng fll Iw1tellulillent
to tile (7olisttlttoll of ti ll 1101 Htnte
y
Irehencvt
r's
and to nsviei where the
rei'itlolg to tmuiv4p.loii to the I r'sdet'wlil Vtim
Presihlent Is Iiiinlo to ult(eharge the powcrs Id ltitles of his omeo

R.exoird by the enlalte' a11 louse of Th'gr'setlltl1e.1 of the Utted SloWtca of
,.4lerlea ItConpesars itaasembld ( wlo.thlrdx of eitch iouse emiwir;iip tiheein),
That lie following artile Is prois)Sel as an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which shall he valid to all Intents and lIri m-s as part of the
ConstittItion when ratified by the legislatres of tlree-foorths of the several
States within seven years front the date of Its snibmission by the Congress:
"ARTIOL. -

"SlCt'ON 1. lIt case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shnll become President.
"Siv. 2,Whenever there is a vacancy In the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress,
"ltro. 3. Itthe President declares i writing that lie Is unable to discharge the
wers and (littleR of his office, such powers antd (lutler shall be discharged by the
Prosident its Acting President until the President declares itwriting that
no Inability exists.
"Sno. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall Immediately assume the powers and"
duties of the office as Acting President,
"SBso. I. In any case In which the Vice President has become Acting President
pursuant to section 4 of this article, the President shall resume his powers and
duties on the second day following his transmittal to the Congress of a written
declaration that no Inability exists unless, prior to his resumption of sitch powers
and duties, the Vice 1reident transmits to the Congress his written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, in
which case the Congress shall Immediately decide the issue. If the Congress
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume
the powers and duties of his office on the tenth day following the transmittal

ice

to the congress of hit declaration that no inability exists. Any declaration by

the Vice President that the President is unable to resume the powers and duties
of his office may be transmitted to the Congress only with the written concurrence
of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as
Congress may by law provide."

PIElHIDEN'rlAI, INABT 4ITY
(114. lie$, 280, 89,h Cotig., lot seai.I
'roposing an nteiidnvist to thi, Colstllition of thp ullted States
JOINT .Ht1OMITION
14-l1iilg (o AtLwcsslOll to the l'reshtelcy oniid Vie lPreoliel'. and to lt'ses where tlie
rpidde

iututill

to disc,,uarge the uowerv nil iliitles of his offivo

of lhe Uillied Stoics
Resolved by tho Senite atid Rouse of )presnitatllt'e
of A nic'rea in Conurc#sa assen, blil (two tiethds of ca(h linec convorritgtherein),
Thot the following article Is proposal as oil anienduient to tile Constitution of
the 11lted States, which shall be vnlld to all Intents oiid )ur)OsC ds part of the
Constitution when rattliod Iy the legislatures (if tiree-fourthl of the several
States witl) soven years frot the (lto of Its slbmlsslon by the Congress
"AnnOt "HacrlNon 1, In case of (ihe removal of the 'resident front office or of is death
or resilgnat ion, tile V'ce President siall.become President,
"Sate. 2. Whenever there is it vacancy in the office of the Vice Preshldnt, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confrna.i
tion by a1majority vote of ith H ouses of Congress.
"sio. 3. If the President declares In writing that he Is unable to discharge
the powers and dties of his office, suich Ix)werS and dutles shall be discharged
by the Vice lPresihe nt nt Acting president.
"18, O, 4. If the President does not so declare, and the 'Vice President with the
written concurrence of a ninjorlty of the hend of the executive departments or
such other Iboly as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress Ills
wrItten declaration that. the Preshdent is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice 'resident shall Immledintely%assunue the lowers alnd
duties of the office as Act Ing Preshient.
"Mr(c. Ml,Whenever the P'resident transnits to file Congress his written declara-

tioni't"no Inillity
exists,' iF shall relulme the power and diltles of hit omfiee
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of th heads
of the executive delprtments or such other bomly its Congreem may by law provide,
tralsiolts within two days to the Congress ilis written declrath inthat the
President Is unable to discharge the powers anti duties of his office. Thereupon
Congress shall Innnediately decie the Issue. It the Congress deterinines by
two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of tile office, tile Vice President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shnll resume the powers
and dut les of his office."
11.

lIe,. 203, 89th Coug., lot sens.1

JOINT 1RNOI.UTION To establish I perainient colinllsloli on Presidentil utl8nblly, and
for other purposes
Reoled by tha Senate and Youseof R prcctathvce of the UIlled Rials# of
America It Conopreas assembled, That In accordance with and purSuant to the
provlslotts of clause 1$of section I of article II of the Constitution authorlsing
the Congress to provide by law for the case of the inability of the President and
Vice President until the disnbillty he removed, the Congress hereby declares that
the deterninntlon of Inability of the President or Vice President is a political
decision based ponll the best, most Impartial and nonpartisan expert medical
opinion aAllable and that there should be il agency or Instrunientallty of gov.
ernment, In which the minority Ilprty shall have representation, created for the
purpose of making the determination with respect to the Inability of the l'res •
dent and the termination of the period of disability.
Sno. 2. As used in tits Act(1) The term "Commission" means the Commission on Presidential Disability
established by section 8; and
(2) The teri "President" means the President of tlie United, States, Including
any person on whom the powers and duties of that office may have devolved as
provided In clause 6 of section 1 of article It of the Constitution of tho United
States, and as provided In section 19 of title 8 of the United States C o,.
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Szo. 3. (a) There Is established a commission to be known as tile Commission
on Presidential Disability to be comlposed of ten members as follows:
(1) the Vice President of ti1e United States,
(2) tie Speaker of tle louse of Representatlves;
(8) tie I'resideut pro tempore of the &ewatu;
(4) the Secretary of State;
(IS) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(0) the Secret Iry of I efenso;
(7) the majority leader of the Senate;
(8) the minority lender of the Senate;
(0) the majority leader of the H1oUSo of Representatives; and
(10) the minority leader of the lous of Represeitlatives,
(b) The Vice President shall be Clalrnan of the Commission.
(c) In case there Is no Vice President, the Speaker of the House of Repro.
sentatives shall be Chalran of the Commission.
(M) The Chairman of the Commission shall not be entitled to vote in connect.
tion with any declaration of the Commission Issued under authority of this joint
resolution.
Sr:c. 4, (a) Whenever, lit the opinion of the Chairman or any three members of
ti Commission, circumstances exist which create a doubt as to the ability of
the lPresldent to diselirge the powers nl duties of his office, the Conmislon
slll he convened by tile Cllairman. After so convening, the Commission Imay,
hy a vote of not less than five of the members thereof, Issue a declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the Iowers and duties of his office.
(b) The Commission may, In the s1ame maimer asi provided in subsection (a)
of this sectloi for declaring a disalllity, Issue a declaration that any disability
with respect to which It Issued a decinration under such subsection (a) no longer
exists. In case the Com1ission Issues a declaration under this subsection that
it disability no longer exists, the person with respect to whom such declaration
is Issued shall resume the discharge of the powers and ditties of the office of
President effective as of the date of such dechtration, except that this selence
shall not apply with respect to any person acting as President under authority of
section 10(d) of title 3 of Ilie United States Code,
StO. 1$. (a) The President miay, by proclamation-(1) declare that he Is unable to discharge the powers and tiess of his
office; and
(2) before the end of the then current Presidential term, declare that such
disalllity no longer exlsts,
(W) Whenever the President Issues a proclamation under paragraph (2) of
subsection (a) of this section, effective as of the (late of such priclatmtion, the
powers and duties of tile oflce of President shall be automnatically restored to
him, and he shall resume the disclinrge of such powers and duties, except that
no such proclamzatiol shnll operate to restore the powers and duties of the office
of President to anty person acting as President under authority of section 10(b)
of title 3 of the United States Code.
(e) During any period of disablllity proelanlmcd by the President pursuant to
the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this section. the Comtllsslon shall have no authority to Issue a declaration with respect to such disability.
Sea. 0. (a) Whenever, In the opinion of tie Clhnirman or any three uietnlters of
the Commission, circumstances exist which create a doubt as to whether the
President Is alive. tile Cominssion slall be cnnvened by the Chairman. After so
convening, the Commission may, by a vote of not less titan five of the members
thereof, Issue a declaration that the death of the President shall be presumed.
(b) The Commission may, in the same manner provided In subsection (a) of
this section for Issuing a declaration presuming tle death of the President, Issue
a declaration that the President Is alive. The person with respect to whom a
declaration Is issued under this subsection shall resume the discharge of the
powers and duties of the office of President effective as of the date of such
declaration,
Sto. 7. (a) Tin any ease In which the Commission Issues a declaration under
section 4(a), or under section 0 (a). or the President Issues n proclamation under
section I(n) (1), the powers and duties of the offiee of President shall devolve ns
provided In elause l1of section 1 of article 11 of the Constitution of the United
States, or as provided In section 10 of title 8 of the United States Code, as
the case may be.
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(is) No deelnrntlon Issied by the Commission under this Act shall be reviewed
by aioy vourt or officer of the Ulited States.

(c) Durig the period that the powers alnd dillies of the offlee of President de.
volve o1 the Vice lP'esldent by reason of a declarition Issied ider ths Joint reso-

i(mi,

hs shall receive eomnpensation it the rate their provided by law for the

Pre.ident.
Le, 8. No person who assumes the discharge of the powers and duties of the
office of Preslident solely by reammo of ai disability of the Presidelit declared or
proeliled tinder nuthority of this joint resolution sholl reiove from ofthee tlo
ceeretary of State, the Secretary f Me Treosm'ty, or tile Secretary tif Defense,
excelt with the approval of not less thim at majority of time members of the
Comiuinisio|n who are Members of the Congres.
8!.c. 0. (t) The Commission iny, for the purpose of en rrylngout the provisions
of this Joint resolution, hold sich hearings and sit tiud iet tt stuch thnes and,
places, adlinister such onths, and require, by otili emi or otherwise, the attend(IWee And1I testiielloy of Such wtiesses aniid the protlttethi of sueh hooks, recor(Ie,
correspondence, lieinornwhluims, papers, 111id doentl
As the ( Oll)liissiolu il1ay
deem advisable. Sublenm may be issued over the signiture of the Chlalrnan,
of tie CommIn11lssion, and llly be served by tiny Ipersoim (leigll1aled by him. The
provisions of sections 102 to 101, inclusive, of tile Revised Statultes of the United
StOtes (2 U.S.C. 102-1)t), slIlltllY In tile ease of silly filulllre of ally witnless
to comply with any subpoena or to testify when aumllnoiled under authority of
tills sect Ion.
() The Commission Is authorized to secure directly fro any execiltive de.
pnrtment, liureau, agency, board, Commission, office, I lidleiieideit estiulilshinent,
or Instruientallty Information, suggestions, estimates, anll statistlcs for the
purpose of this Joint resolution; and elch such (leljrtnient, bIirtati. agency,
board, commission, olilee, establisiment, or histrunmetlilty is aut horized ad
directed to furnish stich Information, Suiggestions. estiiltaes, find statistics
directly to the Commission, u1pon request made by the Chllrlinl.
(e) The Commission shall have power to appoint and fix the compensation of
such personnel as it deens ndvlsnile, without regrar(I to the provisions of the
civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1940, as amended,
(d) The Coimission may procure, without regard to the civil service laws
nod the elsslilentlon laws, tenilmrary oad Interutittent serv ces to the snane
extent ns Is aitbtorized for tihe departments by section 131 of the Administrative
14oxp Ienses Act of 1940 (15U.S.C. 55a), but at rates not to exteed 150 per diem for

individuals,

(e) l]itployment or an Indlvildlnl by the Comissilon as an attorney or expert
In aly business or professlotil fleld, o1 a part-time or tflltilie lails, with or
without con sensation, shnll not be considered w4 em ploynuent bringing such
individual within tile Irovisions of sections 281, 2K3, 284, 434, or 101.1 of title 18
of the United States Code, or section 190 of the Itevised Statutes of the United
States (I U.S.C. 09),
So. 10, (a) Members of Congress who are neuiIerts of the Consnlson shll
servo without compensation In addition to that recelved for their services
as Members of Congress, but they slall be reimbursed for travel, ubsilstence, and
other necessary expenses Incurred by them In the porformtinco of their functions
as members of the Commission.
(b) Tie members of the Commission who are In the executive brnnch of the
Government shall serve without compensation In addition to that received for
their services In the executive branch, but they slhll be reimbursed for travel
subsistence, and other necessary expenses Incurred by them In the performance ok
their functions as members of the Commisslon.
Sim. 11. There is hereby authorized to he appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Szo. 12. This Act shall take effect on enactment,

OINT

(11.
es. 294, 89th Cong., let sm. I
IBOLUTION Propoainq an nmondment to the Conatitution of the United states
relating to Presidential Inability

Resolved bil the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America In Congress assembled (two-thirds of each loe+ eoourrng therein)
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution ol
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the United States, and shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States:
"AnrrOL-

"if:CTJON 1. In case of the removal of the President front ollce, or III$ death
or reslgnation, the said office shall devolve on the Vice President. In case of the
Inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of the said office,
the satd powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President until the illahility
be removed. The Congress nay by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
officer shall then be President, or in case of inability, act as President, and such
officer shall be or act as President accordingly, until a President shall be elected
or, in case of inability, until the inability shall be earlier removed. The commencement and termination of any Inability shall be determined by sieh method
as Congress shall by law provide.
"Sec. 2, This article shall be Inoperative unless it shall have been raifled as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States wltlin seven years from tie (late of its submission to tie States
by the Congress."
tIl.J. lies. 102, 89th Colig., 1st s.'ss.]

JOIN'I' ISOL'1UTION Proposing till iilluondllult to lit,*Coltitlttltloll of tie Unite.t

S1ales

'resi ency uind Vlice 'resiheyev anld it) cises where tihe
Preoldenit Is unatdo to dlschitrge ile powers nnd dilies of hlis office
rolatinlg to stlccsson to tho

Reolved by the 0enato (d llo1o 0of Ieprete#iaticesof the Ulited SlateM of
Amcrlca in Oongrcse a8embled (two-thirds of each House concuorrig therci),
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ANTICLI:

-

"SEo'roN 1. In ease of the removal of the President from office or of hils death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"Swo. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"SEe. 8. It the President declares in writing that he Is unable to discharge the
such powers and duties shall be discharged by
his office,
powers and duties asofActing
President.
the Vice President
"Swo. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
"SsE. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, Thereupon Congress will Immediately decide the issue. If the Congress determines
by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to discharge tle
powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers
and duties of his office."
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I(1.J. ies. 810, 80th Cong., lot Bess.)
JOINT 1tlOt)WTUION 11ropusing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
icePresidenci
of his offceand to cates where the
and duties
to the Presidency
tile powers slid
unable, to discharge
'residenttoIs ouerslon
jointing

Rcsolvd by the Sonato and 11o1 of Reproso;tativos of the United ,tatve of
America Mn Uonqross assembled (two.thirds of each House oonourring thoroin),

Thut tile following article Is proposed as an amendment to the onstItutton of
tle United States, wlich shall be valid to all intents und purposes Us part of
the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of Its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICI.

-

"SicTION 1,In case of the removal of the President front office or of lis"death
or resignation, tile Vice President shall become President.

"Se. 2.Whenever there Is a vacancy lit the office of the Vice 'resident, the

President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take oath of office nlupn con-

firmatlon by a majority vote of both Hlouses of Congress.

"8hw. 3. If the President declares in writing that he is unable to discharge

the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged

by the Vice President ia Acting President.
"'I:. 4. If the President does not so (eclare, and the Vit, President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of tile executive departments or
such other body as congress s may by law Irovihe, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration thtt (he Presilent Is unable to discharge tie powers and
duties of his oftilce, the Vice President shall lisnedliately assunne the iowers
and tutles of the office as Acting President.
"8,e. 0. Whenever,r the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no Inal)ilty exists, he shall resume the powers and ditties of his
office unless the Vice President, with tht written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transnlts within two days to the Congress his written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall linnedlately decide the issue,. If the Congress determines
by two-thlrds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to discharge tile
powers and duties of tile office, tile Vice President shall continue to dliselhrgo

the snne as Acting President: otherwise the President shall resume the powers
and ditties of Ilis office."
lit.I., lIes. :112, 0th Cong., lst sess.]

JOINT tInsr.I0ITION Propoling an nniendment to the Constitution or te Uniteld States
relating t succession to the Presidency and Vice.Presidency and to eases whore the
reshlentlsunale to discharge the powers an duties of his ofle

Resolved by the Sonate and lHouso of Representatives of the United States of
therein),
Aticdoa it Oongraes assembled (two-thirds of each lotsC Conteurrtthi
That the following article Is prol)osed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of tie several
States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"ARTOL

-

"SsorzoN 1. In caso of the removal of the President from the office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"6i5o,2. Whenever there Is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"Sco. 8. If the President declares In writing that lie Is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and ditties shall be discharged
by the Vice President as Acting President,
"Sto. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice President with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and
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duties of his office, the Vice President shall Immediately assume tile powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
"SE. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers And duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of itmajority of tile
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress ay by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress iis written declartitlon that
the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his offlhe. There.
upon Congress shall immediately decide tie issue. If the Congress determinIs
by two.thirds vote of both Houses that the President Is unable to discharge tile
powers and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the power
and duties of his office."
[U,J. Res. 820, 80th Cong., 1st sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an nmendment to the ConotItutIon of the United Stntes
relating to succession to the Presidency and Vie.Presleney nod to cases where the
President is unable to discharge the puwers and duties of his ollico

Resolved by the Senate and Ilorse of 1?eprecntathle of the Uited Rtots of
Amerlca in Congress asenibled (tco.thtrds of each house conerring therein),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to tile Constitutilon of

the United States, which shall be valid to All intents and pIrp~oses as part of
the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourlhs of the several
States within seven years from the date of Its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE -

"SrozoN 1. In case of the removal of tile President from office or his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
"Sic. 2. Whenever a vacancy occurs In the office of the Vice President, the
President shall nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority of the
elected Members of Congress meeting In Joint session, shall then become Vice
President for the unexpired term.
"Se. 8. In ease of the removal of the President from office or of is death
or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the Vice President, in ease of the
inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of the said office,
the said powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President as Acting Presldent until tile Inability be removed. The Congress may by law provide for the
ease of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what officer shall then be President, or in case tof Inability,
act as President, and such officer shall be or net as President accordingly, until
a President shall be elected, or in case of Innbility, until tile inability shall Ie
earlier removed. The commencement and terttinatlon of any Inability way be
determined by such method as Congress shall by law provide.
"Sto. 4. Article 1I, section 1,paragraph 5, is hereby repealed."
HR., 830, 80th Cong., lit eee.)
A BILL To provide a method for determining Presidential Inability, and for other purposes

Be Itenacted by the Senate and House of Representatlves of the United States
of America in Oongress asembled, That the determination as to whether the
President, or any Individual acting as President, Is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President shall be made as provided by this
Act:
Sm.2. Such determination shall be made In the following manner:
(1) The House of Representatives shall, by a resolution adopted by a vote
of the majority of the Members of the House of Representatives present and
voting (providing a quorum Is present), request the Senate to take appropriate
action to determine whether the President Is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, A copy of such resolution shall, upon Its adoption, be for.
warded Immediately to the Chief Justice of the United States.
(2) The Chief Justice of the United States shall, upon receipt of a copy of
mh resolution, convene the Senate In a special Aession for the purpose of doterwining whether the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
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of is office. The Vice President shall not participate In the proceedings of
the Senate during such special session.
(3) It the Senate determines, by a vote of two.thirds of the Senators present
and voting (providing a quorum is present), that the President Is unable to discharge tie powers and duties of his office, tile Senate shall, by a resolution
adopted by the same two.thirds vote required to make such determination, direct
tie %'ice President to act as President during the period of inability of the Prestdent, or until the end of tile then current Presidential term, as may be provided
by such resolution.
(4) Any determination made by the Senate under paragraph (3) may be
revoked, and tile inability of the Prosident which was the basis of such determination may be declared to have terminated, in the same manner as i the
case of the original determination, except that the Senate shall be conveltl In
a special session for stich purpose by tile Chief Justice of tile United States upon
receipt by him of a resolution regiuosting such special sesion aidoitedl by a vote
of the majority of the Members of either House of the Congress present and vote
Ing (providiig a quorum is present ).
(5) If the Senate revokes any determination made by It under paragraph (3),
tile Senate shall, by it resolkition adopted by a vote of two-thirds of tlt, Senators
present lllI voting (providing a quorum Is present), declare ht the President Is
restoredit) the a-4suiptioti of tie powers and duties of the office of President
effective at Bich tite as 11)11y be provided by such resoltition.
Src. 3. (a) Tile provisions of section 2 shall be applicable with respect to
determining whether tie Vice President, or any other individual acting as Presldent, is unable to discharge the powers and duties of tMe offle of Presidnt, mi(1,
IIIiy
sull case, the resoluttlon referred to Ili lpragraph (3) shall direct the
individual next in line of succession to the Presidency to aet as Presilent during
tile period of Inability of the Vie President or such other Indivilual, or until
the end of the then current Presidential term, as may be provided by such resolution,
(b) The provisions of section 2 shall also be applicable with respect to revolIng
any determination that the Vice President Is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of tile office of President and restoring him to the assumplltion of the
powers and duties of tile office of President, The provisions of section 2 shlll
also be alicllnble with respect to revoking any determination that any other
individual acting as President Is unable to dischatnrge tile powers and dilies of
tile office of President and, subject to section 10 (d) of title 3, United States
Code, shall be applicable with respect to restoring such Individual to the as.
sumption of the powers and duties of tile office of President,
[111. 8702, 89th Cong., 1st sess.)
A BJLI To provide for the ease of Inability of the President or Vice President or Interim
successor
Do it etnated by the Senate and Hlotso of Rcprcecntatlivces of the Uited States
of America in ContUrces assembled, That the determination of whether tile President, or any Individual acting as President, has an inability to discharge the
powers and duties of President shall be made as provided by this Act.
Ss~o. 2. (a) If the President shall by message to Congress announce that he
has an Inability to discharge the powers and duties of Ills office, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
(b) If the President does not so announce but tile Vice President or person
next In line of succession to the President Is satisfied that the President or person
then Acting President has such an Inability, lie shall give written notification
thereof to the Chairman and members of the Commission provided for by section
8 of this Act, Upon receipt of such written notification of Presidential Inability
or upon Its own motion whenever a majority of Its membership shall be of the
opinion that there exists such Presidential Inability, the Commission shall forth.
with convene and determine whether in Its opinion the President or Acting
President has an Inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said
office.. Notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the President. If the
Commission so determines, the Chairman shall forthwith give written notice of Its
determination to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the
President pro tempore of the Senate with a copy of such written notification
to the Vice President or person next In line or succession to the Presidency.
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Upon receipt of this written notice the Vice President or person next in lie of
succession to the Presidency shall forthwith proceed to discharge the powers and
duties of the office of the President pending final determination of the question
of inability as provided herein.
SEc. 8. (a) There is hereby established a commission to be known as the
Presidential Inability Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission". The Commission shall be composed of the following members: (1)
The Chief Justice of the United States. who shall act as Chairman. The Chair.
man shall have no vote in the proceedings of the Commission except in the case
of a tie. (2) The leader of the House of Representatives of the political party
having the greatest number of Members of the House of Representatives. (3) The
leader of the House of Representatives of the political party having the second
greatest number of Members of the House of Representatives. (4) The leader
in the Senate of the political party having the greatest number of Members of the
Senate. (IS) The leader of the Senate of the political party having the second
greatest number of Members of the Senate. (6) The Surgeon General of the
United States.
(b) Four members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum and a concurrence in writing by at least four members shall be required for any determination made by the Commission.
(c) Members of the Commission shall serve as such without compensation:
but they shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and necessary expenses
Incurred by them in the performance of their duties.
(d) The Chairman shall convene the Commission without delay upon receipt
by him of a written notification from the Vice President or person next In line
of succession to the Presidency provided by section 2(b) or upon receipt by
him of a communication in writing from two members thereof stating that they
have sufficient cause to believe that the President has an inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of the President.
S.c, 4. (1) Upon receipt of written notification from the Commission of Presidential inability pursuant to section 2(b) of this Act, the House of Repre-

sentatives, if then in session and If not at such time as it shall convene, shall

proceed forthwith by resolution adopted by a vote of the majority of the Members
of the House of Representatives' present and voting (providing a quorum is
present). to request the Senate to take appropriate action to determine whether
the President has an inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
A copy of such resolution shall, upon Its adoption, be forwarded Immediately to
the Chief ,Justice of the United States and to the Senate. If the House shall
fall to request the Senate as aforesaid, the Clerk of the House shall Immediately
thereafter give written notification to the person acting as President of such fact
and such person shall forthwith cease to discharge the powers and duties of the
President.
(2) Upon receipt of A copy of such resolution the Senate shall forthwith
proceed to finally determine whether the President has such inability to dis.
charge the powers and duties of his office. The Chief Justice of the United States
shall preside over the Senate throughout Its deliberations and the Vice President
shall not participate therein. Notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given
to the President.
(8) If the Senate determines, by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate present
and voting (providing a quorum is present), that the President or the person
acting as President has such Inability to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Senate shall, by a resolution adopted by the same two-thirds vote
required to make such determination, direct the Vice President or person next
in line of succession to the Presidency to act as President during the period of
inability of the President or Acting President, or until the end of the then current
Presidential term. If the Senate shall fall to so determine the existence of
Presidential inability, the Secretary of the Senate shall Immediately give written
notification to the person acting as President of such fact and such person shall
forthwith cease to discharge the powers and duties of the President.
(4) Any determination made by the Senate under thepreceding paragraph
may be revoked and the inability of the President or the person actin as
Prtvident which was the basis of such determination may be declared to Lave
terminated by the Senate as in the case and manner of the original determination.
And in such event the Senate shall by a resolution adopted by a vote of two-thirds
of the Senate present and voting (providing a quorum is present) declare that the
President Is restored to the powers and duties of the office of the President
effective at such time as may be provided by such resolution.
The CHAMMAN. I will hear you now, Senator.
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STATEMENT OF HON* BIRCH E. BAYH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF INDIANA
Senator BAYJI. Mr. Chairman, may I first ask the chairman of the
committee if I may have permission to have Mr. Conrad, chief counsel of our Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments seated at the
witness table. Second, I would be more than happy to yield the honor
you have given me as flrst witness to the Attorney General. Is that
in accordance with the wishes of the chairman I I only want to make
this as expeditious as possible and whatever the chairman decides
certainly will be in accordance with my wishes.
The CJATHMAN. Mr. Attorney General, do you want to embrace that
invitation of the Senator?
Mr. KATZENBAOH. No Mr. Chairman I think Senator Bayh has been
burdened by this for a long time and i would be happy to have him

go first.

Mr. Por, We are going to have the services of the Attorney General. He is going to be here to testify. If we don't complete it this
morning, we will want him back.
The CiIAI AN. Proceed, sir.

Senator BAYIL Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which, in light of
the very pertinent statements of both the distinguished chairman and
ranking minority member of the committee I feel would be best inserted m the record at this point. I would be happy to just summarize
the statement rather than read it.
The CHAIrMAN. Be glad to have it received in the record sir.
(The prepared statement of Senator Birch Bayh is as follows:)
TESTIMONY BY SENATOR BIRCH BATH

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am Birch Bayh, U.S. Senator
from Indiana. I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you and
testify in behalf of Ilouse Joint Resolution 1, Introduced by the distinguished
chairman of this committee, relating to the problems of Presidential inability
and killing vacancies in the office of Vice President.
I was privileged to sponsor In the Senate this year a resolution Identical to
one which I had sponsored in the 88th Congress and which passed the Senate
by a vote of 65 to 0.
Last year, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, of which
I have the honor to be chairman, conducted extensive hearings on 18 resolutions
dealing with Presideh'tial liability and filling vacancies in the office of Vice
President, This year, the Senate subcommittee conducted 1 full day of hearings
and heard testimony front several distinguished witnesses, including the Honor.
able Nicholas Katzenbach, President Johnson's nominee for Attorney General
of the United States.
The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments reported favorably on Senate Joint Resolution 1 which at that time, wa' identical to House Joint Resolution 1 now before this committee. The full senate Cominthse on the Judiciary
subsequently reported the proposal to the Senate with no substantive changes
but with several alterations in language.
It Is to the resolution now pending before the Senate that I would like to
address myself and to commend Its present form to this committee for Its
earnest consideration.
Mr. Chairman, at this time I request that Senate Joint Resolution 1, as altered
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, be printed as a part of my remarks.
Section 1 of the resolution simply puts Into the Constitution a practice which
has been traditional in the United States since 1841. In that year, with the
death of President William Henry Harrison, Vice President John Tyler estab.
lished the so.called Tyler precedent by Insisting that he was the President and
not merely Acting President. This complete transfer of Presidential preroga.
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tives to the Vice President upon the death of an Incumbent President has been
accepted ever since, Yet, it has never failed to be questioned by some Americans
iven after the tragic events of November 22, 1143, when Vice IPreident Joinson
ascended to the Presidency, a suit was flied challenging Mr, Johnson's rightful
claim to the Presidency. All that Is done by section I of Senate Joint Resolution
1 and lose Joint Resolution I Is to remove forever the last shred of doubt that
"in case of the removal of time President from office or is death or resignation,
the Vice President shall become President."
Section 2 of the prolosal provides that "whenever there is a vacancy In the
office of the Vice President, the President shall nomuinte a Vice President who
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both h1olse of Congress."
This section is based upon a brond consensus that this Nation must never for
long be without a Vice President, Tile office of Vice President, once scorned
even by those who held It, hans become the second most exnltt 1 position in
American Governnient-and rightfully so, Today, the Vice President Is not a
Throttlebottoi whom no one recoglrv.es, few have heard of. And who has so
little to (10 that lie 111st0 peld tile major share of lls time feetlIng piJeolx in the
park. The Vice President today has a nunbher of statutory and ad hacs ties
which are of signal inportanco. Only recently the Presidenlt named ils Vice
President to head the President's Council onil f'qal Opportunity, n groop which
will coordinate the Govertmlent's extensive agency and del)artmentol work In
tho fleld of civil rights, The Vice President participates Iln nil Cnhbiet meetings,
Tfe Is a statutory member of the National Security Council which only last
Sunday night muade a grnve nd far-reachlng decision coneernilni the role of
the United States iln Vietinm.
The Vice President Is tie Chalrmani of the
National Aeronntles and Space Council which eoordlinnte thils Notion's explore.
tion of the vast and little-known sea of space. Perhaps most Importantly,
though, is tile very real fact that At any moment, the Vice residentt Is tile man
who may assume the nwexomne nd lonely burdens of the lresdelley Itself.
It hs been the singular good fortune of this Notion thtnt In Its history, n President and a Vice residentt have not been lost within the same 4.year term of
office. That mucnit eventuality Is pIassible has been brought onie to us several
times in our history. Blut Iprhaps tile most tragic example of mnn's absolute
mortality was the sudden, shocking, and almost unblellevnble loss of our 3flth
President In the very vigorous prime of his life nud work. Tile Nation continned, however, as It always has and as It always must. The purpose of section
2 of this proposed constltutlonnl amendment Is to provide a means whpreby
this Nation shall have executive continuity, The beat way to acconmplish this, I
strongly believe, Is to provide that the office of Vice President of the United
States never be left unoccuplied for very long.
Having a Vice President for nil but perhaps a relatively few days also would
provide a ready neans by which we can have executive continuity even If tile
President of the United States were disabled tempnrarily or perninliently.
Section 8 of Senate Jont flesolutlon 1 provides that "whenever tle President
transmits to the President of tile Senate and the Apeaker of the HIoume of ep.
resentatives his written declarntlon that he Is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his offme. much powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President,"
Here, then, we provide a menns by which a President can voluntarily divest
himself of hil powers and duties If he Is temporarily disabled-or. Indeed, If le
knows that he soon will Ibeome temporarily disabled, The President inay, for
example. he about to undergo surgery and the domestic and world situation at
that time may demand no Interruption-even for a day or two-of Moxecutlve
lenderhiln. It Is possible that Presldent Miisenhower would have avniled ilm.
self of this proviso had It been In force and effect during any of the three Illnesses
he experienced an President,
Section 4 provides, a means whereby the Vice President and a majority of the
principal officers of the executive departments-that In, the Oahinet--may declAre that the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office. Thin Is Intended to provide for the contingency that tile nature of the
President's disability precludes him from declaring his own Inabillty. Upon
the written transmission of this declaration from the Vice President and a ma.
Jority of the CAbinet to the Speaker and the President of the Sennte, the Vice
President would Immediately assume the powers and duties of the office of Pros
Ident as Acting President.
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Although we consider as highly unlikely the possibility of a dispute between

tho Vice President and Callnet on one haid and tile President on tile other as

to tie Chief Executive's ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
we nonetheless strongly believe that we must provide for such a conthigency In
the Constitution.
Section 5 of Senate Joint Resolutlon 1 provides tile machinery to deal with
such it contigency. First, and most Iplortaintly, it estaibllshes the formula by
which a President slall resume the powers and duties of his office following his
temporary disilacement.
Secondly, It perits the Vice President idininjorly of the Cabinet a 2.day
period In which they may challentge the Presidenat's declaration that noe Illablifty
exists. Tile ilguage of the section would permit tile V'iee President to divest
himself of tlie powers and dilles of tlie Presdency lnim dit ely. But if a serious
question existed as to flie I'resIdent's ability to resume, his lowers and duties,
the %'icePresident-if lie has lilt, silpport (if a imiJorlty of the CAbinet-could
retain the powers ind duties for 2 (lays followhig the President's deellratioln.
If within those 2 days, the Vlee Presideint mid imijorlty of the Colhnet challetiged tie Prsleit's declaration, Congress would "Itunedlat ly proceed to

decide tie Issue."

Thils, we believe, Is a clear coillstltioiiil mandate for Coll.

gress to drop everythig else or, If It were not then Il session, to Imnieditely reassellble to colnsider this issue. The words "Immedlately Iiroceed to (leelde the
Issue" were drawn so as to allow Congress time to consider tle facts before
votllg.
Bectlon 5Sthen provides that "if (lie Congress deteltrmhies by two-tlilrds vote
of both Houses fiat the Pres dent Is unable to discharge thp powers an(d (Itties
of ti't office, tie Vice President shall continue to dlisclarge the same is Acthig
Preshl'iit; otherwise tile lrshident shall resun (le powers and dilties of lils
oftie."
The languagp clearly Implies, we believe, that tie Vice president shall con.
tlitue to act am Preslihnt while (lie disuinte Is bcing settled by tle Congress. Note
that If flie Vice President achieves a two-thirds vote in both houses, 1het conitinlues
to (llseharge tile powers and duties of tile Presidency. lie does not resutlihe
powers and ditties-lie continues to exercise them.
Several questions have been raised oil tile portlous of Seinte Joint Resollttion
1 and House Johit Resolutlot I relating to Inbility. I shall attempt to answer
them briefly.
First, sonme believe thtsn because we are dealing with executive continuity, we
should iln no Instance bring (lie Congress Into the picture. To do this. It lns
been said, would [)rtch (lite traditlonal separatiloi of lowers. I would ploitt out,
Mr. Chlilrman, that there Is ample precedent, involvIig a reasonable commitnglitig
of the three branches of (lovernient. Tile first and most obvious Is the authority
gramlte(d to the Clilef Ixecutive to veto bills passed by both Houses of Congress.
If thero were absolute separatlOt, the President would have 1o such althorlty.
Conversely, many Presidential ai)politniitits nlutd all treatles entered Into by
the Presidenut must receive the advice and consent of tie Senate before they
become effective. lit certain prescribed ciretitnstac(es. (lie louse of Ieliresenta.
ties Is etiliowered with tile great responsibility of electig a President of (lie
United States. in tile pro(e(lires established to impeach md conivict a President
of tle United States. we see the conningling of tle executive, legislative, lld
judicial bratiehes of government . Li'lnally, the ilee Preshleit himself ias certalin
ditties Ili both (lie executive atid legislative branches of (overintent. lit Senate
Joint lResolutioii I and House Joint Resolutlon ll, (ile Comigress becomes involved
after a deesitin has leten made tIn the executive brautehi-nid onlily then when
that decision Is challenged within tle executive branch. Omitting Congress as no
arbiter of this issue would olWn the door to the possibility of a coup, a possibility
both foreign and offensive to our forin of government.
Another questlou has been raised as to whether additional Innguago Is required
In section a of the amendient to enable a Iresldent to iniedlately resmtte his
Imwers after lie has voluntarily given them 11p. We mtnltaill that such Inngunage
would be superfluous and perhals even harmful. Suppose, Ifot will, that such
language were added. A President voluntarily divests hluseli of Ills powers atud
duties. Then, when lie believes lie is lit, lie Immediately resumes them. Then,
pursuant to section 4 of the proposal, the Vice President and majority of tle
Cabinet declare the President really Isn't fit at all. The Vice President imne.
ditely resumes tle powers and duties of the Presidency. Then, tinder section 5.
tho President again declares no Iability exists. The Vice Presidenit and Cabinet,
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under section 5, challenge the President's declaration again. Then Congress docities it favor of the l'resilent, who Inintedlately resllnies the piowers mid dtilhs
again. llere, II the space of a few days, th Nation would have tie powers and
ditties of the Presidency change hands three tiles. The turnmoll this Wollhl
create is almost uninngiiable. As now writen, Senate Joit !1eolutlon 1 no
flouso Joint Resoltion 1 would keel the transfer of these awesome powers
and duties to anl Irreduielble minllimum. thereby enabling as smooth ia transition

of exectitve power as possible In diflIcult eircunstanees,
Others have argued that a tneo limit. should be placed ulpn the Congress to

decide a dispute Ii the executive branch over the P'resident's InablIll.. The
ptrlse of this argiument Is to avoid the possibility of the Congress prolonging
a determination of the President's fitness and thts keel) the Vice residents acting
as President for as long as possible-theoretleaIly against thit hest interels of
the Nation. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, as i indicated earlier, was
moro concerned that tite Congresm have a reasonable titli it whihh to decide
this crucial Issue. It was the consensus that the obedience to and ihllelienta.
tion of any law depends ultimately upon the good will of the vast majority
of our governmental leaders at all levels.
Somewhere along th line, in our form of government, trust ilt lhieplaced lit
men to obey and Implenent the letter and spirit of tlhe law. The Inngtnage of
this amendment makes It abunlantly clear that the purlose and Intent of section
5 Is for Congress to decide the Issue as quickly as possible. If we attelpt to
place a time limit upon the Congress, we are then saying that 20, flO or 100
years from now. in any siuatlon thnt we can ilmngine and sonic that we cannot,
the Congress should he able to determine thls crtelal question of presidential
Inability within 10 (lays, or 20 days, or 30 days. If we nake a time imintltion
too brief, then Congress may not have time to view the facts and reach a Justt
decision. If we make the limitation too long. we may Imply the Congress should
take as much tinie as allowed before deciding the Issue. In my opinion, we
must keep the language of the Constitution general enough to be flexible Iln situa.

tions we are unable at this point In history to foresee.

Mr. Chalirmnn and members of the committee, for too many years the debate
over providing for presidential Inability and filling vaeaneles In tie omee of Vice
President hn been waied on the academic level. Few believed that Anything
ever wold be accomplished to till an obvious and glnring constitutional vold.
Now we are In a position to see on the horizon the fruition of years of work by
many In this vital area.
I wolhl be remiss If, at this point, I did lint single otit for praise the dlstin.
gilshed chairman of this committee, its ranking minority memnber and leaders
of the American Rar Association, whose efforts in tits area have been persistent,
articulate, and effective.
In this era, when whole armies can be moved half.way around the world In a
matter of hours and when elviliatlon as we know It can be destroyed in a matter
of nlinutes, we must never be without a firm hand oni the tiller-a hand belonging
to a man mentally and physically capable'of making the decisions affecting the
destiny of the free world.
History has been trying to tell us something, Mr. Chairman. It is time we
listened.

Senator hAYm. T would also like to ask the chairman's permision to
include in the record at this point a copy of Senate Joitnt resolution 1,

as reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, February 4,
1905.
Te CtIATRIWAW. You have that permission.

(Text of S.J. Res. 1 :)

'rl

or SSERATZ IO1MTr RPSOMtMI'tO

I AN RsrotmPturJ "Y SSNATI COMMMrr,
JUMtCtARY Ott Pr'nIUARY 4, 1005

Ott T1n

Sm'icmtOx 1. Tn case of the removal of the President from office or his death or
resignation. the Vice President shnll become President.
rm 2. Whenever there Is a vaenney in the office of the Vice President, the
President shnll nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Housest of Congress.

Rreo. 8. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Sennto and

the Speaker of the house of 1teprestintatives his written declnratlon that he
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Is unable to discharge tie powers and duties of his office, such powers find (tittles
shall be discharged by tho Vice President as Acting I'resIhent.
Sp:., 4. Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of the prinelpal officers
of the executive departments or such other body its Congress wity by law pro.
vide, transmits to the President of the Senate and the 8Hpaker of the House
of Iteiresentatives their written declaration that te P'resident Is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his offle, the Vie lPresident shall Inme.
dltely itWI-mimp the powers ond duties (it the office as Acting President.
Sco l. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Heinult, and
the 8 aker of the Hlouse of tepresentatives his written declaration that no
lnitbil ity exists, he shall resume the p)owers and duties of his offie less the
Vice l'resdent, with the written contcurrence of it majority of the prinlm l
ofliers of the executive (ieJIlirtnlls oir Such otler body as Congress may by

law pIrovide, transmlts within two daIys to the Congress his written decliratlon +"

that tue President Is unable to disehalrge the powers and duties of his office.

Thereupon Congress shull Imtedliately proceed to decide the issue,

If the Co1.

gress determines by two-tirds vote of both Houses that the I'reshent Is unatlhe
to dischargo the Iowers and tiles of the office, the Vice President shall continue
to discharge the mime its Actlng President ; otherwise the President shall resume
the powers and duties of his office.

Senator B,11i. As you know, yor11 preSen. wllitns (eCnsiders
it an
honor to havo the oppoi'uility to d'ospopsor it bill the distinguished

chairman of this ommitteo lions introduced in the House.
Let me very quickly stimmarizo the process of development, which
led us to Senlte
int. Itemslution I and louse Joint Resolution 1.
LaystYUear I similar measure wa insit reduced into the Senate and passed

flh0 Senate Obr
to 0 under thOe title of Senate Joint. Resolut ion 139. I
certainly want to voice hearty agreement with the statement of Mr.
MeCulloch that the Constitiultion should not. Im amenled in any hit-or.
miss fashion. In fact, it Juts been otitr effort to try to p'eVent this from

happening. As the chairman knows, Senate 'Joint Resolution 139
was it result ot a broad consensus reached iter long study and exton8ivo consultations with leading political scientists, constitutional schol.
ars, State legislators, journalists, and leaders of the American liar
Assocition.

The CIRvMAN. Sit', may I interrupt you there? I neglected to call
o1 Congresmman Andrew Iacobs, Jr., of Indiana, ot1o of our nw
members.

Mr. Jacobs here? Forgive me for not calling on you be.

fore.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW AOBS, 1R., OF INDIANA

Mr. JACO . I am sorry to interrult the junior Senator from Indana
but I wanted to read and I thank you for this opportunity you grant
yoll most junior member to Commentt oil Senator Bayh's (estimoly.

I wallt to join the 111l))lO'Ouls organizations and htldividtuals who
have commended Senator I11yh for the judicious dispatelh with which
he has conlucted the hearings in this Vital legislation in this session
of Con Ve8 and to add such accomplishments Would not have been possible, of course, without. the vital work Senator lhyli performed in
the 88th Congress. The Amiierican 111 1,ASsdoc'it llll allmontg others,
wisely has rpeognlized tlm lrlgellcy an(l

tle'emity of Senator ]1ay11's

proposals. They would correct.( ile sitaion that hIes resulted in tihe
oflko of Vice President being vactint. 10 times for t total of 37 years
in this Nat ion's history.
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I am pleased and proud to add my endorsement guided by the splendid work my fellow Hoosier, the distinguished Senator from Indiana,
Birch E. Bayh.
Senator AYTT. Thank you, Congressman 1facobs. I think the com'.
mittee already knows the great esteem I have for the junior member of
your committee, Mr. Chairman. You will be as proud of him in a few
short months as we are in Indiana.
I want to reemphasize what was said by both the chairman and the
ranking minority member that there is no perfect solution to this
rather complicated and vexing problem with which we have been dealing for a number of years. Our efforts have been directed at finding
the best proposal possible. Each has been willing to give and take a
little bit on his idea in the true legislative process to come up with the
best solution we could find-one which would certainly be better than
none at all. I feel extensive hearings, study, the effort for a consensus,
the support of the American liar Association House of Delegates, the
brief hearings which we held this year, plus the extensive scrutiny
which our committee has given it-not to mention the extensive scrutiny that this committee will give these proposals-will guarantee
that we don't find a hit-and-miss solution to the double-barreled problem with which we are dealing this morning.
The subcommittee of which I am a representative before the committee passed out Senate Joint Resolution 1 unaltered, but as pointed
out by Mr. McCulloch, the full Senate Committee on the Judiciary
held 2 days of executive sessions in which we very closely scrutinized
this measure and did make some changes. The chian ges, I feel make
the bill a better bill. I will say very quickly that I do not believe
that any of tile changes deal with the substance of the resolution but
rather to language l)erfections which will make the meaning and the
Intentions easier to perceive. Quickly, let me run through the bill section by section since I'm certain all of you are very familiar with its
provisions.
Then I will hit on one or two of the specific questions we discussed
in the committee so that your committee may have the thinking of
our committee in making your decision. I don't mean to imply you
necessarily are going to accept the thinking of our committee, but I
did want you to llve the benefit of it in your deliberations.
Section I of Joint Resolution 1, of course, deals with the Tyler
precedent. I think that really the Tyler precedent makes it almost
superfluous to include section 1 which makes clear that when the
President dies the Vice President becomes President and not Acting
President. However, even after the tragic events of November in
Dallas we find that an American citizen thought there was sufficient
doubt to file in the courts a suit contesting the right of the President
to assume the office as President. I think we can clarify this longstanding doubt in one simple sentence.
Section 2 permits us to-have a Vice President at all times. Whether
the President dies and the Vice President succeeds him as has happened
eight times, or if the Vice President dies, which has happened seven
times or If a Vice President resighs, which has happened once, we
propose the office be filled by the President nominating a successor
and the majority of both Houses of Congress confirming this nomination.
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'rhe CHAIMAN. You care to answer questions as you go along or
you want us to waitI
Senator BAY1I. It would be fine.
The CHAIRMAN. You say by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress; would that mean a joint session or separate action by each
House?
Senator BAYh. We suggest that this would be separate action by
both Houses. There seems to be ample precedent whenever the wording is used in the bill that it does mean separate sessions of each branch
of the Laegislature.
Mr. PorF. Ma I inquire? Would the witness prefer that question
bepostponed until lie has concluded his statement?
Senator BArn. Perhaps it would give us more continuity if I quick.
y finished my five-section summary and then submitted to questions.
1have no objection i whatever the committee wants.
Mr. Perv. That is entirely acceptable to me, Mr. Chairman.
Senator BAyu. Fine.

I might say one word about the thinking of the committee in this
section 2 because we had a rather extensive debate on whether we
should change the language in the bill that the chairman and I have
cosponsored in which we say by confirmation of both Houses, to read
the advice and consent of both Houses.
Senator Ervin,.who is a rather distinguished constitutional scholar,
was very strong in his fooling-very persuasive I felt-that the constitutional precedent of advice and consent which gives the Senate
the power to advise and consent under certain circumstances, also
enables presidential nominees to function in office in the absence of any
advice and consent of the Senate. It is our feeling that certainly the
Members of the Congress would not want the Vice President to assume
the powers and duties of the office of Vice President in the absence of
some advice and consent so that he might in fact through a tmgic set
of circumstances be the President. before any of us in Congress would
have any voice in this matter whatsoever. So we felt the word "con.
formation" in this case was better than the use of the words "advise
and consent" because of the implications that might be involved by
past precedent.
Section 3 deals with the disability problem in which the President
may divest himself of the powers and duties of his office voluntarily,
in the event he feels he is unable to perform properly these powers
and duties. In this case, the Vice President would assume the powers
and duties as the Acting President during the tenure of the disability.
Section 4 permits the Vice President and the majority of the Cabinet
to make the decision that the President is unable to perform the powers
and the duties of the office in the absence of a Presidential statement
to this effect. We also provide for the unforeseen contingency that
the Cabinet may not prove to be the best body to determine prei.
dentia] inability in conjunction with the Vice President. So we would
allow Congress might provide by law for another such body to participate in the decision. This approach would enable flexibility without
req hiring another constitutional amendment.
Section 5 deals with the remote possibilitythat the President, on
one hand, would say he is able; and the Vice President and the
44-01-65---4
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interest of the country is that the Vice P'esident should continue to
perform these functions, and that you are not recovered."
In this case we feel to put it very quickly, the issue should be put
to Congress. Both Houses of Congress, acting by two-thirds vote--

more than required in the impeachment provisions--would be required
to support the contention of the Vice President and Cabinet majority.
Now let me hit on two or three questions, if I may, gentlemen, before

yielding to your questions.
One of the problems that has been discussed not only by our committee but at some length in the news media is the problem of time
limitation. How quickly should Congress act? The distinguished
ranking minority member of this committee has suggested there should
be a 10-day time limitation. There have been other time limitations
suggested. Some of the news media have suggested the use of the
word "immediately is too vague. It would lot Congress become embroiled in long debate stretching out over months, they say, and
consequently we should tie the hands of Congress and should limit
them.
I must say the feeling of my colleagues in the committee was quite
the contrary. They felt that the use of the word "Immediately" could
well be too restrictive. The use of the word "immediately" might even
imply a decision without any debate whatsoever, without the opportunity to call on medical witnesses, without the opportunity to consult
with the members of the Cabinet and the Vice PresideAt who had
made this important decision. For this reason, we finally decided to
amend the paragraph so that it reads, "Congress shall 'immediately

proceed to decide the issue)" feeling that the words "proceed to" would
more clearly imply that the process of determination could include
calling witnesses and the like. Nevertheless, the word "Immedia(tel y"

means forthwith, quickly, and with the greatest of dispatch. Now
this committee, in its judgment, can determine whether this gives too
much leeway or not.
.
For the purpose of assuring proper and public notice of inability
declarations, we made provisions for the President to provide a written
declaration of inability under section 8 to the Speaker of the House
and the President of the Senate. It was the feeling of the committeeand our report so states -that trnsmittal to the offices of the presiding
officers of each House shall be sufficient constructive notice for the
transferral of power, and that the time lapse Involved in transmittin
this notice from 1000 Pennsylvania Avenue to Capitol Hill is suliciently short that it would not be something to concern ourselves with
and would guarantee public notice for the entire country. One other
question I will touch on is the strong feeling on the part of some that
we are violating the traditional separation of powers b' permitting
the Congrmcs to get into the act, not only in choosing a Vice President
but partiililar'In l ie area of the final determination as to whether the
President is able or unable to perform the powers and duties of his
office.
I would like to point out I am a strong adherent to the separation
of powers doctrine. I would like to also point out that our forefatlhers
have found it expedient and wise to include in the body of the Consti.
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tution itself, as have subsequent amendments, certain commingling of
the various branches. The veto power is one area, in which the executive attempts to check and soiet mes does check the legislative branch.

The confirmation power of the Senate is another apparent attempt to

commingle and to provide a check. The House of Representatives, as
you know, according to the 12th amendment to the Constitution, does,
In fact, elect a President of the United States if no candidate gets a
majority of the electoral votes. In the impeachment provisions of the
Constitution we not only Involve the House and the Senate but in the
final determination we bring in as presiding officer the Chiei Justice of
the Supreme Court. I feet-it is necessary to bring Congress into the
picture because I don't want the powers which have been given to the
President by all of the people to be taken away from him without the
representatives of the people having a voice.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I proceed( at greater length than I intended
to in a summary.
Vr. RooEns. Mr. Chairman.
The CAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rooaus. Do I understand you did discuss the question in section
2 of your proposed constitutional amendment that in the event that the
President should name a Vice President and the Congress, that is the
House and the Senate, did not confirm that designation, would the
Speaker of the House then assume the duties of the President in the
event of a vacancy I
Senator B.%Yji. Yes, sir; Congressman. This would be the case.
This is one of the imperfections of this measure. Quite frankly, I
can envision the possibility, although I think it is very unlikely, that
Congress for some reason or other would not go along with the suggestion or suggestions that the President might send to the Congress
and in this case if something would happen to the President while
there was a vacancy the present line of succession would be implemented. However, our feeling was.
Mr. RooF.ns. Go ahead.
Senator BAYr. I just want to emphasize why I think this would be
unlikely. Our feeling is that in a time of national tragedy such as a
death of a President where the Vice President succeeds, or where
the Vice President himself dies-the country is in no mood to tolerate
political chicanery in the appointment of aVice President and I don't
think this would b the case.
Mr. Rooirps. You think it ispolitical chicanery, you in your judg•ment as a Member of the U.S. Senate, should feel a man is not compel.
tent to be a Vice President or President? Don't you think It is your
.duty to vote against him and if you vote against him you call thatpolitical chicanery ?
Senator BAYJh. No. But I think in mostMr. Rooss. Well, aren't you at the same time advocating and saying that you as a Member of the U.S. Senate and I as a Member of
athe
House, if we should vote against that, that we are not exercising
our best judgment?
Senator 'BAY. First of all, Congressman, perhaps the use of the
term politicall chicanery" was not a good one.
Mr. RoGErs. Well.
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' Senator BAYH.: But there is a possibility of a political power strug.
gle going on and this is one possibility.
Mr. Roamts. Surely.
Senator BAYH. Under the present circumstances, usually the Presi.
dent would be able to rely on the members of his own party to support
his own choice as to who the Vice President should be which would
be very similar to our nominating ppocedures. In the event the opp 0site party controlled the Congress, then I feel that the effort to pIlay
politics with this appointment would be prevented by a strong voicing
of public opinion and I think this could be supported by the tradit ion
whicl finds very limited opposition to the power that the President
now has to appoint his Cabinet and many other officers who must
be confirmed by the vote of the Senate.
Mr. RooEns. Under this amendment could the President nominate
someone for Vice President who is not 8$ years of a f
Senator BATH. I would think not. I would think, certainly, that
just the adding of an amendment to the Constitution does not repeal
previous requirements that have been put on this office in the past.
Mr. Roons: Well I just wanted to get the record clear that you
have no intention under this amendment.
Senator BY1. None whatsoever. In fact the 12th amendment
setting up new electoral procedure does not carry over all the quali.
fications of the President fn the 12th amendment.
Mr. Roopns. You would have no objection to being so spelled out in
this amendment?
Senator BDYTh. No, sir. Well, I ask the committee's consideration
of our efforts to keep the amendment as brief as we can. Things like
this we tried to put in our report. Perhaps this committee would
prefer to lengthen the amendment by adding this. safe tiard. I, for
one, would prefer seeing it in the report and keeping the amendment
short.
Mr. ROOERRS. You see any political implications that might arise duo
to the fact we are removing the Speaker of the louse of Representatives as a. possible successor to the office of President in this amendmentI
Senator BATH. No sir I don't.
Mr. tonEns. You Ieel Members of the House would go right along
and think that their prerogative passing legislation where the Speaker
i--the one in succession-that that removal meets with their approval
and they wouldn't hesitate to approve it on account of that?
Senator BAYTH. You, sir, could speak better to this question than I.
Mr. RooERs. It is a problem that is presented.
The CHIRMAX. Senator, may I interject ? Would you yield?
Mr. Roopns. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMA. As I see it, I don't see how it would interfere with
the line of succession. The line of succession only comes into being
when both the Prniident and Vice President are no longer with us.
Then you start the line of succession beginning with the Speaker of
the House. Under this proposal it doesn't provide--it doesn't take
care of a contingency when both are no longer with us. That is taken
care of by the line of succession statute,
Senator 3AYrH. That is correct.
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Mr. Rooza. Apparently, I didn't make myself clear. In the first
instance an order for the President to nominate a Vice President and
have him confirmed-now that as I indicated-suppose he is not confirmed by Congress. The succession would be if we follow the law
now, in the event of the death of the President the Speaker of the
House of Representatives would become President of the United
States.
Senator Bnxv. That would be the law, sir, after the ratification by
the Congress and the legislatures of this amendment. It would not
change that law.
Mr. RooF.Rs. It wouldn't change that law and, therefore, that is

what I wanted to make sure, that is what your intent was the success.
sion we have spelled out so far would remain the law. Ilut you do
admit that it does permit the President to pick anybody as long as le
is 35 years of age and I assume American born as required by the
Constitution and- name him as Vice President under this section 2.
Senator BAY11. Provided the majority of Congress will go along.
Mr. RooEas. But if the majority did not go along and a vacancy did
then occur then the Speaker of the House would become President.
Senator b3Ayx,. That is correct, if the Congress failed to confirm a
Vice President.
Mr. Roons. Well, I just wanted to got that clear.

Senator BAYJI. May i insert one thought hero at this timeI
We are trying to recognize in this measure the development of the
office of Vice President and the need to have an able-bodied, working,
capable, articulate, intelligent Vice President at all times. The Vice
President can be a great asset to the President. The line of succession after a double death would not be changed.
Mr. RooERs. We change the line of succession by the virtue of the
statute.
Senator BAyjt. That is correct.
Mr. Roorns. Not the Constitution but the point that I'm getting
at Isthat we have the statute now and apparently would not change it.
Now let's go to section 3.
Mr. TENzER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Senator, I think there is a bit of faulty reasoning here, if you permit
me. The line of succession act only applies, as I said before, when
both the President and the Vice President is no longer with us. If,
perchance, we pass this constitutional amendment and the Vice President is not with us, dies, resigns, or what have you, and the President
appoints a successor and the House and the Senate does not confirm it,
It does not follow that the Speaker becomes Vice President. It onlythe Speaker only advances when both the President and Vice President
are gone.

Senator BADT. I didn't understand Congressman Rogers' question.
I thought he meant on the death of the President.
Mr. oomis. I neverSenator BAYT. I didn't think that was the question.
Mr. Roozns. Mr. Chairman, I didn't have that in mind. Tho only
thing is I was as ,ou and I know, we have had this question of presidential inability discussed from the time that President Eisenhower
had his heart attack in 1055 and we conducted many hearings over
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here in connection with it and one of the difficulties was that you

couldn't get an agreement of who is going to act in certain instances
and if they did act, in what, capacity were they permitted to act and,
therefore, if this is to be presented, I think that we should spell these
things out so there would-be no question of what your intention is and
what would be the intentions of the members of this committee if this
is to be adopted. That's the reason I am asking the question, be.
cause you can really appreciate that if a vacancy does.'occur in the
Presidency and the Sonate and the House does not confirm the President's nominee, then, in the event of a vacancy, who is to take overt
And your answer is that we keep the statute of a line of succession
that we now have-it would be the Speaker of the House of Representatives-and you don't feel that that presents any political problem
in removing the Speaker as a possible successor to the Presidency, that
they will go along, Members of the House will-whatever prerogative
they may have thought they gained by the passage of that pice of
legislation they will willingly surrender it for this constitutional
amendment.
Now, that is your thought as I understand it.
Senator BAYI,. That is my thought; yes, sir.
Mr. AsuroniRE. Will the gentleman yieold for one ohsePvatioul?
Mr. RooFns. Yes.
Mr. ASntMOtRF,. Did your committee consider the situation that might
arise in the case where the President should nominate or name the
Speaker of the House as Vice President.? Then the Congress refused
to confirm the Speaker of the House.
Where are you then?
Senator BAvr You would probably be in a rather unlikely situt-

don,

Mr. AsitMoRU. Speaker of the House would take over anyway
wouldn't he I
Senator BAyjr. On the death of the President. You see, the
Speaker doesn't get in the picture unless we have two deaths. This
would be the ease if the nominee for Vie. President was not confirmed
by the Congress and the President (l141d.
Mr. TxNzER. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield
Mr. AsJ MORE. Well, does your bill provide if the Congress should
refuse to confirm the person the President has named, then would the
President be authorized to submit another name?
Senator BAYR. Yes, sir; and another, and another, and another.
There is no limit on the number of names the President could submit
to the Congress. I think if we didn't pass on the first name, it would
be logical fbr a second name to he submitted.
For any legislation to work, gentlemen, I think we have to assume
we are dealing with reasonable men. They would give reasonable
consideration to the name submitted by the' Presidenit. Tf Congress
didn't approve, another name would be submitted.
Mr. TixzEr. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Asum .O
, I yield.
Mr. WHIrrENEm. I would like to ask the Senator if it is the feeling
of his subcommittee that a constitutional amendment is necessary to
accomplish this purpose.
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Senator BAYU. Yes, sir; we feel atconstitutional amendment. is
necessary.
Mr. WjiThN n. Now article 1U, clause 5,section 1 says that in case

of the removal of the President from office or of his death, resigna-

tion, or inability to discharge the powers and the duties of said office,
the same shall devolve on the Vice President and the Congress mtut by
law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall
then act as President and such officer shall act accordingly until the
disability be removed or a President shall be elected.
Senator BAYH. As the Congressman undoubtedly knows there has
been a considerable amount of debate over whether a constitutional
amendment was in fact needed because of the very wording he just
read to the committee. Because there is sufficient debate, some doubt
we felt it would be safer-to be absolutely safeo-to put a matter like
this in the bedrock law of the Constitution so there cannot be a court
test at some moment of crisis as to the constitutionality of this pro.
vision.
Mr. WJirrERn. I gather from the question these gentlemen ask that
the amendment you now propose also raises question so it doesn't seem
likely we are going to eliminate legal questions.
Senator Bvrir But we would eliminate constitutional questions if
it is the Constitution, would we not I
Mr. WurrmipN; It seems to me this language is abundantly clear.
The only thing that I can see that you make clear in this that is not
clear in the present Constitution is that you take away from the Congress the right to move without the intercession of the President; in
making this determination, Under this proposed amendment the
Congress, it seems to me, will have to sit here and wait until the President makes i move whereas without this amendment and going under
the present language of the Constitution, the Congress on its own
motion makes this decision.
Senator BAyii. Well, the Congress, of course, has not made its own
motion and there is a considerable amount of division of opinion as
to whether it does have the constitutional authority to do so in this particular case-in the case of disability. There seems to be almost unanimous agreement that Congress does not have the power to appoint a
new Vice President, which w the second part of this amendment. This
would require without a doubt a constitutional amendment.
Mr. WfHiTNER. I think that's clear that the present language does
not apply to the Vice-Presidency, but if this situation arises that we
are talking about, the dual death-the Vice President and the President, we have-we either have the constitutional authority to do what
you would propose to do in this amendment to the Constitution or we
didn't have the authority to do what was done when we put the Speaker
in the third position. Isn't that correct?
Senator BAY1. In the case of the Speaker, we are dealing with the
death of both officers and the Speaker does take over as President.
Mr. Wnrrml.%i. Or inability.
Senator BAYJI. The problem of inability is different because we
hope this is a temporary divestiture of the powers and duties of the
office. If we go back to the Tyler precedent.and ap ly it to disability,
then we see that when the President is ill and the VIce President as.
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sumes the powers and duties of the office, he is not Acting President.
He is the President. And as Henry Clay said a long time ago, it is
impossible to separate these two offices.
Mr. Wuimwna. The Constitution, to read it a different way, says
"Congress may by la provide for the inability both of the President
and. Vice President declaring what officer shall then act as President."
Well, may I ask you one other little question?
I notice Inyour amendmentSenator BAYH1. Before you proceed, may I say I don't think my personal opinion as to whether we need a constitutional amendment or
not is as important as the fact that my distinguished friend from
North Carolina and I lut ourselves in this debate. This is just a small

part of the debate that has gone on in the past. We have proposed a
consti(utional amendment on these points just to be safe so there will
be no doubt about it. I think this is justtbeing safe by putting it in
the Constitution.
Mr. WInuxF-n. If the gentleman would yield to one further question. I notice that you used section 4, the language:
A majority of the principal officers of the executive departments.

Now, as I remember it, that's used only one other-or at one time
in the present Constitution. Now, in your prepared statement which I
glanced at, you and our chaitinan in his statement just seemed to
assume that that ,meant members of the President's Cabinet. Now,
what legal authority do you have for saying that the words "a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments" means members of the President's Cabinet?
Senator BAYjI. This has been the general interpretation put on this
language.
Mr. WITINER. By whom?
Senator BAYr. As it has been used in the past. I feel this is a
legitimate question, and we made our intent abundantly clear in our
report.
31f r. W1

ENR. Now, let's take the Department of Defense.

We have the Department of Defense. Within that Department we
have the Department of the Navy. the Department of the Air Force,
the Department of the Army. Would the principal officers of the
Department of the Navy be one of these people?
Senator BAYH. I would say not.
Mr. Wr'ntzn. Why?

Senator BAYU1. Because in the reorganization of the Armed Forces,
the Department of Defense superseded the other three Departments
and they became subordinate thereto and these other three officers do
not sit in the President's Cabinet. The logical Interpretation is that
the heads of the executive departments are the principal officers of
the executive departments. This is the Cabinet.
Mr. WIrrENER. It seems to me the Navy Department is an execuf

tire department and that the principal offcer of that Department is
.
the Secretary of the Navy.
Senator BAYI. I suppose it's important we make it clear we are
taking about the Cabinet. I think this is the interpretation that has
been put on it.
If the gentleman would excuse me, why did you not
Mr. Wuminz.
say the members of the President's Cabinet?
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Senator BAYJY. The terminology has never been used in the Constitution. The term "executive departments" has, and in the report we
define this as the Cabinet, making this interpretation very clear.
Mr. WhITNiER. Of course, when that was used in the original Constitution they didn't contemplate several departments we now have.
I think that putting it into th report would not obviate the hazard any
more than language that has been put in many reports to whih courts

have paid no afttei'ion to in the past.
Senator BAY1I. If my recollection serves ine correctly-and you are
probably more aware of this than I-isn't this the same language used

il the succession statute?

Mr. WJI|ITENER. I don't thinks.

It may be in the statutes,
Senator Bvru, The officers are set out.
Mr. WHITn-R. There again, I think you are in a different legal
field when you have a court-interpreted statute as regards a courtinterpreted cost itut ion.
Mr. Roorns. In the statute of succession you don't have to have an
interpretation by the Chief Executives as to whether the Speaker
should t ake over in the event of a vacancy, vacancy in the Presidency;

do you?

go it would have no application to the response to what the gentleman has said.
But may I back up and inquire about your section 8.
You say if the President declares in writing he is unable to discharge the powers and ditties of the office, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the President as Acting President. Well,
now-

Senator BAY. By the Vice President.
Mr. Roopns. What are you going to (to, sir, as they claimed at the
time of Woodrow Wilson when he had a stroke and many people
claimed he didn't have the capacity, mental capacity with which to
sign i letter. Now, if someone should show up with a letter prosumably signed by him would that give to the President or Vice
President the authority to assume the office under this amendment?
Senator BAYII. Well, first of all, this is one reason we changed the
wording in the proposal. You can no longer show up with a letter.
It has to be written, a written declaration which has been transmitted
to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, and certainly soMr. ROoEns. That isn't what I construe section 8 to mean.
It says if the President declares in writing he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the President as Acting President.
Now, my question is, suppose the Vice President runs down 16thor Pennsylvania Avenue and says, "I got a letter from the President.
.Hesays he is not able to perform these duties. Therefore I am acting as President."
Now, is there anybody in a position to stop him from acting?
Senator BAYXI. llrst. of all, I want to repeat once again. Apparently, I did not make it clear. The committee was sufficiently con.
cerned about the Vice President coming up with a letter in his pocket
or finding it in his dresser drawer or something, that we changed the
wording of the section to which the Congressman referred to read
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that a letter from the President must be transmitted in the normal
course of business as all Executive messages are transmitted to the
presiding officers of both Houses.
Is tlat sufficient ?
Mr. RooERs. That is, if the--there was transmitted from the Presi.

dent of the United States to tile Speaker of the House of Representa.
tives and to the President of tile Senate a letter from the President then
that would be--that's the amendment that you have offered on the
Senate side?
Senator BATh. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. DONA ItY. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. RooEas. Yes.
Mr. DONAHUE. Let us assume the Pre.sident becomes mentally in.
competent. If the President declares in writing that, he is unable to
discharge his duties, if he is mentally incompetent, what. value should
that writing have?
Senator "BAYH. Well, if he is mentally incompetent, whether the
value of tile writing was in question or not, I think it would be incumbent upon the Vice President and Cabinet under section 4 to assume
the powers and the duties of the office as if there was no writing by the
President.
The problem of mental disability to which you referred and Mr.
Roers referred is a tough one. Its problem, really, is much like the
Wilson problem, in which the facts are difficult to nail down. The
President is surrounded by his official family, and his wife and his
doctor certainly have a tremendous influence on him. It seems to me
that section 6 would be implemented and Congress would have to make
a determination of this once and for all.
Mr. Do.;oiuE,. Senator, may I ask you this? Tsn't the whole problem we are confronted with, oiine of what shall be done when the President shall become physically or mentally incompetent to carry out the
duties of the office?
Senator BArn. Yes, sir, that is. Tit is.
Mr. DoVrAmju.. In other words, the present statute relating to the

succession is perfectly sound.
Senator BAH. Ithas nothing to do with the problem we are discussing here today.
Mr. DoNituE. That is right. So what we should try to resolve is
what shall be done when the'President becomes physically or mentally
incompetent. It all boils down to that., doesn't itI
Senator BAYIr. Yes, sir, that's what we are trying to do.
The CH1AIMtA. Would the gentleman from Colorado yield to the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Tenzer I
Mr. 'T1zxu.R Wo are now talking about sections 3 and 4 but I was
addressing my inquiry to the Senator. Under section 2 would it not
be clear that it the Presi dent made a nomination for Vies President and
If both Houses of Congress did not approve, then the President would
make another nomination before the Speaker of House would succeed?
Senator BAY1T. Yes, sir.
Mr. TmjgzpR. Wouldn't that be one?
Senator BRArTl. Of course, the Speaker of the House does not succeed at i1l unless there is a double-death.
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Mr. 'rNzt, That is both President and Vice President.
Senator BAY1. Yes. Yes.

Mr. TENzER. That is what I want to make perfectly clear. Another

nomination would have to be made.
Mr. DoNotjiv. They would have to die simultaneously in a

catastrophe?

Mr. TENzER. Yes.

The CHAIRMsAN. Would the gentleman from Colorado yield I

When the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Whitener, spoke that
the statute may be sufficient, I would like to draw the committee's attention to a statement made by former Attorney General Brownell when
lip appeared before this committee on April 1, 1957, on this subject.
Iro sal as follows:
The number of respected constitutional authorities have argued that there
can be no temporary devolution of Presildential power on the Vice President during periods of presidential Inability and whatever we may think of that argument
I think that a statute would not Irotect the Nation adequately for the doubts that
have been raised have been raised too persistently. As long as there Is doubt,
lingering doubt, concerning the constitutionality oi the statute, as long as there is
a question concerning the disabled President's constitutional stature after his

recovery, I do not believe any Inability as a practical matter, however severe it
may be would be recognized lest recognition In that disability would oust the

disabled President from office.

Moreover if the presidential inability was severe

and prolonged, to note the devolution of presidential power on the Vice P resident

would create somewhat of a crisis Itself.

Therefore, he comi to the mialterabhle conclusion itconstitutional
am endment wouldhd be teessiry.
Senator BAY11. I think tl'words of the new Attorney General will
be particularly interest ing in this alrea also.
The (.71Ar.,N. Go ahead,
Mr. om..its, Senator, turning to section -4,
as anended, it says,
"Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of I lie principal officers

of the executive departments"-let's stop there.
W17h (o voul envision its being prinCijal oflicers of the executive
enatorB,%

.The Mde(lt-'s Cabinet.

Mr. RooErs. And when von use it in that ternm yoU only intend to
have the President's Cabinet?
Senator BM
4 ii. That. is coriecl, sir.
Mr. RooEms. And none other?
Senator BAYhI. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mutts. If in the future we should create an office of Cabinet
of Humanities as an example or of Natural Resources and so forth,
each one of those would be a member of the Cabinet who would be in
a position to act. In other word-Senator BAYu. That is correct.

Mr. Rooanms. If, any Cabinet officer created under the act of Con-

grems would be in a,position to act.
Senator BAY11. That is correct. Yes, sir,
Mr. Rouaw. You and I reeogilze that these positions are at the
pleasure of the President and subject to confirmation of the Houseor the Senate,
Now, do you suppose that a majority. of the officers should arrive at
a conchlsion that the lresident, is 11nable to perform the duties of his
office and hie learns of it, and hie immediately discharges all of them,
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accepts their resignations-then where are we in your constitutional
amendment if he says you no longer are it
member of the Cabinet henco

you cannot say that 1 can't perforin tie duties of the office. What
would happen in that case?
Senator

HAvMr.

This is one of the contingencies for which it Is very

difficult
to find
a positive solution. If I may go one stop further and
expand your
question.
Mlr. Roo rs. Yes.

Senator 1tyrir. To take another very similar possibility, suppose the
President doesn't. find out about it-or suppose lie is unconscious and
the Vice President with the consent of the majority of the Cabinet des
take over. Then suppose the vote was 7 to 3, and the Vice President

as Acting President promptly proceeded to fire the three who voted
against him-

Mr. RoGERS. SureSenator BArIK. On the other side, we don't want to put a Vice

President in a situation as Acting President where someone dies on the
Cabinet and he doesn't have the authority to replace him.
Mr. Roni.s. No, but here the point is this: that the man selected for

the Cabinet position, the men selected for the Cabinet positions are
those the President has trust and he expects honor from them,

Ihe's not

now likely to look with favor to them if they pass a resolution saying
you are no longer competent. They are turnitng on the man who made
heir position possible. Do you think that that is the proper body to
make this determinat ion ?
Senator B1.%t. Yes, I do, sir, for the reason that I feel that the hody
that. works the closest. with the President, that is most familiar with his
capability, should have the opportunity to make this determination
with the Vice President who, I think, has the inescapable constitutional
responsibility of participating.
The CHIxRmAN. Isn't there a safeguard because you say, "or such

other body as Congress may by law provide."
Mr. xRonnts. Now, that Mr Chairman, That's true.
The CIrAxrmMVrA. That body could be the body of physicians, the
Supreme Court or what. have you. That is the safety valve, isn't it?
Senator BArtt. Yes, sir, and thatsMr. Rom,.s. Would the gentleman yield?
Senator BAYIr. That is the yery reason this was put into the language. We don't know what the hfnture is going to reveal to its. We
might find the Cabinet is unworkable. We want the Congress, without
going through the whole constitutional amendment procedure, to be
able to set up another body if, in its wisdom, it thinks it is necessary.
Mr. JooDio. Senator, T don't want to seem to be facetious. Let's
consider this possibility since we are going to take into consideration
situations to occur and sometimes those most unlikely to occur
What provision do we make here, or is there any provision intended to be made if after the assumption of the Vice President to
the powers and duties as Acting President that the then Acting President becoines disabled?
Senator BAYI. We have not provided for this contingency.
Mr. Roomis, May I follow through?
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Mr. Rompn. Is there the likelihood, especially in this lay and
age, when we hoar so much of the seriousness of heart attacks and oth.
er serious ailments that suddenly strike, or again the question of mental
comnl)ctency, and it could very likely hapen, though it may not be

within the real of probability, right. withit that a(ininistration that
both the Presi(ent and the Vice President who astmes the ditties of
the office of the President as an Acting President; then he too maybe
is stricken with some disability but it s likely to occur and if we are
going to now amend the Constitution I thInk that we should well
weigh ths question and make some provision.
Senator i. 4 i'. I think that it is wise for the committee to weigh it
and I think it Is a question well put; but the reason we did not Inelude it was that tle more complicated you make a constitutional
1mne01ent, quite frankly, the more contingenicles for which ,you provide, the more difficult itis to get it massed. The more Contiigencies
you place in it lhe more dillicult it. is to aet the two-thirds Vote of
Congress and three-fourths the State legislatures. What we tried
to ((0 isprovide for the most likely eventualities and hope we can
get. it through, feeling we would have most of these things covered.
There are other contingencies. For example, what l)appeils if the
President and Vice President. are killed after election, prior to being
sworn in? There are many facets of the normal transfer of ExCeutive power that we did n~ot include in the final amendment after
giving it. a great deal of debate. This is one we didihT consider, but
wo did not include for that reason.
The OlAM1,AN. Would the gentleman yield for a moment to clear
up itpoint with reference to wriat you spoke, a resignation of a membo of the Cabinet which might. glm u1p fIle works?
I don't think you took Into consideration the amendment that the
Senate put into section 4. That amendment is as follows:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the irineliml offers of the

executive departu'uent

or siut'h other lIody as Conlgr'eqs lmuy by law Irovilo,

tramits to the Senate and the speaker of the Uouse of Representatives their

writ ten declaratltut-

that means their written declaration-not only the Vice President
but the members of the Cabinet-if the member of the Cabinet resigns
or is fired after he signs the written dechration prevails, he has made
a decision. What happens after he makes his decision could not oper-

ate retroactively so lio is out so that I think your question and tihe

answers that were given should be clarified so that it makes no difference whether that Cabinet ofllicer resigns after lie made his written
decla rat ion.
Mr. Rooms, But thle point I tried to emphasize is not only that, but
naturally if a man, if lie is President and has lots of lCOl)Ic around,
certainly le is going to have at least one loyal mom ber among the
Cabinet say a meeting is necessary to determine whether you siouild
continue to be Presidint.; that he might tiuce the action before they
got this written declaration. That's tNie point I am trytilg to emplhasize and I want to follow through on the other problem as presented
here.
Where you say the majority of the principal officers which you
have said are the Cabinet. Now, or such other body as Congress may
by law provide.
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Now may I inquire, sir, if Congress should set lip itcommission
composed of say tire psychiatrists, and five Members of the House
and five of the Senate, would that body then make an extunination
of the President and we provide in the statute that they shall make
the examination and make their report. Would they thlen-could
Congress enact. such a law and designate such people to make these
determinations and immediately upon that being transmitted to the
Speaker of the 1lose of Rtepresentatives and tIie President. of the
Senate, that. that immediately removes the President from his posi.

tionI
Semittor BAYJT. With the consent of the Vice President, yes, sir,
the Congress could. Just as the Congress can finally take llhe Presi-

dent out of office by impeachment, and under section Aof this proposal
for disability.
Mr. Roim. Now suppose that does happen and immediately the

President under section 5 says he transmits his declarat ion that. no inability exists. Then who isPresident?

Senator BAYU. The Vice President continuess to act as President
until the Congress decides the issue. We have given this a consider-

able amount of study and we have tried to arrive at. a situation where
there is a minimum amount of elhange back and forth.
Mr. Roopits, Then I gather from what you state that. if the situation should arise whether it is the Cabinet or whether it is a stattte
as authorized by Congress and a declaration has been made and transmitted that immediately removes the President. Following his
removal he then certifies that he has the ability to resume the office.
Then he cannot resume his office until he has a majority of the principal
officers of the executive departments or such other body as Congress
my provide.
Senator BAY11. No, sir, let me clarify this. Then the burden is
on the Vice President and the majority of the Cabinet. It is on their
shoulders to get two-thirds of the Congress to support their contention

that the President is unable to perform the powers and duties of the

office. So in that circumstance, the President, if having been declared
by this body that's been set up by Conglress and the Vice President, to
be ill, makes a declaration he is well, t lie only way they could take the
office away from him would be for both the Vice president, a majority
of the Cabinet or this other body and two-thirds of Congress to support the contention he was ill.
Mr. RooEnS. But your first-your section 4 provides that whenever this Cabinet or whenever this committee or whatever is provided
by statute when tley make the determination and transmit it immediately the Vice President becomes the Acting President.
Senator B YJ. That is correct.
Mr. RooEns. This divests the man who has been elected President
of the United States of his office by the action of either the people who
have--he has appointed, or people that Congress have authorized to
make this determination.

Senator BAYH. That is correct.

Mr. WinnmxE.

Would the gentleman yieldI

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman yieldI

Mr. Wiramn. I notice you and our chairman keep referring to
members of the Cabinet and T don't want to belabor this point, but you
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t1najority of the principal officers of the executive departments

anld 1)o 0110 questions that, Congress has tile right to creato executive

departments, I assume. Now, I just quickly lookedd here at the title
5, section 1 of the United States Code, and it says that the provisions
of this title shall apply to the following executive depnrtments.
First, the Department. of State.
Second, the Department of Defense.
Third, the apartmentt of the Treasury.
Department of Justice.
Post Offlee Department.

departmentt of the Interior.
departmentt of Agriculture.

Department of Commerce.
I)opartipent of Labor.
Department of Health, Eiducaion, and Welfare.
Then when we go to Itle 10, section 101, relating to the Defense
Department, and from this in subsection 0,quote: "Executive part of
the Department," unquote, means the executive part of the Department
of Defense, Department of tile Army, )epartmont. of the Navy, or
Department of the Air Force as thecase may he at the sent of the
Government.
And (hen whi'w we look at title 42,section 201, subsoetion (0), we find

the Congress defining executivee department" as follows:

The term "executli'e department" means any executive department, agency,
or Independent estnbllshment of the United States or any corporation wholly
owned by the United States."

Now in 6 minutes I have found these definitions of executive department in existing statutes.
If tile Congress has the authority under your amendment to-and if
the amendment says that the principal officers in the executive departments are to make this decision, it seems to me that you have opened
up greater opportunity for litigation and contention by the use of that
language and that if you mean the Cabinet you should say the Cabinet.
There are probably other conflicts. I am sure the learned Attorney
General when he appears will tell us other definitions of the executive
department to be found in the United States Code.
Senator BAY. I will merely say that whatever language is used
that the intention should be made clear that we are talking about the
President's Cabinet, his official family. I, for one, think that the
langruageIr.
1W rrFNEn. Or such other body as Congress may designate and
if Congress-

Senator BAY. The Congressman is talking about the use of tle
words "executive departments" and I admit this other is in there. It
is in there for the purpose we discussed but when you are talking about
the principal officers of the executive departments 1, for one, think it
is clear we are talking about the President's Cabi.,et.
Mr. MATIUAs. Would the gentleman yield I
Mr. MAoon. Why do you object to puting it in? Why do you object
to using Cabinet I
Senator BAnY. I have no specific objection to putting it in, except
that,-
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Mr. Chairman, if I may clarify my reason again. Tile reason it
was put in, the word "Cabinet" was not used in the Constitution. The
words "members of the executive department" are.
Mr. Moowie. If I may interrupt, rho gentleman from North Carolina, picked out three or four instances in which tle phrase "executive
department heads" has been used which certainly should load you to
the concl fusion there could be some colfsiOn somewhere. Why would
It not be best to designate who shall have this responsibility to deter-

mine the incapability or capability of the President to handle the
alfairs of his office?

Senator BY4 1.I have no objection If the committee wants to change
the wordllng. I might say th ldistinguished senior Selator frol
North Carolina was the one most vehement in his feeling against putting additional language in the Constitution that has no precedent so
long as we make it clear. If you gentlemen don't think this is clear,
we ought to take further steps.
Senator Ervin feels this is sufficient. I do, too. But if the conmit.tee differs, I think it should be made abundantly clear whether in the
proposal, in the reports, or whether in the discussion oI the floot, thlt
we a ro talking about the President's Cabinet. We don't want tho head
of Soil Conservat ion Service or the Veterins' Administration or someone else to be brought into this determination. We are talking about
the President's Cabinet, the people who sit with him.
Mr. WIITENR. May I say this? Senator Ervin is one of my most
distinguished constituents and one of tile moot able lawyers to be
In section 2 you use the wording, "confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress" and then you go on again insection 5 tle
line 5 on page 3, "If the Congress determines by two-thirds vote of
both Houses,' do we mean actually a majority of tile Members of tie
House of Representatives or a majority of the Members present and
voting Do we mean two-thirds of tile Members of the House of
Representatives or two-thirds of the Members present and voting?
Senator Bl3Yvn, This is one question that was asked of the Attorney
General. It is his opinion, and it was our intention, that we proscribed
a niajority of the quoruin or two-thirds of the quorum as prescribed
by tie rules of both Houses. The Attorney General wts of the opinion we have adequate precedent so that whenever we talk about a Inajorily or tw'o-thirds e are tallcti about a mnjoilty of the quorum
whitl is necessary to conduct the'business in the first plhce.
io, IIoOEnS. 'lheilousewvhen you hnve218. Ifthorearo18present,
two-thirds of them vote. That meets the requirement?
Mr. II6oINO. Is that what you meant
Senator BAY!!. That's what we mean. That is the way it is always
been cost rued.
*Mr. M.r m.As. I thank the gentleman for yieldiong.
Going to the question of the gentleman of North Carolina, the use of

the phrase majorityy of the principal officers of the executive depart.
met"and relating tis to file term "Cabinet" because these are, not
necessary ral lel terms; today I believe that the Ambasador of time

,United ations sits with and as a member of the Cabinet. This is
a practice that has gone on since Henry Cabot Lodge was appointed
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Ambassador by President ,isenhower's adlnistrat ion, I understand
o0llemrs, including the head of te I)o1'rI'y ptograin, Mr.Shriver, is also sitt Ig Its a 1-ii.eiiilr of the Ctlbillet. Would
it,
be desirable as it matter of policy that, people of this sort who haeve
close Colitwt wit 11 ihe 'PNidehit.
ald who are constantly in colmUilli-

sof3 other OXtltivt

i lm inehlded in the generic term, "the C'binet " though
cation with him
they ar'o excluded by the laiguago that has been used so tar?

Senator lIAYII. I persoundl, do not lhink they should be included.
Thero are arguments on1 both Si(les of this. If you use Cabinet it could
very well be inter reted to include Mr. Stevels) 1Mr. Shriver, or
others who 1uight by custom Ibegin to sit i on the Cabinet meetings.
][owevei' we Ilire I Iuilkllg Ilollt tlie 'hlif execlitiV(k ollh'es of tis
Coullry, which I think e xlude I nited Nations or the poverty pro-

grlnIrect or,
Mr. MA14i'nAS, He isn't, siltilg ther, by e1ustom, but by invitation
of the l'esident of tie UInit(I States to become part of the Oabinet
and is part of the ('ahinlet
If we are thinking of getting the Cabinet
together, it ii1ight I less 11111111nt, for installed, for the Posti1master
Generl, who, perlhap S, Ilus verv vlsuail eomilats with ith lelsident,

thllan the I 11iled Nati is Alnluhlssador who mlay see lie President oin
it
wpelly or moore Ihu
iailyweekly Inusis,
litisis.
TheI ('itiIt.%
.% N. Will the gent leiaun yield .
I think we finld tie words "execlitive dllartmients' in another part of

the ( 'olstit11tion.

11 un ich, e,section , of this language it says

'i'1o I're~thonl shilll Wi Comillider III Chitt (it (ipe Armly 111d M\vy of the
1711Iled Stiths ndl of fie Milit of tdie Hwvers!l tntils, wmi1en llh.,d
IWOihthactual
service of 0 Uilt111ed 5ts: i; enny require the Olinlon, III writig, of the pirIn.

(ilal 011or of each of the execltlve Ioepartmenis.

What did tle Founding Fathers mean when1 they used the term "oxeeuitiVo departneillSt"? I imagine they must, hVe mvealln tlhe mt
embers
of tie Cabinet so called when they used that term when they flrst
adopted the Consttituion.
Mr.Rooms. Ti point.isMr. M(CtnLocjr. I should like to ask this question.

Is the Atomi Energy Commission an executive department of tie

(loverllment.t Wollihe prinlcipl oIfler. of tie Atomic Enrgy
Commission be ob clothed with authority under this proposal ?

And I refer specifically to the section of the Constitution which
the chairman just read.
Senator BIviI. If you are asking me, I would say "No." I would
say "No." I would sa1y this is not, the interpretation.
Mfr. MCCULtvocm. Fist of all the Atonl Energy Comnission is
not an executive department of Government. I)o you make that
conclusionI
Senator BAYIT. Not in the last degree, it is not. Not in the highest
degree. It, is itsubsidiary branch.
It is not, a departmentll hut it
Commission.
The (;M11AVr.s
. T think we are going to have the Attornev General
appear llre sub.equelntly. I think lie might give us Solm' n111ighten.
ment on thi natter. I think it should be clirifled be,etie there
are undoubtedly som doubts in the minds of a.good many present. I
think there should 1) some precise langugne so that the Ie
no
umbig1ity whatsoever. I think you would ngree?
4,14-.O1- (fl-5
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Senator 13AYII. I agree.
Tie Cu.ium.N'. 'lihere, should also be an llU(hiditent to nail that.
down.

Senator BAYJI. Yes, sir, if necessary.
The CITAIrMAN. May I ask this other question, I think the gentle-

man from Colorado reading something about section 3, whenever the

President transmits to the President of the Senate--no--section 4
whenever the Vice President and so forth-does certain things with
the concurrence of the members of the Cabinet--he then shall succeed

and become Acting President.
I think the gentleman from Colorado feared there might be some
ambitious Vice President who might want to u 1 ,J)power. Haven't

we got. a safety valve tho, also, if he is such it gentlenman and aets
iutlilessly and seeks to stage it coup d'etlat, that, we could impeach;
and ilmpachnient proceedings always lie back of this whole propositionl so that the Congress call always have the last word on this?
Mr. Roils. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, we have had many ambitious
Vice Presidents in the Iast and I anticipate we will lave mnaity in
the fut ure; but the point is this.
in the
hands
a fewin individuals
to upset what
people
of To
theplace
United
States
haveofdone
electing a.President
ly thethewhim
of
a signature which may or may not be genuine, it goes a long way.
That's the thing that I'm emphasizing.
The CHAJtim,. The answer is impeachment.
Mr. Roatmis. Well of course.
Senator Bxrmr. ?fay I just try to think out loud for a moment to

clarify this. You can think of all sorts of eventualties, but in section 8
whicl the gentleman referred to first; this is a voluntary procedure
in which-Mr. ROGFGs. Whnt?
Senator BaYr. This is a voluntary procedure which the President
voluntarily submits to. Now if someone shows up with a written letter
aind says, Iiok what I got from the President," and thle President
comes on television the next instant and says this is a forgery-

Mr. R11rms. Yes, but tnder this, suppose as suggested by the gentlemn from Massachusetts a moment ago that he is actually insane and
the ambitious Vice Presilent. knows thathe is insane, anlSenator BAYM. I would think if he is insane we better get, him out
of there.
Mr. R.ow ns. Immediately suppose he is insane and somebody
through trickery got, him to sign it. or suppose that he is unable to
even sign it. Then this, if lie shows-somebody shows up with the
letter, then immediately the Vice President, takes over.
Now, the point is, that I think it is dangerous to put in the hands of
a few people the right to upset what tie majority of the people in this
country has determined.
Senator B
The 0hi0l right. if I may say so, is not. in the hands
Tvi.
of p few people, but in the vote of two-tlijds of the vote of the House
and Senate.
Arr. Roortms. NotThe OITAIRMAX. Not in section 4.

Mr. Rooms. Not in section 3 beause in section 3 if he shows up
with a signature that he voluntarily resigns or he can't perform the
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duties of the office, then the V ice President takes over. Now can't you

envision itdangerous situation that would develop in carrying out
the executive department of this Nation if the signature of one man
would be the determining factor of whether he was President or
whether he wasn't? Don t you think that we could meet the problem
)foredirectly?

Senator ]3Ahw. What if the lre8i(lent Would write his written r-esig-

nation and seld it under the constitutional authority he now hasP
It seems to me we have to look at this in terms of the limelight
focused on the President,
One, if the P resident feels hie has to undergo a serious operation or
soinethinl like this id lie feels it, is in the best interest of the country,
he wouhl-niam it written, open declaration and the Vice President
would assuele the powers and llties.
Iwo, if ie's unable to (1o this, tihe only way an ambitious Vice
President-wd there undoubtedly have been find will be ambitious
Vice Presi(lei)ts -ilit the only way lie can assume the powers an dilties
even temporarily .is
to get a majority of the Cabinet which was alpI)Oinle( b(y the I es l('It lit, St,l(s to depose aind then-i-f I may eonIinln( ylille of thought 11nd t h1uIl
1
y11
ield.
Mr. lloo.us. Sllre.
Seil(or l,
Rvll. 'lhenl, 1lltholgh I heard it voiee of dissent over here,
ill the filial 0IIitlySis the OIil

W1110 Ill

Vi'elPiresident (.lta colntilue to act

beyond a reasonil)le period in'which this decision is being mna(le in
the Co ..'ress is to gret two-thirds of the vote of both Houses of Con-

gress till I don't t'ink he should be able to take over with any less

support.
Mr. JIODINO. Senator as a matter of fact doesn'tt section 5 iminedlately go into play where the Vice President may have acted in this
matter? All that has to o (lone is that tile Presic'lent himself declhres
that he has the al)llity to act and then the question becomes an issue
fill(] nothi?) more.
Senator ]3AY'. Right, the issue is drawn and Con ress decides. If
you don't get two-thirds votes [Isnfwppn,
Ir fngers t's ack like that.
Mr. lRoomus. Mr. Chairman, I will yNeld back to tile floor,
Ar.
o', MATP. Chalrmn, iyai I say I think we should all reognize
(ai(li(lly what hadn't, yet been artieulated: nnmely, that the Ce'ller]Ba.yh )pl'Ol)O.I om' filie hyh-COller proposal is the Ind result, the pre(ipitnt of a long process of distillation and filtration in whill 10n1y
hia-nds have l)1ayed a part. T say this because I want to enl)h1as'lze tlat
this is not. it,carelessly drawn mnea1sulre and I say that, because I am
anxiois to see that expe(litions action is taken at this esion of Congre,'r oil this vitally iniortant matteiler
Now having sA'i that, however, I think it. is in ortant that we not
(10 anything prec'i)ilously, that we not (o any rus-h acts which all of

Al

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

us and future generations may regret. To illustrate what I mean by
that I call attention to the fact tiat most hgal scholars thought that
vet
the Senate bill had been refined to its highest state of polish and thus
of
text.
the
as
described
is
what
the Senator has brought with hin
Senate Joint Resolutlon 1 as reported by the Judiciary Committee on
February 4, 1905, and most of his testimony has been addressed to the
changes that have been made.
Now, I suggest that the fact that the Senate committee was able
to discover the need for changes demonstrates that this committee
should be careful in dealing witl the subject and that we should not in
any way be foreclosed in our examination of the subject. This applies
not only to the present witness but to all other witnesses who may follow him in the chair, particularly tile most learned Attorney General
of tile United States and, Mr. Chairman, while I repeat, I want to doI
everything I call to expedite final action as promptly ais possible at
expect to insist I be given an opportunity to inquire in detail and
length and I make no apology foi making that demand.
ow, Mr. Chairman, hav ng made tlhat preliminary statement, which
I might add is in lieu of the testimony I had expected to make this
Morning.
always welcome your schola rly inquliu ries.
e.Wo
WHAIRM
The
is most generous. I shill not testify as I
gentleman
The
Air. POFF.
previously intended. Perhaps I can make my points in my iterrogation.
b' saying I agree with most of the lnmy interrogation
I begin
as ladte. 1 think it was all improvement on the origchanges
~u~ge
deletion of
inalBayli-Celler bill, I have some reservation about the
of tile
officers
tile world "Cabinet" and the use of t he phrase "principal be carefully
to
neeis
executive departments.", This is soiethiing thbat
tsk the
studied before this committee deals with it,Now, I mightliealso
to
illing
w
might
he
Senator if in the interests of language clarity
tih
on
line
last,
the
to
next,
accept a hnguago amneni(ent insection 4
text of Senate Joint Resolution 1 as reported by said coimitte,. I
suggest it would be helpful if after the word tihe" auld before tie

.
woid "powers" we inserted the words, "discharge of the". in other
language
that
used
have
we
I make this suggestion because
clear
places preceding setion 4 and because I want to make it crystal
assuming
President
Vice
the
between
there is a distiction not only
the omce of President or assuming the duties and powers of tle President but also a distinction between those two and his assuming the
disoharge of the powers and duties of tile office.
I thik what the Senator intends to do and what the American Bar
President
Association intends is that the Vice President has as Actingthemselves.
duties
the
than
rather
duties
the
of
discharge
assumed the
This may not be a vital point, but for the sake of consistency we
might consider that.
Where you add fle word "discharge"?
The CHAIRMAN.
Mr. orr. Discharge of:-have it. before' tle word powers" in see-

tion 4, next to the last line.
Senator BAYMi. If I may Say so, I think whether the words are used

to
or not, the wisdom of this committee should be carefully given
this
in
get.
do
ever
their inclusion. The goal is to provide that if we
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position-God forbid, but we may-the Vice President should not
only have the powers and duties but should discharge them.
Mr. IOFp. Iam not sure we want him to huwe any title to tie powers

and duties. Speaking for myself, I am jealous of the powers and
duties for the sake of the President who ins been elected by the people.
I want the Vice President to have only the right to discharge, the powors and duties. I say the distinction may be a small one, but I think it
is important in drainatlzing our first concern for the protection of the
duties and powers of the President.
Senator AL'Y1, If I may point, out that even with the outright dis.
position of the powers and duties as we have it in the language, the
next wording, if you notice, is that he does not have the office of
President but that of Acting President. He does not got the full
powers aund duties of the office of President unabated. He is Acting
President.
Mr. Por. I don't think we have any disagreement about that point.
Senator, may I direct your attention to section 2.
You have previously addressed yourself briefly to the advisability
of itlime lijna, but you do so with' reference to the action that would
be taketi under section 5. Now under section 2 it is possible that a
time limit should be considered for two so arate acts. First of all,
the nomination of a Vice President by the President and second, the
SOV0onld action by tipe Congress on the nomination once made, Do you
think it would be advisable to impose upo the President. a time limiit?
Senator BAYJI. I don't believe it isnecessary. There is controversy
on this. My opinion is that there should not be a roadblock to prevent
us from reaching a solution, but. there are all sorts of questions that
arise. When you put a time limit in the Constitution) then what ap.
pens if a sequence of unforeseen events prohibits the President from
adhering to this time limit? Then lie is in violation of tile Constitution.
We felt we must assume we are dealing with reasonable men. With
the glare of publicity and public opinion on the President as well as
on all of us inCongress, if this should ever happen--and 10 memory
of all of us encompasses November of 1908 and I think we can still
sonso the tenr of tie country and tile feeling of urgency-the business
would be disposed of judiciously and quickly.
Mr. Por. I might say I tend to agree with the Senator. However,
I think we must recognize there night be situations in which the
President might hesitate to nominate promptly, For instance: Let's
assume that the vacancy in the Vico-Presidency occurs on Christmas
Day preceding Inauguration Day. He might decide it was unnecessary to fill -te Vice-Presidency. Now, this might be a reasonable
decision on his part. It might be reasonable if thie vacancy occurred
on the 1st day of December preceding inauguration, but isn't reasonable in July preceding the inauguration.
In other words he is not required to nominate and it becomes a matter of his subjective judgment as to whether he is going to nominate
or not.. If we are going to talk about playing politics in the two
Houses
of
Congress,-let'S think about the
. possibility of the President
play
ing
politics.
lhe
rohAnitAi
. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Pop. Yes.
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The CHAMMAN. Is this supposed to take into consideration any time
between the time of election and inauguration ?
Senator BAYH. No.
The CHANUtAN. I think if that is the case there would be no Presi-

-dent on Christmas Day if Christmas happens between the election and
inauguration.
Mr. POFp. I think, perhaps the chairman makes a good point. I
use that as an example,
it's say that the vacancy occurred the day before election preceding
inauguration.
Senator BAYH. Whenever we impose a time limitation, we do limit
and urge the President to act and give a time within which we must
act. But we also run afoul of the possibilit that through good
reason he cannot act. I for one have enough faith in our PrIsident
and our Congress to believe that in these circumstances they are going
to Mr.
act judiciously
in a reasonable
period to
of time.
agree with the Senator. I
PoFp. I repeat,
I am inclined
ask one further question on that point.
Would you object if the adverb "promptly" were inserted to modify
the verb "nominate"?
Senator BAY.

I have no objection to the word "promptly."

I hope

your committee doesn't spend as much time with the word 'promptly"
as we did on debate of the word "immediately."
When you include that one word all the ramifications go with it. I
trust. the judgment of the committee on it.
Mr. POF, All right, may I direct your attention to the second phase
of section 2.
Do you think it would be wise to have a time limit on the mandate
that the Congress act upon the President's nomination?
Senator BAYH. In other words, the time limitation in section 2.
Mr. POFF. Well, I am asking-suppose the President has nominated
a Vice President to fill the vacancy.
Senator BAYH. I understand.

fr. PoF. Should there be a time limit within which the Congress
should be asked to respect his nomination?
Senator BAYH. I feel as faras time limitation is considered throughout in a constitutional provision, it would be better to leave them out
and trust the President and Congress to use their good judgment as
to what would be reasonable. There would be some times, perhaps, when a name would be submitted for which there would be patent
reasons for a tremendous amount of debate. Other times a name
might be submitted and would be readily acceptable and there would
be little reason for a prolonged debate and everyone would recognize
this. I think the good judgmentThe CHARMA1N. Pardon me, that's another reason.
Congress may be dominated by a party other than the President
also which might raise complications.
Senator BATH. This would take longer, I would think normally,
than if his own party was in power.
I think we could still reach .adecision a conclusion.
Mr. McOvrmioctr. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Virginia
yield for this observation?
Mr. Popp. Yes.
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Ar. MCCUZLOCl1. I would like to say that while the Vice President
isthe Acting President, even though t e (ongreis may be in adjournment, under the Constitution he would have the right to convene the
Congress and in these days of fast transportation it doesn't take too
long for the (on ress to convene and quick, certain, effective, dynamic
leadership may justify such an action and that, by the way, is one of
the reasons why I said we had to discuss a bit further some of these
proposals.
Senator BAY!!. May I offer one word here so that the record, in my
opinion, may be abundantly clear?
In no way are we attempting to say that as far as I am concerned,

and I think so far as our committee is concerned, that this is it and this
is the end. I think this committee should-and if I know this committee, it will-give It the most careful examination and scrutiny and
so far as the junior Senator from Indiana is concerned, any questions
you have to ask now, later, or any time on which I may be helpful,
am ready and willing to answer them because this is a matter of great
concern and it shouldn't be entered into carelessly. I have no obje'tions to answering questions at all.
The CHAI MAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. POFF. Yes.
The CHIAIIIMAN. In answer to your question by our distinguished
ranking Republican member that 10 days may elapse between the
nomination and the confirmation, suppose that the Congress does not
act within 10 days? If we put 10 days In there what would happen
then?
Mr. MC(tTLLO.

Mr. Chairman. I might answer that question if

the chairman will permit.
The CIIAIJ.MrAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCULLOCIr. The legislation that I proposed provided that

under section 5 the President shall forthwith thereafter resume the
duties of the Presidency.
Senator BAYJI. May I disclose the thinking of our committee as far

as this particular Jimitation is concerned-and here again I think we
have carefully considered it.
It might well take longer for Congress to make a determination in
one type of illness than another type of illness.. The type of testimony
that would be involved to fully disclose to the Members of Congress
the condition of the President might take longer in one type of illness
than another.
In fact, one horrible example that was brought to our attention that
I don't anticipate-but if we are looking for horrible possibilities.
here is one: "What if we were engaged in nuclear war and the seat of
Government is destroyed? There would be a time element involved
finding a place where the Congress could meet and convene despite
ranid travel we take for granted.
Mr. MCCUI.LOou. Mr. Chairman. I would like to reply that 10 days
was an arbitrary time limit suggested for the very purpose of what
we are doing now, discussing, and if we determined that a time linit
should be set whether it is 5 days or 10 days or 20 days, is a question
of judgment and time delays do not concern me too much in assembling
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'the representative of the people of the United States when tile
occasion demands it.
Mr. Wlinrrtut. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PoFF. Mr. Chairman, if I may recapture tile floor.

Mr. WHITNkll. Just one quest ion,
Senator, earlier I made some reference using the expression members
of the President's Cabinet. I think now, perhaps, I understand more
fully the problem in looking at Corwin on Constitution of the United

States. I find this statement.

The Cabinet as we know it today, that is to say, the Cabinet meeting, was
brought about solely on the Initiative of the first President and may be dispensed

with on Presidential Initiative at any time being totally unknown to the
Constitution.
I do note there was a study made by the Attorney General, 36 Opinion, Attorney General, Aipril12-16,19.9, on the history of this proposition. I am j list hoping- t possibly will be available.
Mr. POFF. Has the gentleman concluded?
Mr. WHITENER. Yes, sir; thank you very much.
Mr. PoFF. Mr. Chairman, to this point my line of inquiry has been
addressed to section 2.
Now I want to shift to section 5, if I may. I believe the Senator
knows I am the author of House Joint Resolution 3 which was introduced on January 4, the first day of the session this year. My bill
in most particulars is the same as the bill the Senator introduced. Its
principal point of departure is in section 5I. It follows somewhat the
concept to which the distinguished gentleman from Ohio alluded,
but they are not altogether the sane.
In order to put my questions in proper perspective may I read the
pertinent language from my section 6?
If the Congress within ten days after receipt of the vice-presidential written
declaration determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President
Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office of the Vice President
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President. Otherwise the President shall resume the discharge of the powers and duties of his office.
Now, the purpose of structuring the language so was to give the
Congress of the United States the opportunity to defend the President without giving positive offense to the Vice President,
May I explain what I mean I Under the language that I have ju*lst
read the Congress would have three possible choices. After the Vice
President hs submitted his challenge, the Congress, first, can vote and
uphold the vice-presidential ehallengo. Second, the Congross can vote
and re ect the vice-presidential challenge. Third, the Congress could
allow thie 10-day period to expire without voting at all.
Now, if Congress chose to pursue the latter alternative it would
be equivalent to the second alternative; namely, voting on the Vice
President's challenge but rejecting it. I can envision the possibility
that the Congress might want to defend the President by rejecting
the Vice President's cRallenge but would rather not have to vote on it.
I am not talkingabout courage. I am talking about the pragmnatic
doubt that mightbe involved, *Now, I ask the gentleman if he has
considered thatapproach ?

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

Senator BAYI.
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I think that we have to realize when we vote as

Members of Congress or take action that we consider what the final
result of our actions is going to be.
To feel in my mind that that President was incapable of fulfilling

the powers and duties of his office, and sit. silently by and (1o nothing
to prevent him from resuming the powers and citiess at the end of 10
clays would constitute gross negligence. By inaction you are, in effect,
acting, are you not?
So, the final result of inactivity would be the same as activity and
the onlyMr. Popv. I don't want to engage in a quarrel. I am not.
I am trying to reason with him. Is it not possible, sir, under your
proposal, for a Congress that happened to be hostile to the Presiaent,
simply to sit, idly by and do nothing when the Vice President's hail.
lenge reacliesit?
Senator Bir.
In what circumstances, if I may ask?
Mr. Por. Sir?
Senator BAYT. Under the provisions you propose?
Mr. Popp. Under your bill, wouldn't that be possible?
Senator BA,
Yes, it,would be.
Mr. POFF. Would it not also be possible if th-Senator BMyr. May I say, if they sat idly and (lid nothing for an
extensive period of time the President could resmne his powers and
duties because the Congress didn't. act. immediately?
Mr. Popp. Well, let's suppose the Vice President who is discharging
the duties of the presidency has a1hostile Congress and suppose that
Congress is not motivated .so much by a desire to uphold the President
as to punish the Vice President. Wouldn't the same possibility entail?
I am arguing, of course, for the logic of a time limit.
Senator BAY,. We are not really arguing. We are trying to exploro each other's tlhoughs here, I think it is something you must pursue. The question is whether you want to limit the capacity of Congre sq-all of us sitting here-to delve into this matter and finally
decide in our own minds on a matter of grave importance to the
country. I, for one, feel that I can trust you and my colleagues in the
Senate to do this with reasonable dispath but would rather not hang
around their necks an arbitrary time limit so that if action is not taken
the President finally resumes the powers and duties of his office. Sup)ose it is it complicated situation, for example Congress has held
hearings and had expert testimony. It looks like within 13 days they
are going to he able to get this done. representative McCulloch says
"10" 1i just an arbitrary figure but let's use it. T's say within 10
days the power reverts to the President.
Here you have a rather unstable situation. First, a Vice President
takes over from the President and then the 10-day time limit expires.
Then the President, takes his power back and 10 days later Congress
decides the Vice President is right and the power comes back to the
ice Presidnt aain, This is why we stayed up until the wee hours
of the night finally deciding that through this period of decisionn we
should know who had the powers and duties, and that should be the
Vice President until the decision was made. Then either the President
or Vice President would continue to perform the powers and duties.
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Mr. PopI.'. I don't know the 10-day period Is any magi, period.
Probably it,
isnot. Probably it.'s too short, In any event I doll't We
any danger in the power shiftinlg back to where it. belonge(i, where t he
people
President.
iftheto 10-day
expired
withoutph.ed it---n
the tlhe
acting,
I1('ongrss
would So,
be glad
see the period
power go
back
where it heloiged al reside there.
Tile CAIIMAN. There is a qmn'uomlu1 call, and, Senator, cill yOiU CoimeO
back at 2 o'clock?
Senator BAvYi. 1 will be glad to be back whenever the chairmian
would like.
I am still feeling very guilty about the Attorney General, knowing
he is busier than I am.
The (7IJAIIUMA . TIM Chair nW Will a11oui)e a eess until 2
o'clock.
So, Mr. Chairman, I should like to have unailhnons authority to
strike from my statement these words, "a hit.-or-niss lroeesg whiel)
isdone indiseriminately" and insert, the word, "done" tiu'ereafter.
(W1hereupon at 12 d2 p.m., th volniliittee wats recessed, to reconvent at 2 p.m.)
AI'TINOON SESSION

'l'hS (1,r
1 xaIIx. For the witness this afternoon we will hear from
our distinguished colleague, Mr. UIndsay.
Mr. Katzenlaeh was to return this afternoon, so I am sure we will
be able to work it out.
Proceed, Mr. T,indsity.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN V. LINDSAY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. IAxNswY. Mr. Chairman, I think it is ill)portant that Members
who wish to testify be heard, and particularly, if they are ilelhi's
of the committee, illd I think itis important, too, that hose who have
ben working o11 this subjeet nigh on to 8 o

10 years should he

listened to,
On the first point, which is the quest ion of Presidential inability.
which we were dliseitssing this morilngThe CIA1MA~,x. Do yoii have it statement ?
Mr. ,NusA. I am going to speak from notes. I am not going to
submit itformal statement,
On the first point, Presidential inalfilty, I think it, is seanlalolls
that the Congress has never acted on this i spite of the fact, that administratlons, l)eginnlng with the Eisenhower administration, have
requested ConlreslsS to take action, and Congress has done nothing.
To Ilove tile C"oifrelss it has taken tile tragic death of a President,

President Kennedy, and the blatant danger that exist ed when Mr.
Johnson became President and there was no Vice President.
The country finally became alarmed, and has, I think, exercised
enough pressure to iush tie Congress to taking some action on this
subject.
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O)n i~lal~lit~, it doesn I, I sul)l)ot, need to be restated low pressing
tie PIrOblent IIIs been ill history aind how much more pressing it is
today ill it smaller world in constant danger of hydrogen warfare.
11dlr sul(h ('ir'cillstll vt& WO I'ed (ieesilon illd fast conllltll cation.

Wte recall, that president (11lrleld wits ill i ,om for 80 days, and

during that period contsiderable (lovermment business in both tile do.
mestic auld internltionlll field was impitired.
Wo know further that during that period of Garfield's icacilty,
ti t ('lhibiet, iit'ludiig the Attomitey General, was divided in its
Olpinio its to who hiad power. If Vice 1Presideut, Arthur l proeeded
to al nobody Could st lte witlh any degree of sureness whether the
Vice 1l'esidllt's Ite1s would he h1w1til. As the committee tay know,
Viice 1l'residllt A rthum', under those eireiumsthees, refused to mako
Ill. decisions lt till.
Tie dlisil)lity of Wilsol was longer; it wis over a year, and alt hough1
flip extell of it is uder considerable debate, neverteless it is estat-

lished that his disalbility ipr,elted his participnition in the debates

overl ti(te ,sailles lret. nd the League of Nat ions. This w11s a
se~nsitive period, as have been periods slnce thn in out' history, hut
)not hlingeoli )ared to what we are feed wil)h now.
We wv discussing this morning the question about who slul make
heiv
decision as to presidential ability. Is it it ViCC-prosidl(ltial decisiot, or is,it t general executive decision, or should it be a ongres-

sio1ill decision , orI'a court (lecisiO.

There is iagood deal of history

On tlli. 'l'he quest io really first. arose when President William Henry
Hillisut died of pnlem onia in office. There were those who objected
to \'lV,( lresiod lt Tyler's succession during the President's period of
illness, andi( there were matny more who objected to Tyler's succession

to tho lresideney even after President IlTarrison's detth. The ques-

tion w-as whether the Vice President really, beame Presidelt to fill
out flhe Iunexpiredl term, or whether he just continued ias Vie, Presidenl and performed tie duties of Presidlint.

Tyler first hold the view that he would only net its President durn(g
tihe unexpi ed term. Then, lIter, hle apparently ('hanged Ils mind

tlnd de,ided to assume thie Presidency.
', other Vice, Presidents have followed sut sle then. In other
words, tll of them hav decided that they were the President, they
were not Ae ing President : they hnd not just Ithe
1a11e, but tile I)owelt.
of oflice of President. They were Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Arthur,
Theodoro Roosvelt, Coolidge, Iarry Tr nan, aild Lyndon Johlson.
This has it
nellig
oll the qinestion of disability, it seems to me. Wle
tre told that til examintlo of the ori hal articles agreed upon by
the Const',ilut ional Convention showed that the delegates at that time
agreed that 11pOil the illallt A'
of tie President to discharge the powers
anld duties of his oflce tei,
e President should exercise those powerg
mtid duties "mtil the liability of the Presideuit be removed."
Ti1 originl thought of the framers of the Constitution was that
the Vie President would act its thie President in the case of the
President's disability. This view, and I am sure the Attorney General when he testifies will support this, finds. stipport in the dpebates
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of the Constitutional Convention indicating that the Vie- residency
was originally created to provide for an alternate Chief Executive
who might function from timo to time should the President lie iuinable
to exercise the powers and duties of his office. When this provision
was stated in so many words and wits submitted to the Committee of
Style, it was revised 'and reduced to the simplified statement that we
have now: "in the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the office, the game shall devolve
upon the Vice President," and that is the wiy it has remained ever
since,
What this really means is that we are talking about, an Executive
decision rather than i. congressional or it court decision in the first,

instance. This interpretation, in fact, has heen .s:haregl by several
Attorneys generall in tie past. Before t1ho Sot'ilo sillwonliiltee, At,-

torney (1neal1 Wllim i oers said that in his opinion the Constitu-

ton invested in the Vice President initial determination as to the
existence of an inability with respect to the President..

The samo view was cx pressed earlier by Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, who incidentally was the first. govertnmenltal officer to draft.
and submit to he Congress legislation along the's lines' indexed, ihe
Bayh-Cellar proposal is an almost exact, restiatement, of tle ori01inal
Brownell proposal made to the Congress, the 85th Congres.,, I believe,
on the occasion or shortly after the occasion of President. Eisenhower's

illness.

Attorney General lBrownell at that time summed up what Ills been
the legal opinion of all of his predecessors in this arla ill Ilodern
history. He said as follows:
At the time of President Garfleld's Illness in 1881, the great weight of oplnilon
favored the Interpretation that Vie lre
'dent
Arthur, and he alone, could (otormino if the President was disabled.

At that time most students of the

Constitution said that the Vice President was obligated to exercise the powers of
the Presidency during Garfield's Illness, Just as much as he was obligated to
preside over the Senate or perform any other constitutional ditty, and that no
enabling action by the courts or Congress or the Cabinet was necessary,
Since the Vice President had the ditty of acting as President, it was argued,

in certain contingencies his official discretion extends to the determination of
whether such a continueney actually existed; in other words, they were applying

a well-known rule that in contingent grants of power, the one to whom the
power is granted is to decide when the emergency has arisen,
Thus, thereo is solid basis in law here to argule thatt1 the init, al decisionn

must be made by the person who is to succeed in power. in this instance it would )o the Vice President. This power to so act is very
gtat. Therefore, it, must be guai'(ded.
The bill that I have resubmitted in the 89th Congress, as I have in
the 8 lth,
87(h, and 88th Congresses, is No. 139,
Members will see that it is vei-y close to what. is known here as the
lBayh-Celler bill because, in fact, it is the predecessor of that bill. To
sum. it up: Section 1 empowers the Vice President to succeed to the
Presidency in case the Chiief Executive dies or resigns or is removed,
and so fourth; that is a restatement, of old law.
Section 2 provides that. if the President shall declare in writing that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, sucll .powers and duties shall he discharged by Hie Vice Presi(lent its Acting
President.
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ih
liability,
I f hIIP ,residentis III) IIlig or lil)hlle to declare 1own
section 3 atholzes ti Vice Pr1'((ideitt to do it; however he needs the
colcurrence--this is again reput ition of what the other bill has--of the
iajor.ty 1.iltnems of tie (' nebt'. IIn other words, sole discretion is
remove(I frotI tlle V ice lIresidmt ill t Ihis itreia.
8et(joll 4 p)oi(1e. that, it and1(1 wheni ..

president declares Iln writing

t hat his disa l ity is terinitilleltIl, lie should resume powers ItIId so forth;
tlid here again
have a parallel to what. we have in the other bill. In
this case, however, where the Vice President holds a contrary view, the

Congress resolves the issue by a two-thirds vote in each House.
Now the linal poin; that. 1 would wish to make is that in section 4 of
the bill. In case members don't have it, I will read the pertinent
sentence out of it.

Whom or tit president mukes public ntOhcemnt fit writing tlint his inabll
Ity has terminated, ho shnll resueno the discharge of the Ipwors and itlhm of his

otlleo ol the seventh day ifter making such lmlnouncellnent,

1i1t If tie Vice

I'residettt, with tho written a))rovll of it iiinjorlty of fit( heads of executive
eolparl nisIII office it the I Inme of such itnouliouwe1ent, tranmsm ItIs to the Congress

his wrlitli' delarnlot tliat in his oplilon the iPresident's itililty hlis not ttrnl-

nate(I, th Cojigress shall thereupon coihler the Issue. If the Congress is not
Own il session, It shll ts8semble In spweltl smsioit on the call of the Alice Presi-

If tle Collgrsx (INeernl('les by concurrent resolution, adopted with the upI)rovitl of two-thir(ds of the .Menmbeirs present in erch Jiotmse, that the Inability of
the 'resident has not terminted, hOretpon, ilotwithstanding any further anniomncemnent by the President, he Vice President shall assume the discharge of
1oh llWv Q'pwr
1111(1 (Ilti, 111.Ctlltig Piresiden t 1111 tihe occurrelrce of the earliest

of the following events: (1) the Acting 1resldent proclaims that the President's
Inability has ended-

IlI other words, ti he ersoln who has tlie power to make tle inlit l.] decision has th power to make a second decision.
(2) -

This is the innovation tlat I would hope Members woulld be careful
about and listen to:

The Congress delermntis by eoneurrent resolution, Adopted with the approval

of atmajorIty of the Members present fi ench House, that (he President's hnbillity has ended, or (3) We President's term ends.

The import tlice of t hat se(oild paragraph is very large, heease here

is it reservation of power by tie Congiess itself, by a sitllpe majority

vote, to take the initiative iii making the decision that the ina1)1lity has
ended, thereby putting itself ill between tie Vice President and the

President, if fl lat should be necessary.

I think this safegiuard is one thit we might want to thiitk ahout very

eareflily, and whei the Attorney General is here, I would hope to
examine lII on ilhis to see whet her or not lie would( agree t'hat this sugrest,ion is one that might, be a helpful one to resolve some of the problems that we have on this.
Mr. Popp. Will you yield ?
Mr. LINDSAY. Yes.

Mr. Popp. 1)i(1 I understand correctly from your reading of the lan-

guage, if you meant, to say that a. majority present in eaeh House-

shouldn't yotl say i quorum?
Mr. L.DSAY. I will accept that. I thank the gentleman from Virginia. Finally, because I assured, the chairman tlat 1 would not take
long-I would turn to thle second issue and that is the incredible situa-
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tion where we permit our system to exist with a President, ill oflco
but no Vice President.

This, I think, is very risky and should not he

continued under any circumstances. The deicieneies in the situation

I think are obvious they have been discusod and rediscussed. Members know that the pea'er might well be of a di fferent political pal t.
than is the President, and I do think, too, that it. can be argued with
logic that, the concept of separation of powers is infringed when a
Speaker must be trained and tuned to executive as well as con.

gressional business in that period when the Vice President has acceded
to the Presidency and the Speaker is next in line.
Second, I do think that you have at problem continually here of
training and qualification which is important in this day and- age.

Particflarly with lightning decisions being made or having to be mnai,
one needs a full-time person as the Vice President at all times. So, the
second resolution that. I had submitted again in this Congress, H'ouse
Joint Resolution 140, proposes a constitutional change toprovide for
the election of the new Vice President by the Congress.
Now, the mnethod of this is slightly different from other Mllelhe)C '
suggestions, and I offer it for the consideration of the committee. It
would provide a Presidential veto in the event, that a, President disagreed with the Vice President selected by the Congress. What is
proposed is that the individual who would step into the offleo of the
Presidency should immediately convene the Senate and Houso in joint
session to select the Vice President. The selection would be by imajorit vote, each Member of Congress having one vote. The Preoidont
would have a power of veto, and if he exercised it, Congress would pro-

poe another candidate.
There would be no right of overriding the veto. I have limited the
possible candidates to Members of Congress, heads of executive departments, or Governors of States. The first person selected would be
required to vacate his current office. This process would be followed

when the office became vacant more than 80 days. It would also be followed If the Vice President left or might become permnently liable
to take his office.
This again is a constitutional amendment that is of great importance
and long overdue. The pressure of the Congress on this has not bon
as old as has been the pressure of the Congress on inability, but it is
just as important in my opinion, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this
committee in its wisdom will take action on these constitutinal proposals as soon as possible, as speedily as possible, doing the best we can,
and if we differ from the Senate versions then we will hammer it out in
conference.
Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAW. Thank you, sir.
The next witness is Mr. Dante Fascell, of Florida.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANTE FASCELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OP FLORIDA
Mr. FASG EFL, Thankyou, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Any time, now or in the future, that any President catches a
cold, all of us are going to be concerned with the problem of who will
run the country if lie is unable to serve. Present law is obviously
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inadequate and it change is called for. Tie committee is satisfied, or
ought to be satisfied tfht there is niow a broad base of support for
necessary changes. ihis is evidenced by resolutions of the American
bar and local associations and other organizations that this problem
must be solved. Americans generally fully support the recognition
by this committee and its chairman of the urgency of the mtter.
Ve ceartaiily need to do whatever is necessary to strengthen the concept of the continuity of the democratic institutions, Certainly it
ought to be clear, and I am sure it is that world conditions are such
that we cannot, in any time, under any conditions, sufter a time lag

with respect to the continuity of our own institutions.

We have obvious problems, all of which you recognize-the leal
form, the procedure itself, the language, the legal effect, pe' sonali.
ties, and politics-but I conclude with only one admonition which is
old homespun philosophy: The time has come to do something, even

if it is wrong.
Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement, which I request be
inserted inthe record. Knowing full well of the ability of the membe'.5 of this committee, I am sure you will work out this problem to
Ie satisfaction of everyone concerned.
Thank you very much.
The CfIRMAN. You want your prepared statement in the record?
Mr. FiScEr(,T. Yes, thank you.

(The full statenient of Mr. Fascell follows:)
Kiir.Ar m x:

OP)..
0i-

It.
P.ASC :M

Whenever one of our residents becomes III or dies while iII ofice, there Is

invarlbly i flurry of coneerm ilout clarifying our laws so thai we many be
able to deal more effectively with such situations than we hlnve in the pnst.
Thus far, sueh flurries have not resulted In action.

President Oatirfel

lay unconscious for most of 80 dys after lie had been

struck by an assassin's bullet. During tht time, the country was without a
President even though the Constitution provides that when the President Is
unable to carry out his duties the 'Vice President is to take over. It does not,

however, say whether lie Is to become President or merely net is President.

It

(toes not say whether lie Is to take over until the end of tile term or only until
the President again becomes able. It des not sa1y who will deihle when such i
disability begins and ends.
Beenuse there Is so much doubt about the law, Garfleld's Vice President Chester
A. Arthur dlid nothing. The doubt also (lissuaded Vice Presilent Miarshall from
Ating during President Wilsotn's 18.month illness. The voluntary agreement
between President ],,isenhower and Vice Preident NI.oln was tint worked out
until after the President flid recovered from Ihis last ilness-too late for It
to be useful. In nay case, there is general agreement that a Viee President
acting on thIe basis of a voluntary agreement cannot hnve the full colildence
of the people, Only an nmelndent to the Constitution can provide the necessary
air of legitiainey.
After each of these ineldents, the lproblemn of presidentll inbility nnd sue.
session was explored, but not until last year was there tny sentblane of agree.
mlIt oi i wly to solve them. in Tlimiry of IN.I, tithe call of the Amerieli
Bnr Assoention, itdozen of the Ntnon's leading legal scholars, mlet here in

Wasbihgton, dieussed the losmilble solutinnq nd, after two (lays, emerged with
it('onsensu
hubseqtlently endorsed by tie ABA house of delegates.
Later in January, the Senate Subcommittee oil ('olstiitlnl

Am1eldinlltsq

began hearings on lpreleutlil Inability which continued in liebruary
From them hearings tnd the nany exmutive seasons which followed
emerged Hente Joint Resolution .19 of the 88th Congress which
l)assed by a vote of 0T5 to 0 shortly before adjournment last year,

amd March,
them, there
the Senate
Chnirmnl
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Oeller has introduced this legislation In the 89th Congress, House Joint Resolu.
tion 1. I have sponsored an Identical. neasur, Hlouse Joint Resolution 235.
This proposed constitutional amendment would s-lve two problems. It would
solve the problem of vacancies in the office of Vice President, which has existed
on 10 different occasions for periods totaling more than 87 years, by directing
the President to nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon contirma
tion by a majority of both Houses of Congress, With the inauguration of Vice
President Humphrey on January 20, 1065, we have a Vice President of the
United States for the first time in 14 months.
It would also solve the problem of presidential inability by directing the
Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidential office
whenever the President declares in writing that lie is unable to carry them out
or, if the President does not so declare, whenever the Vice President-with a
written voncurrencco of a majority of ite heads of the executive departments
or such other body as Congress may by law provide--transmits to Congress Ills
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge his duties. In
either case, the President shall resume his office whenever he transmits to
Congress his written declaration that no inability exists, less
the Vice President, with a written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive
departments, transmits to Congress, within 2 days, his written declaration that
the President is unable to carry out his duties. In such a case, Congress is to
decide the issue immediately and unless two-thirds of both Houses decide that
the President is unable, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his
office,
Thus, the bill provides an orderly procedure whereby the Vice President may
act as President in cases of presidential inability and, furthermore, provides the
mechanism whereby a President can resume his office after recovery from a
disability.
The bill is closely modeled after the recommendations of the American Bar
Association proposal of January 194. The proposed amendment also Incor.
porates the recommendations of the Dade County Bar Association's resolution of
March 5, 1004.
More recently, the Comnmittee for lconomle Development has Issued a national
policy statement on "Presidential Succession and Inability." The principll
difference between their recommendations and this measure is that they would
permit disagreements between the President and Vice President on disability to
be resolved by the Cabinet. The Cabinet decision would stand unless upset by
the Congress through the Impeachment process.
On one thing there is complete agreement: There is urgent need for immediate
action, In these perilous times there can never be a moment's doubt about whose
hand is responsible for running this country. This resolution is the best solution
I have yet seen and I urge the committee to act favorably upon it.

The CIIA U-MAN. The Hon. Charles Bennett.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. DENNETT, A REPRESENTATIVE.
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. B
13
vFivr. I congratulate the committee for undertaking this
important subject. As a member of the Armed Services Committee
for many years, with the background of the full and ever-present
knowledge of the fact that the 'President is Commander in Chief, I
would like to under eore what Mr. Faseoll said on the needl to have
somebody ready without any lapse of time to fulflll these responsibilities. That is one of the responsibilities of the Presidency. There
are many others which I am sure the committee knows fully.
I1want to congratulate the committee for undertaking this.
The CIIAIRMAX. Have you got a statement V
Mr. B
FNrr. I am submitting a statement. If you don't mind, I
will add this to what I have said.
The CHAIR3AN. I accept it; thank you, sir.
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(The full statomeont of Mr. Bennett is as follows:)
STATEMENT OF IEPIiESENTATIVE CHKARLE:S D. DENNF;TT

Mr. Chalrnau, while the framers of tile Colnstltutlon gave scant attention
to the problem of president lJl nabillity and successlon, the fact remains that
since the Presidency of George Washigton the Nation has bcel without ,a Vice
President 10 times, atnd has had 3 President's who were so disabled there was
grave doubt of their ability to perform their duties as President. We are all
familiar with tie lenigthty periods when Presidents airfieldd and Wilson liy close
to death, and aware that during the illness of President Wilson, Mrs, Wilson and
members of tile White House staff conducted affairs of Onto
.eauseVice Presldent Thoimis Marshall feared his acting as Presildtt would oust President Wilson from office,
,Most recently the heort attacks of President Eilsenhower, and the assasslnation
of President l(enedy, again reminded its of the compellig and urgent needl for
Congress to provide for the orderly and prompt determination of a President's
disability, ind on the death or disability of the Vice President for tile selection
of ia immediate successor.
Slnce 1053 I have In every Congress introduce(] legislation calling for a solution to the problem of lresilential dlsltbility aid su(c(essioi, and I want to thmnk
tills comlittmtO anmd all those gathered here today for their Interest and resolve to
provldt it lustlng solution to this problem,
In this Congress I have sponsored House Joint Resolution 33, providing that
iln cases of death, resigmatlon, mid removal, the office of President shall devolve
uipon the Vice President, and iln case of Inability the powers and duties shAllde.
volve on the Vice President until the Inability is removed. The comnevcement
awid terlintion of iny inability shall he determnld in whatever mtnner Con.
gress may provide, alid where there Is neither a President nor a Vicet president
Congress may dectlare who may become President, or in the case of inability
who ma1ly act as President.
During the Ei0senhower and Kennedy administrations an agreement existed
between the Presidenit and the Vice President Oil the course to follow in the
event of disability, and such an agreement now exists between Presldent Johnson
and Vice President Humphrey. But while these agreements may help remove
the problem of disability where there Is it Vice President, where there Is no
Vice President they present no solution for tile Nation.
Former Vice Presideit Richard Nixon, perhaps one of the most knowledgeable
persons In this field, who experienced a period of disability by his Chief Ixecun.
tive, not long ago reminded us of the urgent need for congressional action with
the following comment:
"Fifty years ago the country could afford to lmuddle along' until the disabled
President got well or died. But today when only tile President can make the decision to use atomic weapons I the defense of the Nation, there could be a criti.
cal period when 'no finger Is on the trigger' because of tile Illness of the Chief
Executive."
Events of recent days make this point crystal clear,
I urge this committee to give careful consideration to my bill (H. les. 83)
and to recommend Its adoption to the House.
Thank you.
The CHAIRfMAN. I understand that Th'presentafives Coholan and

Gonzidez will Suibmiit statements which will e inserted in the record.

The CTrAIRMAN. Sennatr Bayh, would you care to resume the stand?

Mr. Poff was addressing inquiries to you.
Continue.
Mr. Popp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
I believe we will take up a. new line of questioning now, if the

Senator cares to do so.

If your bill became i part of the Constitution would it meet the
situation where the President and the Vice Presient simultaneously
become disabled?
44-201-05--6-
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Senator Byiu. No; it will not.

Congressman. Rodino posed that question earlier. This is a matter,
quite frankly, which, if we were seeking perfection, should definitely
be included. But we felt that we had to confine our eWorts to the most
vital, necessary problems now ficing us.
We should get these proposals on the books and then seek others.
Mr. PoeF. May I ask a related question?
Let us suppose the situation in which the office of Vice President becomes vacant and simultaneously the President becomes disabled. In
your bill or in the Constitution, what would be the procedure?
SenatorsB.ir. In other words, the situation we had all of last. year
and the President. would become disabled?
Mr. Pop,'. I could imagine a different situation.
Suppose the Vice President were killed by an assassin's bullet,
istan, ly,fand sulppOse another bullet from the assassin s gun disabled
tile President, and suppose that the Celler-Bityh amendment. were a
part of the Constitutiol, what, wolidd happe. ?
Senator BAYTr, The Vice President, certainly could not act, and the
President would be unable to appoint a successor,
This would be al impasse.
Mr. POPF. Tsn't this a reasonable possibility?
Senator Biir. This again falls into the category of at proposal mu(!h
nearer !)er'fe(tioll thaln tile chairmlan's and 1111? hill I.., Perhaps we
would want. to )rovide unquestionable authority of the Congress lo
provide for these contingencies by statute, Wit, we get into a rather
lhn 't1'" ame'dme'nt to the Col'stif,:tion if we ilnor'Dorate these.
Mi'. Popre. Would it (,onllicate matters greatly' ifthe amendnieilt
were changed in such a manner as to )ermit the person next in line
of presidential succession to initiate tie action which your amendment
vests originally with the Vice President?
Senator B.
,ir.If I may say so, it. probably would because of the
fact. that, the Speaker of the House is next in line of succession,
Then you open the whole can of worms of whether he would have
to resigi his own position as Speaker of the Htouse which is a legislative office, or whether we would have a commingling of powers of
legislative and executive.
Would hie have to resign his seat as a Congressman? This very
greatly complicates the problem.
Timh C\ ti. r.kx. Then, of course, if the Speaker becomes active and
the disability is removed, then he isout, in time cold; he is neither Congres sman or Speaker?
Senator BAyir. That is correct. I did not get a chance to add one
additional sentence that. T want to add to tle colloquy I had with the
distinguished member of this committee from North Carolina.
The difference between outright succession and disability as far as
the Tyler precedent is concerned Is that, in disability we hope and pray
to God that the disability will be removed. With this amendment,
the Ptsident can reassumne his powers and duties, and if hie is replaced
by the Vice President, that, tihe Vice President can resume the l)OWeia
and duties of his own office.
Mr. Moorn. Will the gent,0leman yield'?
Mr, Pow. Yes,
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Mr. Mooi(. Since tile gentleman from Virginia has raised this
question, I would like to also ask the distinguished Senator this: What
if we havo it situation in whieh tile President himself refuses to acknowlelge his inability or the fact, fhat lie is incapable of handling
fho ofice and the Vive' PIvcsident for one reason or another, does not,
initiate, 1mnder Ills own signature, that. whieh is set forth in section 3

of your bill; do you feel it, is necessary tlint. solethling should be done
to this motion, fit consideration of the ease where the President does
not. take it upon himself to declare his own disability, and with the
Vice Presilent refusing to act'?

I assume you hlave Tiad some discussion of this, I would like the
Senator's attitude on this#

Senator BAYv1. We had considerable discussion. In fact, one small
change that we made ill the fiNol committee bill which, if you will notice, is a bit different, from House and Senate Joint Resolution 1, was
to give joint responsibility to the ('abinet and the Vice President to act
under section 4. We have another possibility: namely, not only that
the President does not declare himself, but the Vice President does not
so declre, nor does the ('abinet initiate.
It seems to me that when wo are dealing with presidential power
fhn is given by the people, aren't we Provii(ig enough contingencies
that unless we ca get one of these individuals to act, that perhaps the
President should he permitted to continue
Mr. MIooix.:. Well, we lind I believe, if I might say in response, we
had a circumstance in the Wilson administration where this is exactly
what. ocellrred. It would seem to me this is it contingency tht is
very real and could conceivably happen.
Senator BAYIL It is.
Mr. Moomr.. As I read your section 4 and I may not have before
me House Joint Resolution I as amended, but it seems to me that your
section 4 is conjunctive rather than otherwise, it is "The Vice 11resi.
dent and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments."

Senator B'%Ylt. But either may-take the initiative.
Before we had it "The Vice Piesident with the concurrence"Mr. Moonpp, Then you have not amended?
Senator BAY . No; you read it properly "Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officess" it does not say "The Vice
President with the concurrence."
. fMr. Moonr.. It would seem to me that we are going to have to change
it if fhat is the correct language as amended to carry out tile full
intent, as the Senator has expressed it here, we are going to have to
make a word change there to carry forth your thought.
Right at the present time, as f read it, sir, it would seem to me that
"The Vrice President and a majority of the principal officers" would
have to collectively transmit to the President and Senate and Speaker
of the Rouse a written declaration.
Senator Rkyur. That is correct; there is no question about that.

Either may take the initiative. It was not our Intention to remove

either the Vice President or the Cabinet to l)ermit circumstances
where one could act without the other.
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I personally feel that we need both of them. As President Eisenhower said in the bar association conference-Mr. Moonm, I would agree with you but you are going around the
Horn on me a little bit,
In response to my initial question, you said either/or could happen.
Senator BA1h. I think they can; yes, initiate.
Either one may initiate, I would say.
M r. MoonE. You mean the Initiation as to the capability I
Senator B1,r

Either one can pose the question and the other one

can concur therein.
Mr. Mooem. That is compatible with the atinguag which I read but

we are in agreement that in order for t l e declarationn of the
President that he is unable to discharge his duties to be effective, it
must be a collective declaration with the Vice President and the members of the executive department joining in.

Senator

BAYn.

Yes.

Mr. Mootim. The answer to that is "Yes"?

Senator BAY1r. Yes. If I may say so, your Wilson example is a
good example of one of the most complicated problems which might
arise under this and Marshall did not act. But history shows us that
there was a great, (leal of concern about the Tyler l)p'cedent-that if
he did act, would he then, in the event Wilson then recuperated, not
be Pr.iident and Wilson out in the cold?
We are making it easier for the Vice President to assume Presidential duties. We should put in the amendment the provisions under
which he may act and not make it look as if he is power hungry.
Mr. Mfoonn. The constitutional provision has practically cleared
that up, plus the fact that the informal agreements that have been in
existence in their Eisenhower and the Kennedy and now the Johnson
administrations take care of it.
The question that bothered Vice President Marshall in the Wilson
situation has now practically been settled.
Senator BAYI.

We had 'a similar set of circumstances when Gar-

field laid abed for 80 days and there was unanimous opinion on the
part of the Cabinet that Chester Arthur should assume the powers
and duties. Let me rephrase that. It was unanimous that Garfield was
una-ble to perform the powers and duties, but that the majority of
the Cabinet-I think it. was a 4-to-3 vote with the Attorney General
among the four-that if he did, he would be the President ana Garfleld
would-be out in the cold if he recuperated,
Mr. Moonn. This is under the theory that the office itself isSenator BAit. Yes. I may go one step further, the general reluctiance on the part of the Vice Presidents to move in when there has
been good cause for them to do so I think will serve as'ample evidence
against the idea of it power hungry Vice President. Any ambitious
Vice President is going to be relueant to put himself in t!ie position
of usurpation of the office because the glare of publicity -will be on him
all the time.
Mr. Mno., You brought mo back to my first question too, You
evaluated the exigency nf the Vice President to movo in the've eaqes.
Since this is a matter of highest concern to us today, do you feel that
this proposal of yours should contain some method in the event the

PREIDENTIAL INABILITY

81

Executive refuses himself to actor the Vice President reftises to act,
that there is an area of government that can move?
Senator BAY11. Of course we always fall back on the impeachment
provision, that if the President is out of the picture, you have the
same vote requirement.
Mr. Moore. Then you .Ay if you rely on impeachment, there is no

such thing as Acting President,
Once he has been impeached lie is impeached?

Senator IBAYIr. It is not a desirable alternative. It is one to be
used in the last instance if necessary.

Mr. tfoorm. Maybe we might give some consideration-without
wanting to complicate the matter, and I understand the Senator's
desire to keep this as simple, as possible--that we have some method
that either.prompts the Vice President to act and make it a constitutional reqturement of his that he shall act in this regard or that it
be vested in some other body.
Senator BAYjr. Maty I respond just, briefly to acquaint you with my
thinking on this ?
Mr. Moon.

Yes.

Senator BAYU. It is going to be pretty .difficult for us to correct the
shortcomings that you pointed out, sir, without perhaps creating still
other shortcomings that would be less desirable.
I hope you would look into this with me and see. If there is a way
to do this, fine. We will put the Vice President. in this position as a
partner in this action because li hs the constitutional responsibility
to do this. As President Eisenhower said very emphatically at the
American Bar Association Conference that was hold in ,Tune, it is
his opinion that tie Vice President can't escape this responsibility.
It is his.
Mr. Moonyw. In history it has happened too.
Senator BAYJI. There was no precedent or constitutional provision

such as we are trying to provide. We .put the Cabinet in there
because we feel this is the grou) which is best able to protect the
President from a power-hungry Vice President and the gr-oup which
is most intimately associated with his official status. It is a thorny
problem.
Mr. Mfoon. I based my question on the premise which the gentleman
from Virginia laid. We hind the Vice President killed outright and
the President was incapacitated.
Who is going to then suggest the inability of the President to serve
in the event. that, he does not himself suggest that? You have got a
gap that you ought,to give a little bit of attention to.
Senator BAYJI. I hope you can find a ready solution to itI I have
not been able to.
Mr, Moon.. I thank you,
Mr. POpF. Mr. Chairman, I am disturbedSenator BAYI,. May I say one other thought and direct the coinmittee's attention to the CED report; that is, the Committee on Economo Development which wrote a report very similar to House, Joint
Resolution 1 and Senate Joint Resolution 1. One of the two minor
variances wns that they would give either the Vice President or the
Cabinet power to act such as w6 have in the committee bill; that is,
give either one the initiative. This was in our thoughts when we
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dwelt ott this matter in the committee. So the way the bill was
orl inally drafted, the Vice President himself was the only one that,
had the power of initiative, We changed it and gave It to boh.
Excuse me, Rlopresentativo Poff?
Mr. Popp, T1hat touches preeisely on the point I was about to make.
I aili disturbed about what youl have just stid.

I agree that the language as it ins been amended would do plecisely
what you say but I ask, Is it wise that tis be (lone?

Now, sole thought was given to this precise point by those e in the,
Americani Bar Association and other legal scholars who (,onieemr tWllen
'Solv, .with this issue and I ask: Is it wise to givo i the aierantive
the Vice President or the majority of the Cabinet, the right to initiate
this investigation because when you give the right, to a majority of the
Cabinet, that is the same thing as sayig you give the right to one
member of the Cabinet to start the agitation and I don't agree that
this is wise and I hope the Senator wil reflect on that il may choose
now or later to advise us of his feeling on fhat point.
Senator BAY. I will be glad to meditate a moment out ]oud withI
you on that.
Mr. Pops.. All right.
Senator BAYu. Idon't see any dinger. One Cbinlet, mmber does
not make a majority. You are going to have to have a majority y. As
long as the Vice President has a veto, they can't do anything. liven a
unanimous vote of the Cabinet cannot do anything unless they get tie
Vice President. to go along with them according to our cost it it ionah
amendment.
Mr. Popp. I do see it danger because tliemore you 1)solifette the

authority to initiate the investigation, the more chalice there is that

tie motives for initiating it.
wil not be meritorious.
l ('an imagine that there might be ambitious nemihers of th(, Cahinet. or members of the Cabinet. who would he hostile to the President
l)hilosoplhically or hostile to the President personally and who just
as a matter of mischiefmnklng, might want to star ,it:(.tint-itg at written declaration aniong his fellow Cabinet members.
The Vice President. would have a veto power but tie mischief would
have been done. TIhope you would think (nreflly.
Mr. MATIAs. Would you yield?
Mr. Popp. Yes,
Mr. UATvrIr 4,s. This would have occurred in the Lincoln admiiistration witl Salmon P. Chase.
Mr. PoFP. Precisely.,
Senllator Vkyil, Miay T suggest, gentlemen, thait again T ask vou to,
look at. tile need to ('otisidet' this in the, light of what reasonable, men
itir going to (o.
I asIC you to eonsid, r what cir(,llinr.nt1n(0s the President, hi.Ielf is
going to' be in-phy.i'lly or nm.ialy'-before a Vice resident, be
he Over so nimbitiolls, and the majority of the Cabet l)Ce
they evet 50
te,
hostileor roglish would take tils action.
Particularly wtl the
iodler

communicationss we

lave

iva

ilable)

the

Pt'esident. would have to he in pretty had shope, and-it would have to be
ratller obvious before these steps would be iml)lemenfted.
Mr. Popp,'. T agree and we must some timpe reach a point where we
trust. somebody and yet T suggest that at reasonlable 11-,'1S rle f.e-

8&

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

(Jlontly ishonored ill its brelill itd I think %i'might pJoint. to somo
ineidits inIlhistory whil will reflect what I just. Said.
I sty again, I hopp yOU will think on this, If vou have ny addid1e
ional advice, youl lligllt, Submilt, R to the eoninttte(I, iMit Ia|tel,
th(o'ongress tho tddiIll fill this, Sellator, h11.t11File (1uIRIMIII.
?
1101111l
ehtek lud Ibliep
Sentfor
1141 AY 1
vIasI
AbOtit. to s11' this. WVe 1rve 1t1 lddit lonal
eheek 11(l !inale,.
eyonld the example of thw Lineoln Cabinet let
u.s take the example of the same ( 'ahlnet imposed oi theiIlNtPresideni
,folhmolI. There, I t hink, we could .oilceibly lave had a Cabinet
which was vervy Ihostilo to fiIo lei'esidelt. Even theln, underl those
terrible (ir-iistain
et.
thev cotl(l mt get. he t wo-tlhirds vole that1 was
obvious mlIove to remove it
necOSIS1try1 In Collgress whell there was fill
lPresideit. wh was not. disabled iuider the terills to \vlnicl we refer.
Ur. P1"'.. Mr. ('l
t
I doi'l men to (ol-r(,'l te ('hIlinl an hl
Ihere is po.sily a MisnderStanding of terms. The ('oug" SS wOUld
' P esidll to ile josiion
' fI('
fl'h
1)ill\
lOp t ittil ih i('l(hl
of Am.i(,I. lr(,idellt. This 6evoille s failssile oIl' il tihe sit lli ioll
volltelnl)llate lill sec io 15 o it, i I O11 1111ite
It llll'tt
I'o st %t lhat.
Senator BAY II. If.
wvoui get, there sho ll,,.k mtfrl of it Inloieif
is all t hat would e requiredfor a 1Preside t to S
. n( it (lehtrntin itd
to bring the Conmgress n as tlie Chitairman so rightly points out. 'We
haive to vislali e the sihtio n whNih illoul exist. 'I'lI, 1Preident,

wouhl hvo to be in Smillient conclition (1) iltd thie problems facing
ou' N tion of such Ill vity (4) thin thc Ip"wePresi(, lll it 11
majority
of tle cabinet t wotl dag'ee thnt. ile Vicev Pirside'l should take, over.

D1)ilng this Short. period that wolld he req lired for e"ougresioml
dehher.itionl is the oiilh loRsiblel

period inl wi

filtle powri

t1aken awatv from tlie President W'ithout tile ("olgres

(()il(1 ho

c fillgg. So

e

have thliWr e eel,(s: Tie VAe Presidenl, t lie majority of thie ('abinet,
fill(] a (wo-thirds vole of the Cmgress. That .tbe'ims to cite, ifl most. it
not. all rellsonhle ciretittnstmiep, to he n(lequatpeSafegun rds.
The (IAtM UAN. Aks to .ectionl 5, tIls is th enp where the President.
himself says: "Mry disabilityy is terlinlnlted." This is a case, where thie

Vice president, Says "No; yo011r disability1 is no0(t t1ern1dlntePV)

Tn n can 1ik ethtf, T tli we should llot rely solely oil
nip
th
ee Presi(lent nild vemy Wisely T thinl you say von 810h1(1 hnve, a conenenie of
two-thirds of the heands of tlie exeeut Ive, (lepartmeits mid lhen lhere i
a Clarh of opinion.
Then
Congress can coni id decide thit issue. T think tnt is

fall-. 'There would hanve to he a.majority.
Mr. PopI,.'.

f T may argue your 1)oint for youi nid T would not. pre-

sume to (o hint. beelse you! are more able than I it is true As a,pragmatie matter that, the congress. would halve tile lats say for this
reason, if the Vrice President or Cabinet were neing for interior reaRolls lhe Pre11sidenl would be nbleh, the followhira dliv, to nvail himself
of th0 proteetIlo of he clt
ongressional aet lon simplyh y following the,
procedure atithorized in s.etlnF0/ 5.

Senator BAi-. The next moment. As soon as lie learned of the.
Iransitlon, .section A would be invoke(l.
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Mr. PoFF. You would intend that and this is what I intend.
Senator BAYU. We don't want a great delay. We want the President to say, "Wait a minute and let the Congress decide as quickly as
possible."
Mr. Por. I hope you will reflect on the question of allowing the

Cabinet to initiate the investigation.
Senator BAYIT. Will you clarify the question for me, please?
Mr. Pore. As I understand your testimony, in section 4, because of
the conjunctive structure of that sentence, you feel that either the Vice
President or, in the alternative, the Cabinet, can initiate the action to
obtain a written declaration of inability, and I say I hope you will reflect on the wisdom of permitting this to he done; that is, the initiation to be done in the alternative.
Senator BAY!!, I think the gentleman will perhaps get some idea as
to what my preference is by looking at thle original text, but I think
he also recognizes the importiince for the give and take, the consideration of everyone's opinion, and the draft that we have now permits
either the Vice President or the Cabinet to initiate, and I am willing
to abide by it.
Mr. TENZER. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Po'F. Yes.
Mr. Tzpn. Does section 4 of the proposed amendment give the
Congress the right to any choice?
Senator BATH. No, sir.
Mr. TczR. You have in your proposed amendment the following
language:
Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments or such other parties as the Congress may by law provide-.

Under what circumstances would the Congress provide by law for
another body to do anythingg I
Senator BAYir. ThiN is lust a safeguard, a safety check, trying to
anticipate what the future might give us as far as the way the Cabinet
functions.
Perhaps we will find out that our originalMr. TENzvR. I don't understand that provision in the amendment.
Senator BAY!!. May I try to explain it?
Mr. TFNzrn. Yes.
Senator BATT. My opinion, and that. of the majority of people with
whom I talked, feel that action by the Vice President and the Cabinet
offers the best solution. But in the event the future proves that. the
Cabinet, because of its close relationship with the President, will not.
function or, for some other reason is not the best body to make this
determination with the Vice Premident, then and only then may the
Congress step in and in ita wisdom set up some other body to act in
conjunction with the Vice President.
Sir. TE,*.zmn. Then it is possible if neither the Vice President or the

majority of the members of the executive branches do not act, that
the Congress may act by appointing a designated body to investigate
and make its recommendations to th6 Congress?
Senator ILA-ir. But it will be that body and not the Congress per se.
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Mr. TENzm. That is how I understand it.

Mr. Popp, Surely you don't want to proliferate that power to that
extent. Suppose tha the body which the Congress appoits to do this
should be the Ropublican National Committee or a committee of the
Congress. We would not want, woul( we, to give an extragovorn.

mental body the power to go snooping around agitating for what reasons only they know, the question of the President's physical or mental
capacity,
Senar BAyj. I think this is extremely unwise. I think you are
familiar with how that particular provision got in there. This is the
result bf the consensus session that we had a year ago last January
when we had scholars and constitutional lawyersMr. Porr. I am in favor of the inclusion of that clause but I don't
favor the treating of the investigation in the alternative.
The language or legislative history should make it plain that the
Vice
President alone has the right rvtohro
to initiate the declaration of
inability.,,___..,
The werti
CHAIRBAN. May I make an observation there?
We
tohl1 that there was some r eluctance oil tihe part of Mar-

siall in the case of Wilson, and reluctance on the part of Arthur in
the case of Garfield to make a declaration or even to initiate an inquiry
as to whether the President is incapable and disabled; would you not
still have that situation prevailing today?
If somebody else acts with themn, it might remove that reluctance.
Mr. PoF. I could not agree more. I strongly un(lerscora what the
chairman has said. This is the reason it was written this way.
The way the language appears now as it is interpreted by Ohe author
of the b1fl places a new concept and.grants a new and broader authority to unknown people and Isay tIus isSenator BAY11. The gentleman is aware of the proposals that are
being made of having a blue ribbon committee tw include even the
Supreme Court, the leaders of both Houses, plus expert doctors. This
typo of a blue ribbon connittee has, I think, no place in this, But
this is an effort at compromise and as long as tie Vice President is
permitted to have this veto power, I don't see that tie committee would
get, out of hand.
Mr. Mootr:. May I ask a question ?
1 think you fully understand the manner in which our questions
1111 evolved. I believe it is fair to determine from the manner of the
questions and the questions themselves that we are interested in this.
We want to see the problem and it is a very severe problem as far as
the administration of our Government is concerned, solved.

I think, thouil~, that we, cannot, take a half shot at; this. I think
that we have got to treat it in great detail. I appreciate the emphasis
you )lave placed on this legislation, the fact tlat you have given it
birth and life and the questions that I have asked are simply trying,
in my own mind, to answer some of the questions that have come up.
I support the thsti hereo and the need that tle Congress should act
imme(fflAtely and I congratulate the Senator for his wording; I do
think, though, that there are several situations that have been pointed
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up that leave the language of the Senate resolution somewhat wanting
as an adequate answer to the problem.
Thank you,
Mr. Povr. Now. if we may turn to another Iint and T hope you
won't think I am laboring these points unduly, I don't intend to. I
want to see this thing done as expeditiously as possible and T am
willing to compromise.
Senator BAh.
L,t me make a statement before Congressman
Moore leaves.
None of the members of this committee need to apologize for asking
me questions. The more questions we ask and the more we try to
delve into each other's mind, tl morO all of us can see the dificulty
of solving this problem and the more opportunity we will have of
finding solution. So fire away.
Mr. MrCrjtocjr T would like to make this p oint clear. I understand that, there have been some questions raised bv some people about
tie lengthy questioning that has been going on at this committee. We
seekc to Change tle fundamental law of the land and if we probe every
1)ossibilitv or every probability and most possibilities, we will be doing
no more than a proper job that.shoud be done.
I know that there is necessity for prompt action and to that end I
propose to lend every support that T know how to do it.
On tie other hand, a day or a week or more, if it, improves that
which we finally submit to the state of the tnn. will i time well
spent and it is not done with the purpose or intent to improperly
dcliiv anything.
This is not delivered to von. Senator. It is delivered to some others
who have raised ti question of some of the minority to try to improve
that which is before the Congress and ultimately will be before the
States of the Unint.
The CtAnr.x. Of eourse T associate myself with that statement
you just made.
Mr. Porv. Tf I may approach another line, I dealt with simultaneous
inability of the President a nd Vice President. T want to associate
with that quetnion the ue.stion of the iinbility of an Ating President
and the inabilil of a President when there is no Vice Presidet and
directed toward those three possible cases, T am going to suggest
for the recordMr. CrrAtANX. Will you say that again, l)eaSe?
Mr. Port'. The question of simultaneous inability of the President
and ViepPresident, the ease of the inability of an Actina President,
the case of the inability of a President when there is no Vice President
and to meet those three eases, T am going to suggest for the record,
language which might be added to this constitutional amendment and
T do .o only for plrposs of debate, not because T am wedded to the
language or because I am wedded to the idea that it should be included,
I am suggesting you miy add in seetion 6 the following words:
The liability (f the Vice President shall be determined In the same tannor

is that of the President except that the Vice President has no right to partici-

pate in sueh determination.
I t'15
lit
of the death, resigintin, removal, or tinhdifty (it the Vice President.
the person next fit linte of suecession Mhall nIt Iii lieu of thepVte Presideit ifiuder
sections 4 and 5.
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Now having suggested that for the record, and realizing that it
this moment, I want to attempt, with the permission of the Senator, to
(we.ios up IL114l o ifnqulry with which we cannot intelligentfy deal at

write some legislative history which might be useful in the final
passage of this bill.

The Senator knows that over the years, legal scholars have questioned
the precise definition of the word "vacancy" as it is applied to the

office of the President or Vice President.
And that word "vacancy" is used in section 2 of this bill.
Now, to me, it is clear that the word bas reference tq thos-e eases
where the President or VW President is no longer odeupying the
office by reason of death, resignation, or removal and that as used in
section 2 it has no application whatever to the question of inability,
but I say legal scholars ha-ve disputed the question of whether permanent disability constitutes a vaency.
Now', T assmle that you share miiy feeling that the answer to that
(tuest ioil is negative, namely that the word "vacancy" as used in seetioil 2odeals only with the question of death, rvsignation, or removal.
Senator _AY4r I agree with you and I think we have ample prece(lent to indicate that this is the preponderance of legal thought on the
question.
Mr. Popp. I thank you.

Now another item.

Does the Senatoir feel that when the Vice President becomes Acting
President as contemplated in this bill, he should, before he assumes the
discharge of duties and powen.i of office, take the Presidential oath?
Se1nator BAYir. I think he could. The allegiance he swears as Vice
President is similar to that he swears to as President. It is t question
of semantics as to which oath lie takes.
On second thought,-you will forgive me fol' rambling-as you pose
these questions I think of one thing and then another thought. comes
into mind. We are not in our amendment giving him the office of
President. In fact the only way lie gets to have the powers and dutlies-or as was suggested a moment ago, the discharge of the powers
and dtitis as the ease may he-is because he is Vice Plsi(dent and he is
not taking over as President.
fy opliion, as I think of it now, is that the oath of office as Vice
President gets him into the position where he, under this constitutional
amendment, would assume the powers and dutes as Acting Prsident,
not as President. Tt would therefore be unneessary for h im, with this

provision, to take the Presidential oath.
Mr. Popr. I ant inclined to agree with you, but I yield to counsel.
Mr. CopE ~thVKII. Under the Constitution, the language says:

The President Is given tie authority to veto acts of Congress to function as
flomniminder in Chief, to grant reprieves and pardons, make treaties, to apmint
officials, and convene Congress.

Would an A(sting President have the same powers?

Senator Bhn't. You said the President is given the power 1and we
itre giving the Acting President the powers and duties of the office.
You answered your own question,.
Mr. Co.rnANurlm. Tho Constitution uses the word "President."
Senator BAn?. The President is a flgurehead unless hie has )owers
and duties which you subsequently referred to. We are not giving the
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office but we are simply giving him the powers and duties of the office,
which would be sufficient.
Mr. CofPNHAVEn, Would the Vice President, while acting as President be entitled to the benefits and privileges of the office of President?

Senator BAwt. I would think he would be, yes, sir.
Mr. PoFI-*. Now, the gentleman has reference to the question I was
about to ask next, and this is no idle question. It must be dealt with.
If the person next in line of succession succeeds to the Presidency,
then he will be entitled to the privileges and benefits of the Presidency.
I have in mind such things as salary, the use of the White House and
the White House facilities, the White House staff the White House
stationery, and I think we are going to have to deal with this in a
statute which fixed the salary of the Vice President. This could be
amended by authorizing him to have the salary and to use the benefits
of the White House.
Senator BAYIK. I think we have a precedent for that. My counsel
advises me they did do this for Lyndon Johnson. A concurrent resolution was passed. The point is well taken but it is not something that
needs to be specified in tle amendment itself.
Mr. PoFp'. Yes. In defense of counsel, we need to deal with that
question. I think it is useful to make it part of the legislative history
for that purpose.
Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I yield the floor.
Senator BAYw. I am happy to offer what little knowledge I have,
Unfortunately,I wish I had more.
Mr. PorF. 'I think you have been very helpful.
Mr. MAOGIR00R. I will pass.
Mr. MATIT.AR. Senator, one thing that has occurred in this colloquy
that I am curious about, there was some suggestion if a Vice Presideni,
by reason of the "owers that would be conferred under this amendment were to hold on too long or in some way to hold on wrongfully,
that.impeachment would be the answer which would give the Congress
the last, word.
Section 4 of article IT of the Constitution provides that impeachment shall be for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misde(.
meanors. Would you say that. under the powers of impeachment there
would be A.way to get at this particular problem which, after all, might
be nothing more than ft difference of opinion and possibly an honest
difference of opinion as to the President's health.
Senator BA1YIt. The question is high crimea--whether it is a breach
of his oath of duty or oath of office. T may Aot recollect correctly.
I t hought the question about impeachment of the Vies President dealt
with his refusal to net, not the necessity of his taking too long and
mninta.ining
the powers,
The Congress
can keep this from happening. The Congress cn,
by the same two.thirds vote that is required for impeachment, give
the Viee President the power and, by less than that, the President
immediately takes over. Nevertheless, the point is well taken. I would
much prefer thnt,we not have to use the impeachment powers.,
T quite frankly don't. see that we would under the provisions. T
think the great weight of public opinion would compel the Vici,
President to act. judicially and assume these powers and duties when-
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-over he could got a majority support of the Cabinet and in the event
that le does not let loose the rois, unless he is supported not only by
the Cabinet but by the overwholning weight of two-thirds of Congross, tile President is going to take over again right away.
Mr. MATJHA,. I would feel that the use of impeachment proceedings where there is a subjective question of the President's health or
tin President's physical abilities would be inappropriate. It wouldn't
fall within high orines or misdemeanors.
Turning to section 2, I am interested a little in the philosophy that
may have been expre ed in your committee about the fact thiat it is
the President Nvho shall nominate the Vice President. Under tile provisions of Ihe Constitution already in effect when there is a vlancy in
the Presilency by reason of the failure of an election to be decisive, it
is the House of Iepresentatives where the election is decided.
Now, your committee has seen fit to deviate from this pattern and
to say that the President hlinsol f shall1) the one who shall nominate
him and the Congress is relegated to the position of really confirming
or refusing to confirm the -esident's nomination. I wonder what, is
the philosophy expressed in your committee?
Senator IRBi'i. I will b0 glad to think a bit out loud with you on
that. It is the feeling, first of all, in the normal procedure of our
convention proce, thio President does have a strong voice--not
always the final roice-but a strong voice in choosing who his
inning muto may he. Certainly it is wise, and particularly in the
ltime of rlisis it, lsimperative, that we have a Vice Presilnt with
whom the President can work. It would be worse, in my judgment,
to have a Vice President who was looking for ways to embariss the
President than to have no Vice President at all. For this reason, we
gire the President the same aulhority that he now has as far as the
Cabinet officials and others are concerned to nominate. Then, instead
of his selection being confirmed only by the Senate we bring in the
Senate and the louse-sort of a combination of the election procedure
of the 12th amendment plus the advise-andceonsent powers that the
Senate now has. They would work together as two Houses sitting
separately, but making the final deterinIation to support or refuse to
suBi)ort tle President,

If they ref use to go along with his nominee, he certainly would bring
11l) a second and perhaps a third or fourth.
Mr. WHrIImTxi.r. Will the gentleman yield for a comment-the chairman will remember this very personally, from personal experience
tht when the lst Successiol Act was l;issed by the Congress one'o
the principal arguments presented by Mr, Truman as President was
that it would be undemocratic for ie President. to be in position to
select, his successor and for that. reason the Speaker of the House should
be the man next inilie behind the Vice President rather than a Seeretary of State who was appointed by the President.
Now we come along hero ill 10ih and we say that we ought to reverse
that philosophy Maybe some of these veteiain members will remenmber th to.

rMAIIIIIAS. I would like to pitrsue,that,
Mr. Mc(Ct.oviu, Maiy I reply total observation ?
Arr. ifhrlims. I will he glaild to yield.
Ar.
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Mr. 'McCuiMrOC. I was glad to hear that. observation. I am sur,
this was the opinion of President, Truman. It merits great weight
and much consilderation by reason of that, fact. However, I think
the actualities of the situation are entirely different from the expression
used long goo of 1!1t impropriety of tlat action.
I think the record shows, beyond question, that in recent. conventions,
in both parties, the person who is nominated for President. almost
invariably determined who was to be selected as th candidate for
Vice President,
Mr. WHITENER. When we nominated Mr. Stevenson, he left this Wide
open to t.he convention to iiiake the decision and Senator KOfauver

was nominated.

MIr. McCumoci. I remember thata. might have been the exception. I remember the Chicago on'vent lon when that wasn't, the case
in both parties. I am inclined to believe it.
certainly wasn't the Case
inl 11)(14, at, tle Repiblicanconventionn . anl(
rObllVwa In't fit the
Demorati Convention, Maybe others could answer lint.
Senator BYJI. I have the greatest. respect, for Presi(lent, Truman
and my memory isn't, good enough to recollect specifically, bit I will
vagerlhe did till he could to havie his voice hear1 in11t)18 as far as
the vice-presidential choice is colncerlled.
Mr. McCrimocu. I nhink
there was a i)hrase, while Ii('11
outof'
l (that
convention if I recall correctly.
Mr. MATUITAR. Mr. Clharnian, ifI can recover the floor, tle colloquy
has been very useful because it. brings me to the point. that I wanted to
raise. This is provided by analogy to the position of a presidential
candidate who is choosing his vice-presidential running mate, hut I
would suggest that the man who sits in the presidential suite of the
Blackstone H'otel in Chicago, who looks forward to a period of ,3or 4
or 5i months of cama)nigning ahead of him, who nee(s to have it.
silesman with him, who is going to sell his ticket. and his program and his
platform to the American people may be a very difforelit man from
the IInII Who is ensconced in tile liil lfloply of power at. 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue and his motivations may be somewhat different.
Senator Ihv. May I speak to this? T t)ink you are absolutely
right, but. I think we are going to come to opposite conelusion.s, Go
right it
headi.
M i. M .l'InAs.

TI Will he lintereStilng to hear 3OI1ourllloment,

Senator B mtr. I think you are absolutely right, that. in making his
nomination, the incumbent President is looking toward being ro' minated and ants a Vice Presi(dent not onl
'ith whom he can work,
but l)erlaPs primarily one that would a(ld the biggest polit i'al punch
to the ticket.
T think how nueh more jt(licious it is to have a. Presi(lent you Sial" IF

onsConceo at 1000 Pennsylvania Avenue. To me, lie is a Presideni in
the fill light of public opinion and he has no reason to chonse a Vice
Presi(lont, to get political power. his motivation then would e,1
think, in ill
fairness to him, to get the very best. possible
man lie eould
get, for the job-and isnt that what we are really after as far as the
Vice President is concerned
mr. AMrTAs. I wish T had your full faith in human nature, but, T
someties feel that people who sit in the White House are touched by
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O'tilo ittitgic of t hat office and l iso to great heights of jNI( I'i(t isil, bult we
ha, not everyone hats had 11he matgic
do svoevi de ne, IIn fort 1una1elj', 0t

wanld lit,hint. It jitis8ses soiiiehlollo,

A 111i11 who sdt inl thle W'hit1e House might well feel hie would appa

great L'P oil the paiges of huistoryv if his. Vice 1Prpsident were at weak and
,1 n5ot till imprjobable
voilllil kidId of till idivldllitl anid I would Satis
sit mat ionl.
I doit't wvitnt to recrl'i it,(.'ri'It co()ltt ,OeiSt (Ji of context(, hilt 1in
111 foJ-eigil press and ill thle doiest1 ic. press inl tp(past few Weeks t here
taeswa
hals beelt thlimputjlicat ion that (lie$Presidlent ofile Iitd
go to it
ltlug
him
l)V
not
Vice
Presidenit
the
to
downraide
trying
hult, hie wats
t
were
VC
IlThe itlwAelon
g tatltite (welitn ill LondonlO.
iieligt, keeping
andl keepinlfr hlimi out of th lim
dlowngratding him
1st,1imt'oiu
got ingj it puic persoinl ty.
iain ol giviyo
ugitny. ptrsolial weight or ('redvn('e to it.Thsar
moot ives whla wi ('1111 he Impuvigned to trvilt menl ill guca olikevs al11( it
piossibily ('ott f li ply to)it P residentt wft() wits ioosi ng a1Vice President.
Senat or. RAi, I'(It0 and I were&to add1( it ) ll] of thie mnot ives thilt
vould be itt t vihutled to* ho t Wv() of, las, leaving It(e Ilvre.idvln out of thlis,

1h e are going to
we would have 11pretty long 1l1st. right;. thre. I 1t,iN
haiive to look tt this in't he flight of whalt the great~er preponidera nee of
possil1)i IitI ies would hev. If I maty ask youl to think with me on th recen
I11rgedv llDliltas where I'idoai Johinson wits stid1(lmlhV (levid ed to dhe
TJhe Iitst
otflv( of IPt''illit,~atd(lie whle world wits inl mou0rn1 tug(.
thling Ihilt tile electorflte of this ountilry w1ouldl have1 t oleratod would
hutvlo
w~'CiWilt ot ext renely well
have bxen the selectt ionl of it Vive
qual11ified for' the job.
Mr. M4v'iius. WVell. atmollma he visibly well quailified but Itiuy
wot. he bent to lie 1rei'('Si~ht 's u~liswich oly.the Presidlent, maiy know.
This wvoiild lbe onte of (IImgiuit tempt at ionls'facinig thle President-,
IPt 11.4 A() to ft 411r0e ('o1811t00liaspect. D~id yourl Committee conlsidl tuiin. this tingiu around andI ling theo Congress maklie thle
elect ionl siuh)j evC to thle vewto power of th0 Presi denlt to inlsure, that thle
Pa'esidlent. did(itot ha111- at ik of harm111ony Within thie official familily?
fin
l
Senator BAvl. We cconsidered it. We allso considered con inll te
(hIoiee ill Congress.- to Ihose inemuhers of thle political party of tho
Presidln. I, for one, 1eel-fl jparticultly Some of these constituliouail schlolltrs felt ver~y Strongly utlItithsif we wvevent ('at'e0fttl we
sli uhillher the.1
executive. hranchl and try to set
were0 going to fprolifomat
ill) soineoiie whto would he competing with the IPresidlAn Itiless we
gut ye the President, primary.v respoulsihility. of )iecking the naun with
whitom lie could Wvork. If the per1son1 is ai tm~ y-p)itiby person, tile

Conlgre.s4s wouldh't, go alon1g. Ire woolhIlhave to seld another na1me.
Mpupose ofletting Congress 11m the1
6Ar. MA-vrnm AS. Wha wal(the011
initial selpecion?
Seututlor BRml. The mlost. ilmort ant thing is get Ilug not, only it.muail
who is well qoutlifled, bullt get-i iug it 1111til Whol( Wits ]lot it.lollticild hokc.
I'ho mall would haive to he, 'vel Iqualified, bNt lie should be one with
tvhonml I lie01
Pres-idit Could Work.
Mr. A'viuuis. Of 'ouirse, givingthe President thie veto j)OWVei would
Insurve t hit. the Presidetit wouldut- get anyone with whom he( vouldnV
work,
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Senator Bvinr.We are arguing which came first, tile chicken or tile
eof. Tile Presidnt already has tle power to nominate many execu
Soffices 111(1 the Senate ot the United States las the power to ratify,
to confirm, to advise and consent or not to, and we are giving him th

same power and bringing i the House, of Representatives as tile most
populous and most reprosentative power of the Congress. These shall
hve the final power of election after the President has nominated a
Vice President.
Mr. M,.irr.wt
Just. one final question dealing with the report in tie
fifth section. We get to public policy questions there, which are all
difficult. Some haive to be given priority over others., Certainly, the
President, as the Head of U overument, 1eing vigorous in the most inportant policy consideration, it would outweigh the minor difficulties
thlt.r might be involved.
•
Was any consideration given to tie effect on tie stability of tile
Government from the kind of hassle which would be involved or
which is implied in tile power of Congress to settle it dispute between
tie I evident an(I tie V ice President on ti question of whether or not
the President. was ready to assume this authority?
Senator BArIn. Yestyes; this is a very touchly question. There isn't
any way to simplify it, to make it look like Itis going to work out
without
anlywhole
feelings
beingquestions
hurt, without
controversy.
It isn't.
thinkc tile
disability
caiu be granyttly
sitiplifled, although
not completely simn)lifled by again looking at reality.
Let us say th President has a serious operations. He declares his
own disability. I'Ilere i's no problem.
Say tile Piesident has a heart attack. Ile is in ai oxyren tent and
tile lussians move missiles into Cuba. 'Phe Vico Iresident gets togeter with the Cabinet. and says something lias to be done to protect
the interests of the country, No problem,
would be 90 percent of the disability occurlI
These two examples
rences. What are you gogL to do with tie otier 10 percent? Tcan't
think you can ignore it. I think that you have sufficient I'otect,ion
against, usurpatiol of power by providing that the Vice President, the
majority of tile Cabinet, and two-thirds of tile Members of Congress
must agree tile Presidmt is disabled, There isn't any way to make
this semn as if it. wouldn't be a tangled mess in the press or any place
else.
In tile event, you had a President who said I an ready, willing, I am
able, I want to take over again and the Vice President and the majority
of tile Cabinet saving that you are not-thils would be most unifort.
nate. But we only bring tile Congress in as a safeguard to protect tile
interests of tie people.
We only bring tie Congress in when tile executive branch disagree;
when the Vice Iresident., majority of tile Cabinet, and tile President
can't decido this. Then we bring tle Congness in. It is very similar
to the impeachment proceeding, although 'it is not. tie same decision.
Mr, MATIMs. This could result. in t sort of dialog between Presi(lent and Vice President which would sould a littl like tile poem
"You are old. Father Willani and it, co(l'd 1), moie daingi ng to the
pulblie, prestige of the Presidency than almost anything you can
imagine.
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Senator BAYIL May I suggest that the damage to the President as
an Individual is not so important as the safety of tie country. I think
you will certainly agree. This is not your question.
Mr. MATHIAS, My statement related to damage to the Presidency,
the office of the President.
Senator BAkr. I don't think you are going to escape this colloquy
between the President and the Vice Presidentby keeping Congress out
of it because as I recall the Wilson situation, there was a groat deal of
congressional debate. In fact Congres took it upon itse o appoint.
a committee which marched down to the White House All this was
done in the open, and certainly the inability of President Wilson to
fulfill the powers and duties of his office and the shortcomings of our
Constitution which prevented the possibility of his temporary removal
was damaging to the Presidency also. There is going to be public
debate no matter to which body you give the final power of decision.
Mr. MATTAs. Was there any weight given in your committee to
the private arrangements which were made between President Eisenhower and Vice President. Nixon and President Kennedy and Vice
President Johnson as a means of effecting at solution to the problem,
hut being done on a private basis which would accord with the personalitlies and habits and relationships of the individuals who are most,
likely involved I
Senator BAYII. Yes, it
great deal of consideration was given to this.
This is certainly a great improvement to what we had before. I think
the Attorney General could best speak to this as far as the legal ramiflcations of a private agreement which could not be subjected to the

test of a court, until the country was in the midst of an emergency.

There is always going to be controversy in testing in court., but when

you have a private agreement between two individuals with no sane.
tion by the Congress or State legislatures, there will be much less
certainty about tlhe transfer th an if we put this in the bedrock law of

the land.

Mr. MATHIAs. Thank you very much.

Mr. HvOiiiNsoN. May I ask the Senator one question.

Referring to section 4 of the bill, Senator. Lo us assume thesituation where the Congress has by hlaw provided another body, other than
the principal officers of the executive departments, so that we would
have a general statute providing this other body as well as the constitutional provision referring to the majority of the principal officers
of the executive offices as a body. My question is this: Under those
circumstances, could it,
possibly be construed that a Vice President
would have his choice as to whether he was to go to that other body
or whether he was to go to the Cabinet?
Senator BAY. I would think not. In the first, place, the Conr
has a choice of either providin another bodyor permitting the VJabinet to continue to function. TIC is abundantly clear in the language
as.I read it,If Congress finds that the Cabinet. cannot adeuately I
this role then it provides an alternative body which will function.
This is the way we intended iit. This is the way most all of us look at
it and the way I would like it to read in the record.
Mr. HuIonNsow. Thank you.
44-261 0-05---
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With reference to section 5, let us assume that the Congress by a
two-thirds vote of each House decides the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. The Vice President
continues to discharge the powers and duties of the. Presidency. My
question is this: Does that exhaust the power of the President to challenge the matter again or can he turn around the next day and seek
to regain his powers?
Senator BAY1.
I woul I think it would exhaust the power.
Mr. HuTorHNsoN. So once the Congress had determined that the
President was unable to discharge the powers and duties, it would
in effect relieve him for therbalance of his term
Senator BAYH. No, not necessarily. The Vice President could agree
that the President had resumed his previous capacity and then the
President could take over again.
Mr. HUToHINSON. In those circumstances then the decision would
be entirely within the Vice President's power. Congress wouldn't
have any further voice in the matter?
Mr. PofF. Let me go through it again.
Senator BAYH. I am not certain I understand your first question.
Do I understand you wonder how many times the President may have
the chance to appeal to the Congress or does he just have one chance?
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes.

Senator BAYH. If I answered thatin the previous question, I clearlydidn't understand your question. It is my impression or intent
that he would have more than one chance but, having utilized the one
chance, I think hewould be very careful in making a second appeal to
the Congress because the degree of frequency with which he appealed
to the Congress would certainly reflect the attitude with which Congress would look on his mental capacity.
Mr. HuTounxHsoN. That is all.
Senator BAYH. At any time, the Vice President and the President
could. come to an agreement on this matter. In deference to the conversation Congressman Mathias bnd I had, this would cover a great
majority of the cases . The President could be recovering and the
Vice President would be able to be relieved.
Mr. PoFF. Do you yield?
Mr. HuwmaNboxN,"Yes.
Mr, PoaF4The Senator will notice that in section :5, you don't have
the ponjunctive language that you haie in section 4 and you sy that
the Vice President, with the written cotncurrence of the major y of
the principal officers and so forth; section 4, is the Vice Presidenti and
a ni&jority of the'pDrincipal, officers and so, forth. Now, in section 5,
there is no alternative in the hands of principal officers to initiate the
written declaration.
Senator.BATH. ,This may appear to be a bit inconsistent, but the
difference in the situations is tl
In section 4 you don't have a President saying "I am being Usurped or I am being wronged." In section
,0 you do. -We wanted to limit the direction that could be taken: more
severely whenyou hada President who felt he was being wronged.
I am willing to answer, more questions, but I notice the Attorney
General is outside. If I may ask the committee, I will be glAd to return any time you may have other questions. In deference to the
Attorney General, perhaps I should yield to him.
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The CHAnuArN. The Attorney General is here. I think you have
been very, very patient.
Seantor BAYH. May I make one statement in summary, please?
First of all, I want to thank the committee for its penetrating questioning. I only hope that some of my answers served to shed a little
light on this complex question. The main barrier, I want to emphasize, to our ability to find a solution has been the fact that so far we
have had so many different opinions that we have never been able
to come close to a consensus. Now we have, it seems to me, arrived
at a situation where the chairman of this committee, the chairman
of our subcommittee in the Senate, 76 of my colleagues in the Senate,
the American Bar Association, and others are joining in this consensus,
This in no way precludes this body from making improvements to the
consensus, but I would ask you to consider once again the impossibility of finding perfection and the gravity of the situation which now
exists in which we have no answer whatsoever.
I think for a n nber of years with a carrier pigeon being our most
rapid means of co~nnunication and the caisson bern one of the main
implements of armed warf
quite
problem. But
now we can destroy the
d as we know it in m tes. So we ought to
take a second look a ur individual views. We wan
get an answer.
I appreciate t
act that the questips indicated yo wanted to get
an answer too, d my college es in he'eate want to ork closely
with yoi. T
you for ur tud d appoh and I
be glad
to return if want m
The C n
z. W are very grate
ou foryourco
stand
thorough
station.
Thank ou very much.
Our ne t-to-the-last witn
td
A tourney
eral,

Mr. Katz bach.

Mr.

STTE OPORAL
KA

Ex~

.

THE
yo
r. ~

STATES
p.
ye a state ent in

support o ouse Joint Resoluti
it is nite aIO state nt, and
I am hesita when the co
is ittin so Ion A ithas
to
inflict the wh le stattm t upon y
t ou
I
you, I might su it the total
t emen
r the recordr, and really
simplygo into So of the problems or some of the under andi
that
I have With respett more difficult points and justad, a
par
of it sowe could fous
ntion on those or,ify
ould prefer I will.
submit the whole statement
record
p y answer questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Proceed as you wish.
Mr. KATZEN3BACII. Let me s]ip along in .my statement after saying
1 amn here to support I-rouse Joint Resolution -1, and to discuss other
slated pioposa]s that are before the Committee with reference to
House Joint Resolution. 1."
First, let me say that in using 1,1e phrase "majority Vote of both
Houses of 'Congres in section 2; and 4two-tlhirds vote ofblxth Hous-.
es" in section 5,iwhat is meant is'a majorityi and tw-th9irds vote,
respectively, 6f those Members in eac1Hous6 present And voting, a
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quorum being present. This interpretation is consistent with long.
standingprecedent.
And Senator Bayh stated that was the interpretation made on the
Senate side.
The legislative history should show that. That interpretation, absent the inconsistent legislative history would be the one that would
normally be made, and there is judicial precedent for it.
I assume that the procedure established by section 5 for restoring the
President to the powers and duties of his office isapplicable only where
the President has been declared disabled without his consent, in accordance with section 4, and that, where the President has voluntarily
declared himself unable to act, pursuant to the procedure established
by section 8, he could restore himself immediately to the powers and
duties of his office by declaring in writing that his inability has ended.
However, I note in this regard that the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary has recently approved an amended version of Senate Joint
Resolution 1, the counterpart of House Joint Resolution 1,under which
the President may resume his powers and duties in this situation only
by following a procedure comparable to that established by section 5.
I would much prefer a provision which would clearly enable the President to terminate immediately any period of inability he has voluntarily declared. This is a terribly simple point. In terms of trying to
solve, as this committee is, the more difficult problems, you shouldn't
ignore the easy solutions or make the easy problems more difficult to
resolve. At the present moment there is an understanding between
the President and the Vice President with respect to inability. I think
that is a good understanding. It is the same understanding that has
been had now from the days of the Eisenhower-Nixon understanding.
Kennedy and Johnson had one, and Johnson and McCormack had one.
Under -that more informal procedure, the President is able to say to
the Vice President, "If I suffer an inability I want you to act until
such time as I am able to act again." It could be something as simple
as a minor surgery under a general anesthetic. It might be important
in that 80 minutes that the Vice President be able to act in these times.
I'don't think we should make that problem more difficult. I think
that any constitutional amendment should take advantage of the
practice that has existed, and not make the simple understanding
which can be arrived at voluntarily any more difficult to put-any road
blocks with respect to those. Everyone has agrd we are trying to
encourage a Vice President and a President by this constitutional
amendment tO work out a system of continuity aind not to be abashed
if the Vice President should become Acting President for a short
period of tim.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask a general question, Mr. Katzenbach.
Do you think a constitutional amendment is required or can we do
this by simple statutet I
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think a constitutional amendment is certainly,
as a practical matter, required. If you look at the language of the
Constitution, there is an ambiguity in that language. Whileyou
might be prepared to say that that could perfectly leg'itimately be
construed to permit legislation and some scholars have'taken that view,
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the great majority of constitutional experts have taken the view that

it should be done by constitutional amendment. If that be true, irrespective of who is right as to what the Constitution means, it doesn't
seem to me that we can successfully resolve doubts without amending
the Constitution.
The CHAIRMAN. Your predecessors felt the same way.
Mr. KATZENBAOH. Yes, that was tiL view of Mr. Brownell, Mr.
Rogers, and Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. ioCULLOCH. Do you have language, or would you provide language indicated by the last sentence on page 4 of your statement under
tie pragraph No. 2? I would much prefer a provision which will
clearly enable the President to terminate immediately any period of
inability voluntarily declared. Does the Attorney General have language, or will the Attorney General
prepare language
which he would
1
suggest would effectuate that suggestionMr. KATZENBACH. I would be happy to do so, Congressman. I will
say generally that I will be happy to work on any of these points with
the committee, and with the committee staff, in any way that I can be
of assistance.
Mr. MOCULLOOH. We found that always to be the occasion heretofore.
Mr. PoFF. Will the entleman yield?
Mr. McCuLoc. Yes.
Mr. PonF. Has the distinguished witness discussed that with the
American Bar Association representatives?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No, I have not discussed that with the American
Bar Association representatives. I made the same point i my testimony before the Senate, but I don't seem to have been particularly
persuasive.
Mr. Por. Without the change which you suggest, would you consider the proposal invalid and-would you then not recommend its
adoption?
Mr. KATZENBAOH.. No; I don't think that I feel thi.t strongly about
it. I do feel, as I think several of you gentlemen said earlier we are
discussing an amendment to the Constitution, and I think tat is a
particularly demanding job of draftsmanship.
Mr. DowDy. You referred to the agreement which has existed between the President and Vice President and no doubt now existing between our President and the Vice President regarding the President's
inability to act and the thought occurred to me, suppose the President
has an agreement with the -Vice President to take over and fill the
duties of the office provided the President was in the hospital, and,
as you stated, under an anesthetic for 30 minutes, or maybe an hour
or 3 or 4 hours, and it all comes up as an emergency, and during that
emerge ncy, whether it be hours or daysWe were attacked by an'enemy
and tC,Vice President had to act, and would he have authority.
Is there anything in this legislation that would ratify or make legal
what he did The President hasn't foreseen this before he was attacked, became ill, or went to the hospital, he made no request that
the Vice President should take over.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't think thatthis, in and of itself, deals with
that problem. I think the Presidential agreement between President
Johnson and Vice President Humphrey does deal with that problem,

98

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

and I would think that the intention was not to interl'eno with timhat
kind of arrangement, but ill dealing with tile difieult, problems of disagreement, between the President; and Ohe Vice 1President it night
inadvertently cast,some doubt on these voluntary a1'rri'ingellietts.
Mr. Downy, Would it be or would it not, I) illegal--the actions
the Vice P1resident made during that, period of time?
Mr. KATENIIACII. Under lHouse Joint. Resolutioti 1, 1 would say
that under section 3 it says if the President, (leelares in wriing t ha'
he is unable to disoharge the powers and duties of his office, I would
suppose that the President could say to ti Vice president., eletl
generally: "I want you to regard section 3 as operative, I want. you to
assume those duties in the (vent. I am ilanesthesia, t-hat I 111 11nable to
perform my duties, I want, you to regard me as, unable to do so and
to assume the powers and duties of ihe oflice," and I would suppose,
that there was room under section 3 to do fliat.
Mr.DOWDY. You would have to assume it lot-tlere is nothing in

here giving you that authority; is there?
Mr. KATZENIAcir. No; but I (lon't think I am assuming a great deal
because I am talking about. practice that. has been in existence for
about 10 years, and I am talking against, the background where nolx(y
has been critical of that practice, and where there is no intent ion b)
the use of this language to interfere with it.
It would, I think, be desirable, either if it were clarified in lie
amendments or, at the very least, that it wits made clear that there was
no intention of interfering with that kind of an arrangement.
Mr. DowDy. That is a real possibility though, a situation of tlat
kind, and don't you think it should be clarifle( and make it, possil)he
that it is covered, or that it is not.?
Mr. KATZENDACHI. I think it should be clarified in one way or the
other. If I were writing on a fresh slate, I would prefer to see it
clarified in the proposed amendment itself liut my hesitancy in saying
that is only because so many distinguished people worked so long and
hard to come up .withthis language, and them is such a consensus of
agreement about it that if other changes were to be made, this is one
that I would think might be useful.
Mr. DOWDY. Would you give it some further study and inake some

recommendations to the committee on that point?
Mr. KTZBXBACH6 Yes; I will be happy to.

Mr. DoxoimuE. You say that the existing agreements that, have more
or less carried out during the past 10 years are in no way in conflict.
wifl what appears in House Joiit Resolution 1. LAot mn refer to the
language, section 8. If the President declares in writilig that. he is
nble to discharge the powers, well, there is no such writing in existence today that I know of between the President and Vice President,
that he shall take over in the event that he is undergoing an operation
and is going to be hospitalized for such period of time.
Mr. KAI NBAOt. Well, those understandings have sometimes been
reduced to writing. Where they haven't been they almost are in effect
because there is an oral understAnding that tie same terms that were
reduced to writing before are in effect. Now it might not quite meet
the terms of this,) Congressman, but I would suppose all tAhat would
have to be done would be for them to initial the understanding they
presently have.
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Mr. DoNojur,. If we passed a bill with this language in it, would
that not more 01 less vitiate any gentleman's agreement that existed
between ithe President and Vice Irosident I He would have to declare
it,
in writing.
Mi. KATZIONDAcxI. He could declare in writing the present understanding he has and state in writing that "if in the event I am under
anesthesit or similarly unable, I wisl you to assume those duties," and
I would think that section 3 was broad enough to include it
prospective
inability as well as an actual inability.
''he I1AIRtMAN. Mr. Attorney General, I want to met something
strightened out th!,is getting me t little confused.
r. McCulloc}i
iead from yotr statement. oil
4,,aO
next to the last paragraph, when
you explainei subdivision 5, when you said:
I ai;,sui1t' titt, the procedure established by sNtion 5 for restoring the President. to the powers ind duties of his office Is applicable only where the President
has
lhetm
declared disabled without his consent, in accordance with section 4;
and that., where the President has voluntarily declared himself unable to act,
pursuant to the procedure established by section 3, he could restore hiniself i)mediately to the l(Wiers and duties of his office by declaring in writing that his

inability has ended.

However. I note In this regard that the Senate Committee

on the Judleary has recently approved an amended version of Senate Joint
ilesolution 1,the counterpart. of Hlouse Joint resolution 1, under which the
president may re.qume his Imwers and duties fitthis situation only by following
it prmw~loure comparable to that established by section 5. i would much prefer
a provision whiph would clearly enable the President to terminate inmediately
any period in Inability ie has voluntarily declared.

You used the word "voluntary." I think that is significant. There
are two kinds, one where he voluntarily declares himself disabled, and
this provision would follow where he feels his disability is at an end.
Then we have the involuntary. In that case, section 5, as now
written would be approved; would it not I
Mr.KA1-,NNN1,Vlt. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you were going to supply us language to
cover this additional situation.
Mr.

KMvIENBAciu.

Yes; I think the difficulty, if I understand the

amended version of Senate Joint Resolution I at the moment, is
this: If the President voluntarily declars it., then he is subjected none1holess to the provisions of section 5, which is a 48-hour in effect, delay,
but could be much less and might desirably be much less, if I understand their intention eorretly on the amended laninuge. And I
believe if the President says, "Look, I ant unable to act ibs afternoon,"
I wouldn't expect the Vice President to act, except in the case of
il'ergency, bIecause normally no action need le taken for that period
of t1he. But, should an emergency arise, the Vice President would
act, then I think if the President comes out. and is healthy-fine, hie
ought to continue to perform the funict Ionsof his ofike and notihreo an
involuntary further waiting period of 44 hours or soinithin' like that.
The third point,.I say oIl page 4, even where the President silnahility
Was established original pursuant to sect on 4, rather than declared
voluhthrily by him, the Pre sident could resume the powers and duties
of his office inmediately with the concurrence of the Acting President,
1if would not be obliged to wait the expiration of the 2-day period
mentioned in section 5, I think the language will bear that InstricIion that he doesn't have to wait, if the Vice President immediately
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agrees with him. I think the point. should be clearly understood in
terms of at least the legislative history.
Fourtliq I assume that: transmission to the Congress of the written

declarations referred to in section 5 would, if Congress were not their
in session, operate to convene the Congress in special session so that
the matter could be immediately resolved. In this regard, section 5
might be construed as impliedly requiring the Acting President to
convene a special session in order to raise an issue as to the President's
inability pursuant to section 5.
It would seem to me that is clearly what the intent, must be. If
Congress is out of session, they must be called and he cannot, by his
failure to call, delay the process.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has revised Senate Joint
Resolution 1 to provide that all declarations, including the declarations by the President under sections 3 and 5 and the declaration by
the Vice President under section 4, shall be transmitted to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the Hrouse of Representative,
This change the committee states, would provide a basis on which
congressional leaders could convene Congress if it were not, then in
session. However, the Constitution expressly authorizes only the
President. to convene Congress in special sesion-article II, section 3,
clause 2-and in view of iat provision it might be argued that Congress cannot be convened in special session by its own officers. Accordingly, I would think it preferable to provide that the Acting President
must convene a special session in order to raise an issue under section 5
as to the President's inability. Although section 5, as it now stands,
could be construed in that way, the committee may wish to consider
whether it would not be advsable to add express language which
would make that intention unmistakable.
Mr. Po . I assume you will submit the language which will implement that suggestion I
Mr. KATZWENAOU. I will be happy to, if it is the view of the committee.
Mr. Popp, We are going to wind tip with a constitutional amendment that will be longer than the Constitution.
Mr. KATzzMAOH. I don't think anything I am going to suggest will
have that effect.
Mr. Popp. I hope not, but the amendment you suggested will occupy
several paragraphs.
Mr. KATZENBAOI,

of them.

b

I

believe I can do t, inless than 20 words,boh

Mr. Por. I hope you can. I will recall that you said you could
do so.
Mr. KATZFONA01AO Having said it, I will be sure to do so.
Mr. McCurLCi. Mr. Chairman, I should like toask the Attorney
General whether or not lie believes that there might be some conditions that exist in our country that would authorize the leaders of the
House and the 'Senate to call the Congess into extraordinary session.
And could this be one of then, if the Attorney General believes that
there is such a foreseeable condition which might warrant thttf?
Mr,KATZImBAOJ[. I think the answer to both questions would be
"Yes, sir." I would Ohnk ht ,if you had a simultaneous death of
both the President and the Vice President, you have still got a suc-
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ce.sion statute, but the succession statite,presently covers people likely
to be in Washington. I suppose in the event that you would run out
iof people Oil your suction statute, that the leaders would be justified
Vl)(y to perform the function which is
in so doing 6or the want. of any1
explsly vontlineld in t1 (xonstitlition, if that is what you had in
mind.
Mr. MATHIA8. Mr. Chairman, I note, sir, that both section 2 and
section 5 refer respectively to a majority of both Houses of Congrss
and a two-thirds vote in both Houses. The Constitution is not, completely uniform in its references to voting majorities or voting practices but at least in some places, it provides, for instance, that twothirds of the Senators present. should concur. Would these provisions
'createany ambigauity in view of the fNct that. we are dealing with such
iahighly oitiIlsubject
aMr. KATZENBAI

don't. think that we have any ambiguity, unless

ambiguity would bW oreated by a conflicting legislative history as to
what was meant. If the intention was clear that it, nieant a majority
and two-thirds of a quorumiand there was not-hing in the legislative
history to sughgst the opposite, that would be a chear nterprtation
and there would he no need to clarify that in other language.
Mr. MArHrAS. There are some shocking opinions rendered in the
States on this question which indicates that maybe the addition of not
20 words but 1 word would tutse difficulty.
Mr. KATZENBACIi. There is precedent mn the Supreme Court for the
that 1 jtst made. The case is MissouriPaoifo Ra.i'oay
terpretation
Company v. Kanas.
Mr. LiNDSAY. Do you yield?
Mr. MATIAS. Yes.

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Attorney General, I take it under House Joint
Resolution 1, in the event that. section 5 is invoked and a two-thirds
decisionn should be made and the President is held by Congress to be
unable to perform his functions, that. if the President should later wish
to recapture the power and if the Vice President disagrees, you go
t hrolgh the same procedure all over again ?
Mr. KATZENBAOH. I don't believe you can otherwise interpret it
unless you sy--the only other possible interptaton would be that
having been done once, he never can get back in, and I would not think
that was the intention,
Mr. LINDSAY. I would like to ask your opinion of some language
that appears in an offering of my own, House'Joint Resolution 139,
in wlu9ch I inserted the following after the two-thirds provision has
occurred.
an.
Mr. RATZENBACH. I t.m familiar with that, Cong
Mr. LiNisAy. Are yoou familiar with the three conditions?
Mr, KATZNBAOu. Yes.

Mr. LINDsAY. What would you think of the incorporation of those
three points in the constitutional draft?
Mr. KATZUNBACI. I have no objection to the three points that you
have put in there to clarify this other than-perhaps I can say it this
way, Congressmn: The House 3 oint Resolution 1, ashas been pointed
out, was worked on by many leaders of the bar and has the support of
a large number of Senators. It is, as President Johnson says, a responsible resolution of a very difficult problem. I think any of us in
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this room could arrive at other responsible resolutions of the same

problem which would vary in one way or another and which I might
prefer or you might prefer. I think there is a problem in section 5 of
recurrent procedures of this kind.
I would think, as a sensible interpretation of section 5 as it. now
exists, the Senate or the House would not continue to act on this, absent some change of circumstances. I do think the provisions that
you have there would obviate that particular problem and they seem
to me to be reasonable provisions in terms of dealirig with what I think
you envision of every 48 hours a new request.
Mr. LiNDSAY. I was thinking not. just of clarity, because you would
have a continuing problem and there is room for clrification, I would
think, in section 5, but I was thinking also of the importance of giving
Congress at least the power to restore the condition as it was by a
majority vote. You could have on your hands a most difficult, trying,
dangerous, and nasty situation of a power fight between two branches
of Government and this would at least retain, by constitutional language, in the Congress a final say to put an end to the whole show,
should it become wise to do so. Otherwise, there is no area here at
all where Congress has any initiative at all.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. KATZJ BAOH. I think you make a valid point.
Mr. LINDSAY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?
Mr. COHIF (presiding). Would you care to complete your testimony without interruption?
Mr. KATZIENBACI[. I had only one more point to make with respect to
the "immediately decide" and "immediately proceed to decide" language that was discussed, and I think the committee is so familiar
with the proposals that have been made and with the advantages and
disadyantag", that it might be better for me to submit myself to
questions at this point.
Mr. Wi'rrMnR. You said there was an ambiguity in the present
constitutional provision which you think may be construed to limit
Congress in its right to legislate adequately in this field?
Mr. KATZI NBA0H. Yes.
Mr. WwTT.ENE. What is it I

Mr. KATZE)NBAOH. Juxaposition of the word "both" and the use of
the conjunctive "and" at the end of the article.
Mr. WHrrmt. Equally good constitutional scholars as those to
whom you referred take the position that It is ambiguous; there are
equally good scholars who say it is unambiguous, aren't there?
Mr. KATZENBACIH. No. If you will forgive me, I don't thi~ik anybody could read it without saying it is capable of more than one
construction. It may be that there are equally 'od scholars, certainly, who say it should be consttued in the way that it permits you
to provide for only one, My point is that that doesn't solve the problem. If youhave to debate as 'to whether or not that is correct construction you can't resolve that by legislation whieh later can be
attacked as not being in- accordance with the Constitution.,
Mr.Warr xrOi. But if T-ou.e Joint Resolution 1,is w-ritten into the
Constitution, it Will not be sufficient in itself, There would still be a
requirement Ior legislative action to implementit.
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Mr. KATzNBA0H. It provides for some legislation and, I would sup.
pose, legislation consistent with it could be enacted, but I would
say that the effort here was to solve this probleln without further

legislation.

TMfr. WI'rENER. But there are many .questions which this would not,
answer; that is a constitutional amendment which could only be answered hy legislation, isn't.that correct?
Mr. KA TZENBACTI. I would-I am sure there may be some and I
ain sure that even with all the ability on this committee it is going to
be iniposssible to (rft anything which in every given (ircunistance
gives you an absolute clear answer. That is beyond the capabilities
of any legal draftsman.
Mi'. 11rlI'rENFRI. If I may ask you on one other matter that we referred to this morning: This proposition of referring to a majority

of the principal officers of tie executive department: We do have, apI)arently, varying definitions within the statutory law of the Nation
on this subject?

Mr. KAWENOACHk
Mr. WiIiTmNF.

Yes.

What is your opinion as to the adequacy of that

descriptive language and your further attitude as to whether we should
spell it. out when we talk about these )rincipal officers?
Mr. KATZENBAC1J. I would think the straightforward interpretation of it would find some support as you indicated this morning, but
what is meant by the language? Are the members of the Cabinet
those who head executive departments? I would think that would be
the normal part of it.
Mr. CamuL. Plus the legislative history showing the purport and
intent of the Congress.
Mr. KATZIENBAOIr. It doesn't seem terribly important to clarify that
particular provision in House Joint Resolution 1 because Congress
is able anyhow to give that job to some other body, and by the same
token could, by legislation, rather than write it into the Constitution,
could simply say that body shall be, Secretary of State, Secretary of
the Treasury, and so forth. Because it provides for legislation, it
doesn't seem to be a major stumbling block.
Mr. WHITHNER. Until Congresq does that, there will be a great difference of opinion as to the meaning of this very important language.
Mr. KATZENUAOJH. I.doubt that there would be a great difference of
opinion on it, but I would concede that it is capable.
Mr. WHITN.R. Congress has the authority to state what constitutes
one of the executive departments.
Mr. KATZENBACIL VIt has that authority. There is no question
about it.
Mr. WHITENER. It has said it in different statutes in different ways.
If that be true, you have a patent ambiguity here that would have to
Ie clarified by a statute.
Mr. CErV. Could that, not be included in the report?
Mr. KATZENBACI. I think that would be adequate.
Mr. C:lmi. As part of the legislative history. You come back to,
"Why all the shooting?" It is because of the inability of those of us
here 'today to intelligently interpret the situation. I can understand
tle reason why tiebrains of this country, who were the Founding
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Fathers who drafted this wonderful Constitution of ours, even they,

as I see now, were somewhat perplexed with this thing.
Mr. WHITENER. My only rebuttal would be that any lawyer who has
ever read Steve Nelson's case and the report of the Congress on the
Smith Act, who would have the slightest suspicion that the legislative
history written in the committee report would have any bearing on
the dourt, is a very trusting soul.
Mr. POFF. I quote from your testimony on page 6 the following
section:
If the issue of national leadership Is to be importantly affected by the delay,
then delay should favor the President.

I might say I agree with you. Is it not, true that delay in conprsional action under section 5 of House Joint Resolution 1 would favor
the Vice President?
Mr. KATZENBACTI. It certainly would, in the absence of at least one
House acting. It.is almost impossible for me to envision circumstances
where there would, in fact, be delay.
For a Vice President to take those steps, it would really have to be
assured of quick and overwhelming support in the Congress.
Mr. POFF. Your answer would apply equally as to Resolution 1 as
amended?
Mr. CHIEL. May I break in? Three bells are normally a quorum
call, but this is an automatic rollcall on motion to recommit legislation
before the'floor. What is the will of the committee and you?
Mr. McCuLLoor. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say this: Since
this is a rollcall on a motion to recommit, that means that in all likelihood there will be another vote on the meiits and that means that there
would be a delay of a least 45 minutes until the second vote would be
complete.
Now, I would therefore suggest, unless the Attorney General has
some commitments that he must make tomorrow morning, that we
recess until a time certain tomorrow morning.
Mr. KATZENBAOH. I am afraid, Congressmen I do have commitments for tomorrow morning. I have to testify on another bill in
another House.
Mr. CmErir. Let us recess with the understanding that the chairman and Attorney General will get together at a future date.
Mr. Popp. May I suggest if we could adjourn to an hour certain
tomorrow and hear another witness and then arrange for the Attorney
General to come back at a later date.
Mr. CHELF. That is already done. I understand from counsel we
have a witness scheduled in the morning.
The prepared statement of Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach will be made a part of this record.
(The statement of Mr. Katzenbach follows:)
STATEMENT BY NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBAOn, AoTING ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES

I am privileged to appear before this committee to give my support to House
Joint Resolution 1 and to discuss related proposals which are before you to
amend the Constitution in order to remedy two critical deficiencies. The proposed amendments would, first, clarify the situation that would exist in the event
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that the President should become disabled, and second, provide a means for filling
vacancies in the Office of Vice President.
About 10 years ago, the chairman of this committee initiated a scholarly study
of the problem of presidential Inability. A special subcommittee composed of
ranking members of this committee was appointed. To Insure a broad and Impartial approach to the problem, a questionnaire was sent to eminent jurists,
political scientists, and public officials. In the succeeding years, extended hearings were held and reports filed. I am not aware of any constitutional problem
which has received more comprehensive and continuing attention by this comnittee than' that of presidential inability. Therefore, I see no value In any extensive review of the history of the presidential inability provision of article II,
section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution, or the interpretations which have been
given to that provision over the years. These matters have been fully covered
In the Attorney General's opinion to the President of August 2, 1961 (42 Ops.
Atty. Gen. No. 5), and I respectfully request that the committee make that
opinion a part of the record of these hearings.
At the outset I wish to reaffirm the view I have expressed on several previous
occasions that the only satisfactory method of settling the problem of presidential inability is by constitutional amendment, aw House Joint Resolution 1 proposes. The same of course is true of the problem of filling vacancies in the Office
of Vice President. I know that some distinguished scholars take the view that
Congress has power to act in the matter of presidential inability under the
"necessary and proper" clause (art. I, see. 8, clause 18), and that a statutory solution would therefore be adequate. There is, however, equally distinguished support, including that of the last three Attorneys General, for the proposition that
the problem can be adequately resolved only by constitutional amendment. And
as a practical matter, if what we want is to assure continuity in executive leadership-and if what we want to avoid is unertainty, confusion and dissension at
the very time of crisis-then in my judgment a statute would not provide a satisfactory solution. So I fully agree with the constitutional amendment route
marked out by House Joint Resolution 1.
1. THE PROBLEM OF PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

Article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution provides as follows:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the siid Office, the Same
shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected."
It is generally agreed that this provision poses no legal problem in the event
of the death of a President. As a matter of historical practice, first established
by John Tyler and followed by seven other Vice Presidents, the Vice President
becomes President in such a contingency, Section 1 of House Joint Resolution 1
confirms this practice in the case of death and extends the same principle to
removal of or resignation by the President. Under section 1, therefore, the Vice
President would become President and be sworn in as President in the event of
the latter's removal, death, or resignation. I can see no objection whatever to
that section.
As for presidential inability, there is no similar settled practice.because, of
course, so far in our history no Vice President has ever exercised the powers and
duties of the Presidency during a period of presidential inability. It Is true that
the identical Eisenhower-Nixon, KennedyJohnson, Johnson-Mccormack, and
Johnson-Humphrey understandings on this matter, supported as they are by the
views of the last three Attorneys General, have gone far toward establishing a
settled practice. These informal understandings, however, leave much to, be
desired as a means of resolving such fundamental questions. Moreover, they
make no provision for the situation that would exist if the President and Vice
President should disagree on the question of inability. Accordingly, it is clear
that what is needed is a lasting and complete solution to the key questions which
would arise under the ambiguous language of article II, section 1, clause 6 of the
Constitution If a President were to become unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. The first of these questions is whether it is the "office" of the
President, or the "powers and duties" of the office, that would devolve upon the
Vice President in the event of presidential inability. The second is who Is au-
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thorized to raise the question of "inability" and make a determination as to wll,
it commences and when it terminated.
The great majority of constitutional scholars have expressed the opinion that
in the event of presidential inability, the Vice President succtvds only temporarily to the powers and duties of the office and does not permanently become President. This has also been the unanimous view of Attorneys General of both
Republican and Democratic administrations for at least the last decade. Simi.
larly, the majority of scholars are agreed that the Vice President has constituitional authority to make the initial determination of presidential inability, an(l
that the President has the authority to determine when his inability Is at an
end. My own judgment and that of many Attorneys General Is that this is so.
However, enough doubt has existed on the subjects i the past that several
Vice Presidents have been deterred from acting as President when the President was temporarily disabled. As you will recall, this hapined most dramiatically during the prolonged illnesses of Presidents Garfield and Wilson, when
the country was left without leadership and decisions were made, to the extent
that they were made at all, in a questionable manner.
The events of the last decade demonstrate how quickly and unexpectedly disability can strike. If a President should become disabled while section 3 of
House Joint Resolution 1 Is in effect, there could be no dispute as to the status
of the Vice President as Acting President in discharging the powers and duties
of the disabled President. There also would be a firm constitutional guarantee
that the President could reassume his powers and duties as soon as his inability
has ended. On this basis, we can assume that a President who is sick, or about
to undergo an operation which will temporarily incapacitate him, would not hesitate to announce his inability, nor would a Vice President be unduly stow to act
if an emergency situation of thils kind should demand it.
The extraordinary situations-where the President cannot or does not declare
his own inability, or where a dispute exists between the President and Vice
President ag to whether inability exists--are covered by sections 4 and 5 of
House Joint Resolution 1.
Section 4 provides that if the President does not declare his Inability, the
Vice President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the
executive departments (i.e., the members of the Cabinet) or of such other body
as Congress might by law provide, may transmit to Congress his written declaration that the President is disabled, and immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President. Section 5 provides that the President
can resume the powers and duties of his office by transmitting to the Congress his
written declaration that his inability has ended. If, however, tihe Vice President
does not agree that the President's inability has ended, section 5 further provides
that the Vice President can, with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress might bylaw
provide, within 2 days so advise Congress. Thereupon Congress would be
required immediately to decide the issue. A two-thirds vote of both Houses
would be necessary to keep the President out and permit the Vice President
to continue to act as Acting President. If the Vice President could not muster
the necessary two-thirds vote In each House, the President would resume the
powers and duties of his office.
As the committee well knows, the factual situations with which House Joint
Resolution Iis designed to deal are numerous and complex. Inevitably, therefore,
some aspects of the proposal will raise problems of ambiguity for some observers.
In order to assist in'resolving any such amiguity. I propose to set forth the
interpretations I would make Inseveral difficult areas so that the committee may
consider Whether clarification is needed.
First, I assume that In using the phrase "majority vote of both Houses of
Congress" ii section 2, and "two-thirds vote of both Houses" in section 5, what is
meant Is a majority and two-thirds vote, respectively, of those Members In
each House present and voting, a quorum being present. This interpretation is
consistent with longstanding precedent (see, e.g., Mtissouri Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Kansas, 248 US. 270 (1911)').
Second, I assume that the procedure established by section 5 for restoring
the President to the powers and duties of his office is applicable only where
the President has been declared disabled without his consent, in accordance with
section 4; and that, where the President has voluntarily declared himself unable to act, pursuant to the procedure established by section 3, he could restore
himself immediately to the powers and duties of his office by declaring in writing
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lint 1)ia Inability has ended. However, I note in this regard that the Senate
('oillittee on the Judiciary has recently approved al amended version of Senate
*,ollt IResolutioni 1, the ('ounterpirt of lHouse Joint Resolution 1, under which the
1'resilentt 1ay resunue Ills powers and duties in tils situation only by following
it lrocedure comparable to that established by section 5. 1 woul miuch prefer
a provision which would clearly enable the President to terminate immediately
aly period of iuabiltyhe has voluntarily declared,
Third, I assume that even where the President's inability was established
originally iursuant to section 4, rather that declared voluntarily by him, the
IPresident could resume the lowers an(d duties of his office immediately with
the concurrence of the Acting President, and would not be obliged to await the
(,xi)lration of the 2-day period nentloned in section 5,
Fourth, I 1ssni11e that transmission to the Congress of the written declarations
referred to in section 5 would, It Congress were not then In . session, operate to
convene the Congress in special session so that the natter could he immediately
resolved. In this regard, section 5 might he construed as impliedly requiring
the Acting President to convene a special session In order to raise an Issue as
to te Presilent's inability pursuant to section 5.
The Senate ilommittee on the Judiciary huts revised Senate Joint Resolution 1
to provide tihat. all declarations, including the declarations by the P'resident
uider sections 3 and 5 and the declaration by the Vice President under section 4,
shall be transmitted to the President of the Senate and Spwaker of the House of
Representatives. This change, the committee states, would provide a basis on
which cumigressional leaders coulh convene Congress if it were not then in session.
However, the Constitution expressly authorizes only the President to convene
Congress in special session (art. II, see. 3, clause 2), and in view of that provision
it might be argued that Congress cannot. be convened In special session by its own
officers, Accordingly, I would think It preferable to provide that the Acting
President must convene a special session In order to raise an Issue under section 5
as to the President's inability. Although section 5 as it now stands could be construed in that way, the committee may wish to consider whether it would not be
advisable to add and express language which would make that intention unmtstakable.
Fifth, I assume that the language used In section 5--to the effect that Congress
"will Immediately decide" the issue-means that if a decision were not reached
by the Congress immediately, the pH)wers and duties of the office would revert to
the President. This construction is sufficiently doubtful, however, and the'tern
"immediately" is sufficiently vague, even though used also in article I, section 8,
clause 2 of the Constitution, that the committee may wish to consider adding
certainty by including more precise language in section 5 or by taking action looking toward the making of appropriate provision in the rules of the House and
Senate.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, in approving Senate Joint Resolution 1, has
changed the language "Immediately decide the issue" to "immediately proceed to
decide the issue." This change seems to have the effect of reversing the interpretation I have indicated, the result being that under Senate Joint Resolution 1,
as approved by the Senate committee, the Acting President would continue to
exercise the powers and duties of the Presideney while Congress considered the
matter and until one of the Houses of Congress brought the Issue to a vote and
failed to support the Acting President by-a two-thirds vote.
I note that the committee has before it several, proposals (H.J. Res. 8, HJ, Res.
119, and H.J. Res. 248) which would provide that once the issue of inability was
referred to Congress, the President would be automatically restored to the powers
and duties of his office if Congress failed to act within 10 days These proposals
would Odd a measure of protection for the President against interminable consideration of the issue by Congress. However, it would still be possible under
these proposals for the Issue to be decided by delay rather than by a vote on the
merits.
In view of the difficulty of etablishing in advance exactly what period of consideration would be appropriate, the most effective course might le to initiate
promptly the adoption of rules for the consideration of questions of inability that
would Insure a reasonably prompt vote on the merits. I do feel that, If the issue
of national leadership is to be importantly affected by delay, then delay should
favor the President. Particularly Is this so If the President may not, under section 3, unilaterally declare an innediate end to periods of inability which le has
voluntarily declared,
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It is sometimes suggested, with respect to provisions like section 5, that the
doctrine of separation of powers is Violated by exercise of legislative authority
in this field. I cannot accept this argument. Congress, it will be recalled, now
has constitutional authority to enact a succession law when both the President
and Vice President have suffered inability (art. II, sec. 1, clause 6). Congress
is also authorized by the Constitution to determine impeachment proceedings.
Accordingly, vesting authority in the Congress by a two-thirds vote to determine
the inability of the President in the event of an impasse between him and the
Vice President would not seem to be a significant extension of its present authority. It should be noted in this connection that Congress would be authorized by
section 5 only to confirm what the Vice President, acting with the concurrence
of a majority of the Cabinet, has done. Congress could not initiate the procedure for determining the commencement or termination of presidential
inability.
In my testimony on this subject in 1968, I expressed the view that the specific
procedures for determining the commencement and termination of the President's
inability should not be written into the Constitution, but instead should be left
to Congress so that the Constitution would not be encumbered by detail. There
is, however, overwhelming support for a measure such as House Joint Resolution 1, and widespread sentiment that these procedures should be written into the
Constitution. The debate has already gone on much too long. Above all, we
should be concerned with substance, not form. It is to the credit of House
Joint Resolution 1 that it provides for immediate, self-implementing procedures
that are not dependent on further congressional or presidential action. In addition, it has the advantage that the States, when called upon to ratify the proposed amendment to the Constitution, will know precisely what is intended. In
view of these reasons supporting the method adopted by House Joint Resolution
1, I see no reason to insist upon the preference I expressed in 1963 and assert no
objection on that ground.
II. FILLING VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF VIC PRISMENT

Related to the problem of presidential inability is the equally critical problem
of vacancies in the office of Vice President. Too often it is overlooked that the
country has been without a Vice President 16 times-in almost half of the 86
administrations in the history of the Nation. In an age marked by crisis, we can
no longer afford such a gap in the high command of the executive branch of the
Government. Today more than ever, the working relationship between the
President and Vice President has become increasingly close; the burdens of the
Presidency and the exigencies of the times leave no other alternative. The need
Is therefore manifest for a constitutional amendment to assure that the office of
Vice President will never again remain vacant.
In my opinion, House Joint Resolution I embodies a highly satisfactory solution
to this problem. Section 2 would amend the Constitution to provide that whenever therq is a vacancy in the office of Vice President the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
Permitting the President to choose the Vice President, subject to congressional
approval, will tend to insure the selection of an associate in whom the President
has confidence and with whom he can work in harmony. Participation by Congress should help to insure that the person selected would be broadly acceptable
to the people of the Nation.
All things considered, it is clear that House Joint Resolution 1 represents as,
formidable a consensus of opinion on a proposed amendment to the Constitution
as we are ever likely to find. It may not satisfy in all respects the views of every
student of the problems with which it deals. For that matter, I doubt that any
proposal could ever fully satisfy eve,-yone in this difficult area. But. it seems
to me evident that this proposal, as President Johnson has said, "would responsibly meet the pressing need * * *." That need has never been greater in all
I
our history.
If Congress acts favorably on this proposed constitutional amendment this
year, it is possible that it would be ratified by 1966. I therefore earnestly recommend such action.
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OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Article 11, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution authorizes the Vice
President to act as President in the event of *the President's inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and to act
In that capacity "until the disability be removed."
The same Article is interpreted as vesting authority In the Vice President to decide whether Presidential Inability exists, If the President .is
unable to do so, and authorizes the President to determine
when his inability has ended.
The memorandum of March 8, 1958, between former President Dwight
D. Eisenhower and former Vice President Richard M. Nixon, representing their understanding of the constitutional role of the Vice
President as acting President In the event of Presidential Inability,
is consistent With the correct interpretation of Article U1, section 1,
clause 6 of the Constitution.
Attorneys General Herbert Brownell, Jr. and William P. Rogers have
expressed the same views on the identical Questions.

THE I SIDNT.

AUouST 2, i961.

DnAR MR.PRsImENT: I have the honor to respond to your

request for my opinion upon the construction to be given
to the Presidential inability clause of the Constitutio.
Article II, section 1, clause 6 reads as follows:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said'Ofle, the Same shall delve
on the Vice President, and the Cqngress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring 'what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected."
You request my opinion on these questions: first, whether
when Presidential inability occurs, the Vice President under
Vol. 42 Op. No. 5.
44-281 0 - 65 -* 8
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Article H, section 1;clause 6 succeeds to the "Powers and
Duties" of the Presidency or whether he succeeds to the "Office," i.e., becomes President and remains in the office even
if the inability should cease; second, who determines whether
the inability exists and *ho determinies whether the inability
has ended; and third, whether the memorandum of March 3,
198, betwn f"or,mer President E9isenho0ver and former Vice
president Nixn, representing their understanding of the constitutional role of the Vice President as acting President,
is a desirable precedent for this Administration to follow.
As shall be shown' hereafter, the great majority of scholars
aid my 'two immediate predecessors have expressed the
opinion that upon a determination of Presidential inability
the Vice President succeeds temporarily to the powers and
duties of that office, and does not permanently become President; and it is also their opinion that the Vice President
may determine whether the inability exists. My immediate
predecessors were also of the opinion that the President may
determine when his inability has ended, and thereupon resume
the discharge of the Presidential functions. For reasons to
be discussed hereafter, I concur in their opinions. I also
conclude that the understanding of March 3,1958, is in keeping with the Constitution, and that the precedent set by it
could appropriately be followed by this Administration,

owe of Pm&dentWio inbiity do the ofke itelf or do
mrZ ~, powers anid dttie Of the offic de'volove on the
For many years constitutional scliolars have debated
whether Article II, Section 1,* lause 6 was .-intended to transform a Vice Preidefnt into a President upon the occurrence
of the latter's inabiliky. It *ll be notd that this clause
contemplates four situations in which the Vike President
may be called upon t act as President. 'ii three situations,
permanent exclusion of the' P dent from the remainder of
his term is obvious since these involved removal from office,
death or resignation. The difference of opinion arises respecting the fourth contingency, 'viz:"Inability to diselit"'ge
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the Powers and Duties of the said Office." Did the authors
of the Constitution intend to exclude the President thereafter,
despite his complete recovery, from resuming the discharge
of his powers and duties It, may be noted that after this
fourth conthigency follow the words "the Same shall devolve
on the Vice President." Do the words "the Same" refer to
the office of President, or do they refer to "the Powers and
Duties"?
It is my opinion that under Article II, section 1, clause 6
of the Constitution the Vice President merely discharges the
powers and duties of the Presidency during the President's
inability and this conclusion, as shall be shown hereafter,
finds support in the following:
1. The records and history of the Constitutional Convention.
2. Debates in the Convention and ratifying conventions.
3. Consideration of other provisions in the Constitution.
4. The example and experience of the States in providing
for succession.
5. The dictates of reason and established rules of statutory
construction.
6. The great weight of constitutional authority.
These considerations will be discussed in order.
1. The record and lhietory of the Comnetiona2 (ontention.
Without dispute, Article II, section 1, clause 6 nowhere
expressly provides that the Vice President shall under any
circumstances become President. Had the framers of the
Constitution intended the Vice President in certain contingencies to bcome President, they would not have been
at a loss for words. Reference to the records of the Constitutional Convention discloses that the framers of-the
Constitution, never intended the Vice President in event of
Presidential inability to be anything but an acting President
while the inability continued.
Of the various written plans submitted for consideration
at the Convention, only Charles Pinckney's draft offered
May 29, 787, specifically referred to Presic4ntial disability.
Article VIII of this draft provided in part that in case of the
President's removal through impeachment, death, resignation
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or disability "the President of the Senate shall exercise the

duties of his office until another President be chosen * * *.

1

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole
to consider various proposals, but having made little progress
mon the question of the President's inability, referred this
proposal to the Committee of Detail which was then considering other matters. This Committee reported a draft
on August 6, 1787, which contained Article X, section 2
relating to Presidential inability. It provided that in case
of the President's removal as aforesaid through impeachment,
death, resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, "the President of the Senate shall exercise
those powers and duties, until another President of the United
States be chosen, or until the disability of the President be
removed." 2 On August 27, Mr. Dickinson remarked about
the vagueness of this clause. "What," he said, "is the extent
of the term 'disability' &who is to be the judge of it?" Unfortunately, his suggestion produced no clarification.'
It will be noted that up to this point the official to act as
President until the President's disability was ended was
"the President of the Senate," not the Vice President.
Article X of the draft was then referred to the Committee
of Eleven which reported on September 4. In its report
provision was included for the first time for a Vice President,
as distinguished from the President of the Senate' who
was to be ex ofeio, President of the Senate, except on two
occasions: when the Senate sat in impeachment of the President, in which case the Chief Justice would preside, and
"when he shall exercise the powers and duties of the President," in which case of his absence, the Senate would choose
a President pro tempore. The Committee of Eleven also
recommended that the latter part of section 2 of Article X
be amended to provide that in case of the President's removal
on impeachment, death, absence, resignation or inability to
discharge the powers or duties of his office "the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another
'8 Max Farrand, The Reoordt
600.
'2 id. 186.
8 2 Md.427.
42 id. 495.

@the Federal Ootvmtk of
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President be chosen, or until the inability of the President
be removed." He was not to become the President in
either event.
On September ',the Convention adopted an amendment
to cover the vacancy or disability of both the President and
Vice President providing that the Legislature may declare
by law what officer of the United States shall act as President
in such event, and "such Officer shall act accordingly, until
such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." *
On September 8, the last clause of section 2, Article X
was agreed to by the Convention, and a Committee of five
was appointed "to revise the style and arrange the articles
agreed to by the House" including those provisions dealing
with inability.T Thus, as the proposed article came to the
Committee on Style, it consisted of two clauses dealing with
Presidential succession. The first related to the devolution
of the powers and duties of the President's office on the Vice
President in certain cases including the President's inability.
The second authorized Congress to designate an officer to act
as President in cases in which both the President and Vice
President were disabled, had died, resigned or been removed.
A temporal clause modified each main clause limiting the
tenure of an acting President to the duration of the inability
or until "another President be chosen" (first clause) or
until "a President shall be elected" (second clause). Nothing in either clause said that the Vice President was to
become President.
On September 12 the Cormittee on Style, condensing and
combining the provision for Presidential inability, together
with the provision for joint inability of both the President
and Vice President, reported the clause as follows: 8
"(e) In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge
the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-president, and the Congress may by law
provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring
69 id. 495, 499.
2 id. 682.
'Davls, iabilit o the Pr domt, Sen. Doe. No. 808, 65th Con#.,
10 (1918).
2 Ferrand, op. oft. eupra note 1, 598-899..
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what officer shall then act as presidents and such officer shall
act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or the period for chusing another president arrive."
Madison crossed out the words "the period for chusing another president arrive" and inserted in their place "a President shall be elected." 9 In this form the clause was written into the final draft of the Constitution.
The Committee on Style had no authority to amend or
alter the substance or meaning of the provisions, but merely
to combine and integrate them as a matter of form.1o In

this setting, the effect of what was done by it may be better
understood by placing the provisions originally agreed to
by the Convention side by side with the clauses as they were
adopted by the Convention.
"Artcle* Originally Agreed AR Later Reported by Corto by the Convention
mittee on Style 'andFinwlav
Adopted
Article X, section 2: * * * Article II, section 1, paraand in case of removal as graph 6: In case of the reaforesaid, death, absence, moval of the President from
resignation or inability to office, or of his death, resigdischarge the powers or du- nation, or inability to disties of his office, the Vice charge the powers and duties
President shall exercise those of the said office, the same
powers and duties until an- shall devolve on the Vice
other President be chosen, or President;
until the inability of the
President be removed.
Article X, section 1: The and the Congress may by law
Legislature may declare by provide for the caoe of relaIw what officer of the United moval, death, resignation or
States shall act as President, inability, both of the Presiin case of the death, resigna- dent and Vice President, detion, or disability of the claring what Officer shall
President and Vice Presi- then act as' President;
dent;
*2 id. 626. See also 2 id. 599.
10 Davis, op. ot. **pro note 7, 11.
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and such Officer shall act ac- and such officer shall act accordingly, until such dis- cordingly, until the disability
ability be removed, or a Pres- be removed, or a President
shall be elected."
ident shall be elected.
Comparison of these provisions makes clear the intention of the framers of the Constitution. When the provisions were placed into the hands of the Committee on Style
and Arrangement, they explicitly provided that in case of
inability of the President, the Vice President was not to
become President, but merely to "exercise those powers and
duties * * * until the inability of the President be re-

moved," When, therefore, the Committee on Style condensed the language and reported the provision to read in
case of the President's "inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the
Vice President," the exact meaning intended by the Convention was carried over to the revised language.
It has been argued by one school of thought that "the
Same" as used in the succession clause refers to "Office," and
therefore the office devolves on the Vice President who thereby becomes President. The other school asserts that "the
Same" has reference to "Powers and Duties," and that the
Vice President may merely discharge those powers and
duties, but does not become President. Since a definitive
answer is not to be found in any fixed rules of English usage,
Professor Ruth C. Silva has concluded that the antecedent
of "the Same" should be ascertained on the basis of the
intention of those who framed and ratified the Convention. 1
This is sound construction.
This interpretation is reinforced by other language initially agreed to by the Convention. If it were intended that
the Vice President should act permanently as President, it
seems unlikely that the language adopted by the Convention
and sent to the Committee on Style would expressly prescribe
a temporary period during which the Vice President shall
exercise "those powers and duties," vis: "until another President be chosen, or until, the inability of the President be
il Silva, Preidetstal HuoOeeseon 82 (1051).
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When we refer to the provisions before and after the
Committee on Style had combined them, it appears that the
Committee did several things: consolidated the two provisions into one and introduced the words "the same shall
devolve on the Vice President"; omitted reference to
"absence" as an occasion for operation of the succession rule;
used the adverbial clause "until the disability be removed,"
only once instead of using it to modify each of the preceding
clauses separately; substituted "inability" for "disability" in
the clause referring to succession beyond the Vice President,
possibly as being more comprehensive and covering both
absence and temporary physical disability; and changed the
semicolon after "Vice President" to a comma so that the
limiting clause beginning "and such Officer" would refer both
to the Vice President and the officer designated by Congress
Thus the evolution of this clause makes clear that merely the
powers and duties devolve on the Vice President, not the
office itself.
2. The debate in the Coniventiom and in the rdifying
oOVAenti wn.
The debates in the Convention are not too illuminating on
the question whether a Vice President was merely to act as
President until the latter's disability was over or to beme
President. In support of the view that the debates demonstrate recognition that the Vice President's role was to be a
temporary one while the inability existed, statements relied
on are not squarely in point, but the inferences drawn are
entitled to weight.
Thus, Professor Silva states: " ** This assumption
[that the Vice President is an acting President] is implicit
in James Wilson's objections to the election of the President
by Congress. The gentleman from Pennsylvania said that
the Senate might prevent the filling of a vacancy by dilatory
action, so that their own presiding officer could continue to
exercise the executive function. Gouverneur Morris and
James Madison likewise objected to this mode of election for
a similar reason-he Senate might retard appointment of a
President in order that its own presiding officer might continue to possess veto power. Such objections are without
iEd. 10.
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merit if the President's successor was intended to become
President for the remainder of the term."
There is other evidence from which the intention of the
delegates may be determined. Charles Warren reports that
during the debates little enthusiasm was expressed for an
officer such as the Vice President, that the discussion centered
on his status as a legislative officer, and there was no discussion as to his succession even in case of the President's
death." However, Warren is of the opinion "the delegates
probably contemplated that * * * the Vice President would
only perform the duties of President until a new election for
President should be held; and that he would not ipo flat
become President."" It seems fairly clear that if the delegates did not contemplate that the Vice President shall become President on the death of the President, but only
perform the duties of the office, that they certainly did not
intend any different result upon the President's inability.
Discussion of the succession clause at the ratifying conventions was also singularly unenlightening.
Professor Silva, who has made a careful study of the
matter, reports there is no record of discussion of the succession clause at the ratifying conventions except briefly at the
Virginia Convention. George Mason objected to the clause
because it lacked provision for the prompt election of another
President in event of vacancy in both the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential offices. Madison's attempt to answer this
objection indicated that he did not think that the designated
officer in event of succession beyond the Vice President
"would have that tenure which the Constitution guarantees
to a do jure President," but it does not appear that Madison
had in mind the status of a Vice President who might be
acting as President." What is of greater significance is that
the delegates in the ratifying conventions always carefully
distinguished between "the President" and "the acting President." Reference was made to "the Vice President, when
acting as President," not "the Vice President when he be'sCharles

Warren, The Making of the Oonstitution, 634-635 (1928).

1 Id. 68.
16Silva, op. ott. supra note 11, 11.
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comes President."' Silva#says that "nowhere in the de,
bates of the ratifying conventions did a single one of the
delegates use the latter expression."' 1
The Federau t; in which Hamilton defended the proposed
Constitution an4 explained in detail its provisions, is sur.
prisingly silent as a whole on what was intended when a
President suffers inability. However$at one point Hamilton
defended the role of a Vice President over the objection that
his position would be "superfluous, if not mischievous." He
urged that two considerations justified the Vice President's
position one to cast the deciding vote in the Senate when
they were equally divided; the other, that "the vice-president
may occasionally become a substitute for the president **
and exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the
president."

I

While these debates in the Convention and ratifying conventions appear to be inconclusive, generally they ten4 to
support the argument that a Vice President or designated
officer was never, in the view of the framers of the Constitution, intended to become President. If there was Presidential
inability, the Vice President was to act only until the inability
was terminated."
3. Con8idetationof other k#phion of the ontitutimo..
Reference to other provisions of the Constitution also
supports the conclusion that in event of Presidential inability,
the Vice President would merely serve as acting President.
For example, the Twelfth Amendment provides that if
the House should not choose a President before March 4,
.'then the Vice-President shall' act as President as in the case
of the death or other contitutionaldisability of the President." (Italics added.) It may be observedithat this Amendment does not say that the Vice President will become President in this situation.- From the underscored language,
Warren h as concluded th'a6 when the Twelfth Ameiiient
was ftdopte'd, "its framers, interpret6d the Constitution as
meaning that the Vibe President should Only act as President
it.

12.

.

Federalist (J. 0, Cooke, ed., 1961), No. '68, pp. 461-462.
lThe
0
1 Silva, op. cit. supra note 11, 167.
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in case of the latter's death * * * " , And from this it

would necessarily follow that he would not become President
in case of the President's inability.
Other provisions of the Constitution also consistently avoid
language to the effect that the Vice President shall become
President except in a single instance where this was the
specific intention. Thus, Article I, section 8, clause 5 states
that the Senate shall choose a President pro tempore, in the
absence of the Vice President or "when he shall exercise the
Office of President of the United States." Here again, the
action of the Vice President is not described "as becoming
President," but merely that he shall "exercise the Office."
On the other hand in section 8 of the Twentieth Amendment,
where it was intended that the Vice President shall actually
become President, it is explicitly provided that if, at the
time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the
President elect has died, the Vice President-elect "shall
become President." The same section provides, moreover,
by way of comparison that in event the President has not
been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his
term, or if the President elect fails to qualify then the Vice
President elect "shall act as President" until a President has
qualified, and similar language is employed where neither
a President elect nor a Vice President-elect shall have
qualife4.
This difference in treatment in various provisions of the
Constitution taken as a whole convinces me that both the
framers of the Constitution and members of the Congress
engaged in drafting amendments to the Constitution have
been in agreement that a Vice President "becomes President"
only when precise language to that effect is used, and that
it is not to be implied.
4. The example and ewperiwoe of th State* as a guide.
Ih attempting to ascertain the intention of the framers
of the Constitution, it is helpful to know what the practice
was in the Thirteen States when the' Consitution was
adopted. We would expect that the provisions of those
State Constitutions dealing with succeson in event of a

0,Clarie

Warren, o* . olt. sjpi* note 18, '687. As I shown hereinafter,

however, "constitutional custom', has Uidoubtedly modified this original
terpretatlon In the event of the President's death.

In.
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Governor's inability definitely influenced and shaped the
thinking of the framers of the Constitution in determining
what provision should be made in event of Presidential
inability. Accordingly we may consider those State constitutional provisions as a guide in interpreting the corre-

sponding succession clause in the Constitution of the United
States.
In most of the States at that time, in event of the Governor's "absence" from the State or during his inability,
provision was made for the temporary exercise of the Governor's powers by the succeding officer. The Governor was
not ousted; he remained the Governor in those contingencies,
resuming the discharge of his functions upon his recovery."
So too, today, with very few exceptions, State Constitutions
expressly or impliedly provide that where the Governor is
unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office, the
officer next in line of succession shall discharge them, but
only temporarily."
The inferences to be drawn from this review of State
practice and experience relating to gubernatorial disability
and its bearing upon the problem of Presidential inability
have been summarized forcefully by Professor Joseph E.
Kallenbach: 2
"* * * State experience reinforces the point observable

in national experience that situations of various kinds can
and do arise involving inability of the Chief Executive to
exercise his powers and which require devolution of these
powers for an indefinite period of time upon the officer next
in line of succession. It shows that constitutional provisions
on this point are, in effect, self-executing. It shows that
devolution of power in these circumstances can be brought
about by simple acquiescence of the incumbent when he is
able to recognize his incapacity. He does not, by so doing,
remove himself from office, but merely acquiesces in the
Richard H. Hansen, Ewcoutlve Dfiablity, 40 Nebr. L. Rev. 697, 701-703

(1961).

UKallenbach says that currently 46 States have such provisions.

Pr.0

dentii inabilty, House Committee Print, 84th Cong., 2d sess. 40 (Jan. 81,

1956). See also, Richard H. Hansen, Tho Year We Had So Preedet (to be
published soon). A fairly complete survey of provisions of State laws relatins to disability of the Chief Executive of the States also appears In
PrifWdentii InabftUy, House Committee Print, Old. 66 et seq,,
0 ibd. 48.
1
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operation of the constitutional rule that permits and requires
the succeeding officer to exercise the powers of the chief
executiveship. The officer named by the constitution or
laws as the one upon whom the authority to act as governor
shall devolve has no option but to exercise the powers and
duties of that office, even though his doing so does not oust
the incumbent from the office of governor permanently. His
duty to so act is an ancillary and conditional function of
the incumbent in the office next in line in the succession.
When and if the cause occasioning the temporary devolution
of power has ceased to be operative, there must be a resumption of his constitutional powers and duties by the temporarily displaced Chief Executive. His assertion of his right
and capacity to reassume the powers and duties of his office
is ordinarly regarded as sufficient to restore them to him."
5. The dctate of reason and eatabli d rule. of .tatutory OtMtrtiUOM.
As between two different interpretations to be given a
constitutional provision, it is fundamental that one will be
adopted which avoids inconsistencies and results which are
harsh or absurd.
Inherent in the position that a succeeding Vice President
becomes President upon the latter's inability, is the fact that
the President must forfeit his office, if through no fault of
his own he suffers inability, however temporary it may be.
It is difficult to draw any such conclusion from the language of the Constitution, or to imply one which carries with
it such grievous and drastic consequences, particularly where
the Constitution expressly declares only one way to remove
the President, and that is through impeachment.
The absurdity of such an interpretation is made even more
apparent when considered with the language of Article II,
section 1, clause 6 authorizing the Congress, in case of disability of both the President and Vice President to determine "what officer shall then act as President." It is claimed
by those who assert that the Vice President becomes President in event of Presidential inability, that the limiting
clause "until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected," refers only to the clause immediately preceding
it, under which an officer designated by law acts as President when bota the President and Vice President are dis-

121

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

122

able, and that it has no reference to the first portion of the
clause where the President alone suffers inability. It is
therefore argued that the Vice President under the latter
contingency takes office for the remainder of the term free
of any limitation,*"
This contention, if accepted, would create an inconsistency
and disparity in treatment between the President and Vice
President most difficult to explain on rational grounds. We
would then have the anomalous result that the Constitution
discriminates against the President who has been elected and
favors one not elected to that office. Such a dubious construction may not be adopted.
As was said in the 1881 debate on the subject: -'What
principle, what consideration of expediency or policy is it

which forbids the President, when relieved of his 'inability,'
from reassuring the office to which he was elected, which
does not apply with at least as much force to the VicePresident who was not elected to it I I can imagine none."
There is another apparent weakness in this argument.
Assume that both the President and the Vice President were
disabled. Under. the clause providing for joint disability,
if the President recovered before the Vice President, he
could resume the responsibilities of his office. It obviously
makes little sense to say that under the first clause where
the President alone is disabled that he forfeits his office
permanently, but that under the second clause where both
he and the Vice President are disabled simultaneously, the
President would not forfeit his office if he recovers first.'
The framers of the Constitution were wise and mature men.
Absurd and illogical results, repelled by reason,. have no
place in the Constitution. Nor should an interpretation involving an anomaly be imported into the Constitution unless
the language itself compels it; here, "there is no such
compulsion." 2'1
Senator Charles W. Jones, 1

Cong. Ree. 142-148, 191-198 (1881).

*SenatOr Richard Coke, 18 Cone ° aem. 141 ' (188). See also, Wflitam W.
Crosskey, Hearmge before/ Speetal Sbommittee 'ot Howe Commfttee on the
Judtoianv to study Preefde",i ta inabitty, 84th. Cong., 2d sess. 107 (1956).
'*Crosskey, id. 107.
w7id.
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In the face of these arguments, it is not surprising that
almost every Student ofthe Constitution who was recently
canvassed to express an opinion, agreed that in case of temporary Presidential inability, the Vice President succeeds
oily to the powers and duties of the office as the acting
President, and Inot to the office itself; s and in event of a
seemingly permanent disability,2 the large majority of these
scholars concluded the result would be the same because it is
always possible that the disability may be removed." Both
of my immediate predecessors, former Attorneys General
Herbert Brownell s and William P. Rogers " concurred in
the majority view. This view, in my opinion, is clearly
right.
As against the arguments supporting this array of opinion,
there are arguments on the other side expounded by rela, 1
tively few scholars.
A major contention already noted is that the immediate
antecedent of the words "the!Same" in Article II, section 1,
clause 6 of the Constitution is "said Office," and, therefore,
a reasonable interpretation is that it is the Presidential office,
$included In this group of distinguished scholars of the Constitution were:
Stephen K. Bailey, Princeton UniversitY; Everett S. Brown, University of
Michigan; Edward'S. Corwin, Princeton. N.J.; WflMiank W. Crosakey, University of Chicago Law School,, Charles Pafrman,
School of Harvard
University; David ,Felman, Unlyersity of Wisconsin; Thomas K. FUiletter,
Estq New York, N.Y.,; James Hart, University of' Virginia; Arthur N. Holcombe, Harvard UAIverslty; Mark DeW. Howe, Law School of Harvard University; Richard 0. Huber, Tulane University; Joseph E. Kallenbach, Unt4W

versity of Michigan; Jack W. Peltason, University of

nlltnis;

. Roland

Pennock, Swarthmore College; C. Herman Pritehett, University of Chicago;
John H. Roman!, the Brookings Institution, and Arthur E. Sutherland,
Law School of Harvard University. Preesdental-itablftiV, House Committee
Print, 85th Cong., lst seas. 49-52 (1957).
id. 52-64.
*
Herbert Brownell, Jr., Presdentiul Inabltty: The Need for a Oontetv
tional Aendment, 68 Yale L.1. 180, :192-198, 203-205 (1958); Hearing
before the Speotal Suboommitto ol the House ommittee on the Judiokr
on Probtsm of PresidentialInabfiltt, 86th COng., 1st sees., 4, 10 (1957).
,MPresdentioai Ir.bity Hearings before' the Suboomppittee qft Onos"ts.
tonal Amendments of the Senate Judloary Oommittee, 147?, 148-149 (1958).
On the other hand, former Attorney General Wayne MacVeagh would prob.
ably hive Sipported the' minority view. During Garfield's iluies, MaoVeagh,
although agreed on -the desirability of -having 'Vice President' Arthur act as
President,' felt that "Athur'S exercise of presidential power would be equivalent to Garfield's abdication," Silva. Presidential Eewoeelon, ojp. oi. *upra
-note 11, 66. " Unfoftdhately, 'we are not favored by any exposition on the
subject by MacVeagh.
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not merely the President's powers andduties which devolve
upon the Vice President" *
Arguments to the contrary resting on established principles
of statutory construction have been made in detail above and
need not be repeated. Suffice it to say, Article II does not
provide that the Vice President shall become President upon
the latter's inability. Since it is a contradiction in terms to
have at one moment two Presidents-the one disabled, the
other in office-and for the other reasons mentioned, the contention that "the Same" means "said Office" must be rejected
as lacking in merit.
Another argument made in support of the theory that it
is the office of President which devolves, is that the Constitution vests executive power in the President, knows a single
Executive, and by implication bars any one from exercising
it other than one actually President. It is claimed that in
recognition of this principle, the courts have denied any one
the right to discharge powers and duties of the President
which under the Constitution require his personal
judgment."
But when the Constitution is viewed as a whole such an
interpretation of the vesting clause is completely consistent
with a construction which permits the Vice President to act
as President while the latter is unable to perform the duties
of his'office. Thus it has been pointed out:"
"* * * The restrictions laid down by the courts apply
to the delegation of executive power by the President to his
subordinates, and should not by analogy be extended to the
devolution of this power in such a way as to defeat the
purpose of the succession clause. The records of the Federal
Convention give no indication that the framers of the vesting
clause would preclude the possibility of an acting President
in case of vacancy or inability in the Presidency. Their sole
purpose in writing the vesting clause appears to have been
the establishment of a single, as contrasted with a plural,
nTheodore W. Dwight, PreefMN" Iebftg, Vol. 188 No. Am. Rev. 486,
448 (November 1881) ; Representative Henry A. Wise and Senator Robert 1.
Walker, Cons. Globe, 27th Coon., let ass. 4-5 (1841); Senator Charles W.
Jones, 18 Congt. Re. 142 (1881) 14 44. 918 (1888)..
l InWutig House committee Print, eupoe
a Brown and Suiva, ?Pre
note 22, 12.
Mi4. 12-18.

See also, Silva, op. o.

"p"w note 11, 78-17.
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executive. The purpose of the succession clause seems to
have been to provide a substitute for the President in certain
cases, not to provide for the creation of another President.
The rule is well established that the different clauses should
be given effect and reconciled if possible. The conclusion is,
therefore, that the clause vesting executive power in the
President should be construed in such a way as to allow for
an acting President, who will exercise executive power in
case of the President's removal, death, resignation, or
inability until the disability passes or another President
is elected."
The strongest argument that can be made is that which
springs from past practice. It is that when succession occurs
by reason of death, the Vice President becomes President, and
it is argued that the same result must necessarily follow in
each of the other contingencies enumerated in the same clause,
including "inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of
the said Office." Indeed, it is this "constitutional custom"
as it has been described, 5 involving death of a President,
which has created whatever constitutional doubts may be said
to exist.
All seven Vice Presidents, who have succeeded to the
Presidency upon the death of the President, have taken the
Presidential oath and have been generally recognized as
President of the United States."1 John Tyler was the first
to establish this precedent when William Henry Harrison
died in 1841, and the principle laid down by him was followed by six other Vice Presidents upon the death of the
President in office.' 7 Although President Tyler's action
might readily have been questioned had historical materials
on the framers' intent been at hand," the fact remains that
it has been relied on for the proposition that the Vice President becomes President when the elected President dies-proposition scarcely to be questioned today. Corwin says
in this connection: '
IsDavid

Fellman, Presidetiul Inabilty, House Commlttee Printi eupr

note 22, 24-20.

10Tohn Tyler, Millard Pilmore, Andrew robauon, Cbester A. Arthur, Theedore Roosevelt, [Jobnl Calvin Cooidge, and Harry S. Truman.
"Silva, Prestdential Inability,, 85 U. Dot. L,J. 189, 151-158 (19057).
fHansen, op. oit. supra note 21, 704.

0 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Offive and Powore, 04 (1957).
44-201 0 - 85 - 9
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"That Tyler was wrong in his reading of the original
intention of the Constitution is certain. It was clearly the
expectation of the Framers that the Vice-President should
remain Vice.President, a stopgap, a locum tenens, whatever
the occasion of his succession, and should become President
only if and when he was elected as such. Tyler's exploit,
however, having been repeated six times, must today be
regarded as having become law of the land for those instances in which the President, through death, resignation,
removal, or other cause, has disappeared from the scene."
As Corwin goes on to point out, it was the possibility that
this precedent might be extended to cases of Presidential
inability-permanently ousting the incumbent which deterred two Vice Presidents-Arthur and Marshall--from
undertaking to exercise the powers and duties of the office of
President during the prolonged illnesses of Presidents
Garfield and Wilson, respectively. Neither Vice President
wished to be regarded as a "usurper." This possible risk
also may have led these former Presidents to minimize or
deny their disability. Other factors, however, of political
nature, were present in both cases.
The problem of succession to the Presidency was considered immediately after former President Eisenhower's
heart attack in September 1955. Congress was not in session, and there was no immediate international crisis. On
the basis of medical opinions and a survey of the urgent
problems demanding Presidential action immediately or in
the near future, Attorney General Brownell orally advised
the Cabinet and the Vice President that the existing situation did not require the Vice President to exercise the powers
and duties of the President under Article II of the
Constitution. 0 All concerned accepted this opinion, and a
plan was worked out to enable the executive branch to function during the President's illness which included having
former Vice President Nixon preside at meetings of the Cabinet and the National Security Council. On October 21,1955,
Mr. Brownell conferred with the President in his hospital
room at Denver, and advised him of the legal basis of the acBrownell, op. ot. oupre note 80, at 196.
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tion taken, and that no written authorizations were required
to ensure that his previously established policies would be
executed and that the Government activities would continue
without interruption.'1 Thereafter, informal discussions
took place between the President and the Vice President concerning "what the Vice President's role should be in the event
of a similar unfortunate occurrence, or any other happening
which would disable the President temporarily at a time
Moreover, when
when presidential action was required."'
President Eisenhower was operated on for ileitis in 1956,
it is said that Vice President Nixon stood by fully prepared
to initiate, "as acting President, whatever action would be
necessary in case of international emergency; for it was
realized that the announced intention of the President to
undergo a serious operation might entice a hostile foreign
power to make some drastic move in the expectation of finding, at the critical moment, confused and uncertain leadership in the United States." 4"
While the overwhelming weight of authority and the
strongest arguments support the theory that the Vice President is merely an acting President during the latter's disability, the precedent established by Tyler and followed by
six other Vice Presidents in taking the oath of President
upon a President's death, coupled with the lack of a close
relationship and understanding between the President and
the Vice President, created sufficient doubt to deter both
Vice Presidents Arthur and Marshall from discharging the
powers and duties of the President's office during periods of
Presidential inability. In the Eisenhower Administration,
arrangements were made between President Eisenhower and
Vice President Nixon, discussed hereafter, designed to provide continuing leadership in the executive branch of the
Government in the event of the President's inability, and to
make clear the constitutional legitimacy of the Vice President's action, should he be obliged to discharge the powers
and duties of the office for the duration of the inability.
In my view, there is a.clear constitutional distinction between the situation in which a President is permanently re41i.
"Id. 202.
"id. 202-208.
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moved from office by death and the situation in which he
holds office but is temporarily unable to exercise its powers
and duties. In the former case, the precedents of several
deaths in office have established that the Vice President
succeeds to the Presidency. In the latter case, he cannot so
succeed because the President, the individual chosen by the
people to occupy the office of Chief Magistrate, is still incumbent. In view of this distinction, the fact that the Vice President succeeds to the office of President when the elected
President dies does not establish the proposition that he
becomes President when he merely exercises the powers and
duties of that office during the incumbent's temporary
inability.
II
Who determines whether the inability exists? Who determines 'whether the inability is ended?
I now turn to two subsidiary questions:
1. Who has the authority under the Constitution to decide
whether inability exists; and
2. Who is authorized to make the determination that the
inability is over?
These are important problems upon which scholarly
opinion differs somewhat.
1. The large majority is of the view that the Vice President
or other "officer" designated by law to act as President has
the authority under the Constitution to decide when inability
exists.4' Both of my immediate predecessors favored this
64Sllva, op. oft. supra note 11, 100-102: Davis, op. oft, supra note 7, 18;
Senator Augustus H. Garland, 18 Cong. fee. 189-141 (1881) ; Senator fi1.
bridge 0. Lapham, 14 Cong. Ree. 017 (1883) ; Lyman Trumbull, 133 No. Am,
Rev. 417, 420-422 (1881); Benjamin F. Butter, id., 431-488; Proasdential
Ittability, House Committee Print, op. cit. supra note 22. Thomas K. Fin.
letter, id. 27-28; Joseph Ei. Kallenbach, id,45. Hearings op. oft. aupra note
25. Sidney Hyman, id. 58-59; Roger P. Peters, id. 122; C. Herman Pritchett,
id.71; John 11. Roman, id.43-44.
The Constitution does not define Inability, and It has been the subject of
varying definitions, none authoritative. It has been suggested that as a matter of sound Interpretation the definition of Inability should cover all cases,
permanent or transient, physical or mental, in which a President is in fact
unable to discharge a power or duty required to be discharged In the public
Interest, (See Slil,id. 171). Most scholars are opposed to defining Inabil.
Ity in any amendment to the Constitution or in legislation.
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interpretation. Attorney General Brownell summed up the
legal basis for concluding that the Vice President is the sole
judge of a President's inability, where the President is unable
to do it himself as follows: "
I* * * This is so because the Constitution does not state

who should determine the President's inability in the many
circumstances in which, as the founders themselves must
have foreseen, it cannot be the President himself. The
Cabinet could not have been intended to judge the issue, since
this body is not referred to in the Constitution. It is not the
Congress, except by the negative sanction of impeachment
and conviction for a wrongful attempt to exercise power. Nor
is it the Supreme Court, because the question of presidential
inability is hardly one which fits any type of jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution on that tribunal. But the
power to determine the inability of the President rests in the
Vice President not simply because the Constitution places
it nowhere else. By a well-known principle of law, whenever
any official by law or person by private contract is designated
to perform certain duties on the happening of certain contingencies, unless otherwise specified, that person who bears
the responsibility for performing the duties must also
determine when the contingency for the exercise of his powers
arises. Similarly, under the present Constitution, it is the
President who determines when his inability has terminated
and he is ready once more to execute his office."
There are conflicting views. One school of thought believes that the right to make the inability declaration belongs
to Congress.," Cooley argued that Congress may determine
inability because the Constitution confers this authority in
the "necessary and proper" clause, reason dictates it, the decision of Congress alone can be final, and English precedents
involving Parliament and a few disabkc Kings may be relied
on in support of congressional action.
*Brownell, op.o@. eupro note 80. 204.
4
Early authorities aro cited by Silva, op. M44.
*epro note 11, 106-107.

More

neent authority will be found tn note 58.
'Thomas

M. Cooley, Vol. 188 No.Am. R". 422, 426-427 (November 1881).
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Persuasive arguments have been raised in opposition to the
theory that Congress has the power to determine specific
cases of inability or to provide by general law a method for
deciding such cases. One is that since the Constitution ex-

pressly provides in Article Ii for succession when both. the
President and Vice President are disabled, it excludes the
right of Congress to act in the case of Presidential inability
only. This is an application of the familiar maxim in
statutory construction, inclu8io uniwm, emolmuio altetih.'

It

is an argument favored by Attorneys General Brownell'
and Rogers, although the latter also stressed Professor
Sutherland's contention that ending the President's duties
by ordinary legislation would run counter to the doctrine of
separation of powers.50 Apart from sound constitutional
interpretation, there are practical considerations since "each
act of Congress must have for its validity the concurrent
action of the president." 51
Both of my immediate predecessors were, therefore,
strongly opposed to the legislative or judicial route for resolving the problem. Mr. Brownell said: "Ordinary legislation would only throw one more doubtful element into the
picture, for the statute's validity could not be tested until the
occurrence of the presidential inability, the very time at
which uncertainty must be precluded." 52 Authority is
divided on this point.5 I concur in Mr. Brownell's
judgment.
48 Butler, op. cit. supra note 44, 428, 482 ; Davis, op. cit. supra note 7, 18-14.
" Brownell, op. cit. supra note 30, 208.
60 Hearings, op. cit. aupra note 81, 170,170.
f1 Butler, op. oit. supra note 44, 43L Cornelius W. Wickersham, Chairman
of the New York State Bar Association Committee on Federal Constitution,
expressing the views of the Committee, stated: "It is extremely doubtful
whether Congress has power to deal with the matter without a constitutional
amendment and clearly the ambiguity of the present provisions cannot be
cured by act of Congress alone." Hearings, op. oft. supra note 81, 95.
0 Brownell, op. cit. supra note 80, 205.
0 Among those who recently expressed themselves in favor of an amendment to the Constitution upon the ground that It is either necessary or desirable are: Stephen K. Bailey, Hon. Peter Frellnghuysen, Jr., Richard 0.
Huber, Joseph N. Kallenbach, Arthur Krock, Jack W. Peltason, C. Herman
Pritchett, Arthur 19. Sutherland, Hon. John J. Sparkman (Prakenial I*.
abiUt, House Committee Print, op. oit. supra note 28, 5-8). Edgar W.
Waugh, Charles S. Rhyne (Hearings, op. ilt. supra note 81, 127, 191).
Equally distinguished are those who currently assert that proposed plans Of
Presidential inability may be carried out by statute. Among these are:
Everett 5. Brown, Edward S. Corwin, William F. Crosakey, Charles Fairmat,
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2. There remains the difficult question: Who makes the
decision where the parties involved are in disagreement that
the President's inability is ended, and that he is ready to
resume the functions of his office?
Unquestionably, those scholars who claim the Vice President becomes President upon the latter's inability would
assert that the Vice President may not be divested of his
authority by recovery of, or action taken thereafter by, the
President. In my opinion, this view does violence to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, and would defeat the will of
the people.
Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers were in agreement
that the President could reclaim the discharge of the powers
and duties of his office merely by announcing that his inability
had terminated, and that lie is ready now to execute his
office.", In my opinion this interpretation of the Constitution
is clearly correct. The force of popular opinion, the people's
sense of constitutional propriety, and the cooperation of
Congress could be counted on to support the President's decision if he acted properly.
There is no complete agreement among scholars as to who
determines whether Presidential inability exists, and who
determines when it ends. In the opinion of my two immediate
predecessors, and fin my own opinion, while the Vice President
may declare when the President's inability exists, it is the
President alone who has the constitutional authority to
determine when his inability is over. This is implicit in the
fact that the Vice President would merely be serving as acting
President in such a contingency, and that there is only one
President in office. The President's conclusion that he is able
to resume the'disoharge of the powers and duties of the office
must of necessity be accepted as binding unless and until he
is removed by impeachment proceedings. As was said by one
constitutional scholar: 1 "The Constitution recognizes but
one method of removing the President, and that is by conviction on articles of impeachment."
David Feliman, James Hart, Arthur N. Holcombe, Hon. Herbert Hoover, Mark
DeW. Howe (Presidential Inabflfty, House Committee Print, op. Mft.supra

note 28, 68--8).

54Brownell, op. off. supra note 80, 204; Rogers, Hearing , op. oft. &wpm'
note 81, 175.

"Senator Coke, 18 Cons. Roe. 141 (1881).
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III
1h the undArtanding betwem Pre8identEsenhourand Vice
President Niwon a de8irable precedent to be followed by
this Admini8tration?
Finally, there is before me the question whether the understanding between President Eisenhower and Vice President
Nixon on Presidential inability is a desirable precedent for
this Administration to follow.
On March 8,1958, the former President and Vice President, in consultation with the Attorney General, reduced to
memorandum form their understanding of the constitutional
role of the Vice President as acting President. It declared: "
"The President and the Vice President have agreed that
the following procedures are in accord with the purposes
and provisions of Article 2, Section 1, of the Constitution,
dealing with Presidential inability. They believe that these
procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves only,
are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but are
consistent with its present provisions and implement its clear
intent.
"1. In the event of inability the President would-if possible--so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President
would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers and
duties of the office until the inability had ended.
"2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the
devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and would
serve as Acting President until the inability had ended.
"3. The President, in either event, would determine when
the inability had ended and at that time would resume the
full exercise of the powers and duties of the Office"
It seems to me that this understanding is entirely consistent with the correct interpretation of the Constitution.
The introduction itself purports to bind only the prior
incumbents of the office of the Presidency and Vice PresiWT.Y.Tim, March 4, 158, p. 1, Col. 2, p. 17, ecl. 1.
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deny. This is an appropriate technique which leaves subsequent administrations free, as they would in any event be,
to follow or reject the precedent.
Section 1 states that in event of inability, the President
would, if possible, inform the Vice President of his condition, in which case the Vice President would serve as acting
President until the inability is over.
This provision contemplates that the President will voluntarily announce his own inability, if it exists, for the purpose of encouraging the Vice President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office until the President has recovered. This section helps to remove the obstacle which
caused responsible Government officials to refrain from acting in the Garfield and Wilson cases. No one can possibly
accuse the Vice President of being disloyal or a usurper if he
undertakes to serve as acting President upon the request of
the President. This section embraces most of the cases of
Presidential inability likely to arise.
Section 2 deals with a situation in which the President is
unable to communicate with the Vice President. In that
event, the Vice President may take action "after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circum-

stanlces."

It will be noted that section 2 leaves the determination of
Presidential inability in the first instance where the Constitution places it now-in the Vice President. There is one
addition in section 2 which is absent from the Constitutionthe Vice President may consult with other persons as seems
to him appropriate.
Even though the Vice President need not under the
Constitution consult any one, it is clearly wise and conducive
to strengthening his position if he seeks advice from other
persons before presuming to exercise the powers and duties
of the Presidency. Since the Constitution is silent on the
matter, no specific persons to be consulted are mentioned, and
of course, in view of the latitude given, he might conceivably
consult no one before he acted.
Section 8 states that the President may, whether he or the
Vice President has declared the inability, determine when
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it is over, and forthwith resume the full exercise of the powers
and duties of the office.
Here again, the understanding represents what my two
immediate predecessors and I regard to be authorized by the
Constitution-that the President may regain the powers of
his office without the concurrence of any other official or group
if he is of the opinion that his inability has been removed.
Attorney General Brownell has said: 6 "The EisenhowerNixon understanding, by providing, first, for the Vice President's determination of presidential inability and, second.
for the President's determination of when that inability
terminates, thus coincides perfectly with article II, section 1,
of the Constitution as originally drafted in 1187 * * *."
This was also Attorney General Rogers' opinion and it is
mine too, without reservation.
Since this understanding may prove to be a persuasive
precedent of what the Constitution means until it is amended
or other action is taken, I would favor that the present
Administration follow It. Cumulative precedents of this
kind, may be valuable in the future.
IV
In my judgment, there is no question that the Vice President acts as President in the event of the President's inability
and acts in that capacity "until the disability be removed." I
do not believe that the practice which has grown up to the
effect that the Vice President "becomes President" in event
of the death of the President creates any substantial doubt.
I believe also that there is no substantial question that it is
the Vice President who determines the President's inability
if the President is unable to do so; and that it is the President
who asserts when the inability has cease. These conclusions
are supported by the great majority of reputable scholars
who have examined the problem, as well as by my predecessors.
In this connection, it is important to note the development
of the Vice Presidency in recent years, and the changes in
INBrowneU, op. oft. eupro note 80, 204.
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that office which have come about, particularly in the past
two decades. During this time the Vice Presidency has
moved substantially from its anomalous status under the
Constitution in both the executive and legislative branches
towards the former. Recent Vice Presidents have been given
significant executive responsibility and an important voice in
the highest affairs of state. The working relationship between the President and Vice President has become increasingly close and, during the past Administration as well as
the present one, the President has been concerned to keep the
Vice President current an4 informed with regard to Presidential policies.
While one cannot predict with certainty that this trend will
continue in future administrations, I regard it as altogether
likely because, in an age marked by crisis, this course seems to
be dictated by the necessities of our time. It is significant
with regard to the problems discussed in this opinion because,
in my judgment, it greatly reduces the possibility of an imapasse between the President and Vice President, and thoughts
in the public mind that the Vice President should be regarded
as a potential usurper of office. It also is relevant because it
greatly increases the practical capacity of the Vice President
to act as President in the event of Presidential inability,
whatever the cause.
I am of the opinion that the understanding between the
President and the Vice President which I have approved
above is clearly constitutional and as close to spelling out a
practical solution to the problem as is possible.
Respectfully,
ROBERT F. KENNEDY.

13,5
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Mr. CHELF. We are adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, February 10, 1965.)
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WEDNESDAY,

FEBRUARY 10, 1985
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D. .
The committee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to adjournment, in
room 846, Cannon Building, Hon. Emanuel Celler (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Celler, Rogers, Donohue, McCulloch, Poff,
Tenzer, Grider, Whitener, and Chelf.
Also present: William H. Copenhaver, associate counsel; William
R. Foley, general counsel.
The CHAI!MAN. The meeting will come to order for further hearing
on House Joint Resolution 1.
Our first witness this morning is the Honorable Willard S. Curtin.
The Chair wishes.to announce that the very distinguished Attorney
General Mr. Katzenbach will return to complete his testimony at
2 o'clock.
Mr. Curtin, we are very happy to have you.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLARD S. CURTIN, A R RESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mr. CuirN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe my office has loft copies of my statement here, so I presume
you all have them.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I much appreciate
this opportunity to be heard in reference to this very serious question
of Presidential disability, on which congressional action is long overdue.
Numerous authorities who have devoted a great deal of time to
analyses of the processes under which our Government operates have
been struck by the fact that our Constitution is silent on specific procedures to be followedin the event ofa President's becoing gravely incapaditated during his term of office. This is a matter of longstanding
interest to distinguished scholars who have undertaken studies of our
unique kind of representative democracy. People in and out of Government, and notibly Members of the Congress, over the years have
questioned this apparent flaw in our Republic's structure.
Of course, the law does spell out the line of succession to a Chief
Executive in the event of death. But it is mute with respect to a
manner and method of determining the ability or inability of a President of the United States to discharge the powers and uties of his
office in instances where a critical illness or a disability of possible
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lon -term. duration may arise. Indeed, a President confronted by
such misfortune of circumstances has no clear-cut. instructions to
which he can look for guidance under the language of our Const itl.
tion or of existing laws.
Article 1I, section 1, of the Constitution provides that the Vice
President shall exorcise the powers and duties of the President in

event of the death, resignation, or disability of the (Thief Executive,
or his removal from office. To take care of further contingencies, a
series of so-called Succession Acts were enacted by the Congre s. The
act of 1886 established a line of succession starting with the Secretary
of State and going through the order of Executive Depailments.
On July 18, 1941, a new law was enacted to bring the Speaker of the
House and the President. pro tempore of the Senate in line of succes.
sion ahead of the Cabinet members. The philosophy behind this
action of 1947 changing the line of succession was that the spirit, of
the Constitution intended clearly that the Chief Executive should
be an elected official rather than an appointive one. With this col.
clusion of reasoning, I fully concur.
But th knotty question remains-who is vested within certain, sure
authority to arrive at a determination of when is a President not
able to discharge the powers and duties of his office? The answer
is-no one, under existing processes.
I became interested in this problem soon after becoming a Memelr
of the Congres.s, and pursuant thereto, I introduced a resolution for a
constitutional amendment in the 8lth Congress, and I have reintroduced the measure, with certain modifications, in each succeeding
Congress. The last resolution that. I so introduced was on Jantary 6. 1965, and is House Joint Resolution 129.
This resolution would establish a unit to be known as the Presidential Tnability Commission. The Commission would ha've the re.
sponsibility and authority to relieve the President or Acting President of th United Statesupon a determination that he Is not able to discharge properly the powers and
duties of the office of President, and after any such action, to restore Out
President or Acting President to the assumption of such powers and duties
upon a determination within the same term of office that le Is able to discharge
properly the powers and duties of the office of President.

The aforementioned Presidential Inability Commission would I)e
composed of eight members, as follows: Fii'st, the Chief Justice of
the ITnited States, who would serve as Chairman of the Commission,
and who would have no vote in the proceedings of the Commission
except in the case of a tie; second, the senior Associate Just ice of the
Supreme court of the United States; third, the Secretary of State:
fourth, the Secretary of the Treasury; fifth, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives; sixth, the minority leader in the House of Replresentatives; seventh, the majority leader in the Senate: eighth, the
minority leader in the Senate.
Five members of the Commission would constitute a quorum. Menibers of the Commission would serve as such without. compensation.
Any two members of the Commission could cause the Chairman to
conven the group without. delay by communicating in writing to him,
stating that they have sufficient cause to believe that. the President is
unable to discharge properly the powers and duties of the office. The
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Commission is then directed to seek competent medical advice as to
the condition
of duties.
the President
ability to subsequently
discharge properly
said
powers and
Shouldand
thehis
Commission
dtermine Presidential inability, it is bound to thence notify the House of
Representative andi the Senate--if Congress is then in session-the
President and the individual next in line of succession to the Presidency. Thereupon, the Presidential powers and duties would devolve
upon the individual next, in line of succession. The same series of steps
is established for the President's reassuming the powers and duties of
the office if tei Commission determines that. the disability no longer

exists.

I have examined with much interest various other resolutions which
have been introduced on this same subject. They provide various
methods of handling the problem and they all have much merit. Any
one of the methods proposed by the various Members of the Senate or of
the House would serve to remedy an imperfection that for most of our
national life has distressed authorities and scholars of American Government. In this day of challenge and stress, it is strongly advisable
that the Con ress clarify beyond any doubt or uncertainty the provision of the Anstitution with respect to tie execution of the duties of
the President in the event of disability.
That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my statement on the matter. I
would be glad to answer any questions any member of the committee
irght have.

The CHAITRAm. The thrust of your argument is that there should be

set up what you call a Commission on Ia11ility of the President; is that
ri ht?
+Mr.Cmrr . That, is correct sir.

The

CAI1RAtN.

And that should be composed of the Chief Justice

of the IT.S. Supreme Court as Chairman, senior Associate Justice, the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Members of the House and Members of the Senate--that is, tie Speaker of the House and the majority
leader and those identical matters of the Senate.
Mr. Ctrrrm. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We some years ago sent out a questionnaire to quite

a number of political scientists and some of them recommended exactly what you have indicated, hut therm was quite a paucity of those
who answered the questionnaire. It was not quite universally accepted.
However, we are glad to consider your point of view.
Mr. Cumrrm. Thank you, sir.
The CHtAIRMA. Are there any questions?
Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Curlin a
question.
tnder your proposal, there would be no implementing legislation
available to the Congress, would there? This would be it!
Mr. C irN . That is correct. This provides only for disability and
the decision of the Commission would be tinal. It has nothing to do
with the death of the President. It doesn't in any way handle that
problem.
Mr. WmTTENER. But insofar as your proposed, amendment is coneerned, if it is approved by the Congress, this would be it. Congress
(couldn't clarify or do anything in the future, could they?
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Mr. Curnx. Except that they could change the amendment by
future amendments.
Mr. WHrENER. Congress doesn't do that.

Mr. Curnr;. They would start it by resolution through the Congress.
Mr. WwrnxE. So the amendment proposed (H.J. Res. 1) does
leave the Congress in position to legislate with reference to the makeup
of the Commission and to implement or do other things which may be
necessary to carry out the amendment.
Are you so satisfied with this language that you think this should
improvement
word without
be
act?legislative act or otherlegislative by
in the
languageany
executing
wisetheorlast
Mr. CuRmN. Well sir, I don't say that mine is the only possible
solution to the problem. It is one solution that I have suggeed, sir.
Many solutions have 'been offered. I do say, however, when Congress
passes itresolution it should be final. I don't think there should be
the ability to tamper with it in succeeding Con resses. I think we
should solve the pixoblem once, solve it flinay an definitely.
The CHAIRMAN. YOU provide that the initiation of the inquiry
should be by at least two members of the Commission?
Mr. CtRTIN. At least two members of the Commission :yes, sir.
The CHAMMAN. And then there is notification to the Hlouse and

the Senate. Suppose the House and Senate is not in session?
Mr. CumTI.

Then there would be no such notification, sir.

Then if the House and Senate are not in session,
the House and Senate would be bound, wouldn't they?
The CHAIRMAN.

Yes, sir.
Mr. CutiTrr.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?
Mr. WHrrENR. Let me ask, in section 77 it is provided that the

Commission shall seek competent medical advice as to the condition of
the President and his ability to discharge properly the powers and
duties of his office.
Suppose the President says, "I am not going to 'have any doctor
down here looking at me, I am President of the United States," then
what happens?
Mr. Girrn4. If I might answer with another question, suppose we
have--and certainly I hope it should never occur--but suppose we had
a President that became completely mentally incompetent to the point
he didn't know what was going on, and, as happens in so many cases
where a person' is in such a condition, they don't think anything is
wrong with them,, but believe the rest of the world Is wrong.
Now, in those circumstances, somebody has to be able to go in and
forcibly examine the President, and I thinkMr. WnrrENR. Forcibly?
Mr. CUR"I, I think this CommissionI should have the power to compel an examination, yes.
Mr. WHIrTENR. Suppose the President says, "I am Commander in
Chief of all the military, I will put them in front of the White House
and the first doctor that tries to step inhere I am going to tell my military people to resist."
Mr. CuwPIN. Then there would obviously be no need to call a doctor to examine him, because it would be obvious on the face of it that
the President is mentally ill.
Mr. WHITENER. During Andrew Johnson's time, there were many
people that even went to the extent of bringing impeachment pr -
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ings, and later historians have shown he was a very great man and a
lover of the Constitution.
Mr. CtURTIN. I don't think there was any question about that previous President Johnson being sane. I thought he couldn't agree as to
what Congress thought. was the proper procedure in dealing with the
South.
Mr. WHITENER'. But they were so anxious to get him that two people suggested this, and then the President has every power that this
Nation has to keep a doctor from examining him as long as he is President. Then do they proceed without a medical examination?
Mr. CURTIN. I would think that in the event the activities of the
President were such that it was quite obvious that by his very actions,
he was insane, they could proceed without such medical examination.
Mr. W111Trin. Recently there was an American citizen forced to
be put on an airplane, hauled into another State, and thrown into a
mental instituttion because a psychiatrist he had never seen wrote a
letter and said the man is bound to be incompetent.
Is that, the kind of medical advice you think this contemplates?
Mr. CURnTIN. I think, sir, when you have a Commission made up of
the leading officials of the United States, it would be unlikely they
would get medical advice that was not the best that could be obtained.
Mr. WIiITENEJI. Suppose that was the only advice they could get. If
the President puts the troops out there to protect himself, you say
that is evidence of mental disability?
Mr. CunrrN. All I can say, Mr. Whitener, to that is that somebody
has got to decide whether he has a disability or not, and if it isn t
done by doctors any other procedure that you feel would be a better
procedure to help this Commission arrive at this decision would certainly be agreed ble to me, but. obviously somebody has got to make
at decision, because the President may be in such physical or mental
condition that he could not make that decision.
Mr. WHITENER. What does your amendment say about who would
become President if there was no Vice President?
Mr. CurIN. This has nothing to do with that. This resolution assumes that there is a Vice President. It seems to me that is not a
part of the disability law, because that is a situation where you have
got the death of a President.
Mr. WrrNFNR. All right.

The CHAMAN'. May Iask this question?
Mr. Cunr. Yes sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Suppose, God forbid, a President is captured by the
enemy and held incommunicado for a long period of time. Would
you call that inability?
Mr. CtnrN. I am sorry, sir, a President that did what?
The CHAIRMAN. I said, God forbid, our President is captured by an
enemy and held by the enemy for a rather long period of time. Would
you call that inability?
Mr. CuRTI. If he is not able to perform the duties of his office,
that obviously would be a disability, yes.
Mr. WHTENER. Would you need a doctor's statement on that?
44-261 0--65----40

142

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

Mr. OunnN. No, the doctor is only to help the Commission if there
is any doubt in their minds as to whether or not, the President is
disabled,

aimed at mental
But your
The CHAnMAN.
I proposal is more or less
disability
physical
and/or
Mr. GuiTIN. Yes sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Told it cover the illustration I gave?
Mr. CumR r. I think it would, yes.
Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Chairman, since you are asking the question
about the proposition we had yesterd y about the President about to
go under anesthesia, I just wonder if this applies? Do you remember
the line of questions ?
The CHAIMAN. Did you want to ask a question?
Mr. WHIrrENER. We had some testimony yesterday about a situation
where a President has gone out to a hospital and is going to have his
appendix removed, and for the next hour lie said "I am not going to
be able to do my job, and some emergency might arise."
Now, how will we take care of that under resolution?
Mr. CumnN. I would think there would be no need for the Commission to come into being under those circumstances. That is a very
temporary matter of a few hours. It. could certainly be done with the
same procedure presently being used-for the President to say to the
Vice President, "During the period I am under anesthesia, you handle
the affairs of the Presidency.
Mr. WHITENER. Suppose he has gone out there for an appendix
operation, and as a result of something that happened while lie was
undergoing surgery, and lie signed this statement saying, "I am
going-to be gone for 2 or 3 hours and not able to perform my duties,"
If something happened during surgery to his mind and he never came
out of it. Wouldhe have, under your proposition, a temporary legal
situation which couldn't be unraveled if he did have a stroke or somethingwhile he was under surgery?
Mr. URwTIN. Well, all of these are relative, sir. If lie was disabled
for 4 hours, it probably wouldn't be necessary. If, as a result of
anesthesia, something went wrong and lie became mentally incapacitated for a week, the Commission could come into being. Whether it
be 4 hours, 1 day, 2 days, or 3 days I say is a question of degree.
Mr. WHITENER. Now, suppose this situation happens that you mention, that he contemplates at the most, a 6-hour disability because of
surgery, or a predictable cause, and that he doesn't recover like he
contemplates, and he is in a coma for a month.
Now, is it your thought that after the 6 hours are up the Commission would then come in and make a determination, then 6 months
later when he comes out of the coma, or 6 weeks or whatever it is, they
sit again and put him back in office?
Mr.CURTIN. Well, again I can only repeat it has got to be a question that, after a reasonable length of time, iR it becomes obvious that
there is a disability, then any two members could activate the
Commission.
If I could use a personal reference, we had a track circumstance in
my own congressional district where a very healthy young lady went
under anesthesia for what they thought was a minor operation, and
she did not come out of the anesthesia, but was in a coma for about 8
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weeks and then died. Obviously, if, God forbid, something like that
happened to the President, somewhere in the course of that period of
time, some member of the Commission is going to say, "This books like
it.is a disability for which we should function as we are authorized to
(10," but whether it is going to be at the end of a day or a week is a mattel' of reasonableness.
Mr. Roo~its. May I ask a question?
Mr. CvRTiN. Yes, Mr. Rogers.

Mr. RooErts. We have had a great deal about individual privacies,
and, as you and I recognize, there is the doctor-patient relation
involved.
Do you feel that this Commission set up by your section 3 or 4 of the
bill would authorize calling in a doctor that the President may have
been consulting to have him expose to this Commission the condition
of the President?
Mr. CuRTiw. Sir, it seems to me when you are going to try to determine whether 9,man is disabled or not, you have got. to have somebody who can speak with authority. Obviously a doctor can speak
with more authority on certain features of a mental or physical disability than a layman can. Somebody has got to be the one that trig-

gers the matter.
Mr. ROGERS. Most State laws and I think the general proposition

is that there is a confidential relationship between doctor and patient
just the same as among lawyers. Now, do you propose under your
amendment that when this Commission is set up that. they have a right
to have that?
Mr. CUnTIN. It happens all the time under the laws. In my State
of Pennsylvania, if someone is thought to be insane, there is a commission set up to determine whether he should be committed or not, and
that commission consists, in Pennsylvania, of two lawyers and a doctor. Now, that doctor can tell the court his findings.
Mr. RooERS. Yes; but suppose the man who is before the court has
previously had a doctor that has treated him for many years, and has
had the confidential relationship between the two. Do you, in Pennsylvania, permit that door to come into court and testify
Mr. Cuni. Yes.
Mr. ROGERs. As to his relation-

Mr. CUTIN. Not as to any.previous history, but he is authorized to
conduct an examination at this particular time on this particular question and testify to the couit his findings. He could have been the
doctor for the last 10 years, but lie can still do it.

Mr. Ron1ps. Don't you propose by your amendment that in the
event you establish this Commission to determine whether you'have

the responsibility and authority in such manner to relieve the President or Acting President of his powers and duties upon the determination that lie is not able to ,discharge properly the powers and duties of
the office, and that after ;uch actIon, to restore the President or Vice
President-in other words,
! you give certain authority to certain people
to make a determination
Mr. CURTis. That is right.

Mr. RoGERS. As to whether or not a man is capable of carrying on
his duties .

144

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

That is correct. Somebody has got to make a determination, because the President conceivably could be in such mental
condition that he could not make that determination himself.
Mr.

CuTIN.

Mr. Roors. But you feel, however, that the question of the privacies

that the President may have in connection with the examinationsuppose he says to these groups who come down to examine him, "I
will have no part. of you, don t come on the White House grounds."
Then what do you do I
Mr. Cun:N. Then we are getting back to Mr. Whitener's question.
It seems to me the refusal of the President could be in such manner as
to ver well indicate to the ordinary layman that he is mentally incapacitated. If he met a doctor at the door with a shotgun, or something like that, you would obviously think there was something just
a little bit abnormal.
Mr. RoGEms. Then if he should deny them the right to come in, and

they go out and make this determination, then he is no longer President.
Mr. CURTIN. That is right.
Mr. TENZER. Congressman Curtin, under section 7 of your proposed
amendment, do you not think that the best interests of the people of
the United States would be served if you required the Congress to be
called into session and pass upon or have some check or balance over
the decision of the Commission?
Mr. CurTIN. Well, let me answer that question by asking you one,

sir. How is the Congress going to determine whether he has a disability or not-not by sitting over in the Chamber and discussing it.
There has to be an examination of the President.; does there not?
Mr. TENZER. The Commission would render its report, but you
would have the Congress of the United States, the elected officials
of the people, voicing approval or disapproval of the report of the
Commission or calling for further testimony.
Mr. CuTIN. Well, sir, the section I have here does not call for the
Congress to be called into session; it states that the report is relayed to
the two Houses of the Congress, but I would see no objection to giving
the Congress the right to pass on the decision of the Commission.
Mr. TiNZ R. Well the Congress presently does so in the event of an
impeachment proceeding.
Mr. Curin. That is right.
Mr. TENZER. And they call upon the Congress.

Mr. CumRIN. Well, they are the court and jury.
TEMNZER. With regards to the question.of presidential disability
and succession, in order to preserve the original tenor and purpose of
the Constitution, the final choice of a successor to the, Presidency or
Vice Presidency should rest with the Congress.
Mr. CuOriN. Well, of course, an impeachment proceeding is somewhat different. There the House of Representatives acts as prosecutor and the Senate acts as judges.
Mr.

Mr. TENZER. I am aware of that.
Mr. CURTIN. This proceeding is not that permanent.
Mr. ROGERS. Well, don't you think that the man who has been

elected President of the United States should at least have some opportunity to show somebody that he has the capacity to perform other
than these men Ihat you have outlined here?
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Mr. COvlriN. Certidnly I would have no objection to the President
being heard. I think he should be heard tinder those circumstances.
Mr. ROGERS. But. you don't provide for him being heard, do you?
1fr. CVRTiN. Well, although it. is not written down in words, he
certainly would not stand mute during this whole proceeding unless
he was in real bad shape.
Mr. RO ERS, You put the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and
tlien the Associate Justice who may be of the opposite political party,
then you have the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, and there is even some question what their political affiliation may
be at the present time.
Mr. CuRTIN. We can normally assume they are sympathetic with
the President.
Mr. RooFpms. Then you say the Speaker of tie House, who could be
the opposition party.
Mr. CtrRIN. Possibly, but then you have the minority leader, who
obviously is of a different. party than the Speaker of the House, so you
have divided the parties in the House.
Mr. Roaons. But up to that point you have a possible 3 to 2 against
the President.
Mr. CtTRTIN. I don't buy that-I don't agree, sir.
Mr. ROGERS. When you say you don't buy it, suppose that the Chief
Justice is of the opposite political party.
Mr. CU TIN. Right.
Mr. Rxm :ns. And that. the senior Associate Justice is of the opposite
l)arty.
Mr. CUR'TI. All right that is two.
Mr. ROOERS. And as the Secretary of the Treasury was at one time
with the opposite party. Iet's assume the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Treasury are sympathetic with the President..
Mr. CURTIN. That I think we can assume. He wouldn't. have members of the Cabinet unfriendly to him-not for long.
Mr. RoaERs. All right., let's assume the Speaker is of the opposite
political party.
Mr. Crmvn. Right
Mr. R aERs. Then you get. the Speaker, the majority leader, and the
minority leader of the House. Then you get the President of the Senate, the leader and the minority leader in on this question of making a
determination.
Mr. CurTix. Right.
Mr. ROGERS. Now, don't you envision that there is some possibility
of some political implications that. may arise in connection witly it?
Mr. CUrrIN. No sir; because this Commission is split right down
the middle politically.
Mr. RooERs. Let me cite you the history of the political campaign of
1876.
Mr. CtTR N. Yes, sir.

Mr. RoGFRs. We.ll, the question arose as'to who got elected President,
so they referred it. over here to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme
Court divided it according to political lines and gave it. to the men of
their party. Now, that is the Supreme Court that did that.
Now, after the War Between the States, do you imagine that. Johnson, the President who succeeded Abraham Lincoln-if he had had

146

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

this group determine whether or not he was fit and able to serve as
Premsdent-is there any question in your mind but what all that group
would have found him insane because they thought that his actions
were sufficient?
Mr. CURTIN. As a matter of fact, sir, the makeup of the Com-

mission was assuming a preponderance in favor of the President's
party, because I was assuming that the two members of the Supreme
Court were nonpartisan.
But takingyour assumption that they would be of a party that was
opposite to that of the President, then you have got a commission that
is made up 4 to 4.
Assume that the two members of the Supreme Court are of a party
that is different
the President's.
That
would
be offset
their
I think
we canbyassume
who
of the Cabinet
two people
counterPart, the than
would be of the President's party or would be very friendly to the
President. That is 2 to 2.
You have got in the House the Speaker and the minority leader;
the are opposite parties, so that.is 3 to 3.
You have got in the Senate the majority and minority leader, so
that is 4 to 4.
It is right down the middle, politically.
Mr. ROOERS. The point I am trying to emphasize is, don't you believe
it to be dangerous for us to vest in the hands of, be it 59 7, or 11
people, the determination of who is President of the United States,
without some check on them?
Mr. CRTIxN. Well it depends on who you want as a check on it.
Mr. WHITENER. MiP. Rogers, I wonder if you have considered this
possibility. Suppose that a President dropped dead, the Vice President is in the hospital at the time, and these Cabinet members that
Mr. Curtain mentioned are so friendly to the President and may detest
the Vice President. Then what happens?
Mr.

CURTIN.

Well, again, sir, if I can answer that question, nor-

mally the Vice President is going to have the equal friendship of the
Cabinet because of the fact tfat they are presumably the same party as
the Vice President and it is the President's appointees, if we are using
a political'Mr. RooERs. The point that I am trying to state and which I think
you should consider is that with the selection of people that you have
here, most of them are politically minded.

I can
answer
if you go
to theHouses
Congress,
youMr.
areCUTnIN.
going toIf.find
every
one that
of tihesir,
Members
of both
are

. .
. MI
Mr. RoGERs. Yes; but as a group, in determining action that may
be taken, I think there should be some check on people of this nature,
regardless how motivated they may be, because I brought forward the
two instances that happened after the death of Lincoln and how close
they came to impeaching President Johnson.
Now, you don't envision for 1 minute, if you look at the history at
that time, that President Johnson would have had any chance if he
had to go before a group of this nature, and then less than 10 years
later you have a question of who was elected President, and you refer
it over here to the Supreme Cotuit and they divide it strictly on the
political line.
political lyminded.
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Now, isn't it dangerous to our philosophy to place in the hands of
any group of men t~ie proper determination of whether or not a man
is in Congress? Going one ste further, during the period of Woodrow Wilson, after he had a stroke in 1919 he was received by a group
in the House and the Sen-ate which were adverse to him. Now, this
group had been there do you think they wouldMr. CiIELF. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. RoGERs. All right; go ahead.
Mr. CTiEJJF. Along that-line, is it or isn't it true that the representation sent by 'the House and the Senate to interview the President were
denied access to him?
Mr. ROGERS. No; I think-

Mr. CiHp.L. Under the Wilson administration.
Mr. Cuatr. If I could interrupt, my understanding is that Mrs.
Wilson wouldn't let them through the door.
Mr. Ci1FiL. That is it. You wouldn't want -to bring the women
down on your backs.
Mr. ROGERS. But even then, if she wouldn't let them in, do you think
this group should go ahead and act because the wife wouldn't let them
in to see him?
Mr. CURTM. Again it is a question of relativity. I presume we are
saying that 535 men and women are better able to determine the question than a commission of 7 or 8, or whatever it is. It is a question
of can 10 people do the job better than 7 can a hundred do it -better
than 10, can 535 do it better than a hundred?
You speak of the Johnson impeachment proceeding of the last century. Now, there you had this impeachment trial, and certainly the
President didn't come up here to a completely impartial atmosphere.
There was definitely high feehing involved.
Mr. RooRs. That is the point that I am getting at.
Mr. CuRn.. That high feeling involved the whole Congress, thut
conceivably it whole C6ngress could have definite opinions. Itsocould
not be completely impartial just as perhaps the Commission could not.
Now, I certainly would have no objection, and I am not trying to
impose my thoughts on you, obviously, but I certainly would have
no objection if you wanted the Congress to pass on the findings of the
Commission. That would be perfectly all right with me, but somebody, somewhere along, the line, has got to make a decision.
Mr. WHIT
R. I think what Mr. Tenzer was trying to point out
was that in the other proposals the Congress has te right to make
the final decision because the Congress is in theory, at least, more
representative of the people, and in this modern time I think that if
the authority would not be adequate, if the President were accused
by somegroup of being mentally incompetent, and the Congress made
t e decision, theo Congress could then invite the man over here to speak
to the Congress and appeal. It. could be televised and the people of
the Nation could look at it, and if the man was competent, and it was
apparent that he was competent. it would not only be apparent to
Members of the Congress but wouldbe apparent to the Nation. .There
would be very few Members of Congress, no matter how politically
motivated they were, who would stand up and say the man was
tally incompetent and otherwise unable to carry on his work ifmenthe
millons of people in the Nation who looked on him on television as he
spoke to the Congress decided he was all right.
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It seems to me that is the danger of this system here, because you
could have a star chamber session, and then build up a record and send
it up to Congress, and if we only had appellate jurisdiction and the
poor President didn't have a right to come up and present such evidence as he wanted before the Congress, it just wouldn't be much of a
trial. You wouldn't even treat a common bootlegger that way in
Pennsylvania,
Mr. CURTIN. There is merit to what you say, obviously, but I could
call attention to the fact that I am sure you gentlemen all realizeand I am not a physician, I am just an attorney-while I have practiced law I have seen occasions where people who were mentally ill,
badly mentally ill, have appeared before courts and have scintillated
for about a half hour or so, but, of course, as soon as they get tired
their disability becomes apparent. However, they can make a very
fine speech if they are just. set up for it, so, therefore, the fact that
someone appears before a group of men and makes a good speech
doesn't mean that he is not mentally ill.
Mr. WmTn.m. But you, would let Congress have some authority
in this resolution of yours, in this amendment, and then the Congress
could say that the President would have a right to appear, but. that if
he did he would have to be submitted to interrogation by committees,
Representatives of Congress, that this would have to be done in public.
You could'do many things, but your resolution wouldn't give Congress
any right to do anything but sit up here and make speeches and say the
Commission has done right or wrong.
Mr. TrFNzER. In any event, Congressman Curtin, this would be a
period of emergency, and in a period of emergency it would not be best
to have the Congress in session.
Mr. CURTIN. I would certainly agree to that, and I would have no
objection to having the bill amended, if the committee, in its wisdom,
feels it is a good approach. I certainly have no objection to having
the resolution amended so that the findings of the Commission would
be subject to the approval of the Congress. That would be perfectly
all right with me. But somewhere along the line somebody has got to
start it. and I think a commission is the way it should be started.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate your
contribution.
Mr. CURTIr. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. PoF. May I express my commendation to the gentleman for his
contribution on the matter and to ask if I have correctly interpreted
his testimony to mean that while he is first interested in' the proposal
he has made. you would be glad to see this committee act expeditiously
upon what has come to be pretty much a consensus of an approach
which is somewhat different from your own.
Mr. CURTIN. I certainly agree with that.
.
Mr. POFF. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. CHELF. In Other words, anything is better than nothing-and
that is what we have right now.
Mr. CuITiN. Anything is better than what we have right. now.
The CHAIRMAN. 'Our next witness is our colleague from Ohio, a new
member, and we certainly welcome him here, the Honorable Rodney M.
Love.
Before he addresses the committee, Mr. McCulloch would like to say
something.
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Mr. MCCULLOCIL. I would like to welcome this man to the committee. Judge Love is the new Congressman from the Third District of
Ohio. Facetiously I should like to say he comes from Dayton, which
is the main suburb of the Fourth Congressional District of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF HON. RODNEY M. LOVE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Mr. Lovi. Thank you, Mr. Chairmah, and thank you, Congressman
McCulloch, for those very kind remarks. For one thing, since I am a
newcomer here, Mr. Chairman, and in view of the very fine resolutions
you have before you may I be permitted, sir, to submit my written
statement, without taing up any further time of this committee?
The CTIAmIrAN. You have that permission.
Mr. LovE. "Thankyou so much.
(The prepared statement of Congressman Love reads as follows:)
TESTIMONY OF REPRESENTATIVE RODNEY M. LOVE, OF OHIO, IN SUPPORT OF HOUSE
JOINT RESOLUTION 230, PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION

Mr. Chairman, members of the Judiciary Committee, I decided to submit
House Joint Resolution 236 because I believe the U.S. Constitution is not
only ambiguous, but defective, on the subject of presidential disability
and that we, as a nation, have been extremely fortunate that our Presidents
have been able to discharge their constitutional responsibilities. The office of
Vice President was made vacant due to the tragic death of Mr. Kennedy
and there has been io procedure for filling it. In support of the American
Bar Association and the national forum which it sponsored, Senator Birch E.
Bayh, of Indiana, and Representative Emanuel Celler, of New York, chairman of this committee, I submitted a bill of my own. I know the people
of my district would want me to speak out in favor of such an amendment
to the Constitution.
In my written testimony, I make no reference to history. This has
been most carefully documented and repetition is unnecessary. I merely
want to emphasize that prudence requires this representative body to act,
now, to submit to the State legislatures, an amendment correcting a defect
known to us for many, many years.
In addition to supporting the overall effort, I want to point out what I
consider to be a danger, in the event a President would transmit to the
Congress his written declaration that no inability exists. The Bayh-Celler
resolutions provide that the President shall resume the powers and duties
of his office unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a
majority of the heads of the executive department, or such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmits, within 2 days to the Congress, his
written declaratipn that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office.
My question is, What could happen within that 2-day period, in the event
an incompetent President resumed the duties of his office and issued orders
affecting the security of the Nation? While I agree,- the President should
be able to regain the powers and duties of his office easily, when his inability
ceases to exist, nevertheless, the Vice President should have time to file a written declaration with Congress, before the presumption in favor of the President's ability is restored.
To accomplish this, I have provided that the President shall resume the
duties and powers of his office on the third day following the transmittal of
such declaration to the Congress unless, prior to the end of the third day,
the Vice President, with the appropriate consent of executive department heads,
transmits to the Congress his written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. I use 3 days
on the theory that the President's written declaration could be submitted
on Friday and Congress might not be in session over the weekend.
I found no particular objection to the language that Congress shall- immediately decide the issue, for 'it would seem to me that this means Congress
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shall decide this important issue within a reasonable time. However, If this
committee believes the word "Immediately" is too uncertain, a 7- or 10-day
provision certainly should not be objectionable, as provided in Mr. MeCulloch's
bill, House Joint Resolution 119.

Mr. MOCULLOOT. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I should further like to say that Congressman
Love was an able probate judge of Montgomery County, Ohio, the
county of the late lames M. Cox.
Mr. LovE. Thank you, gentlemen.
The CUHAIRIAN. Our next witness is Marion B.Folsom, Chairman
of the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government,
Committee for Economic Development. Is Mr. Folsom here?
Mr. CHrEiF. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest a 10-minute recess while
we are waiting on the next witness? I understand he is in the House
and it will take about 10 minutes for him to get here.
The CHATRUAN. Yes, the chairman will declare a 10-minute recess.
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will resume.

Our next witness is Mr. Marion B. Folsom, Chairman of the,
Special Committee on Presidential Inability of the Committee on
Economic Development. Unfortunately he is delayed in the Senate,
appearing over there before a committee, and is on his way here, T
understand, but in the interim, Mr. Paul, who represents Mr. Folsom,
will start reading his statement.
Will you give your full name and title to the stenographer,
please?
Mr. PAUL. My name is R. Shale Paul. I am a professional staff
member with the Committee of Economic Development, and with
the Chair's permission I will read the statement exactly as Mr.
Folsom has written it.
The CHATRMAN. You may be seated, sir.
Mr. Popp. Mr. Chairman, before the witness begins, may I ask
if you would rather we reserve questions for Mr. Folsom, or are
you prepared to respond to questions during the course of the
readina?
Mr. PAUL. I can respond to questions, sir. I think it would be more
appropriate, inasmuch as Mr. Folsom will be here in 5 or 10 minutes.
if you could reserve questions for him, He is prepared to respond.
I certainly could, but. he perhaps would answer them better than I.
Mr. POFF. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARION B. FOLSOM, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
FOR IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, COM.
MITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Mr. PAui,. The statement reads as follows:
"Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Rerpresentatives: My name is Marion B. Folsom. I
am chairman of CED's I Committee for Improvement of Management
in Government.
'The Committee for Economic Development is composed of 200 businessmen and editeators. ItN purpose is to conduct objective economic research, to support and promote
economic education, and to formulate and publish recommendations, on major economic
problems, that will contribute to growth anud stabillty In the American economy, higher
living standards and increu~sing opportunities for all Americans, and to strengthening
the institutIons and concept sent a to progress In a free society.
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"Your invitation to testify on the vital subject now before this cornnittee is much appreciated. In this, I speak both for myself and for
those associated with me in the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, as well as for the trustees of our parent body,
the Committee for Economic Development.
"I believe that you have seen our CED policy statement on 'Presidontlal Succession and Inability,' published last month, In that understanding, Ipropose to limit my comments at this point to three subjects: First, identification of the organization I represent and a brief
description of its procedures; second, the basic principles or criteria
that we believe must be recognized in finding the best, solutions for
these difficult problems; and, third, our conclusions concerning the
major issues in dispute, and the reasoning leading to those conclusions.
"The Committee for Economic Development was established in
1942. It consists of 200 trustees representing a broad spectrum of
business and university leadership in the United States.2 These
trustees have devoted much time and personal attention to the developinent of polcy positions designed to encourage the economic wellbeing of the United States and of the free world. As a result, the
policy statements they have produced-with the aid and advice of the
)est scholarly minds in the Nation-have been favorably received in
influential quarters and have enjoyed broad public acceptance.
"About 2 years ago, several top officials and former officials of the
Federal Government approached me and others active in CED, proposing that we apply the same approaches to improvement of our governmental institutions that we have used in formulating beneficial economic policies. On this basis, CED established the Committee for
Improvement. of Management in Government. The 25 CED trustees
with most experience in government were appinted to it, and 10 addi-

tional members were add-ed from outside CED to provide the broadest

possible balance for our work. Four of our 35 members had served
as heads of Cabinet departments, 5 had been Assistant or Under Secretaries, 13 chairmen or members of Federal regulatory or advisory
commissions, and 13 were former bureau chiefs or directors, or special
assistants to the President or to Cabinet members. In addition, we
have benefited from the counsel of our Advisory Board of 15 members-men with wide experience in governmental afairs, as well as in
university and business circles.
"The policy statement on 'Presidential Succession and Inability'
is not a staff document, as such. It is the product of intensive analysis
in a long series of discussions among our trustees and advisers, in
which we were able to use the results of the American Bar Association
studies and other excellent scholarly work to best advantage. In accordance with CED practice, the statement was then given thorough
review by the CED Research and Policy Committee, which approved
and issue it as the official CED position. Lists of both the Committee
for Improvement of Management in Government and the Research
and Poicy Committee of CED are attached, together with our Advisory Board,
"I would emphasize the character of the organizations I represent;
the care with which they have deliberated on the subjects that now
2 A complete recent list of CED trustees is found on pp. 42-44 of the policy statement
on "Presidential Succession and Inability."
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concern you; and the remarkable degree of unanimity among my colleagues on every major change quired to nuike our constitutilonal
system more perfect in matters of presidential succession and inability.
"Our cnsenss is robaby due to the fNet that our first. efforV
to find agreement, on tho b~asic principles t~o h~e observed-was succesful. If T may, T would, offer thiqs quotation from ort policy staiteillult,
"This Committee i convinced tiat. the Issiles of stlc'esiOfl and hlhlllty aWe
vital and niust be fined by the Nation wlthoitt further delay. We have soilght to
examine each alternative tiat has been seriously proposed, and to identify its

advantages and disadvantages.

"* * * In analyzing the alternatives this Committee has judged their pros and
eons against these base criteria:
"(ton-o.ttitty in the Pre*identlaloft.ee.-n event of either denth or Inability of
the Prefident, therp niust be no break In the exercise of the Ixwers and dltlies
of the Presiden(y;
"Legitimaey.-Any transfer of the Presidential office or Its Iwwers and (1tih,;s
must be fully acceptable to (lovertnent offtilals and to the general Imblih:
"ao0rtqntV.-No question of doubt should be permitted to arise as to who Is

exerclsing the powers and duties of the Prsideney at tiny tin|,-.two 11m) cont.

posting for Presldentlial authority would be disastrous for the Nation:
"Stabilityl n.polfey.-There should be nio shllrp shift In polley or eluig( of

party :

",qpeerd amf simpliefty in proeeditre.--Thv' proeedures by which either th'
Presidential office or Its powers and duties are transfermd must be fast. efficient.
find easily understood:
"Preservationof the separation of ptotir.q.-Whatpver corrective aot
ton
nmy
be taken, It must not weaken oir tradtlotinl pattern of selration of powers.
partleultirl.v bet0wen the Presidency and Congress.
"The Committee Is convinced that correct solutions 1nmuist meeit all these testk.

"Several provisions of the !))oposals now beflre you uee these
criteria, and have our full endominent. 11(, anep, for (%X1tnle. t1111
any vaetney in the office of Vice President should Ihe lwonlht),1
filled

through noinnation by the President. with (ionr -e.,sionaleonf lr
matron.
We arer, also. on the need of constitution authority for the President
to assign the President nowers and duties to ihe Vice President for
limited porios in situations where both parties are. in nareement oni
the necessity. We also concur in the view that manjor resnonsibility
should be placed on the Cabinet, in determination of presidential in.
abilitv where the is ue is in doubt; in fact, we would rely more heavily
on this device than most. current, proposals have done.
"There are serious, perhaps fatal, weaknesses, however, in other
provisions contined in prowsals now before the Senate and the fToue
of Renresentntve. when these are measured against the bAsie criteria
considered by CED to be of paramount. iniortance. Since the, Con.,itUtion is likely soon to be nnwnded, and since this Committee on the
.Tudielnry of the Hose of Reprsentatlves appears to be a court of
lost, resort in this matter, T must identify the weaknesses as we se,
them. It, would not be diffleiult, to revise te terms of proposals now he,fore yoU to overcome the ob ections to them.
"The first weakness needintr correction is in the provision placlnr
primary remponsibilitv on the Vice President in any finding of undeclared Presidentatl disability. We feel very strongly that the initiative
in determination of an iudeclared Presidential inalilitv should lie wih
tlhe Cabinet, and not with the Vice President. Th other words, sucl
determination should be by 'the Cabinet, thiA Vice President concurring,' rather than by the 'Vice President, the Cabilfft concurring0.' Our
reasoning rests upon repeated experience, for example duu'ing the Oar-
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field and Wilson illnesses, showing that the Vice lPresident, is likely to

be illost reluctait to proclaim the Notion's need for him to assume the

Presidenlial powers and duties-no iliatter how urgent or obvious
Ihe flecessity--so long is the President lives.
"The Atice president, shoul never he forced to accept authority un(le conditions lernliiting unfair charges of usurpation against. him

nor should his natural feelings of (lefermee tnd loyalty to a disalblex

Chief ixectutive be allowed to absolve him from his proler responslibilitv. The Comitiltee for Im|1provellient. of Mallagelent. in Goverlmelt.
takes iatstlOif osi-on ol this point, perhaps because four of iswere
inplebers of tIto cabitiet during olie ot' more of President Fisenhower's
Several ,periods
of illness. I f Memlbers of the Congress were to visualize
(early the realities incases of this kind, we believe they would conclude,
us we have, that. iit int ie should rest with the Calbinet, ald not with
the Vice President.
"Former Attoi'ney Oenertl Brownell,
before the Sellte
,hdiciary Subcommittee on (onsteit utionaia peakingg
Amen'dmets on
YJaiiualy
I,1965, agreed wit I our 'ie
l thilte Calinel rather than the Vice
President..should have this nithItive. lle thought that the aillendieit
asIproposed might. permit this, in J)ractice, but we Submit that aliy
(Iou)ts In the matter should be removed through elarifl.ntion of the
proposed wording.
"Second, we oppose authorization for reactionn of any alternative
grou) as a substitute foi- the Calbinet. il (let('lIil ililt lol ot residential
Inability, oin grounds fully explored in our policy statement. The requiremlents of ('ol linlt)ty, aid of speed and simplicity, should Ie deci-

sive. The Cabilnet. is best situated, through the intimate knowledge
of its nllembers coil('erniiig major issues of state, its Well as by reason of
their dlay-to-day1 work ing association wit h tle President, both to judge

presidential inability and to assess the urgeneies in the national sitnalit any Inofluent. The (OInlet, and only the Calbinet, is capable of
the informed, instantaneols action that the eirculinstalwes may deeiaed.
4"A third wea kness in current proposals concerns Congressional Con-

tiol

firinat ion of a presidential nomination to fill a future, vacancy in the
Vice Presidency. We believe this should be done through a joint sessionl of the two Hllouses, requiringapproval by a majority of all Senuatots and Representat lives presel aid vot-iig. We favor this method, as
opposed either to eoifirmation by the Senlate alone, or to a)plroval by
hie two Houses acting Separately, for three prima111riealsols: (1) The
joiht. session corresponds to vot itg strenlgtlh, lState by State, in the elecloral
college;
(2) Aetion-pro or coin-woiul be more expedifiouS
than could be expected through Separate consideration by the two
nhlouses or under normal Senlate procedures; ald (3)the Senate and
the House of Representatlves might, he in (disagreement, with most
iiii
fort uit tl
eeffects.
"Ability to overcome a vice-presidenlial vacancy is an iIml)ortant,
and in terms of historic frequently the most imlportanti, reason for
allieiding tie Collstitution on this subject, and avoidance of unnecessary delay is in the national interest. We ackilowledge that formal
aelon In Joint session would require establishlnlt of rules of procedure for that body, but this would not seem to bean insoluble problem.
I have noted with interest President Johnson's proposal of January 29
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that the device of the joint, session be used in cases where the electoral
college does not produce a majority.
"Fourth, and conceivably most serious of all, we are much concerned
that the Nation avoid any possibility of doubt, dispute or delay concoming termination of any presidential inability. That, is why we
urge that this matter also he decided by the Cdinet, subject only to
presidential concurrence. The amendment, proposed last year opensin our view-opportunity for confusion over who hls legitimate atthority in the exercise of the powers and duties of the Pt'sidency in
some future time of trial and trouble.
"The principle of separation of powers among the three Iamelne-s of
Government appears to us to be eminently sound. We cannot agree
that it Is wise to place a possible future difference of opinion between
President; and Vice President over the termination of a presidential inability before the Congr mq for decision, especially if the result. is to
depend upon two-thirds majorities in both Houses.
"This subject, deserves renewed attention and closest, scrutiny.
Under the language previously proposed, it, would he possible for a
President to terminate his own. disability, against, the judgment, of the
Vie President. supported by the entire Cabinet, and a nianimnous vote
of either the H'ouse of Representatives or the Senate. if only one more
than one-third of the other boly were to agree with the Pr sident.. It
would be easier to remove a President through the constitutional impeachment process than to prevent1 resumpt-ion of his powers at(l
duties under this cumbersome system. We may hope that no such disagreement would ever occur, blit some better arrangement than this
should be made for the possibility-however remote it. may now seem
to be.
"Before fixing the proposed arrangement in our Constitution we
should consider carefully the circumstances of the case for whic-h the
proposal is designed. Let. us contemplate tie situation when a disabled President asserts that his inability has terminated, whereas a
majority of the Cabinet and the Vice Pre'sident disagree."
Tf I could defer to Mr. Folsom, who is now here.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Folsom, we welcome you here. I am sorry that
you have to make this sudden transition from the Senate to the House.
1 know you have had a busy morning. We know you to be a. very
dedicates and honorable public servant, over the years as Secretary

of Health, Education, and Welfare Department, and now a very lionored gentleman in business. You are head of a very largo estaiblishment in my own State, New York, the Eastman Kodak Co., and for
that. reason I doubly wA'elcome you here.
We are very happy to receive whatever contribitiol you might, make
to our considerations.
Mr. Cirmv. Might, Tsay, so far as Mr. Folsom is concerned, his fame
has preceded him here, hie is known and respveted by all Americans.
Mr, Fohsor. Thank you very much. I am sorry T am late, but t,hey
held me over in the Senate on the health bill they are considering.
They kept asking questions, so Tcouldn't get. away.
Tihe CHAIRMAN. Your able assistant, started reading.
Mr. Fotso. Now, we nust try to imagine what, would occur if this
issue were placed before the two houses of Congrt ts, considering the
issue separately, calling for expert, opinions, holding long hearings,
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engaging it) del)aies (ivisivO of public o)ihflon, aid finally disagreeing
l)etween fliniselves.
While the issue remained in doubt, possibly for months consider the
etlfects upon tlo executive branch of our Government. Te Vice President's authority over 1oth foreign and domestic affairs would be
severely weakened, especially if the Cabinet were divided in its convietions. The position of the two Houses of Congress would be quite
nmconfortal)le, with press, television, and radio influencing public
opinion. Congress, quite rightly, would wish to avoid hasty judgment, and this, in turn, woul lead to extended delay. The resulting
confusion might border on chaos, regardless of the condition of world
Nt ir.

Sueh a solution would appear to violate every criterion we have
found to he essential. It would certainly weaken continutity in the
exercise of presidential powers and duties. It would cast, doubt on
the legitimacy and public acceptability of the office. It would create
imeertainty and instability in policy. It provides the opposite of
speed and simplicity in proeedures, and it runs counter to the principle
of eparation of powers. We strongly reaffirm the merits of Cabinet
(lecision on this delicate matter, subject only to presidential concurI realize that questions have been raised concerning the ability
of i.Vice President using presidential powers during a prolonged
presidential inability to create and to fill Cabinet vacancies in order
to strengthen his own position. Cabinet. appointments, however, are
sulbjeet to senatorial confirmation, and in the hypothetical case we
ive in mind it must. be assumed that Senate approval of any changes
would bo 9"i en only after most careful consideration. Realistically,
ito Vice Presilent under sueh conditions would wish to expose him-

self to criticism for attempted usurpation except under dire necessity.
Our negative view of some weaknes.se.-as we see them-in the proIosals now before you should not cloud our affirmative position on
many elements coitaiied in them.

We undertook to study this sub-

jct.becausee of its prime importance, and in the hope and trust that
the best, and wis.st. remedy may be found for each defect in our present
system. The Constitution is not. easily amended, nor should it be.
ie process requires the kind of earnest deliberation now being given
by this Comniittee on the oJudiciary, as well as by all other Members
of lot h Houses of the Congress.
I would conclude by quoting a key paragraph in our CED policy
statement:

The urgency of national action to resolve the doio)ts and uncertainties cloud Ing presidential sucesslon anl Inability cannot he overly stressed. Failure to
correct the deficiencies will subject the Nation to risks and hazards that are
avoidable. Promptaction is imperntive.

(Membe's of the committee are as follows:)
COMMIT'PTEM FOR ECONOMIC DEV'ELOPMEI.HNT
COU(ITrrEE FOR IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT
TRUSTEES

Marion B. Folsom, chairman, Eastman Kodak Co. (tinder Secretary of the
Treasury: Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare).
John A. Perkins, vice chairman, president, University of Delaware (Under
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare).
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James . Allen, chairman, Pooz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
William 'Denton, publisher and chairman, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (U.S.
Senator; Assistant Secrotary of State: Ambassador to INESCO).
Marvin Power, nannging director, McKInmy.v & Co., Inc. (consultant to U.S, Air
Force; Bureau of the Budget).
John L. Burns, New York, N.Y. (member, Senior Advisory Group, Air Force
Systems Command).
Walker L. (Oster, chairman, the Detroit Edison Co. (official, War Production
Board: adviser, Atomic Energy Commission).
,ohnt T. Connor,' president, Merek & Co., Inc. (General Counsel, Office of Sclentiffe Research and Development- special assistant to Secretary of Navy).

Robert Heller, Cleveland, Ohio (consultant, exemutivO deparimeut and Congress).

Alvin R. ,Tennings, executive partner, Tybrand, Ross Bros, & Montgomery.
Ward Keener, president, the B. F. Goodrich Co. (Industry member, National
,T.
Wage Stabilization Board: membwr of team, Mutual Security Administration
surveyy of Germany); Advisory Committee on Civilian Personnel, Depart.
ment of the Army).
C1harles U. Kellsfadt. Sears, Roebuek & Co.
Sigurd ,.Tarmon, New York, N.Y. (U1.S. Advisory Commission oil Information).

Roy ?.Larsen, chairman, executive committee. TPimp, Inc. (Vice Chairman, U.S.

Advisory Committee on International, Education, and Cultural Affnlrs).
David H. tllienthal. chairman, Development & Repoureps Corp, (Chairman, Ten.

nessee Valley Authority: Atomic Energy Commission).
Thomas B. McCabe, chairman, Scott Paper Co. (Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Federal Rtoerve System).
Nell IT. McElroy. clirmnn, Procter & Giamble Co. (Seretary of Defense).
Robert n. Natlan, resident, Robert R. Nathan AssoeIntes, Tie, (executive, War
Production Board: economist. Department of Commerce).

Robert V. Soraeue, chairman, Sorngu

Fhectric Co. (consultant on continental

defense to National Security Councll: Director, Security Resources Panel of
Science Advisory Committeo of Office of Defense Mobilization).
Hdkar i. Stern. .Tr,, Royal 'Street Corp.
Anna Lord Strauss, New York. N.Y. (member, several Federal advisory boards).
Chnrles P. Taft. Cincinnati. Ohio (Director, Comnninty War Servlets, Federal
Securitv Agency (HEW); Director. Wartime Eeonomine Affnirs, Department
of State).
Sidney T,. Weinbere. partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co. (Vice Chairman, War Produetion Board: Deputy Administrator, Office of Defense Mobilization).
NONTRKUTE.RA

William H. Drapor, Jr,, chairman of the board, Combustion Engineers, Inc.
(Under Secretnry of the Army).
Frederick M. Eaton, partner, Shearmnn & Sterling (General Counsel, War
Production Board: dole nto. Disarmament Conference).
Thomas H. Eliot. chancellor, Washington University (General Counsel, Soeial

Securtv Board: Congressman).
Artihfir S. Flemmine. prestdenf, Tnivorsitv of Oregon (Secretary of lealth.
Education, and Welfare; Director of Defense Moblilzntlon: member, Civil

Service Commission).

Devereux C. ,To nhs. Now York Life Insurne Co. (Chnirmnn. President's
(Pmmittepon Education Beynd HTtth Sehonl).
James P. Mitchell,* senior vice president, Crown Zellerbaeh Corp. (Seretary

of Labor: Assistant Seretary of the Army).
James A. Perkins, president, Cornell University (official, Offlee of Price

Administratfon).
Sydnev Stoln, Jr., Stein Roe & rnrnhnm (consultant to President and to Budget
Bureau).
W. Allen Wallin, president, the University of Rochester (administrative assistant
to Proldent).
Philip YVine, president, U.S. Counell, Intornntional Chamber of Commerce,

Tne. (hairmnn,
Netherlands).

U.S. Civil Service Clomminslon:

I Now on leave from OR) in (Iovernment service,

2Decensed, Oct. 19. 1904,

T.S. Ambassador to the
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The CITAIMAN,. Mr.Rogers.
Mr. ROOERS. Mr. Folsoni, has your committee considered whether or

not the present proposal is sufficient to meet. the uncertainties of conditions that may arise, such as, you might say, though it. may pro-

vide for the assumption of the powers and duties of the President by
the Vice President acting as the President, a situation wherein the
Acting President falls into the same disability or inability as his
predecessor? Has your committee given this any consideration?
Mr. FoLsor. I think we mentioned it. but we didn't think we could
provide for all contingencies. We think that in that. case, of course,
we feel that the line of succession ought to be changed too. We think
you ought to go back to the system in use before 1947, in wheih succession would go from the Pres'ident to the Secretary of State and down
the line in the Cabinet, rather than the present arrangement.
In that case, a situation of that. sort, there wouldn't be any specific
constitutional arrangements for it and we might be in the same difficulty we are now, but it might be provided, of course, that the Seeretary of State would assume the function the same as the Prewident.
We haven't felt it necessary to provide for all contingencieq that
miglit arise, because we thought in this way we could take care of
the principal items. And we would be much better off than we are

now.
Mr. ROOERS. Since your committee finds a need to change the present

posture we are in because of the nuclear age, and since it,
is conceivable,
though remote, that some situation like that might occur-.
Mr. FoLsoA[. Of co use, you could provide for it by stvay'g that
where the Vice President also is disabled or can't. operate that then
the Secretary of State or whoever might -be next. in line would assmn
office, rrov;ded the majority of the Cabinet would agree. That could
be included.
sAlso member of Committee for Improvement of Management In Government
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Mr. Rooputs. You mean in the same proposal, that would appropriately fit the situation ?
Mr. Feor1sor. The Saime proposal we have for tie Vice President I
think would fit in the case of the Secretary of State if lie were tle
next. in line.
Mr. Roomtts. T note that your conlinittee, Mr. Folson places a great
deal of emphasis on the need to have the Cabiliet, or tile members of
the Cabilet act instead of the Vice Presidenl, 1in it cerain case, in
initiating the president ial inability provision, the declaration. Al(though you eite it reason in your p!repared statement about the reluctance of the Vice Pi'0dnt to net int ase like this, nonethehss can
we not, assullie tlat. a Vice Presidelit, intores-ted in the welfare of the
Nation has as deep a concern as any Cabilnet, and is certainly close
enough to the situation and J)roball)y closer than any Cabinet member
mi ght be, esl)ecially whlen w consider th experience of to(lay ?
Mr. Foiso.n. Of couee, we, knorv in lhe past. there has bleeii great
hesitancy on the part of the Vice President. to do that, as in the case of
the Wilson-Marshall sitlnation and also tihe (hirtield situation to which
we called attention, but. the way wo think it. would actually work out
is that eit her tile Vice president, or somn member of t he Cabinet would
bring the matter tip for discussion, and if a majority of the Cabinet
agreed and the Vice l'residlenlt agreed the vhange'would be made.
But, we don't, think the initiative should be left entirely to the Vice
President.
Mr. Roaeirs. Well, it, isn't. under this proposal.
Mr. For~somir. No.
Mr. Roamis. You are changing it around, as I see it., to the Cabinet
with the Vice President concurring, whereas it is the other way with

the Vice President initiating.

Mr. Fosor. We think tile initiative should come from the Cnbinet
because of the delicate position of the Vice President. If there is
much doubt about the disability, he would be subject to criticism.
Some people might say he was usurping the power or l)ushing himself
ahead too much, and it would be very delicate for him to do that.
We compared the situation that might exist with that in a company,
for inhtanee, where we know a vice president would he-stitate for a
long time to push himself into the presidency, and we fee.I that in
many a situation the Vice President would hesitate for a long time
to do that.. Then if he waited too long, le wouldn't accomp lish it,
If he acted too quickly, some people would say he is usurping his
powers.
Mr. RooErs. Mr. Folsoin, on the other hand, considering the experience of the past 4 or 5 years, must not we conclude that the Vice President has probably been closest to tie situation and working so closely
and intimately with the President that he would probably be more
aware of any presidential inability than any other Cabinet member
or tle members of the Cabinet combined?
Mr. FoLso-,N. No, I wouldn't say the Vice President is any closer
than some members of the Cabinet. Some might be as close, bitt from
my own experience in tile Disenhower administration I would say tliit
some members of the Cabinet-as I think is true now-were closer to
the President than the Vice President, and were more intimately acquainted with the operations of the Government.
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Mr. Roarms. Hasn't the trend been to it closer relntioniship bet ween
the Vice President. and the President I
Mr. Forsor. I don't think you would find it any closer than it would
be, say, between the President and the Secretary of State al(] the ,Secretary of Defense, because they are in more frequent contact than the
Vice President is.
Mr. RooEs. That, may be so, but theni wouldn't the knowledate of
the disability-because this is what, you seem to rely on in
In talking
about their ability to work closely with him-together with the fact
that you assume he Vice President might be reluctant to sort, of impose himself, but it would appear to me that the ability to nse..
whether the President is suffering an inability or disability is more
important, and I think the person who would be able to tell this most
or recognize this quickest would be the Vice President, the person who
is closest to the President.
Mr. FoTJsom. The way it works out is the President is actually ill
daily contact right, now with the Secretary of Defense and the Speretarv of State, every, day, almost.. They are very close to the situations
and could certamiy tell very easily whether he is slipping or not.
whereas sometimes the Vice President wouldn't he brought, into the
discussion for qnite a, while, because he, hasn't any regular specific
duties that require him to see the President constantly as these other
officers have. Anyhow, we are talkig ahout the combined judgment
of the whole Cabinet iere, not just one or two of them. We want a
majority of the Cabinet, and the'Vice President also, but wC are afr-aid
that if the initiative is left, to the Vice President there might be a delay
in the matter whieh otherwise wouldn't take place.
Mr. Romm s. Thank yoii vey much, Mr. Folsom.
The CHAIM AX. Mr. Folsom, you say:
"A third weakness in current proi)o

s conern congressional eonfirmntloit to

fill a future vacancy in the VIce-Prestdeney. We believe this shotl(l lie dlone
through a joint session of the two Houses, requiring approval by a majority of
all Senators and Representatives present and voting * * *

As vou know, we have never had any such proposition. 'We have
never had a joint session where there would be any debate, for example.
and I take it your proposal envisages some sort of debate.
Mr. FoTso-r. That is true.
The CuAIRMANX. The nearest approach to a joint session where there
is convergence of the powers of theIHouse md Senate is in impleachment where the House brings the indictment and then the House managers go over to the Senate and act as prosecuting attorneys, as it were.
T know of nothing in the history of the country where there have been
joint sessions other than those that involved formal hearings to hem,
the President's state of the Union message, or when we have visiting
dignitaries from abroad. but, other than that we have never had oinbit
sessions where the Members of the Senafe and the Members of the
Hos e could join in debate....
Now, if we have such a joint session, and I make these declarations
in tie hope that you can tell us whether your com mittee can evaluate
the substance thereof-if we have these joit sessions, who would preside-the Speaker of tle House, the President pro tern? Again would
we have to recognize protocol and give deference to the Seiators il a
joint session of that sort, and wltmt would a majority be? Would it
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have to be the total of the combined numbers of the Members of both
JHouses-100 in the Senate, 435 in the House, making 535? Would it
Ih one above half that amount to constitute a majority of a joint
session?
Those are questions that tile raising doubts in my mind as to a joint,
seRssi(ol. Why couldn't the same thifng be accomil)lished by separate
sessions?

You say there may be difterenM.e OV disagreement between

ome House and the other. That difference might still be registered if
they wve ill
joint session.
i'., Fol sOM. We thought of all these items you mentioned. In the
first lae, we t hinlk this is such an msual situation that We (1o't.
,ewhi Ii cannot be ]hld in a different way than has been usual. Now,
we realize that you havc to have rules of procedure which you don't
]iii'e allow, but we (loll't see why those rules of pr-ocedure cainot be
adopted verv soon after this almendnent is effective,so tiat 'ou could
Ivready for'I lie emergency, if it ever arose.
We ha(1 ill minld just a majority of the whole joiflt. session. Il that,
way., it would actually com-'espond, as I pointed out here, to teielectoral
Vote so far as the States are colnerned. We thought it wvoull be a
m)or, r,,1epreselit native situat ion tliall to leave it to the two Houses. act ing
separately.
Tie ('mi .NrAix. You smy a majority of those present and voting?
M1"r. Fol.sor. Yes.
The ('um.ir..
hat would constitute a majority. It wouldn't
have to I the total (omlined ?
Mr. Fo,soM. No, a majority of those votin g. We think the rules
of p'o('(edhl could easily be worked out, but they ought to be worked
out ahea(l of tine, of course. We do think this woii1(d be more expe(litious than haing tie two Houses act separ ately.
The (' .\ir.mx. You must also consider that te House is not a conIhming body. The Senate is a continuing body.
hat. -would invade
your idea very materially, because t-he touse would have to pass rules
every session, or every Congress, rather, because once you pass these
rules they may l)e binding on the Senate forever, but they would not
be binding on the House after the Congress had concluded.
Mr. Fougo.ANt. Well. you have to adopt- rules every session.
The (hruir.\ -.E'ery Congre.s.
Mr. Fouso:M. You could just. incorlporate these ill your other rules
The Cirmur.,x. Well, flit is not so easily done.
Mr. Forso.r. Once. these rules are aol)eled onice, there wouldn't be
much difficulty continuing them, along with your other rules.
Tihe CHm ,nIMA.
You have no idea. what happens when you consder
the vieissit-udes of the members with a change in conditions. We have
this question brought up in every single Congress.
Mr. FoLso'r. Well, why would there be any discussion about. it?
Why would there be any disagreement on it ' I don't see how there
would 1)e much disamleement with it once it had been decided on. It is
-not a controversial 1ssue at all.
Of course, the other method would probably work out all right,
1,ut we think if you had the two Houses in disagreement you would
have itlot of trouble. In a joint session the nomination would be
settled once and for ail.
The C ,m tArN. If there is disagreement-
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Mr. FoLsoM. The House would have many more votes, of course,
than the Senate, and in most cases the I-louse would determine it
because of the greater numbers. We think, as a matter of fact, the
House should be given more precedence or more weight because they
are more closely in touch, since they are elected every 2 years, with
public opinion than the Senate might be,
The CHAIRMAN. You don't say anything in your suggestion that
the House should have any degree of paramountcy.
Mr.FoLso3r. No; butit actually works out if you take a joint session
with the majority of 435.
The CHAMMAN. In other words, you wouldn't take the majority
of either House to act, but the majority of the total?
Mr. Foo,so. The majority of the total.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the Senate would agree to that?
Mr. FoLsoM. Well, I don't know.
The C AirAN. I dont' lknow, either.

Mr. FoLsoM. Anyhow, that is our view. As to whether you would
ever get it done or not I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have had some experience with the
Senate. You ought to know.
Mr. FoLso t On the other hand, we were considering also the
proposal that it should be left to the Senate entirely, like all other
appointments. Now we think the House ought to be brought into
the picture.
Mr. Cn .rv.I didn't hear that.
Mr. FoLsoM. We think the House ought to be brought into the
picture, you see, and we didn't go along with the suggestion that the
Senate alone would be confirming.
Mr. R!oGEis. Very wise. A most profound statement.

The CHAIMAN. Nfr. Donohue?
Mr. DoNoiFuE. No questions.
The CA1R,,AN. Mr. Dowdy?

Mr. DoWDY. You feel your proposal would bring it closer to the oneman, one-vote idea that seems to prevail at least in the Supreme Court,
whether it does in the House or the U.S. Senate or not?

Mr. FoLsoMI. No; I don't think it would be tied into the one vote.

Mr. DowDY. It would be closer to it, though. The bigger States
would have a bigger voice in the selection.
Mr. FoLsoMir. Yes; that is true.
Mr. DowDY. I was interested in what you brought up here as to the
line of succession after the Vice President. Did you mean that that
should be written into the Constitution?
Mr. FoLsor. Oh, no; that could be handled by Congress, of course.
That doesn't have anything to do with this constitutional amendment.
Mr. DOWDY. I just ,anted to be sure I understood correctly.
Mr. FoLsoMr. The Constitution provides, you know, for the Congress
to take care of that.
Mr. DowDY. There is one other point, I
ould like to have your
opinion on, Mr. Folsom. There are two differetfioccasions--one is the
selection of the Vice President, the other is whether there is a vote on
when the President has recovered his capacity to act-two different
times when the House or Senate either separately or jointly would be
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called upon to vote, and the question has been raised as to whether
those votes should be taken by secret ballot.
What do you think of that?
M[r. Forsor. So far as the inability, we don't think the Congress
Should be brought into .it at all.
Mr. Downy. Vhat if the President says, "Well, I am able to act,
noW," and the Vice President with the concurrence of the Cabinet
members says, "No, you are not." Then somebody has got to make the
decision.
Mr. FOLSOM. Of course, in our recommendation, that should be left
to the Catbinet entirely. In that case if the President has been disabled and the Vice President has acted, and the President thinks he is
able to take over again and the majority of the Cabinet agrees, then
that would settle it, and it shouldn't go to the House, whereas the
resolution would go to Congress.
Mr. Downy. Is I une(lrstand it, if lhe majority of tie Cabinet
agrees with the President thlt lie has recovered his capacity to act, that
would end it, under these 1)oposals.
Mr. For,so r. Not under the Bayh proposal.
Mr. DowDY. W'ell, I might be wrong. I was thinking that. the only
way the Vice President could question the Presidient's determination
that he has recovered his capacity to act would be with the concurrence
of the majority of the mealbers of the Cabinet.
Mr. Foisom. Yes: then it would go to the Congress.
M[r. Downy. Tlien it,would go to Congress for a two-thirds-in other
words. the Vice President would have to have two-thirds of the Memnbers of each House agree with him.
Mr. Forsomr. Yes.
Mr. DOWDY. Otherwise the President would return. Now, my
.question was whether or not that vote in the I-ouse and Senate should
be by secret ballot.
Mr. FoLsort. Do you have many votes with secret ballots now?
Mr. DOWDY. Not many, but-

Mr. Foisomr. I don't thiiik it should be, myself. I am just of that
re didn't consider that at all in our committee.
opinion.
Mr. DOWDY. Of course, I don't, anticipate the time would ever come
when we would have to do that.
Mr. FOLSO-M. We don't think it ought to be brought to Congress
at all.
Mr. DOwDY. But if it is.
Mr. Foiso.r. Tf it is, .1still think it would be better. I don't see why
you should have a secret, ballot. It would be quite embarrassing, [
know.
Mr. DOWDY. You feel if the Vice President has been acting and the

President claims he is able, then the pressure would be brought on
the Members of the Congress, We would hope the Members of Congress are not susceptible to bending to pressures, but in the event there
might be someday such a situation,
Mr. FoISo, r. That is the reason we don't like to have a public debate
on the tiing, because we think it might go on for some time and be
embarrassing and very unsettling to the Whole country and the world.
If you are going to have an open debate, you might as well go the
whole way and have an open vote on it.
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Mr. DOWDY. You would probably run into more danger there of
unsettling conditions than in the election of it Vice President who has
been nominated by the Vice President.
Mr. FOLSOM. Of course, we think that in most cases would be more
or less automatic. Looking back in recent years I can't imagine any
situation where Congress would turn down the President on the appointment of a Vice President, since in recent years the President
normally picks the Vice-IPresidentia I nominee, anyhow.
.Mr. DoWDY. The President could nomiinte anybody lie wanted to
and it would be automatically approved whether it was for the good
of the country or not, and if the President nominated someone for
Vice President, if it was for the good of the country, I don't think
there would be any question, uider secret ballot he would be selected.
Mr. FoLsomt. I don't think it would make much difference in that
case.
Mr. DOWDY. Do you see any objection-and this is a question that
has been raised-to our having a secret ballot? I believe you said it
should be a joint session, and I see no reason for a, great deal of debate
about, it, because it would simply be on the name the President sent
over.
Mr'. FOLSOMr. No, but I would favor, still, an open vote on it. Tiat
is just my personal opinion.
Mr. DOWDY. That question has been raised.
Mr. Foisoir. 'We didn't discuss that at all in our committee.
Mr. DOWDY. Thank you.
The CYTAIRMAN. 11r. Folsom, on page 7, you say:
Conceivably most serious of all, we are much concerned that the Nation avoid
any possibility of doubt, dispute or delay concerning termination of any presidential inability. That is why we urge that this matter -also be deelded by the
Cabinet, subject only to presidential concurrence.

You leave out the Congress entirely.
Mr. Foisoxr. Yes.

The CTAIRUMAN. From a practical standpoint, and the pragmatic
standpoint, don't you think we would have some trouble in that regard,
leaving out the Congress?
Mr. FoLso-[. 'Well, in this case if the President himself says he is
able to continue and the Cabinet, who are in as close a situation as
anybody could be, said they thifik lie is, we feel it is an executive
situation. It would open up a question of the separation of powers,
to bring Congress into the executive situation. There is not a question.
of policy involved here; it. is a question of fact.
The CAIRMAN. Of course, you must remember that those who are
to decide would be appointees of the President, namely the presidential
Cabinet. Don't you think there might be prejudice, therefore, in favor
of the President if the sole responsibility for this determination rests
with the Cabinet.?
Mr. Forsoim. I think you will just have to depend in all these cases
on the judgment of the individual members of the Cabinet.
Mr. DowDY. Will the gentleman yield?
The CHAIRMAN. Yesir.
Mr. DO ,DY. On tiis veiy ,oint, the Acting President, specially if

he is acting for any lengh 'f time at all, might, well replace the Cabinet.
with people who would support him.
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tile final analof that
Mf r.ifFOLsoM.
by
to conltiuiieInindefnitely
wantspossibility.
President
a have
Vce thought
you findWe
vsis,
getting' rid of the Cabinet an( getting people he can dictate to, Cono'l'eSS lh take cal' of tie situ atilol. In the first place, you have the
impeachment, and in the second place you could deny appioprl.ations
for an thing.
Mi. DowDvy. I haven't noticed Congress being prone to turn down
aj)propriatioils slice I ha ve, been here.
M1ir. Fousom. If it is a. question of gettiing his own Cabinet members,
voi would flind if yoll cut out a fimw key appropriations he couldn't
operate very well.
The CIIIcIAN. One of the reasons for having the Cabinet decide
is to keel) the powerr separate.
Mr. Foxsorm. It also would speed the situation tip. If you are goiug
to have any long dsctss. n ilCongress? it would get out, and. of course,
th Ctahinet members themselves might have discussion that wouldn't
be quite so public as if you had a debate oil it.
,
(O(course, we dont have actual separation of
The C,
powers. Congress does intervene in the case of an election of tile PIesident when none of the candidates get a majority of the electoral vote.
There is no separation there. The 1-ouse must m1ake the detelimilltion,
then, so there are cases where there is a converging of the powers.

Mi'. Foson. Yes, and of course quite a,few people feel, also, that
there are some restrictions that some of the Congress puts on the appol)riations bills so there is not. so much separation of power as there
should be.
The CiIAmI.,mA. mr.St. Onge?
MJr. ST.O,(m. No questions.
CAIAIMAN.
M'.deferi
Teuzer?
The
Mi'. TJENZ.E.
I will
to Mi'. Gr'idler.
Mr. Gmwir. Mr. Folsomn, let's get down to an actual case. When
President Eisenhower had his heart attack under the Celler-Bayh
bill as pro posed, the amendment, do you Ihink that the Cabiiet would
have declared the President disabled if the procedure of having cong'ressional concuirrence and a declaration of reability were onl the
books? Do you t think the Cabiinet would have decla'ei the P'esident
disabled?
Mr. FoLso-r. Well, of course in that situation, since he recovered so
quickly so that he could carry on after a short, time, I think tlat is
a pretty good case where if you left the initiative to the Vice President
he would have hesitate,1 quite a long time before anything wild have
been done. I think in that case the Cabinet might. have been more
willing to take concerted action than the Vice Pr'esident, btit that is
just a. surmise.
In case he had been disabled, and the Vice President were in power
for quite a while, the President saying later that lie had recovered, I
think if the Cabinet agreed it could have, been settled very quikly.
Now, lhe other Waiyif the Vice President said flint he didit thiik
the President had recovered, then it would have had to come to Conmress. If either House failed to get, the two-thirds-you see, oi a littln old one-third they could botch the situations. It would take a pretty
small umber of people who weren't as familiar with the facts as the
Cabinet members were. The Cabinet members, you see, are really in
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better shape to judge presidential ability to carry on than most, mormbers of Congres would be.
A-r. GOmDui,. Do you believe if the Cabinet, had had tlie power to
declare the disability terminated that, they would bo more likel, to
decltre him disabled in the first, insmlce tlhian if this power had rested
with the Congress ?
Mr. FoLsor. I doubt if that would make much diflrence. T think,
judging by the people present when T was in the Cabinet, T would d.
pend on their judgment. in any ease.

M r.
ammit.

hank you.

Thle
rr
TIdenltally, siilO the Eiseihiower incidlt was
brought up, what holit. the Wilson case, where he lingered for months
after a stroke, hlind the Meillbers of th Cabinet tried to do something
but, couldn't? Lansing, you1 may reniellmer, wanted to t ake the had
to deelu'e tlo President disflbled, and yet he was compell- to resign,

so there was a case, whore the Cabint, was helpless.
Mr. Fousor. 1inthat ese a luinlher of lheill tried to pelvail upon
Vice President Marshall, lh1t he reflsed to do anythilg_ about it. The
responsil)Ility in that (lase was up to Marshall. of course, that was
due to the fact that it,
wasn't, cleal ill
ile Constitlltil wtitllthe Sit lll-

tion was and how he could take over'.

If he took over, some people

thou,..,lt he might have to keep on indeflnitely.
The C'I,\irnMxN. If the Celler-Bayh amendment was in eft'eet at the
time of the so-called reluetnee of Mar.shall, T don't think that. reluct anee would have been present , ause he would have 1 eil bIaeld
by the Cabinet an( would have beell Ialed hv a t wo-thilds vote of
tle louse itself, and that. would have removed his reluctance.
rr. Folsomw. 1We think in that
inor li'oposal, if he had the
i'Use,
bacling of tie Cabinet he would have taken ovl'r anyhow witilout the

Suim)mot of the Coligress.
The COiumiAN. I 'tulfconceive how you cold say llther than this,
that the,allege since of tle Cabinet is usually with th'e President.. ie
is tie milin A1hlo appointed them. Illey nrc responsible unto him.
imr. Foso,. Tn the Wilson ease, T thifl you would find several
Cabinet mellie's who tried to get. MAlrslall'to take over, and they
wer'e fill appointed )y tle President.
The COrniarAN. T say if lie. emuld be baed ly a two-thflid.s vote
of- the. House and the Senate, T don't think that reluctnce would be
pl'CS'nlt.

Mr. Ctirtvi.. And that was sad, too, because, as memory seTrves me,
President Wilson's disability liluere(d on for some 1S months, which

wias a hortil)le thing. The Lord las been good to thls country.
Mr. Foirsor. That is why we link vl ought to have thIis'amendment, one way or the oth5.. 11,le01' you go tllo)11 with flip Baylh
necessary that something he don1e.
amendment 01' uiot, we think it 'is
Ire think you would get speedier act ionoi ur polm)isal.
Mr. CiTmi.'. In your stalement a moment ago. Mr. Folsoml, that. the
President, at, the various conventions more or less pits tle, nod, or
should T say th1e touch of favorite isun, or certainly lets be known his
approval of his rimning mte, which is a very $heaihy thing, thi
doesn't detraet frvom this sittflon at. all. TIn ily opinion, it is i.very
healthy thing, because T certainly wait a friend inmy corner if any-
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thin111ppllsto Il)W lind( I wat it 1111111 ill wloiii I halve tilwit illost
his kio~ luld fnitlint.. Sort, of t inlg, so I
coldrdel Ineilhs liiis
Ihink I hna this helps t~e sit nation nat ierU Iln (let iet s froii it.
Alr. IlHomw. I aigree.
Ar. D~owny. Yoii itist Ilave been i'em(1ing your hi-story.
was ahoult
Mr.i~ Cmiwix. I hanve been reading hist ory ; ysiineI

CollMr. Joii, TPh is 'oillilflittee 'is ('igilgQd()%%-0 ill Itle wrifitl(? of at
ind.
stit-tiional inmeiidnent, which will be suliblnitfted for ratiffhcfit

thie purpose of t hilt 11iimiitliiieit. would be to estitlhisli. tho niachdinory
whereby th O~~o h ~Ciel ftelnited Statfes woldd be
trani'lsferr-ed to sOllie o lit'i' l)C1'501 by Some1 otlier'agency.
I imauke 11o lj)ologY li5 Oll of Ilie 1111t hiors of oilie of t lwese bills for ily
dvtliste of tile lPidk'lit's office. 1 11111 jeloums of hiis pomvrs, andI
wilalnt thlis peoposil to b~e ca i'efiil to sllfegi11ai'd his pourers.
If(11(h1re is it quest loll od, fili iilig t he 1Presideli or tilhe Vice I~ei
it is Iie Ipresident iii wiotii tile
(lent. l1 will rilvor t iie I'sikleit,
1)(0pleIliv reposedl liese I)0wI''.
XAnd I1light. al 1tha1 1 aill not
imliiipiessed wit h tho uaigllim('li t hlt, (I i ie P~residlent Nu'olld 1)e
relltillit, to ill itinte t,lie action.
1 11n1 110t iil-esse( becae i fi'st, of
0ll, if this were it pato of the basic Jaiw of the lahnd, it. is diffliut, to
illilgilie a Vi('C I-esidelit A%-l)
wolil(l he So) weaki its to fatiI to tilke ilpp1'olil-'iato act 1011 whenl, 1s filie clliiitian has indhicat ed, he aic(iplites
01111at(
olwold halv('t leslppol't of thle Calbileti111( potentilly, if lnecesW()
ioses of the ('oiigress. IIlieis too weldk
hNrto-I Iiiils of'thle tw
to ooso, then0 li0 (loesn't. belong ill t111t 'joh.
NOw%, halving Salid Otht. I might, say that, youl' point. libout, allowing
thle Caibinept to mnfitothle illes Ia loll- I Pr-efelr to (.all it, tilhe agita1ion-hals 1ii rendip beenl Iiken e'uire of aipput rent ly by anl fulwnldial'nt,
inside by.1
t-he Senateo *Jl(Iicitl' ("olillniiee.
I lli1lel'st uuid Y'om
psil)l~ou
ICo be thtlie ('adipe iitia-ite anld thle
m e te asnIatle itPollille byj adopting
Vice P~residlent, colIlr i ue
the han~jgoure il t-hleconjunct ivo wh'lich wuu'ldliiik it-, 1)ossible for
eitlher Iho r&)liinet, or the Vice Presidenit. to init iateC th1e lct onl.
Now, 1 a111OoPOSedl to (i lt. change, ail lillvilig sfl il it on('e I will
nd icite igniin thlt F11111 prepay r-ed to' m1a1%. 1e
acomlwoln tsvr, if niecessalry,
to) get, soinetIiling doneW, lee('aiise I wiatit to Sole solit hlinr dtine, lPOt AlY
isunwise to pr-oliferate
hut I saly I Ililtik dtht is un1wise. I think it-,
that power to inlit'ilfe the inlvestimrtionl inl 11iny way.
Thle Conlst it-Aftioll itself, whenl it stated thtth Vice 1i-esidenit
woldl( Imq11 ui e opowe'5 oflthe 1li-esitdeit, implied tlint.' thle Vice President wold~ be the 111111 wh'o wNou 1(1niako t lie, first, decision about t lie inaibility of thle Pr-esidenit, 1an1d I tChink 0101y were, wise whenl they did so.
MI direct. your attention to pager 7 ofyour. test linolly. 01n pages
7.8, an'ld 1)you deal with thle dantger of 64layiig acionl by tile Conl"'eoss inl the event thle Vice JIresidenit cha'lleniges the1
PI'esilit'S olet
Irirationl thalt lie is r'estoredl.
Now, hiere aigainl I thlinkl thalt if ther0e-is to be conigressionial action,
and. if there mus; 1)0 some conlgressional delay that delay- ought to
favor Cte President;, rather than the Vice Pl'esidlent.
Now, (10 you agree?
.n
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Mr. Forsost. Yes: I think I would, hut we just dlo't like ile idea
of having any delay at all when there is some liteeifililtby du1rin1g tliit
pIeriod as to 'who eventually is going to le the 'esi(lent.
Mr. Popp. This is in lino with tlihe statement that you iiI(Ide oil page 9
whieh called attention to the fact that the delay might be as long as
several months.

Your point, as stlted on page 9. 1think is well tfilwin.

Now, do you think, then, it would be advisable, iI'tIhis (on_'ress (Iecides that the Congr'ess should have a hand in this (leeision, do you
think it would be a(h'isable to have a time lintit on the eon
'rssional
action ?
FoLSO.m. Well, I heard that. diselssed fit the Senate coifttee
theMr.
other
cay, and there was i1U0h discussion ns, to what wording to
put in the amendment. Of course you knlow it was felt the lingua e
should he verA, general, and it would lbe diflicult to decide on a Ipr ieuIlar time limit that. might be appropriate In all

(it

ionslt. 'Flhev

were debating whether it should he in~medi.Wely, promptly. )I-how%many days there should be, oi what the interpletiat ion should he, so
I think if you are going to have anything lt. all, you wovld have to he
definite as to the Iuniler of davs., liut T (loilt .see how you 'ould(1
pick out a period of time that would he appropriale.

Mr. Porp. As T understand your statement, delav is obieet io(! l le.
If delay is objectional)le, then I would assume a time limit would be
preferable.
Mr. Folsomr. Well, of course tle discussion there seemed to indicate it would be. very ditfieull to get prompt act ion, say a few du ys a.-

tion.
Mr. Povr. 11(ll. T understand,

but T am asking fle witiless what

he thinks about it., not-the Senate.
Mr. For, ro. That. discussion lust; baced up my feelin, that any
delay is unfortunate, and T don't think there would be the delay in the
proposal we have. There mi,,ht; be delay in the (liswussimi ill tie Cab-

inet. itself )ut. once the decision was made there would l)e no delay at,
all.

It would take effect. immediately.
v. N oW, in tie bill whilih T introduced, T included the fol-

Mr. Po

lowing lanurage: "If the Congress within 10 days"--nld the 10-day
period T use Simp ly as a symbol
The Cimxx. What section is that?
Mr1. POF. Section 5 of nV bill. [Reading :

If 'di Congress witlinteon days after the receipt; osf the Vice IPrhsideti's writ-

ten deeiaratlon determines by two-thii'ls of I)th
unable to discharge the powers

imes that the President s

id duties of the ofle,, the ice Presihent sill

contimie to (liseharge the same ait Aeting lPresidenC. Otherwise the Pre.ident
shall resume the discharge of the powers and duties of his offlee.

Now. I think I need to explain what the effect of tlit would be.
It. would essentially give tile Conriess three choices. 'lTe CongreoC
challenge. The
could act and vote favorably on the Vice President's
Congress could act. and vote against, the Vice President's ehallenee.
Or. third, the Congress could fail to aet at all and allow the 10-day
period to expire. and if the Conaress close the third alterniative it
would be fte equivalent of having chosen tie speonid altr.ila"ive and
yet, it would be a. graceful manner of favoring the Pesident without
giving a, positive offense to th Vice President who is then dischalrging
the powers and duties of the office.
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Now, how do you feel about. that; approach?
Mr'. ,'OsJm()i. Well, oi course, the difllettlty coies incase y,)u don't

get.Mr.
t he 1(of'pi.
two Houses
agree.
If ti to
two
Iiouses (10 not. agree, the 10-day period expires
Itnld flie President. resumes his duties.
Mr. FpmJs()m. TIen you Ive the question raised of whether tile
lresioleit-duvi'ng that, time you would Ive (liselssioll whether the

i'rvsi(e~l, is fit or not fit, anti we just. don't like tie idea of having all
period of that sort.
Itil beingg discutssed openly (lriti)g it
nily way that we eould keep
sliggost
tite
genlt.emani
Po.
Could
Mir.

hat question from being discussed if the Presi(lent ever left office
beiluseof'llality?. lis something iescapable.
Mr. F(1s,01. 1iit if you are going to have the congresss In at all, I
l'eel it. would l)e desirable to have i ti ne limit suell as you suggest,
rat hel thall just lea ve it wide opel. I would agree on that.
Mr. ('om.'n ivEl. Mr. Folson,, with regard to this issue of delay,

l'it aaIt I I it d we have a sit llat lion
ifwe (donot IIv ( congresss in tIe
wlherely tihe ('abiiet a1l4 the \'ice President have acted to take away
this power from theIlresident, wolId von not have interninal)le delay
on1 any choie of putt nllg t(he Presidelt iack in ?
M'. lm,.som). Of course nler the proposal yol don't brillg it to
(Congr'ess whellti I Vice lresi(lelit takesoverl.
I an t saying keel)ing ill indol that where we
Mr.

have the sittlitionwith a group of mn1. who have already acted to
take a way tile lrsidents oefie, this saine group of men would, under
(111' p)roposals, have tle l)urden of saying wheli he (ould go )ack. In
othe. words 1inder your proposal there is 1o0 limit whatsoever. It
n3y run to the en(l of the term. The idea of tih('eller-1Hall proposal
isto have Congress as a check, not f'om the standpoint as .so1epeople
have discussed of perhaps aiding the Vice President, but as a cheek
to l)rotect tile President , with the idolt Ihat. two-thirds of Congress
or all of Congress in opel session, inl opel (ebate, are not going to vote
irrationally or improperly.
Then to ro one step furt her Mr. heCulloch said let's even try to
'ut the possible delay down, because in the Celler-layli l)roposal, as
we l)ossihly se it, if the Vice President were to fail to reconvene Contriess, they being out of session, or ifCongress (-hose to delay, interinudiably, themselves there would l)e no wity to net within iiperiod of
months, shall we say. Unler the Poffl-MeCulloeh pioi)osal, it would be
in the interest of tie Vice P1resident to quickly reconvene Congress,
were out of session.
if it,
Mi. l). .'.They would have to act or fnil to act, l.)ut either would
have a. Consequence, and either (onsequene is designed to l)rotec't
(Ile powers of the President.
Mr. Fo,soMn. Well, now, we feel, of course, that since the. Cabinet
is originally appointed by tle President it is as onerned inl p'otpcting
lie Piresident as Congress would be. 'he chief criticism of oium' plan is
we feel the Cabinet would be too favorable to the President. We feel
that you have to trust the judgnient of the Cabinet in )oth cases.
Tf you don't agree with that, the thing to do is to bring Congress
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into it, but. you have to realize the difficult in ease one House votes
one way and one the other
Mr.[ov.i..
I will put one further pragnmtic example, and then I an

through withithe question.
Suppose the CED proposal had been a part of ti Consiitution
in 1861 to 1864. Do you suppose the Cabinet might have removed
President Lincoln I
Mr.
r if
Iosole was in a condition where he was very sick and
couldn't carry on, they might.
Mr. Por.. Iell, he wasn't overly sick during the course of the war,
but I think all people are familiar with the hostility that existed between incoln and hs Cabinet. I won't name names, but I think it is
)retty well known.
Now, what wotlhl the Cabinet have done when Vice President lJohnson became President following Lincoln's assassination if your CED
proposal had beenlf a part of ie Constitution, bearing in "inid flitt
there had been no check whatever-and this is a government o (hel(ks
and balances, isn't it-tliere had been no cheek whatever by the rep'esentatives of the people Who sit in the two Ihouses of the Congress if
the decision had een made by mnenml)ers of the Cabinet, who are not
elected by the people but are appointed by the president?
The (HAIRMAwN. They probably would choose one of their own
members.
Mr. FoLsonr. Of course, as I said before, at that time Congress and
everybody was antagonistic toward tle President, and they Wouldn't
la.ve done much to protect the Presidlent at that time. They were as
antaYoiistic, toward the ]i'esident as the. Cabinet was.
Mr. CmrF. iM'r. F~ohsom, I was very munch impressed wt

orsae

ment on pfage 3 that was presented lhere to the committee this morning, anld I am going to read it back to you for the purpose of the
record:
The policy statement on "Presidential Succession and Tnabilty" is not a staff
document, as suih. It is the product of Intensive analysis In a long series of
discussions anmong our trustees and advisers, in which we were able to use the

results of the American Bar Association studies and other excellent scholarly
work to best advantage.

Then I come down to the bottom of page 3, and I would like to reread this because this ilnpresses me, sir, and it does show that you have
given it a great deal of concern and an awful lot of spadework and
hard work:
This committee Is convinced tht the issues of succession in inability are vital
and must be faced by the Nation without further delay * * *

I might say, at this juncture, I buy tlis wholeheartedly. We mnit
act, soon, and it would be a sad day for Amenca if 35 memlbers of the
bar, all lawyers, of this great eommiittee, and those on the Senate side;
if we can't come up, witi tie 80-odd bills we have got, with some sort
of answer to this l)roblem, then God help America.
To go back to the reading again:
We have sought to examine each alternative that has been serfoilsy proposed,

and to identify its advantages and disadvantages.

Then here is what I like very much, from your statement on page 4:
In analyzing the alternatives this committee has Judged their pros and cons
against these basic criteria:
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Continuity in the presidential office: In event of either death or inability of the

President, there must be no break in the exercise of the powers and duties of
the Presidency.

I agree, sir.
1Legitiia(y: Any transfer of the Presidentlal offlee or its powers and duties

must be fully acceptable to Governillent offlelals and to the general public.

Again I agree with this wholehearfedly.
Certainty: No question of doubt: should he peIritted to arise as to w%'ho is
exerelsiiig the powers aml duties of the Presiiency at any thie-two men cornltilng for pr'sidenithll authority would he (islstrous for the Nation.

Once aga ill I say, "Anmn."
Stability In policy: There should be no sharp shift in polley or change of

1lrMy.

Again ] buy this, beenause you are re(hl'inig, its I see it, to all absolute
IIIlIlIIUIIt
1trotill)leQ, leadlle hes, h ( he -well, you know what, I
mean. Then we come to the last one:
Speed and slm1piclty in

,

dei(t lld office or Its powers
al ',asIlyum(lerstoot].

.4rs 'TiI
o'leIt'res by whieh ether he l'(,sldiles
ute are transferred imist be fast, efficient,

Again I think you hit the tlgtl
ii'dit;. dead center. I think this
is the li'oloill. I do sincerely li~l lWe, (hat this is tile whole basic
l)'o!lel( rigllt here t hat I til) goiflg back into, that you have so very
ably luit.
l'rese'rvatihu of the,( Sl'luoi It lon of powers: Whatever corrective action miay be
talkell, It must. niot wealkoll our tradiltlofil palttern of separate ion of powers,
pmri k'ularly bet wveeu i the Presideny tid (Congress.

Aain,
t h1is
wlolellelrtely.
The.youll I buy
winl
Hp by saying:
The conlinmittee is conviniced

l at

'(reet solutions must meet all these tests.
Sir, I think that,that is a Iril IInlt statet en int, and T want. to coin pi-

melit yon, .si', foi the work Itilt. you have done on this. I think that
the country 5s blessed ln hav ing men of your caliber and your ability
and yoir im)triotisin to do jobs of thislkind. I know mliost all you
eatei is hell, blut while you an.e alive and you can cateh them, I'am

going to toss you sonle lotqilets.

M. Fom,sor.. Thllik yOlt veyo
ry ivh, but the bouqtis I think ought
to go to our whole CoMmit tee for hniprovemeilt of allaglliellt ill
GoverlielnIlt. We hanvea vAerv nble comMiittee, men who linv( had wide
experience ill indlustry, heads4 of large companies, most of them, and
yet, have also had wid'o OX peuietnee iln govenient. On our committee
there are three or foi' loriiier Secretaries and several Tder Sec.retaries. We ha'eatforller Conglllresm!laMr. Ciwiil. It reads like "Who's Who."
Mr. Foisom.1.
We have a. former Congressmni, Mr. Eliot, who was
Assistant Secretary of Labor for awhile, and we have a former Senator, so we have pretty broad experience in both fields.
Now, I might say that we I'ealize that there are lots of dilthwnces
of opinion on the d itterefit bills. 11We were hoping to contiblte to
the discussion, and out' chief concern is that some action be taken.
Now, if your committee and the Senate committee fliinlly agree that
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other plans than the one we suggest will answer it, we certainly would
go along 100 percent, because we know that you people have had wide
experience in many of these things, but we were looking at it from a
purely unbiased point of view and came up with these recomniendations.
You will find in the work of our committee we try l)ut do not insist
on being umaimous. We find if you try to be unanimous you water
it down, and yet you will find there are only about three or four (hssents among our whole committee.
We have complete confidence in the judgment of your two committees that you will come up with the right answer.
Mr. CmIV,

P.

I would hazard the guess that we will come up with an

answer as best we can make under the circumstances. Naturally it
will not, be the perfect answer, because even the Constitution, as great
as it was and written by men of the brains of Thomas Jefferson and
others, we have had to amend it 24 times to keep it alive, vital, breathing, and active so I don't think we will come up with a perfect answer
here, but maybe we will come up with something that later can be
amended and through trial and error we can adjust or modify as the
case may be.
Mr. fiOLSOM. We thought if you would keel) in mind these criteria
which you just read, and lhichi I think everybody would agree with.
whatever solution you come up with that will meet these tests we
think will he a pretty good bill.
Mr. CiTELF. Thank you.
The C\AIM ,N. Mr. Folsom, I want to say that I got a great deal of

satisfaction and got a. great deal of help from this report. on presidential succession and inability put out by the Committee for Economic
Development, and we are very thankful to you for your very wise
comments and your very gracious manner. We want to thank your
committee and through you your trustees and nontrUstees and all those
gentlemen named in the appendix to your speech. They constitute a
roster of the most brilliant and gifted talents from all walks of life
in this country.
Thank you again, sir.
Mr. FoLso-r. Thank you. I am glad to be here. I am awfully
sorry I was late getting over.
fi.CE.LF. It is a pleasure to do business with you, sir.
The CInR-mAN. The committee will adjourn until 2 o'clock, when

we will hear from the Attorney General and Members of Congress.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene
at 2 p.m.)
AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIwRMIA. The committee will come to order.
The first witness this afternoon is the very distinguished friend from
Connecticut, Mr. John S. Monagan. We are very happy to hear from
you.

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

173

STATEMENT OF HON. 1OHN S. MONAGAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
U[r. ilfONOAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the conmittee. I am going to be very brief.
I have filed a resolution, louse Joint. Resolution 158. 1 apotm. m
support of this resolution. It is comparable to many other resolutions
which have been filed. I am not. wedded to any particular language
or proviSion, and I amilOt,going to take tle time of the clairlllal oil
any
lengthy
It seeitis to me th1in we ha \'e clearly set forth
t.e fact
a discourse.
spent
-ld enough
time on discussion and that the time for
action is here. It is urgent, it is necessary, and therefore, 1 ask that,
the committee give consideration to the proposals that, are before the
colminittee,. and that they irmake appropriate recommendations tlat will
be acceptalle to the Congress. In this way, we will be able to move
forward with this very vitally needed clmiage ii the Constitution of
the Uited States.
I ask permission, Mr. Chairman to have. included in the record at
this point a statement, and an inclusion. which I have filed with the

committee.
The CJIAIR'MAN. That may be done.

Thank you very much.
Mrfl'. MO11NAGAN. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I
believe that enough lhas been said and written iin support of positive
action on legislation to provide this Nation with an essential guarantee
of continuity inl the position of Chief Executive of our Government.
I shall not take the time of the committee for any lengthy discourse on
the merits of my bill, House Joint Resolution 158, andothers which
have been filed for this purpose. It provides for Presidential appointment of a new Viee President, when a vacancy occurs, and for congressional determination of Presidential inability.
Certainly, all of us have been talking far too long on this subject
and we have thus contributed to delaying the action which we recognize to be not only essential but urgent.
I respectfully urge this committee to report out a resolution which
would be acceptable to the House and, ultimately, to the legislative
bodies of the States. I make this reommendation to you in tle belief
that in all quarters there is recognition of the need for action now and
without f urther necessary delay.
I will, however, with your perlllission, its ex)laniation of my bill,
submit for the record a copy of a statement which I placed in the
Congressional Rec)rd of January 26, 1965, and which also includes
coples of newspaper editorials in support of the action which I
advocate.

44-201-05--12
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(The statement referred to is as follows:)
A PRUst F'.NTIAL SiPFerssiOx AMKNIMNT
(Mr. Monagan asked and was given permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and Include extraneous matter.)
Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to say, again, that Congress must face up
to the responsibility of providing for the effective determination of presidential
and vice-presidential inability and succession. For this reason I have again
filed a bill-House Joint Resollition 158-a copy of which I attach herewith, and
Which I believe will eliminated In the future ucertalntiles that have been with us
o(n too man,y occasions.
Weailliess-es In the l)resent provisions for executive suecesolon were once more
brought into sharp focus following the assassination of President Kennedy. The
Ia)seuce of provision for filigix the vacitted office of Vice President caused a period of InteriiatiiOntl uncertaiitv which remained with us from November 220
193, to Januifary 20, 190611. While these questions are not new to us--witness
the Wilson iablltty--our most recent experience highlights the need for positive
action during this session of Congress. We cannot afford the hazard of further
delay.
All of us are aware, I minsure, that no less than eight Vice Presidents have
taken over the office of President upon Ihe denth of Incumbent Presidents since
1841. This means that. fornearly one-ilfth of the history of the country, the
Nation has ien withotit a Vice President.
'Phe joint resolution whielh I have filed for action by the 89th Congress Is
Snilar to legislanion which I proposed In tie 88th. It provides that In tle
event of tit(,
t'ulllovnl of th Preslqienlt fromt oflice or of his death or resi-nation,
the Vice 1lresideftt shall become President for the unexpired term. Within 30
dlays after such succession, tie new Prei.dent would nominate a Vice Pr-esident
wio would talke office upon confiruation by the House and( Senate. A majority
of those Members lrve.ent and voting would be required for the confirmation.
Similar action would be taken in the event of removal, death, or resignation of
the Vice President. Should the President declare his inability to serve In writing,
lie would hip succeeded by the Vice President, and this succession would be autoimatle, In the absenee of such declaration In writing, the Vice President could
assume the duties and powers of Acting President with the written approval of
the majority of the heads of the executive departments In office. Should there
be e(introversy, It would be resolved by a majority vote of the Congress.
In the absence of a President and Vice President, the order of succession
to the Presidency would be from the members of the Cabinet, as follows: Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
Postmaster General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary
of Co itiaerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health, Edncation, and Welfare.
Mir, Speaker, tie Issue of presidentinl nd vice-presidential Inability nnd suecession is one of the most challenging before the Nation. It was of sufficient
Import to merit recomimentdlation by President Johnson In his state of the Union
message for action In this session.
itfurther support of my proposal, I Include an editorial from the Meriden,
Conn., .Iournnl, of April 27. 19064. I also include an editorial from the Hartford,
Conn., Times of January 15, 1065, on the same subject.
[F rom the Merlden .ournal, Apr. 27, 1904]
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

A nation without a presidential backstop In the form of a vice president Is a
nation in danger of confusion nd dismay tn the event its chief executive Is
removed by death or incapacitated by Illness or accident.
The Unite(d States today Is in this position, lacking a Vice President and encumbered with a system of Presidential succession which would be bound to
place an aged, possibly an Infln man at the helm.
To change e the system, even if Congress can agree upon a plan, will be bound
to take a great deal of time. Congress, giving its attention to other pressing
matters, does not seem disposed to consider a matter which is possibly the most
pressing of all.
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itepresentative John S, Monagan, )emocrat, of Connecticut, has introduced
a Joint resolution p)ro)osing an amendment to tile Constitution which, he argues,
woi(I "lit torrent cndlitions as well ats future uncertainties."
The Monagan bill proves, as tit present, that in the event of tile removal of
the President from office, or of is death or resignation, the Vice President shall
lK'oMP iPresident for tile unexplred term, Within 3( days thereafter, the new
lreslhint would be required to inollilliate a Vice President who woul take office
111o1 vollirillatlon iy the House and Senate. A majority of those present and
voting would lbe required for confilition, Similar action would be taken in
tile (etlt of r111ovll, death, or resiglation of the Vie Presilent. The bill also

would establish procedure for the Vice President to succeed the President as

ActiilL Preshlent If tile President were unable to serve. Should tie President
diecliare his Inability to serve iln wrltillg lhe siiceessioii would be automatic;
In tile absence of such a declaration the Vice President could assume the duties
and powers of Acting Presldlent with the written approval of a majority of the
leads of tile executive departments In office,
Should there be a controversy, it would be resolved by a majority vote of
tile Coiigress. In 1i11 absence of a President or Vice President, the order of
suceesslo to the PresIdency would be from tile menlemes of the Cabinet in this
order: S(retary of State, Secretary of Treasury. Secretary of Defense, Attorlney General, Poslaster -eneral, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of
Agriultlure, Seereilary of Conilerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Ilealth,
Edlicalloi, and Welfare.
'Ihe plan Is simple; It seems to foresee every possible contilgency. We like
It I)wtter tian any of the other plans offered to (late.
The long process of amelllilg the Consltitutlon requires the al)prOval of twothirds of both houses and ratifleatloi by the legIslatures of three-fourths of
the States. There Is no feasible shortcut.
In tlie more than 0 months between iow and tile next clectil, anytitng could
happen, Presidefit John1son is not a cautious 111111, ad Il spite of the preanth1ns erected around hi1, lie often expose.,; liliiiself in till Misffe Iaillilltr. Ividle
mingllhig with crowds. He drives Ihis car at. high speeds when lie visils his
Texas ranch.
Some11 years ago, 1ho suffered it serious hwart attack. He works
long hours and gets a nlitilium lloult of sle(). His life, It Is apparolt, Is full
of more thba1ll nornlal risks.
Next November, a new Vice President will be elected, and the country will
breathe more easily. But the faults of the present system of president tial succession will remain.
Congress should approve a i)etter p)lan of succession (luring the present session,
and siouhl start It on Its way toward becoming a part of tile Constitution.
Ite)reseintative Monagan's 1)1ll sliotild receive the attention which it deserves.
I, has done a real service to the country 1L)roi)sing it.
[P,'rom the Ilarttord Tines, ,Tnn. 15, 10051
I1RtSTIMENTrAr, SUCCESSION
Congressman John S. Monagan, of Conneeticut's Fifth Congressional District,
1)rol)oses an aliOndment to thie Constitution that would guarantee tile )resilential
succession iln the President's inability to serve.
Mr. Monagan's proposal provides that the succession proceed through tle Vice
President to the Inemibers of the Cabinet Ili the order of senlorlty of their departments. A President cold declare himself in writing to be unable to serve, or In
the absence of such a declaration tie Vice President could assume the ditles of
Acting President with the written approval of a majority of the heads of executive departments, Controversies, tile resolution provides, would be resolved by
a majority vote of the Congress.
It's a good Idea ald has the advantage of being simple. It will probably be
criticized for proposing a change from tile present he of successlon-Vice
President to Speaker of the Ilouse-which keeps the office il tie hands of an
elected official, not atl appointed oile.
Blt Mr. Monagan says that there have been times (the Elsenhower adintlilstration, for example, when Sam Rayburn was Speaker) when the President and
tile Speaker were not members of the same party. A change of party In time
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of national crisis might be. too upsetting for the country to endure. 'l'lwre,,
another objection to the Speaker as heir, too-the Speaker is usually an old
man, for it takes many years for him to attain that office.
As for the Speaker being an elected official, there is the point that lie Is not
elected President 1t1 only a Member of Congress. Ills fellow Congressmen, not
his constituents, elect. him Speaker.
This and other proposals to safeguard time succession should be explored
thoroughly-now, while there is no hurry.
H.J. RES. 158
Joint resolution proposing ail anendnment to the Constittion of the UNd States relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency and to cases where tlip 'resident
Is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Resolved by the Senate and Honse of Reprcsentatires of the Mltetd States of
Antrloa in Congress assembled (two-thlrdn of each Hotsc eoneutrrituf therein),
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the,
United States. which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States:
"ARTICLE
"SECTrON 1. In case of the removal of the President from office, om' of his (leath
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired
portion of the then current term. Within a period of thirty days thereafter, the
new President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon. (' )flrination by both Houses of Congress by a majority of those present and voting.
"S., 2. In case of the removal of tile Vice President from office, or his e(lath
or resignation, the President, within a period of thirty days thereafter, shall
nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by both
Houses of Congress by a majority vote of those present and voting.
"SEc. 3. If the President shall declare in writing that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by tile Vice President as Acting President.
"SECr.4,If the President does not so declare, the Vice President, if satisfied tit
such Inability exists, shall, upon the written approval of a majority of the heads
of the executive departments in office, assume the discharge of the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
"S.c. 5.Whenever the President makes public announcement in writing that
his inability has terminated, he shall resume the discharge of the powers and
duties of his office on the seventh day after making such announcement, or at
such earlier time after such announcement as he and the Vice President may determine. But if the Vice President, with the written approval of a majority of
the heads of executive departments in office at the time of such announcement.
transmits to tle Congress his written declaration that in lls opinion the President's inability has not terminated, the Congress shall thereupon consider the
issue. If the Congress is not then in session, it shall assemble in special session
on the call of the Vice President. If the Congress determines by concurrent
resolution, adopted with the approval of two-thirds of -the 'Members present in
each House, that the inability of the President has not terminated, thereupon,
notwithstanding any further ailnoitneement by the President. the Vice President shall discharge such powers and duties as Acting President until the occurrence of the earliest of the following events: (1) the Acting President proclaims
that the President's inability has ended, (2) the Congress determines by concurrent resolution, adopted with the approval of a majority of the Members present
in each House, that the President's inability has ended, or (3) the President's
term ends.
"SFC. 6. (a) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office. Inability, or failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Officer of
tile United States who is highest on the following list, and who Is not under
disability to discharge the powers and dittes of the office of President, shall
act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of
Defense, Attorney General, Postmaster General, Secretary of Interior, Secretary

177

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

of Agriculture. Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health,
,duwatioli, and Welfare, and such other heads of executive departments as may
Ie :tablihd hereafter an11t) order of their establishment.
"(2) The same rule shall apply in tile case of the death, resignation, removal
froinl offce or inability of an individual acting as President under this section.
"(3) To qualify under this section, ti individual lust have been appointed,
by id with the advice find consent of the Senate, prior to tie time of the death,
resignation, removal from office, or inability of the President and Vice President,
and mut not be under impeachment by the IHouse of Representatives at the time
tMe powers and diles of the office of President devolve upon him.
"(b) It elise of tilt, death, resignation, or removal of both the President and
Vite Presideit, his successor shall be President until the expiration of the then
*Iwurent. presidential term. In case of the inability of the President and Vice
I'(,sidpnt to discharge the powers and duties of tle office of President. his sit((esso, as desiglited in this seetioh, slhll be subjet; to the provisions of sections
3, 4, and 5 of this article as if lie Were a Vice President acting in ease of disablilty of tie President.
"() Tile "taking of tlhe oath of office by an individual specified in the list of
jlmagrllih (1) of subsectiotn (a) shall he held to constitute his resignation from
tie ofl1,e by virtue of the holding of whihvi lie qualifies to act as President.
"td) iDuring the period that tiny individual acts its President under this
seelioi, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by aw in th( caise
of the President.
"Src. 7. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as
an anendlent to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the
sevveral States within seven years from the date (,f its suhmission."

The (,m.u

(ong'resslnan

Sluriver has submitted a statement

for tie record and it will be accepted.
(The statement of lion. Garner E. Shrivei is as follows:)
,rATHIMEINT

OF GrARNERlt. 1
S'rATE or KANS4 AS, TO T
llSENTATIAETS

im1IVm1m, A RIPRim.:N'rAT1%V
1

( ONMITT'EII

ON Tll,

IN CONOREs

JUDICIARY,

I'.S.

PROM 'rill.

I.OUS

Op Ru'-

Mr. Chah11nan, I aplpreclate this oPpOftinilty to express sulort of the vital
deliberations which this conimittee has undertaken In regard to the complex
problems of presidential succession and disfabilty, and vacancies in the office
of the Viee-Preshlency. Most adult Amerlcams recognize there is a need for
congressional action after careful study of all proposals.
I have Introduced a resolution (H.1J. Res. 143) to amend flie Constitution to
clarify the latent ambiguities and the shortcomings of existing law. My proosil enbodies the major recomnendattions of tihe "consensus" arrived tit by
tle Conference on Presidential Inability till(] Suceession sponsored by the
American Bar Association.
Under the terms of my proposed amendment, the Constitution would provide
that in the event of the permanent exclusion of the President from office: i.e.,
removal, death, or resignation, the Vice President shall succeed to the office
for the balance of the unexpired term. This will have the effect of giving a
legal basis to the precedent esthlished by JTohn Tyler.
In view of the growing Importance of our Xation's second highest office and
the recurrent history of vacancies connected therewith, it is highly '(esirable
tlt that. office should be filled at all times. On 16 occasions, totaling more than
37 years, tle office of Vice President has been vacant. In all, our Nation has
been without a Vice President it excess of 20 percent of the time during its
history. My proposal, if adopted. would amend the Constitution to provide
that ln the event of a vacancy, the President shall appoint a Vice President
wilt the advice and consent of both Houses of Congress....
In connection with the laramott problem of disability, I propose that In
ti. ease of such an eventuality, tile powers and duties, hut not the office. shall
be discharged by the Vice President for the duration of the inability or until
the expiration of the President's term of office.
The President May establish his own disability by issuing a declaration In
writing to that ereet. Where lie fails or is unable to do so the Vice President
with the concurrence of a majority (i the Cabinet or such other body as the
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Congress may provide, are authorized to establish the fact of Presidential disability.
Similarly, the ability of the President to resume his powers and duties, may
be established by his declaration in writing. If the Vice President and a
majority of the Cabinet fail to concur with this decision of the President,
the matter would be brought to the Congress for resolution.
History as well as commonsense indicate that we cannot Insure against or
be spared the sorrow of a fallen leader. We have it within our power, however, to remove the cause of great anxiety and apprehension that arises out
of the uncertainties of the present law. Our failure to capitalizie on the present
opportunity will render meaningless the tragedies and near tragedies of tie
past and the sorrows of the American people who have inevitably flowed in
their wake.
Mr. Chairman, this is a problem which your committee is well qualified to
consider and to recommend a legislative solution. I commend this comnlittee
for launching these important hearings. Thank you for the attention you will
give to the resolution which I have introduced.

The CHAiRmAN. Congressman Halpern.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEYMOUR HALPERN, A REPRESENTATIVE:
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
M'fr. HALPERN. 1i.. Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of this very distinguished committee for the opportunity of
appearing before you today.
The committee is engaged in considering a very important consti-

tutional and political question. It is indeed curious, as the chairman has said, that Congress has for so long delayed effective
implementation of the disability clause in the Constitution.
Here in the House I have introduced House Joint Resolution 183,
which is identical to the measure proposed by Senator Birch Bayh
and the able chairman of this committee.
This resolution providing for an amendment, to the Constitution
seeks to lay down certain procedures by which Presidential power and
authority can always be realized in fact as well as in theory. It designates a method forfilling the office of the Presidency in case of disability; and it determines the means whereby the Vice President will be
chosen when that office is vacated.
There are, of course, a number of different proposals which have
been put forward. The measure which I am cosponsoring meets the
consensus of the American Bar Association and a great number of
respected educators and public officials.
Whatever the remedy, we cannot expect to meet all the contingencies
which may arise. Nor is this detailed prescription desirable. The
authors have made no attempt, for instance, to actually list disabilities
under which the President or Vice President is authorized to set the
procedure in motion; there is no clause for the invitation of medical
advice.
House Joint Resolution 183 sets a framework which leaves to the
pr ii ipnls involved some very delicate decisiohng if the awful question of disability arises. And I think this is wise and suflliently

protective.
Section 1 of the resolution affirms the so-called Tyler precedent
which, if the President is removed from oflice, the Vice President accedes to the office-of the President and the full measure of its power and
authority.

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

179

Section 2 provides for the nomination and confirmation of a new
Vice President when that office is vacated. I believe this solution is
reasonable and just. There are those who would weaken the President's authority to designate a successor; this argument fails to contend with the essential point, and that is the capacity of the means
to provide continuity. Continuity, the constitutional questions of
Presidential power during a term of office, must be the guiding principle. The Vice President, when the Presidency becomes vacant, should
be able to provide that continuity to every possible extent. We can help
to insure this by providing the President with the initial power to
nominate the second person in line of succession.
Section 2 also provides that the people, indirectly through their
chosen representatives, shall have a proper voice in the process.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 provide for the assumption of the powers and
authority of the Presidency when the President becomes disabled.
The clauses are sufficiently broad to cover all emergency situations,
and they are elastic enough to permit personal judgment. Both the
executive and legislative branches are brought into the decisioning.
It a conflict arises concerning the ability of tie President to carry out
the duties and functions of hi office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
Mr. Chairman, this important question has already undergone a
great deal of study and analysis. It is a delicate issue. There is
literally, no end to all the contingencies which can erupt. It would
be wrong to put'the Executive and the Congress in a straitjacket while
attempting to deal with all potential dangers, thereby weakening the
capacity of human judgment to work its Way.
But it ismost important that we end tifs period of awful uncertainty. ThA international situation is such that the country can no
longer risk a potential power vacuum. 'We mnust act speedily to close
the gap in our structure of executive res)onsibility.
Three tunes in our Nation's history we have exl)erienced circimstances of I)residential disability. In each case the sit nation was somewhat different. The illnesses which struck General Eisepihower were
temporary, and after a. period of recuperation, the execution of the
office was not. impaired. President James A. Garfield lay near death
for nearly 3 months in 1881, but, dispute regarding the manner of succession prev'ented the )roper func~ioiing of (e ofie ltlil Mr. Garfield's death.
Again more recently, researchers have described the inal)ility which
struck President Woodrow Wilson: no one close to the President was
disposed to act because of Mr. Wilson's adamant refusal to consider
a surrender of Presidential power.
Experienceo shows that conflicts will arise concerning the extent of
incapacity and constitutional interl relation. The amendment wlicHi
I support. will provide a frameworki, an essential structure. endowing
those close to the President with the
power1onstitUtional
to at. This
is Of parai0unt,imnportance. We all kiow thit, executive appointees
in so imtapoetat a iattor are uinderstalidably reticent abouttaking any
action whih th(e, President opposes unless they are by law given that
authority. And in these sitiatfions, in order to protect the Nati6i's
interests, they must have lawful sanction.
I am very encouraged by the widespread support which has greeted
this proposal. The assassination of President Kennedy has awakened
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the country to the need for enactiig legal proveses4 whprehv executive
power is sustained when tragic unexpectaneies occur. We need to
insure that the otllco of the President is always neolded by a Vice
President. And we need a, constit.utionatl answer' to Ilresi(lel itial in-

ability.
I am confident that, tile committee knows the serioitsnes of the prob]ema, and will act resl)onsil)ly to approve this pro)osal for a constitutional amendment. I think the States will give the proposal an early

and aflh'mative action. There is nothing so fundamental to our system
as insuring its perimnence, and these troubled times certainly require
that we leave no al)pS ill 0111' stI'ucture of Governnl(t, alit holi'i %,.
I want to thank you, Mr'. Chairman. for giving me thr, privilege of
appearing before you today and presenting bv views on this very vital
problem . and thrust that. this committeee will l)prove the legislation
before it.

The C.m.ir.vx. Ani questions?

[hank you very innu'h, Mr. THalpern.
Mr. \LPErI. 'rhank von, Mr. Chairman.
I,
Th (ti,.\nAr.k-x. T will offer for tlh(, record thefefl

ilioliv of the
I-ono,'rble Willipm S. Moorhead of Penlsl !viltnia. 'Flat will b- accepted.
(The statement. of ion. William S. Moorhead reads as follows:)
Marquis Ci"hlds reminded us recently of Woo(lrow Wilsro's wise words.
"Men of ordinary physique and deucerlptlon cannot be President nti live if the
strain be not soinewhat relleved. We shall lie obliged always to i pi('king our
chief ligistrates from among wise and prudent athletes-a small claus."
ANilsoin wrote those wor(s when he wits still lt
,1iloil.
it hiliself was
to le the central figure some years later In a period of greatllleertality is he
lay disabled in the White House uinitlit' to exer(,ise or delegate the pmwers of
hIs office.
We have seen a serlos of situations i recent years when the I)i'ofieiit of presdentillI disability and succession inde ui'gcnt Iactioll ii(lvifhile. Bit filet Ii(,st
thit (olld lbe donie 'vere forlival and Infornal a reeinents-solne of doubtful
legality-between the Chief Executive and the next In line of s-ueeession. It is
of the utmost Importance,therefore. that we net now,
Ilouse Joint Re.qolutlon 219, whieh I have introdlced, Is Iletical to House
Joint Resolution 1, introdueod by the distitnguisled l1i1h'n1101 of this eoilliiif tet.
These resolutions provide for a coititutional amenldment iifidei' %v10hth Vi(e
President would suceed the President if the President dtied, res!gimd. or was

removed front office.
l3ut one of the nali eolnttiltuonal i)r01olens sinitroiiidiig fthe nceessihi of the

Vice President to ihe Presidency. Is whether the sue(es.ooleolliek(s ,ctllg President or President for tile remniiider of the term. Tils eonfllsioh would be (,lenred
u1p by tills cratitultonal amendment. It makes separatesprovision for enses
of death, resigution. or remoVal of tile President. ol tie one hand1,
(nddisability on the other.
Tile desirnbility of having the office of Vi('e President filled tt all t lies Is
obvious. Tie proposed Amendiient to the Constititoit provides it pro'edilre

to Insure peleetton of a new Vice President iin'ti0ilite1y after the former Vice
Pro.ildent beemtes Presldent. It Is a proeedire tliat ires tile aidvalithge of provid ng tile new Prsideilt with a Viee President wit Ihowi
lie can work hirnoilously, yet it gives the Ipeoplle a voIce in his selectioll tliroilih their ele(ted Mombers of the ,Senate ani the joitse.
Se'tlon 3 of Ihouse .nliolt Resoluttol 219 sets lip a l)roc'edlure by which a Pre.tdent may deelaire his own Inability. It removes conflistoi as to whether the
Vice Prp.sident Is Acftilg President or PresIdet, and thereby makes It: ensler for

a President to imke the crucial decision as to whether lie lii('lf is nble or
not able to econtinlle tile exercise of his dtielo., It also bolsters tl Vice Prosident in the public intnd itf
a President indieaes his trlust li hin by declaring
his own Inability in writing.
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But there are other elr0imstances that might prevent a President from declaring his own inability. A stroke, a coie, or mental disability might mean
that a President could not communicate to others a declaration of inability.
Or lie might refuse to acknowledge such a conditioni. Section 4 provides a
logical, safeguarded procedure to deal with suel chireunlstances.
But suppose a President recovers. When does lie resume his (Iities? Setion
5 provides tile procedure and it also averts a situation in which a President night
want to reshmie Is duties when lie was not really (Caiible of doing so. In this
case, appropriately, the ultlftsite responlsiblity rests, with the Comigre.s.
But suppose that there were no Vice President and, as determined by existing
public law, either tie Speaker of the House of Representatives, or tle President
pro teimpore of the Senate were Acting President, tliere would be no Vice President to act under the provisions of section 5. Because of this possibility,
I would
suggest itslight revision of section 5. It. should provide that whenever a Presi(lent, desirous of resuining his dutties, notilies Congress In writing that 11 inability
exists, he shall resume his duties unless the Vice President "or other Acting
President" (adding those words itn
quotes), with the written concurrence of exeeutive department heads, declares the Presilent unable to discharge his duties.
Then, if the Congress, by a two-thirds vote of both Iouses, determined the President unable to resune his dtities, the Vice President "or other Acting Presildent"
(again adding the words in quotes) would continue to discharge those duties.
Mr. Chairmnvian, I reiteraite my belief that it is inpeorative we act now to resolve
the uncertainties of existing law dealing with presilential succession and disability. This constitutional aniendnment would, linmy view, deal effectively with
time problem.

The Cjit o..
NM
X. nhe committee is ijoul'nd until Tuesday lit
10
o'clock.
(The following matter was received for the record:)
lion. EMANUEL CELLAR,

1IousE O1 REPRESENTATIVES,
11'ashinlgtonl,
D.C., dJtannary ~.
1115.

(annon 10U80 Office B1thldiog,
DIAR CiiAIRMAN CELLEI : I appreciate your invitation to testify before ' the cornjiittee on House Joint Resolution 224. As I assume you have a long list of witnesses, I do not intend to take up the time of tile conimnittee. You may sImply put
mie on record as favoring any solution which may be worked out to tile problem of
succession to the Presidency.
I believe it is high time that some change is nade, in otur previous haphazard
system of placing tile highest responsibility in our Government in the hands of
any individltial, and therefore lend my total support to this resolution.
With every kind regard, I am
Sincerely yours,
Joi.N LI. DENT, MeJlber of ('on grcs.
STATEMENT OF 1io. lNowitjw J. DIuwINSKI, OF ILLINOIS, BEFOiNF 11orsE, JliiICIAlmY
COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT'OF 1-.R. 3792, PRovIING FoRt PRESIDE.INTIAl, INAILITY
Mr. Chaiirfids,
the hill whicli I have intrOll(,ed in this session of congress s
(11. R . 3792) to provide for the case of Inabilitly of the President or Vice Presi(lent. or iithll successor Is; I lbelieve. it ollpartlsiiln solution to a prohleifi of
grave national stature, wlth which the ntublie Is seliusly concerned. It is a
siniiple, solution to tile problein 'which, In iy opinion, ,a1in11
walt for tie
dolition of a coistitiohl aineidnt.
M lill!
wo
cete a 0 ,x-!aiillii
61"a,
ptrrliraneiit C(oiinisstoil that oli its owii miotiol
or on request, may tiititally determiliieteexistiee of a l)remileitill InAbility,
senoling.i copy of its illitial dlerintiathio of this fet to tile Speaker of the
House alnd to the Vice Presidelit or person i tie p1ositlin- of Vice President.
Upo"receiplt of this coiy, the Vice Presliet is direeted to Assume the powers
ani1d duties of the office. whereuIpon the house, by majority vote, refers the
matter to tile Senate for final determination hy two-thirds vote. Failure of
pitlier the House or the Senate to so deterinie ends the inattir, blit if the.
Senate so deternines, the Vice President contiltues to perform the powers and
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duties of the office for either the remainder of the presidential term or until
the Senate determines the inability to have ended, whichever occurs first.
Our present President has suffered at least one major heart attack, -and Presi.
dent Eisenhower had periods of inability for the same and other reasons.
I realize there are numerous proposals before your committee on this subject
and that a matter of this technical and possibly explosive nature deserves the
fullest consideration in order to arrive at the most practical solution.
I am confident that this committee will give this matter thorough attention
and provide the most constructive solution to the problem.

STATEMENT OF HoN. ABRAHAM J. MULTER (DEMOCRAT, OF NEW YORK), IN SUPPORT
or H.R. 830, To PROVIDE A METHOD FOR DETERMINING PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY,
* AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to share with this distinguished committee my
views on the formulation of legislation to secure continuity and stability of
executive leadership In the event of presidential disability.
Mr. Chairman, ever since the Philadelphia Convention In 1787, many practitioners and students of government have been concerned about the ambiguity
of one word in article II of out Constitution. Article II, section 1, clause 5
states, in part, that, "In case of the removal of the President from office, or of
his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President * * *."
The central word of concern in this clause is the word. "inability." The
earliest concern about the meaning of the word was expressed at the Constitutional Convention, when Delegate John Dickinson, of Delaware, contending
that the word was "too vague," appropriately asked: "What Is the extent of the
term 'disability' and who is to be the Judge of it?" Today-almost 178 years
later-this committee meets to raise the same question and to attempt to resolve
the snine fundamental problems which it implies. The only difference is that,
today, the urgency for a sound solution is made more manifest by reason of
crltial events in the American experience.
Let us take a look at some of these events. There are two of an especially
"classical" nature. The first event evolved out of the circumstances in the aftermath of the shooting of President James A. Garfield. Garfield was cut down by
an assassin's bullet on July 2, 1881, and lay stricken for a period of 80 days
before death finally rame on September 19. Shortly after Garfield was wounded,
many In Government-including some of Garfield's Cabinet-urged Vice President
Chester A. Arthur to assume the powers and duties of the Presidency: but these
urgings sparked a controversy which centered on the question of whether the
assumption of these responsibilities implied also the assumption of the office
itself. Some held that if Arthur assumed these powers, he would In fact become President; and that Garfield would be unable to regain office if he subsequently recovered. Because of the allegedly doubtful legality of taking over
the functions of the Presidency when the President was alive, plus the fear of
creating the impression of being a usurper, Arthur refused to act.
Another event, with somewhat parallel circumstances and implications, took
place In 1910-21 with the disability of Woodrow Wilson, During the last 18
months of his second administration, Wilson suffered two strokes and was left
generally unable, physically and mentally, to discharge the functions of his
office., Vice President Thomas R. Marshall was urged to assume the powers
and duties of the office, but troubled by the same doubts that assailed Chester
Arthur nearly 40 years before, he refused to act. Once again, the question

loomed IlArge: "Io the assumption of the powers and duties of 'the office of
President tantamount to the assumption of the office Itself?"1

This vexatious question was raised once more in the last decade when President Eisenhower suffered illnesses in 1055, 1950, and 1957. I need not document
the circumstances of these occasions, for we can all recall the danger that can
be sensed when a President Is incapacitated, particularly in the nuclear age.
After his last ailment, President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon made
an agreement with respect to presidential disability. This kind of understanding has been repeated in the two succeeding administrations. Such arrangements
governing the transfer of power in the event of the unexpected raise serious questions of a constitutional nature which cry out for an answer in this matter of
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presidential disability. Article 11 of the Constitution is unmistakably clear
in its intent:
"* * * the Congress may by law provide for the case of * * * Inability, both of
the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a
President should be elected." The Constitution does not tell us how to determine
presidential disability; nor does it tell us how to return the powers and ditties
of the office to the President after his disability. But this great document did
make it incumbent upon future lawmakers to grapple with and solve this
problem.
Let us therefore act with dispatch in this session of Congress. Let us act for
two reasons: (1) so that there will be no question as to the exact nature of the
transfer of power; and (2) so that the decision regarding this transfer will be
judicious and circumnspect.
I was delighted to see that the President, in a recent message to Congress,
urged action in this matter of presidential (sability by calling for a constitutional amendment. In this message, he stressed that, while "we are prepared
for the possibility of a President's death, we are all but defenseless. against the
probability of a Presiders incapacity by injury, illness, senility, or other affliction." I could not agree'ibore with this observation. Reacting in the same wiy
to this deficiency in our system of Govertjli
t.41utpluced oil January 4 of this
session a bill-H.R. 830-to remejy-tfFs problem. I s-4t-ngt that this bill would
give effect to the goals entinclatd in tile President's messa
and I, therefore,
urge its consideration.
/
Basically, II.R. 830 pro es a method for determining presldentia liability.
First, a simple majqflty of the House of Rj ,
ntatives would
iuest the
Senate, In the form o a resolution, to Olet rmin whetberthe Presidents unable
to discharge his re ofonsibilities. .Ulbn tdopti n, the re'.lution would be forwarded to the ChiI Justice ofrhe Supre ie Cot rt, who wuld immediate r convene the Senate
mliecial'sqsion for ti purpqtseof fletermining wheth - the
President was di bled.
.
Second, if tiw -thirds of the Seiiittore' ii6ent a
voting lte~mine that the
President is ut able to discharge his
0n" -. liti ., the Kenat' IWould, 1). a
resolution of t o-thirds of those presgf nd iiting, d ect/fhe Vlt e President to
serve as Actin Presldenjfor the (I tfrton Qf the per od that thb President is
disabled.
"
\ on' {
"
c
i
Implicit in tis method, of dete, elna 1ozVIqs:theztde- tn lie ice Presid t
would act as I resident du ing the Isability r*4'io): 'I wouhl(Ffd
be Preside t.
We could thus eliminate tie probl~zha faced
b
,
Vio
residents
Chester
of lier
(uties Art
and
epowers
dschqng
and Thomas M rshall, wh feared
Presidency limpl ed irrevocf bleA sumptiof
ofol uo 0
This hill also lovides a solution to anolher.q
tioi that hais )1g been as ed:
How does th6 Pr dent go about regaining.-hi office 4nce he has ecovered romn
his disability?
.
First, a maJority 'f those presetff and voting n either Hou /of Congres would
adopt a resolution dl~ecting the Chief Justice f the 'it
me Court t convene
a special session of thhSenate. The plti ?.se-of this 816late session % uld be to
consider revoking its prylous determination of presidential disahliy.
Second, if two-thirds ofiAttle Senators present and voting det - ine that tie
President is able to disclharg6-s responsibilities, the Senate vo ild declare, by a
resolution adopted by two-thirdk-4 those present and yottfig, that the powers
and duties of the office of the Presidftnare.etored"o the President.
Mr. Chairman, when nil amendment to the Constitution is under discussion,
utmost caution must be exercised with respect to its language and intent. This
responsibility demands insight atd foresight of a nature possessed by those who
met in Philadelphia to draw up the law of the land many years ago.
I urge that the proposed amendment tinder consideration anticipate the needs
of future generations, For this reason, I should like to poit to another facet
of H.R. 830, sweiflfclly that portion which deals With the disabilty of the Vice
President, or any other Individual acting as President.
Certainly, tile Vice President is just as mortal i a man as is the President.
ie is generally subject to the same illnesses Which eould afflict a President.
Appropriate steps should therefore be taken to protect this Nation in tihe
event of the disability of a Vice President, or any other individual who acts as

A
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President, In H.R. 836, I suggest that the methods of detelimlinhig this dipability and restoring the powers and duties of the Presidency be the sanme its
those applying to the President.
Let us not be incomplete in our efforts to assure proper presidential loadership. History warns us that since 1841 a total of elght. Vice Presidents have
had to assume the powers and duties of the Presidoey after the death of the
President. I strongly urge that we include in any constitutional ameIdmllent a
provision governing the transfer of power to another who would act as IPresidnt
in the event that a Vice President becomes disabled while discharging the duties
of the office.
The objective of H.R. M6 is unquestionably in accord with that eiltinchiled iII
the Presidetnt's recent message. Above all, however, I strongly recommend that
pertinent and realistic improvenents be nmde in this matter of disability, Without improvements we are a horse-and-buggy governmut In the jet Itm.

(Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at
10 a.m., Tuesday, February 16, 1965.)

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1965
hTWRsE O1, JEPIYSFN' .TATIV-,
ComrMIi-IEI( ON I'lE JUI)ICiARY,

Ta.v9h,//nqon, D.C/.

The 'ooim itteo met at 10 a.mn., pursualnt, to adjouiI'flllliml , ill 1o0111
14'(, Cannon Building, lon. Friank Chelf presiding.
Present: Representatives ('eller, Chelf, St,. Onage, 1-lungate, Ten'zer,
C(onyers, G-ider, Gilbert, lPofl, Moore, I nlsay, MIGregor, Math ins,
I flitehimson, and McClory.
Also l)resenit William R. Foley, general counsel; and William I.
('OplillaVer. associated counsel.
M1r. Cnnf:I.' (presiding). We are a little late, so I guess we had better
get, with it.
The first, witne.s-scheduled this boring is the, Honorable Robert T.
St aflord, Representat-ive from \ermon't, then the Honorable I)on
Fi'quua, of Florida.
STATEMENT OF HON. DON FUQUA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. I,1'Au.. Mr. Chairman and ielibels of the committee, I want,
to thank yoll for tile opportunity to appear before. fihe Committee on
1the Judiciry this morning in l)ehalf of 1tle resolution that I have
introduced, ]ouse Joint. Resolution 250, which is a company ion measure

to those introduced by the chairman of this committee and others pro-

posing an amnendmelt to the Consti|uition of'the United Stales relitinlg
to the siicmbession of time Presidency and Vice-lPresidency in the ease.
where. time President is unable to discharge the powers anld tiess of
his office.
Iho Constlittion of tie I hated States has left, misolved the problems
of how the presidential duties and powers are transferred in I-lie event a
President. be o1ie.s incapable of administering the di ties of his office.
true in tile vent. 1thaft. tie President, (loes not
lytieilaPly
a
Thlis
11der'sland and reilio lie has become inca-pacitated. Study of the
lroblelli 1dWates that- there has long been an awareness of the lack of
charihcai ion byithe Coist ittitiliut, is of this time, it. is a. natter left
.iui'esol
"ed.
Most recent ly, the assassillnation of President. Kennedy saddened
1s deeplyy anid also emphasized the. imjiportance anid the need of a
Vibe Presileint b eini i a positionn to quicldy and 1asuredly take hold
.of tie reins of Govelrnlmeit as they fall from the hands of a faltering
President.
185
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There is a great urgency at such a time, but it could very well bo,
just as pressing in the event of a President's incapacity to execute
the powers anc duties of his office. Our country has been most
fortunate to never hae experienced national chaos caused I)y the
uncertainty and anxiety of the Nation being without responsible and
capable leadership. Not that I would even anticipate there ever being
such circumstances, I feel very strongly that there is a great need for
clarification in the Constitution of the question at hand. This is so
very true in our day when time is of essence to a degree greater than
ever before since only the pressing of a mere button can result in
hostile conflict that did take days to come about in years gone by.
Our Nation has a unique concentration of power and responsibilities
in the office of the President since in most nations these are shared
by two or even three officials. The President's active leadership is
most essential to the effective operation of the Government in every
respect--domestic affairs, military leadership, foreign affairs, and even
a leadership for Congress to perform its own role properly. Therefore, in this light, every effort toward bringing about the smoothest
type of transition within as little uninterrupted exercise as possible
presidential powers and duties is most desirable and greatly needed.
Inl the effort to amend the Constitution for clarification of the provisions relating to succession to the Presidency and delegation of the
responsibilities of that office, I introduced H-ouse Joint Resolution
250 and humbly request that you give it and the provisions set forth
in it favorable consideration.
In giving my support to such an amendment to our Constitution,
I feel it is most important to emphasize my belief that in instances
where the Vice President would have to carry out the provisions of
the proposed amendment, it is most important that congressional
approval serve as a check and symbolize popular participation and
for establishment of legitimacy of the actions taken. This country
has been blessed to not have the overzealous men we have seen in
other nations who usurp the rightful leadership of their governments.
However, it is always our desire to protect our Nation and its citizens
from any actions whih would result in a deterioration of the excellent
and fine Government established by the forefathers of the Nation.
It is for this reason that I so strongly recommend that whatever
resolution is approved by the committee that it provide for this
"cheek and balance" system we know is important to the proper administration of our Government for the good of all concerned.
Mr. CHILF. Thank you very much, Congressman. We very much
appreciate your interest not only in your bill, but in the other bills
that halve been introduced.
Are there any questions, gentlemen?
Mr. Poff?
Mr. Porr. Do I understand that yourbill is identical to House Joint
Resolution 1?
Mr. Froy,\. Yes, thnt is my understand
.in
Mr. PoFp. Now, as I understand the fifth section of House Joint
Resolution 1, when the President believes lihat his disability has
ceased, he may resmne the Presidency upon transmittal to Congress
of a written declaration to that effect) and he will resume the Presi-
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deny unless within a 2-day period the Vice President and majority
of the Cabinet, or such ot1ier body as Congress .may appoint, challenges the President's decision to return, in which event Congress
call act on the challenge.
If it upholds the challenge by two-thirds vote, then the Vice
President continues to discharge the powers and duties of the office.
Now, has the gentleman considered what might happen if Congress
delayed acting on the Vice President's challenge?

Mr. FUQtjA. Let me say to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, whose knowledge of constitutional law I regard very highlyMr. Poi'. If I may interrupt, I reciprocate that statement.
Mr. FTQIJA. I recognize, and I understand that this has been a
question that has come before this committee, and that maybe the
word "immediately" should be inserted. Let me say that if in the
judgment of this committee they felt this was necessary, I would
certainly not. object. I recognize in writing constitution al amendments that maybe we can't be as specific as we can in writing statutory
acts. I would not object to language that would have the ell'ect to
immediately summon Congress into session, but I can see some problems that might occur if Congress were not in session at the time
and had to be called back.
However, this country through the years has worked on somewhat
of a harmonious relationship in matters as great as this, and I feel
that Congress Would not hesitate to come back into session in time
of such an emergency.
Mr. PoFF. I might state to the gentleman that the Senate Judiciary
Committee has changed the language to read "immediately proceed
to decide." I am not certain that that clarifies the situation greatly,
but I have suggested the possibility of imposing a time limit within
which the Congress should.
My bill is alike in all particulars except that the Congress would
be instructed to act within a 10-day period on the Vice President's
challenge. If it acted and upheld the challenge then the Vice Pres.
ident would continue to discharge the duties of the office. If it, failed
to uphold that challenge, then the President would resume the power
and duties of the office, and if the Congress failed to act within a
10-day period, the President would resume the discharge of the
powers and duties of his office.
Now, I suggest that this approach makes it easy for the Congress
to uphold the powers of the President without giving a positive
offense to the Vice President merely by failing to act at all within
a 10-day period.
I also suggest that written in that frame, the language imposes
upon the Vice President-if he cares to remain in office-the burden
of calliing Congress back into session if it should not be in session

at tiat time, so I hope the gentleman gives some thought -to that
alternative, and if

he should see fit to do so, maybe lend his

endorsement.
Mr. FUQA. Well, I certainly recognized the gentleman's Judgment
and alco thiat of the great Judicafry Committee." Not being a lawyer
myself, I am in the somewhat awkward position of arguing constitutiona law with such authorities as sit on this committee. I certainly
would not oppose anything that miglit clear up this point. I ecog-
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nize that,this coulhl be a problem, that. there could be something, supposO wt.h the rules of the Senate as they are now, they engaged in extended debate as the'l hiavo beell known; to ill the past, ani there also
could be other delaying tactics should Awe get. involved ill this type of
situation. I alm not, sure that the gentleinn's 10-day period would
correct, this, iuinless it would necessitate the taking of a.
vote within this
time, and then this would necessitate cuttilug off debate should there e
extended debate, and so forth.
I cln see if we want. to get Iealse(ific in anything' 1ou Pass, you
('lul Ii.wa1ys (•Olle lip with cnrcuistaiees that- might not be COVel'ed
inl it•.
Mr. lw''. Well, I a)precinte what, the gentleman has said, and yet.
sugest that cloture would 1)e imposed in the Senate by urecisely th
same, vote as required to uplold the Vi('e Presidet,'s challenge.
I thank the gentleman.
Mr. ( 1 rr a. )o any other nlenlhers care to question ?

Mlr. 1.\lio'mm. By tile fet you see fit to introduce a constitutional
a mendenwt, voi feel t.he uroblem should be attacked by tihe amendmenC. route rather tlan by the statutory route.
Mr1'. FtQu... Very dlefinitely. T feel our Founding Fatfhers, not.
real iizing sonic of the comp liaeitions hat. could result--as f said in my
testimony, T think tills country has been blessed that. we have not had
a chaotic sitiuat ion exist that. could leave doubt and uncertaitiy to who
was ruler of this country.
T think
it -)oss
is a very
I,)
,st
I'I:"
ti
e:'
i1 . serious problem tit should he eoped with in the
[ a-ni interested as to thep real specifics of my alellienleiit :I a1 co'tainly not wedded to any of them that they; must be this way or 1
would Op)oSo the bill.
I think very constructive suga'estiolshave been made this morning,
and It
T thin his committee is going to give all realms of thought on
this matter their deliberate consideration.
Mr. M -.Gimmon. Would it be your feeling that the statutory apl)roach, lending itself more readily to change from time to time by the
Cons.tress, eetaml lN more readily than the consti tutioal nlIpproach,
would make the statutory aplroaeh less att-ractive than the eoustitiitional amnalment approach ?
Mr. FuQi.r, I certainly feel that way. T think there might,be certaini imlplementations of the amiendnent )y statute, but T think we
should get. something in the Constitution, rather than, have the stat-ule
conm Up at some time when we do have a crises and with emotionalism
and anxiety we might. pass something we regret later on. I think

this is a. serious i)roblPni, and T think it should be dealt, with by the
constitutionlial aiendilent, approach.
Mr. MGrrmon. Tialk you, Congressman.
Mr. OCur~r. Mr. Tilfgtno.
Mr, -tPmoTE. Yot far, T take it. the two-tirds vote to override
lhe
President
's deela ltifon tlit lie is again able as opposed to a
nmajoritvy
voe0?.
Mr. FTv,\. T think this should remain in the bil, and Ithik
that this is a quest ion that T hope we never get confronted with, as
is i)resente( Ill
section 5. but T think it should be clear rather thflan
having 151 percent in favor of something that we definitely need twoio
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thirds in favor. We must have support for whoever is in power in
this particular instance, and I think the Members of Congress will
acquaint themselves with flie facts as they see them, and I think

it,should be a two-thirds vote.
Mr. 1TuNGAvr,. So if 65 percent found him disabled, he would still

not be disabled?

Mr. FUQUA. Well, we are getting into picayune figures right now.
Also if 49 percent, the other way, felt Ilk he was not-I think a
two-thirds vote in the Congress, we require for constitutional amendments requiring three-fourths of the States. We are dealing with
a serious question that shouldn't be decided by just a simple majority.
I think it is a graver question and that it should be decided by a
larger group of people.
Mr. h1NO1AVrE. Thank you.
Mr. CTTm.r,. Are there any other questions?
Mr. Mathias?
Mr. MArTAS. I wonder if the gentleman would comment on
whether he sees any dangers in the fact, that for the first time we
depart, from ti dpinoeratic principle that the Vice President of the
Republic shall be elected, and instead replace the choice in the hands
of the President, which is contrary to all the precedents in our history.
Mr. FIuquA. I recognize the gentleman's concern, and I somewhat
s 1jire bu,
hut I (lon't know of anv other method that we could go about
this. W\e asked f6r the President, to nominate, then it is confirmed
by a majority of the Congress elected and respon.ihle to the people.
I don't think it would be quite fair, and it would be time consuming
to try to hold a national election for the single purpose of electing
a Vice President. We are all aware of the increased cost of cam
paigning, and where hoth parties have to get together and hold a
convention and make a selection.
In general practice in the past in most conventions, the two most
recent political party conventions, I think it is generally assumed that
the nominee of the party decided who would be his running mate,
and even though they both did have to go to the electorate, I don't
thil we are really departig as much from precedent as we might
thinly we are.
Mr. MfATrITAS. Reserving that point for just, a moment, let. me suggest that the Constitution today provides that when there is a vacancy
ini the Presidencv or Vice-Pres4idency by failure to obtain a majority,
the 1-louse of Representatives proceeds to elect, so that, we do have
a precedent in the ConstitUtion for an election by the Memblers of
Congress as being the nearest thing to a full-fledged national election.
Now, do you feel that this method of providing g for a vacancy
would le apl;ropriate in this circumstance?
Mr. Ft-,,. Well, I tin6k certainly ti President power Tassume
would select someone from lis party. Then if you in
got into the sitlation where tie Co6ni'ess was eontrolled by the position pr ty, as
we have had in recent years, then tlis coild- complicate niatters evoen
more so. so TI
thik his gives ilore stnblity and eontnitv to th vicepresidential office by.having the President. selecting, He still has to
go to the Congress, and Congress does not have to vote to approve him
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if they don't think he is the man best qualified for the job, so we still
have recourse in the Congress, and I think are still exercising our
constitutional responsibilities.
Ml'. MaT,ias. You and I were both here in the last. Congress when
we lived through the very unhappy and tragic days of November of

1963.
Do you really believe that any request that had been made by Presi-

dent ,Johnson in the shadow of that tragedy would have been refused

by the Congress? In other words, do you think the Congress is going
to be unduly critical or even reasonably critical of the President's
choice in a matter of this sort if it. is exercised during a period of tremendous national stress?
The same would be true during a period of wartime, or during some
crisis in the Nation's history which leads the emotions of tie people
and the emotions of the Congress to consolidate so completely behind
the,national leader that his word becomes law.
Mr. FtQt. Well, let me say to the distinguished gentleman that I
recognize that there is prol)ably strong feeling in supl)ort, of a Presi-

dent during times of national emergency.

However there is provided

in section 2 the possibility that Congress does have the rightwhether they exercise this right or not-to not confirm the nominee of
the President. If we want to be a rubber stamp, that is our privilege,
but we do have the right not to be a rubber staml).
Mfr. M[A'iir.S. Well, isn't the question here not the privilege of the
Congress to make mistakes, but the duty of Congress sitting here in a
moment of relative national calm to rTovide against mistakes, and the
duty of this committee to examine 1these l)ossibilitieSO
I just wondlered if you agreed that there was such a possibility.
Mr'. FtUQTA. lherels such a possibility, and I can think of a number
of individuals-relating to this same experience--where possil)ly, if
President Johnson had nominated them, they might have been turned
down b1y the Congress.
I anm sure that anybody holding that high office would certainly use
good judgment and select, someone they, thought, acceptable to the
Conilgress, bit I could name many individuals who would have been
rejected by the Congress should he have (le('ided to select. them.
Mr. MAL'UT1S. I thank the gentleman. I know that the gentleman
undlerstonds that my questions are not directed at the ofterlno' that he
has made here today,but the necessity I believe exists that, this coinmit toe should examine very fully all aspects of a. very serious national
problem.
Mr. CtEr.. CongressmanI let, me say this to you, sir, that for a mn
that in't an attorney you have ade a very brilliant presentation aId
one that. I think anybody can understand.
Mrl. FIUQtA. Thank you, sir......
-ti. Ci ;I',,. Are there any othe-,qiestionsof the witness?
Ur. CONvEIS. May I ask this one question of the, distinguished gentlemn?
Mr. OfI ELF. Mr. Conyers.
Mr.( ON.E.,S. jWroild youalivi.e aiy objection to a method that would
deal with this Problemt l)y statutte rafler than constilutioiill ameidmenit., if it embodied the same substantive proposals as found i) yolll
resolution ?
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M1r. FU'QU,. Let ine say to the gentleman from Michigan that I think
this is a serious problem that should be dealt with. We have been
blessed by not having some events happen that I think could have happened and I visualize could Iave happened.
I think the best. approach is by a (onstitutional amendlnent.

How-

ever, if it could be resolved by statute, then I would be interested in
seeing what the statute did contain. As we are well aware, stat utes
can be changed within a Congress the sanle way as constitutional
anindments, but it is a little longer route by constitutional
amiendnent, and something a. little more permanent. and definite thal
by statute. 1 think a constitutional amendment is the best apl)roicll.
TIhis is my opinion. I would like to look at a statute before 1 gave any
afthrmativo support.
It is a serious problem that should be dealt with, and I think the best
wty to do it is through a constitutional amendment.
Mr. CoNYvms. Thank you.
Mr. (imiA.,. Are there any additional questions?
Thank you, Congre.siman Fuqua.
Afr. PorpF. Mr. (111ha illa 1.
Mr.0uum
1 . Yes.
Mr. PoPF. The gentleman fronm Vermont, Mr. Statford, scheduled
to be heard earlier, is absent on ofleial business. May 1 request that
his statement be inserted in the record at this point ?
Mr. C,nfr,v. Without. objection, it will be so ordered.
(The statement is as follows:)
STATEMENT OF lioN. ROBERT 7. STAFFORD, A IEI'RESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
TIlE STATE OF VERMONT, ON PRESIDENTIAL )ISABIIrrY AND SUCCESSION

Tho legislation which I have introduced (HJ. Res. 248) Is identical with other
measures now before you on the subject of providing for a constitutional allendmeut pertaining to presidential disability and succession.
I do not say the methods provided in this plirticular resolution are the only

ones whih shou l be considered. But I feel strongly that immediate consiieration must be given to this question and action inust be taken by this Congress.
It seems to me there has been enough talk about the lack of provisions in our
Constitution to provide this great country continuity of leadership in tile event
of presidential death, resignation, or disability. It Is time we acted to do sometiling about tills Vol.
After study of all the various proposals wlich have wilt fort on tills subject,
It Is my feeling hint tile resolution which I have introduced provides the best

approach.

The important tiling, Iowever, as I said, is to get action and I hope this comml ittee will give us tie opiortunllty to vote on this matter on the floor of the
House. Thank you.

Mr. cinr.li.

Mr. Martin Talor, Esq. chairman of the Coimittee

on Federal Constituion of the New York State Bar Associition.

I will call on my distinguished colleague fronm New York, M .Lindsayx, to introduce hin.
.
Mfr. LiI)iSAY. Mr. Chairman and members of the coliiiiittee, it is
indeed tipleasure to have before the colltuttee my constituent, Mr.
Martini Taylor, chairman of the Conunittee on Federal Constitutio1n
of the New York State Bar Assoeiation. I just wish to say that Mr.
Taylor is one of the momst distinguished lawyers that we have in New
York State. His reptiutation is of the highe"St, and his knowledge of
constitutional law is well known throughout our country.
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Mr. Taylor has testified four times before the Senate on this subject
which we are considering, and he has been a member of the bar for 52
years.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CHEiru. Thank you, Mr. Lindsay.
Proceed, Mr. Taylor, if you please, sir.

STATEMENT OF MARTIN TAYLOR, ESQ., CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

Mr. TAYLiR. Well, after that introduction, I am afraid to expose
my ignorance.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you a printed statement, Mr. Taylor?
Mr. TAYOR. No; I haven't.
This committee, since 1956, has been considering this question. On

the whole, we have taken the position that it should be done by a
broad general statement in accordance with the former constitutional
practice.
The CAIRMrN. May I ask you to raise your voice a little bit? It is

rather hard to hear you.
Mr. TAYaLOR. Surely.

The basic theory is that the implementation or the detail should be
contained in an act of Congress, and that the fundamental power
should be stated in very simple terms.
I quote, in support of that and not just expressing my own view,
from the very first hearings on what was then 139 before the Senate, a
very brief statement which was quoted from John Marshall. He said,
in substance, that detail should not be in the text of the Constitution.
At the same hearing, the Deputy, now Attorney General, stated the
same thing. He said implementation is a matter for act of Congress;
detail should not be in the text of the Constitution, and he added the
further thought that if for any reason it subsequently turned out to
be not the best method of doing it, or even a debatable method of doing
it-as, for example, in the succession law which has been ehangedthat It was better not to what he called phrase the detailed terms in
the text of the Constitution.
To the same effect, and at the same hearing, Mr. Powell, then president-elect and now president of the American Bar Association, in
substance made the same point.
I suggest it to this committee, as a matter of policy for you. All a

committee can do is make suggestions as to at least their view on a

que.01 on of constitutional law.
If I might go back for ust a second, I forgot to speak of one thing
that I meant to. House Joint Roslution 1 has two things in it. One
is the provision for filling a vacancy in the Vice-Presidency. I think
th&relias beefi pretf veheial a'pova1 of that idea,"but T hink there
ar6 one 6r two points ab6ut it that perhaps have not been wholly
explored:
It doesn't sdem to c6ver the period between election and inauguratiofn. Sinis de
8'ighe
to pl0vide for emergency, why not cover
thewhole period Of 'meraeOcy.'It speaks of-aIvactui'c'in thi6 office. I aim not sure. Perhaps someone could tell me what that means.
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Then the third point about it is it couldn't be equally applied to
the Vice President, or rather, to put it the other way, let's suppose that

the President were disabled an d the Vice President is then performing the duties of the office-not holding the office. Would there in
turn be the power to have an alternate?
To go back to the other question, in addition to the expressions of
what 1 call the broad outline theory, I also have the late .Senator Kefauver and Keating, who both advocated that idea, and the late Senator Kefauver, as you know-and especially the chairman of this committee who worked with him on trust matters-was an extremely experienced lawyer, and he eventually came to that idea that it should
be in the very simplest form.
Now, at the later hearing in March 1064, Mr. Katzenbach and Mr.
Powell advocated what was Senate Joint Resolution 1, but they did
not do it on the ground that they had changed their ide. as to the
fundamental way to do it; they id it on the ground of expediency,
that since 1787 until now nothing has been done, it is better to do this.
But I thinlithe argument about that is that since we have waited
so long, isn't it better to do
accordance with what has been
heretoore the accepteol s itutiona p
ce?
Now, to take jw' minute t e and that little bit to show what
has taken place n the past, I am going to rea hro
t
a few
of these sec ns of the Constit
n. In article
t e legislative
section, sec on 4, which
s th ta
le power o Xing the place
of 6lecti
that has
ple ent tio n
ress.
f course -the
general road pros sion at the e id, "n e a1 laws n c.sal'i and
proper some pedple have
ad enguh to coy r inability
F)t
ever it may . bn
ress, a
f course he end
the v'y petragraph that w
e king bou , the uccession
rovision
y sljmuld
is lef to Con rs, so thI
seems logi10 o say iatt iabi
inil
equal y be left to hngr s
,T1e
is p er give "such r gulations
asCo gress sh lI mal'
In rticle I
whiei
overns/r
-ics, there is again power to
make egulatio 's resp
g terrtiis
the quartering o troopswhich is perhaie a biol o but
s
in
manner pr cribed by
I
law.
Of c irse, the 13th ampd e t as t slaver
t legislation,
and repr entation, 1th; is legis tion , nd tlsuffra e mendmentall of tho have iml ew~qntai
left
agress.
e Prohibition
Act was le to Congreis,"th
omens Suffrage ct was left to.
Congress, an 0th the terms' of President, and o forth, and, ten
strict of Columbia, "Con ss hall have power."
finally in the rec
This proposed am ndent now seem
the only dne where the
detail is set fortlin the tek
ut.
Now, on the actual provisions of it, I don't know that a lawyer
should be asked to pass on these questions of policy, but these are
some ideas that occu' as to tle actual provisions of it.
In the first place, the Whole necessity or the whole purpose of facing
this situation is because, among other thinhgs,-it might need to be
done quickly. This doesnt seem to accomplishtliat.
There are so many steps. In the first place there is the declaration
in writing by the President. Isn't it perfectly obvious that any tribunal, whether the Senate or Congress, would act.I Is it necessary
to put in the text that the PresidenC has to put It in writing? Is it
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'thinkable that anyone would ignore a communication from the President who said, "I am not fit to perform my duties?"
Then you get the second step,, that the Vice President will. Historically, of course that isquite different from the functions of the
Vice President. as they were originally contemplated, and it has been
argued that the Vice President is in a difficult position because he may
be deterred by reluctance, as was the case of Marshall in the illness of
President Wilson lie may be ambitious, but in any case has to make
a decision that afdeets his own position, and certainlyif there is conflict between the President and the Vice President, which might be
wholly the result of a physical or mental condition--it is not necessarily a criticism, but it, might be a fact--then what he has to do is
to concur with the majority of the Cabinet, and something similar to
that takes place when'the President himself or somebody else thinks
he is not able to resume the duties. There we go through it,
again,
the President does it, the Vice President with the concurrence of the
executive officers, the Cabinet, and then it is even said this must be
done within 2 days.
Well, I know of no provision in the Constitutio, which orders the
President or the Vice President or the Cabinet to do anything in 2
days, and I am stressing the point of detail in the Constitution.
Then finally-and I say this with great reluctance to you gentlemen
here--"Congress shall immediately decide the issue." Now, there is
a question there which I think you will consider as to whether that
doesn't violate the principle of the separation of powers. Isn't
the determination of the ability of the President to perform an office
an executive act? Is that a legislative act? I raise that question.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you yield at,that. point?

Mr. TAYLOR. Beg pardon
The CHAIR-UX, Will you yield a moment?
Mr. TAYLOR. Surely.
The CHAIRMA N. There are places in the Constitution where there is
directly or. indirectly a violation of the separation of powers, particularl'y where for example, in the event of some doubt as to the
election of the President by the electoral college, the Congress must
intervene. That might be deemed violation of the principle of separation of powers.
In the matter of impeachment, where the Congress itself brings
indictment and a trial is had in the Senate, that also might be deemed
a violation of the separation of powers, so that we have already in the
constitution a converging of the two powers-the legislative Ind the
executive.
Mr. TAYLOR. I quite agree. Since you raise the point for discussion,
I was conscious that it had been done, whether it wants to be done, or
whether it should be done in a rather expanded form.
In impeachment it was necessary because there was no machinery
for doing it at all. In other words, Congress, if you please, took tei
place of prosecuting attorney and raised the issue. Then they had
to provide the tribunal to try that issue.
The CHArItHAN. With all due deference to your views, isn't there
some necessity here for action, expeditious action when it is time for
us to act, and if this is the practical way of doing it shouldn't we do
it even if it does, in a way, violate that separation of powers?
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Mr. TAYR.on Well, I would answer that by saying that if that is
necessary, these other things, the detail of working out are in the text
of the Constitution. If it were done by an act of Congress in pur-

suance of a broad enabling power, then it wouldn't be necessary to do
that.

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that an act of Congress simply
said the commencement and termination of inability should be made
by a majority of the Cabinet. Then you wouldn't need any of that,
would you? In other words, there might be a variety of ways, and
Congress might do it as a legislative act creating the power to do it,
rather than making the decision.
Tlle CHAIRM[AN. Do you mean by that we may not need a consti-

tutional amendment?

Mr. TAYLOR. Oh, no, I don't mean that at all. If I can digress for
a moment, there has been great disagreement of opinion as to whether an amendment was necessary or not. I think there is a completely
practical answer to that. Many people have taken the view that you
must have a constitutional amendment, and surely the issue is going
to be raised. Therefore, since it is, I think the answer is to have a
constitutional amendment.
The CHAIRAMAN. I think that was your position when. you submitted
a statement to this committee in 1957, was it, or 1956?
Mr. TAYLOR. Something like that, that is right. I think that is
the practical answer to it, because while a great many professors and
students have thought that the general enabling or ilnal clause of the
power of Congress are broad enough to do that, you can avoid the
whole issue by having the amendment, and it might be raised at a time
when it was critical.
The CHAIRMAN. I take it from what I have heard that the thrust
of your argument is that we need a constitutional amendment, but
we might not bog down the Constitution with so much detail. That
is what you are arguing?
Mr. TAYLOR. That is it.
The CHAIbrAN. And the detail might be filled in by congressional
act after the Constitution is amended?
Mr. TAtyoR. Well, that has been discussed both ways. There are
suggestions made that an act of Congress should be passed at the
same time, or rather the steps taken to do it. The arguments about
that fall into two different categories. The one theory is that if you
have the machinery created now, if you have an act of Congress, you
on the one hand have difficulty getting ratification of the amendment
because some people in different States might not like the implementation of Congress, or the other view is that if it were just left to Congress without specification at this time that probably that would be
more likely to succeed in terms of getting ratification. That is a political question that you are much more skillful about than I am.
Mr. (GiELF. Do youlave any other qeustions, Mr Celler?

The

CHAIRMAN.

No, that is all right.

Mr. CEir,. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Por ?

Mr. PoFF. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished witness is sugges(ing

that there were omissions and that these might be supplied.
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Doesn't this run counter to your first, suggest Io tht. you don't want
to load the Constitution down'with details?
I suggest itmight require some rather elaborate language to cover
all of the possib e cases that might result between tle time of the
election
and theweinauguration
date.
In addition,
must think of
the possibility of disability of either
or both the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect in that period.
Mr. TYLOR. Yes.
Mr. P'opp. If we are going to deal with one case, we ouglht to deal
with all if we pursue your suggestion to its logical extremity, and I
suggest this would indeed complicate and enlarge the languiage.
Ir. T,%YtojR. It wouldn't be complicated if you just cover the one
thing with the period between elec lon and inu111iration.
Mr. POFF. I wanted to explore with you oneoiher point that you
raised, and I am glad you raised it l)ecallse I thlinlc it ought to be
explored for purposes of legislative history.
yu 1 asked if anyone could (lefine the wa'ord "vacancy," an( that word
ought to be very carefully and l)r]c('istly (](filledl
(luring the corse of
these hearings.
MA r. TiAYLOIR. I agree.
Mr. Popp. Now, I am one who does not believe thnt,the word "vacancy" should include a state of permanent disability. There are

leza scholars who feel otherwise.

For iny own IurpoSes as an author

ofone of the bills, I intend the word "vaency ' as use(l in that bill
to include the death of the President, or the impeachment of the President, or the resignation of the President, and specifleally not to include
permanent disability of the Vice President.
Now, however, I would like to discover what; the gentleinan had in
mind.
Query: Would a vacancy occur if the Vice President's whereabout
became unknown for at period of time?
Given the case of the Vice President flying to London in an airplane
and tle airplane suddenly disappearing as airplanes sometimes do,
would that constitute a vacancy?
Here I think you reach the point of what, is reasonable and what is
not reasonable. I do not believe that a responsible President would
assume that his whereabouts liing unknown for a period of one day or
two days or three days wouldconstitute a vacancy, but when you reach
the point of a month, two months, or three months, then the question
does arise.
Mr. CFLr.,R. Suppose he is captured by an enemy-God forbid-and
he is held incomnun icado for a leng.thy period of time?.
Mr. PoFrm. A very good point, and it has precedence in history. Mr.
Booth, you know, first intended not to assassinate President Lincolni,
but to kidnap him, and indeed made an attempt to do so, wlich failed.
Mr. TAY LOe Isn't it answered in the text IVacaney in-the office."
Now, I think all of these proposals have been made over the years.
In the case of inability it is not, the office that, is vacant. It is the
power
and
dutiesquestion?
that are taken over, not; the office. Doesn't that
answer
your
Anir.. Per,
r.own
Wel, itdoes partly, but I wonder if the gentleman has
any viw on the case that the chairman putt and the case that I put.
Would a period of a month during which the whereabouts of the

Vice President were unknown constitute a vacancy?
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'TAYLOR. In other words, if that could be filled, it. would be
sol
Sm ulch thing us sayinr if ti Vice President wais, what,
unable to perform the dtties of thel'resident,? 1 don't. know how you
Would phrase tltat.
Mr. op. 1 (ol't iler. I just, raise t110 question so it, can he
given some thought. I miglt say 1 al)preclto tihe, gentleman's
ArFr.

drafliU

test imony.
io (1lIAUC A. Doesn't it boil down to tlis, that, you just can't
possibly wriite a perfect constitutional amendment here?
Mr. TAYmOr. Thit we tire all agreed ibout.
Ti CHIAIRMAN. It. jUSt. canl-t 1) (10110. Franldy, wo hav'e been
wrestling with .tis tling not only in this session, but the his( session,
and it goes back for mamy years.' We have had so much trouble with
it th at at o1e t 111e wo just thrw u) our hands in (lesl)air.
At. i
he expense of rel)etition, we had sent to quite a number of political scientists a series of quest ions so flat. we coul get- some enliglitenment on this subject. from those who had the eX1)ertise, and we were
more hopelessly confused after w'e got- the answers tlan before we
sent out the q(uestionnalires, because there was utter lack of unanimity,

and complete variety of opinions of these experts.
If the experts can't agree, I don't know how we can fashion that

which would be as perfect ts, shall we say, the Ten Commandments.
I don't knolow how we can (10 it.
Mr. TAYLOR, Why don't you go back? Doesn't that. drive you back
to lhe thing that if you do it by act of Congress you have the
opportunity to change that if it turns out to be impractical?
The C11AInUrMN. There is a lot in wmhat you say.
Mr. TAY
~o.It doesn't solve the problems 'but, offers a formula to
try to solve them.
The CHAIRIMAN. Many argue that way.
Mr. TYxLoir. Supposing, for example, the Succession Act had been
written iln the text o the institution, with the variety of alternatives,
with different steps, where you have seen in the last few years wide
difference of opinion as to tle Succession Act,. Well, you would have
the power to change it. Why not have it in the case of inability?
The CHAIRMAN. 'We have changed that Succession Act I think about
three times in our history.

Mr. TAYLOR. That is right.
Mr. CHLr. Are there any other questions?
Mr. Moore?
Mr. Mom. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Citnu, Mr. LindsayI
Mr. LiN)SAY. I will simply express thanks to the distinguished witness for his contribution.
Mr. Ci.n:rX. Mr. MacGregor?
Mr. MAfcGimmor. No questions.
Mr. C1inr,'l. Mr. Mathias?
Mr. MA'rLTs. No questions.
Mr. Cil.ur".
Mr. MeClory?....
Mr.;MdCi,'or, I would like tW 'ask the gentleman a few.questions.
As I understand this proposed amendment, which is in various
forms before the committee, it Is divided into two parts. One is the
subject of the selection of a Vice President in the case of a vacancy
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in the office of the Vice President, and the other has to do with the

subject of disability.
Would you not say that insofar as the subject of selection of a
Vice President in the case of a vacancy In the office of the Vice President, it is not too difficult to phrase that in proper constitutional, brief
language.
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.
Mr. MCCLoRY. The difficulty we encounter is when we get into

the subject of disability or inability in which it is necessary to spell
out details which occur under those situations, particularly where the
disability is not recognized by the President himself. Is that correct?
Mr. TAYLoR. That is right.
Mr. MCCLORY. Now, has the New York Bar Association taken a
formal position on this subject?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. It advocated and has advocated that it should
be done by simple amendment, giving Congress the power to make
the determination. At the time of the hearings on what was then
Senate Joint Resolution 139, we filed a report which I will leave
here, in which we said we preferred the simple amendment, but that
if something could be drafted along the lines of what was then 139
that the committee would not oppose it.
Mr. MCCLORY. That was at the last session of the Congress?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes~ the last session.
Mr. MCCLoRY. I have been going through the various resolutions
and bills in this session, and I don't think there is any bill in the
present Congress which embodies the recommendations you are
suggesting.
Mr. TAYLOR. I think that is right.
Mr. MCCLORY. My attention has been drawn to a proposed con-

stitutional amendment recommended by the New York Chamber of
Commerce. Are you familiar with that language?
Mr. TAYLOR. go; what does that say? .'
Mr. MCCLoRY. If you don't mind, I will read it; it is three very
short paragraphs.
Amend the Constitution to provide:
1. That the Vice President in case of the inability of the President shall

succeed to the powers and duties of the office of President but not to the office,
Itself.

2. That the determination of the commencement and termination of such

presidential Inability shall be as the Congress by law shall provide.

8. When a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President, the President

shall nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority of the elected Meinbers of the Congress meeting in joint session, shall then become Vice President

for the unexpired term.

Mr. TAYLOR. Would you read the part about inability again?

Mr. MOCLORY. That any determination of the commencement and
termination of such presidential inability shall be as the Congress by
law shall provide.
Mr. TAYLOR. That I am familiar with because I wrote it.
Mr. MCCLORY. That, in substance, is the form of the constitutional
amendment.
Mr. TAYLOR. That is right.
Mr. MCCLORY. Not the precise language, but the form and substance

that you would recommend to the committee for recommendation to
the Congress.
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Mr. TAYLOR. It jst happens I drafted it.
Mr. McCionr. I think that your position is echoed by the minority
leader of the Senate, Senator Dirksen.
Mr. TAymoit. That was recently so stated in the newspapers.
Mr. MCCLORY. I am inclined to the same point of view as you have
expressed here to the committee.
Mr. TAYLOR. Up until last year it was approved by the American
Bar Association, the City bar and State bar, Senator Keating, and
Senator Kefauver, and now I see in the paper Senator Dirksen.
The CIIAIIIMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Of course, IHouse Joint Resolution I has been approved by the American Bar Association.
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; I understand that, but that reverses the position
that it took last year.

Mr. MCCLOiy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
tions.

I have no further ques-

Mr. CjLLF. Mr. Gilbert?
Mr. GILBERT. I have no questions; thank you.
Mr. CTEfr.,. Mr. Hungate?
Mr. HUNGAT. Mr. Taylor, do I understand that you do favor a constitutional amendment?
Mr. TAYLOR. Oh yes.
Mr. HUNGATE. Which would make clear the power of Congress and
you would leave the details to statute.
Mr. TiYyLo. That is right.
Mr. CnrFLF. Mr. Tenzer.
Mr. TENzR. No questions; thank you.
Mr. CiIELF. Mr. Grider?
Mr. GIUDER. No questions.
Mr. CiIELF. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. It has been very enlightening.
You have been most helpful to the committee. The next witness is
scheduled at 2 o'clock this afternoon, so we will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the committee recessed until 2 p.m. the
same day.)
(The following was received for the record:)
NEW YORK STATE BAR AssoorATIoN, COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Report on proposed constitutional amendments on presidential inability and
successor Vice President (S.J. Res. 35 and 139)
The committee has review Senate Joint Resolutions 35 and 189, together with

much of the testimony with regard thereto before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
The committee is firmly agreed on the following points:

1. It is urgent that there should be an amendment to the Constitution of the

United States providing more explicitly for the accession to the office of President by the Vice President in, the event of the death, resignation, or removal
of the President, and for the accession of the Vice President to the powers and
responsibilities only of the President in the event of the President's inability.
We consider that the language in Senate Joint Resolutions 35 and 139 with
respect to this, is satisfactory.
2. It is urgent that there should be an amendment to the Constitution provid-

ing for the selection of a successor Vice President to hold that office whenever

that office shall be vacant. With respect to this, the committee agrees in principle with those provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 139 which provide for

the appointment of such a successor Vice President by the President by and

with the advice and consent of both Houses of Congress. The committee sug-

200

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

gests, however, that to accomplish this result, and to take care of certain situations not now covered by paragraphs 1 and 2 of Senate Joint Iltsolution 139,
those paragraphs be revised and proposed as a constitutional amendment in the
form set forth in the appendix to this report.
3. There Is an urgent necessity for a constitutional amendment wihiehi shall
provide for the determination of the inability of the President to act and for
the steps to be taken inthe event that tills should occur.
The committee believes it would be wiser to follow Senate Joint Resolution 35,
which in effect delegates to tie Congress the responsibility for adopting legislation to deal with this problem, than to proceed, as in Senate Joint Resolution 139,
to set forth in precise detail the method of determining inability and the provision for dealing with it. In support of the flexible delegation of authority set
forth in Sengte Joint Resolution 85, the committee cites (a) its belief that
sound constitutional practice calls for broad enabling powers and simplicity in
constitutional provisions, leaving the detail to Implementation by the legislative
branch, and (b) its concern lest setting forth the detail in the proposed amendment will, in fact, create rigidities which itiy not be adapted to the preclse
situation when it arises and can only be corrected by a further constitutional
amendment.
Tite committee is unanimous in its conviction as to the urgency that the
Constitution be amended so that the dangerous uncertainties with respect to the
Presidency which now exist shall be ended. The committee believes that we
cannot afford to continue to live in the modern world with constitutional machinery on vital points full of so many uncertainties and gaps. In the event
that the recommended or any other comparable procedure should be agreed upon
by the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee for the determining of the
Inability of the President to act andl for the steps to be taken in the event that
this should occur, or If any such procedure should le later adopted by the Congress, the committee will give the decision Its wholehearted support. The committee of course expects to be openminded in its consideration of any such decision, even though varying from this, committee's suggestions, in the earnest
hope that a satisfactory solution to a very critical problem will be found at an
early date.
Respectfully submitted.
Martin Taylor, New York City, Chairman; Theodore Pearson, New
York City, Secretary; Ernest Angell, New York City; William 0.
Breed, Jr., New York City; Bruce Bromley, New York City; Porter R. Chandler, New York City; William Tucker Dean, Ithaca;
Howard M. Holtzman, New York City; R. Keith Kane, New
York City; Randall J. Leboeuf, Jr., New York City; Ernest D.
Leet, Jamestown; George Lindsay, Jr., New York City; John 1.
Lockwood, New York City; Henry S,Manley, Strykersville; Willis L. M. Reese, New York City; William J. Rennert, New York
City; Harrison Tweed, New York City; Cornelius W. Wickersham,
Jr., Now York City.
APIuL 17, 1061.
APPENDIX

Sections 1 and 2 of the propsed constitutional amendment set forth in Senate
Joint Resolution 139 provide as follows:
"SEoTION 1. In case of the removed of the President from office, or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired
portion of the then current term. Within a period of thirty days thereafter,
the new President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by both Houses of Congress by a majority of those present and
voting.
"SEO. 2. In case of the removal of the Vice President from office, or of
his death or resignation, the President, within a period of thirty days thereafter, shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by both Houses of Congress by a majority vote of those present and voting."
While endorsing, as a matter of urgent priority, a constitutional amendment
embodying the principles set forth above, the committee believes that it should
be redrafted to take care of the following points:
(a) Section 1, as presently drafted, does not cover the situation of the death
or failure to qualify of a President-elect, an eventuality which very nearly
happened at the time of the attempted assassination of President-elect Franklin
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D. Roosevelt. The existing 20th amendment provides that in such a case the
Vice-President-elect shall. become President. However, such an assumption of
office by the Vice-President-elect would not come under either the "removal,"
"death," or "resignation" of a President as set forth in the first sentence of
section 1 of Senate Joint Resolution 189; and a Vice-President-elect thus assuming the Presidency would not be able under Senate Joint Resolution 139, as
presently drafted, to nominate a new Vice President.
(b) Section 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 189 likewise does not cover the case
where a Vice-President-elect dies or falls to qualify before Inauguration Day.
The President should be empowered under such circumstances to nominate a
new Vice President.
It Is suggested that both of the above eventualities, and possibly others not
presently contemplated, should be covered by providing broadly for nomination
of a new Vice President whenever that office is vacant.
(o) Sections 1 and 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 139 provides that the nomination of the new Vice President must be made within 30 days. Situations might
occur (for example, in case of sudden temporary Illness) where the President
might fail to make the nomination within 30 days, and a nomination made on
the 31st or 32d day might be claimed to be invalid. The committee believes
that it would be preferable not to impose a specific time limitation which might
cause such complications.
(d) Sections 1 and 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 139 now provides that confirmation of the new Vice President shall be "by both Houses of Congress by
a majority of those present and voting." It might be claimed that this language
Implies a majority of the total of both Houses, so that, for example, an overwhelming majority In the House might override a majority of the Senate. In
line with what we believe to be the Intention of the draftsmen, we suggest that
the provision be clarified to provide for confirmation by a majority of those
present and voting in each House.
The committee accordingly suggests a constitutional amendment providing
for the appointment of a new Vice President in substantially the following
form :
"SEaTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President for the unexpired portion of the then current term.
"SEc, 2. Whenever the office of Vice President is vacant, the President shall
nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by both
Houses of Congress by a majority vote of those present and voting in each
House."

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. Ciui' (presiding). The committee will come to order, please,
The next witness is Judge Michael A. Musmanno. Judge we will

hear first from Mr. Mathias and then hear from you next.

The Honorable Charles Vathias a member of the committee representing the great State of Maryland.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES MoC. MATHIAS, 3R*, A REPRESENTA.
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, the opportunity to appear before the
Judiciary Committee in support of House Joint Resolution 264 is
very much appreciated. The warmth with which I support this
resolution proceeds not so much from pride of authorship in House
Joint Resolution 264, but rather from the very grave reservations
that I feel about House Joint Resolution 1. In explaining the proposal contained in House Joint Resolution 264 1 must state my reasons
for strongly opposing the provisions of House Joint Resolution 1.
I approach thlis dual task with Some sense of the temerity involved
in being critical of a jolt resolution offered by the distinguished
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, endorsed by the American Bar
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Association, and approved by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S.
Senate. Such criticism is often dismissedd s more nlit-pieking. But
the dangers that could assail the RePublic, if we make an error in
judgment in this matter, are so grave that I lutist speak freely and
fully on the doubts that I feel concerning the proposed chalges il
the Constituholl.
I have three basic objections to the succession provisions of Ihouse
Joint Resolution 1. The first of these is suggested by a comment on
the nature of American Government made by the honorable Robert
F. Bradford, former Governor of Massachuisetts, who said:
In no other country in the world does the word "citizenship" mean what it

means here. 'The American Is a cit izen, not a "subject,' not a "t(

Ollill,"

and not a slave of the State. Every American Is an Individual with rights as
all individual proclillied by the Declaration of lIdependence to he ,mmllellable," guaranteed by the Conlsitition to be secure; rights which he can mihtain
even against the Government itself.

''hie happy state of our Nation described by Governor Bradford
exists because the Constitution guards against theNbus e of power by
II101 itild by instit utions of government.

Our Constitution i* effective il preserving freedom because the
Fotldilng Fathers anticipated and provided against the worst that
-could be expected of men.
The Constitution does not assume that good men will ahays occupy
public office and will aiwvays act in accordanlce with thel highest. motives.
n the contrary, the Founlldinig Fathers examined the l)ossiility that
t ll tact oppose) Ie might more f requeplit ly be the ease.
For exaimple-Benjamin Franklin is quoted by James Madhison ill
llis ,Journal of the C6nstitutional Conventioll-June 2, 17871:

Sir, there are two passions which have a pmwerful Influence on the affairs

of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of Ipower, and tile love of
money.

Separately, each of these has great force in prompting meni to action;

but wheni united i view of the salle object, they have Ill nminy minds the most
violent effects. Place before the eyes of shell mnen a post of hollor, tIlat shall

be at the saine time a place of profit, and they will move meaven mid earth
to obtain it. The vast number of such places it Is that renders the imBitish

Government so tempestuouts. The struggles for them are the true soues of
all those factions, which are perpetually 'dividing the natlo, dlstraeflig Its
councils, hurrying sometimes ilito fruitless and mismehlevous wars, and often
compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace.

The Constitution seeks means to interpose legal safeguards between
the weakness, th6 temptations and the evil of men and tie injury they

might do the State. We do the same in private life when we ask
anihonest debtor to execute a mortgage or an honorable man to state
Ilis promise or covenant in writing.
ly pormiittifg the President to amies "VicePresident, House Joint
llesolution 1 operates on the opposite prhneiple, asstuming that a President will always be enlightened and disinterested in nalinilg a Vice
President. While this oj)timismf reflects well on the 20th century's
opinion of itself in 0ontrast to the pragmatic 18th eell tliry estimate
of human frailty, it my not be a prudent basis for constitutional law.
Congressionalonfirnition of a vice-p residential nom nice would be
only a ,mild chek and, in my J!Idgmeut, woull be a mere forinality
in a period of national emotional stress.

Most of us who wer-e lere

in tho lost, dark days of November 1903, would confirm that almost
any such request made by President ,ohnson would have been favor-
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ablly 1'('c&ived( by Il1( Coiigi'ess ill our' dlesire to supplor't. luld( Stabilize

G iving the President exclusive power to ntom)' ial tv it Vice 1Pres iditlt

1111.4heeti julst ifiedl by it fillse fliilogy to the br1oad~ (lis(let 10on allowed it
11h)(1011l1 jprsideolt iI;l nomineve to express a preference for his runn11ingf
I)IIIto. But it Jprvsi l&')it I l 11)ille anld tlUi~ll ibmbflt 1Preil(dft a 1
11er1 differed nt ten-evenl if t hey inhatbit. the sailie 1)1011 al frame -and
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Johnl F. Kenneoly inl
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anl heir anid 5U('CC55(fl'.
Couple th is p~residenltill nioti vat ion to the provi.siOnis of I loulse Joint

Resoluifon 1 with respe't; to presidlt jal inlability and tile conlsider-atCioii that iight. Iiove aiP'Csi(Iylt tonfoinaiUt(ea respectale, but pallid,
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suiccession, at 1residentf imy indleelihesitateo in seeking a1vigoro'ous and)(
aggressive Vice P~residenit: Sue-h it. danger would nlot., have esellpe(I
examlinaition b1y f li framler's of thle Conisftiutionl anld should be (consd lde'ed by those who proposeo to ametil it.
Ii contrast, House Joint Resolution 204 would ful fill the commanihiding niecessitV 'Of ourl. dan1ge'rous alge for at securle SIRlccessiou anld would
melet Some Of tile objections to House fJolt- Resoluitionl 1.
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provides for anl elect ion inl the most. dcecrativ.maunc' 1)rilt iflable, by th imedit Crepresent ait
ives of the people.
It; insure11s harmlionly Inl the exe(ut ive branchl byv 1reurn
ocr
rence of th1iPesidenit in this'choice.
thcocOf course, Madisonl's Jourl-1- ean be quoted against it al1so. The
founides questioned whether thie L~egislatur'e should elect t-Jhe INcutive alid therebyj gain it (lominanlce.
Toesdity, Septeniber 4th * * * Mr'. Slierit'l il 4110
h ob)ject- (if tils tiiise

of the Rieport of the Coffiitttee wits to get rid of the Itlilhgibl1ify whielh was attalhed to tho nIlodo of election by the( Legishitire, anid to retider Ili'e ExOceniv
~e
Indecpenident of, the Legislatre. * * *, Mr. Ooni'ernenr Morris sid lie woil(

give the reasons of tbo Conmilitte andi Is own. The first wats tho danger of
Intrigue and Mo'tion, If the lijilOillitit Shoulld lie x1iado by the Legislature.
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But this objection was swallowed in the 12th amendment and in
this case seems less dangerous than the alternatives of House Joint
Resolution 1.
It is closer in principle to the concepts of the Constitution and would
be safer in practice.
I shall not speak at length on the presidential disability provisions
of House Joint Resolution 1. I recognize the desirabihty of some
firm understanding with respect to this matter and I am cognizont of
the Attorney General's opinion that only by constitutional amendment can we be sure of universal acceptance of any scheme for the
temporary relief of a President from his constitutional duties...
Yet so much depends on the personality of the parties, the practices of this generation and the climate of the time that I would prefer
a more flexible arrangement, such as the custom established by President Eisenhower and' followed by President Kennedy and President
Johnson. But when separated from the President's selection of a Vice
President the disability provision of House Joint Resolution 1 is
shorn of some of its disquieting features.
At first lance the concept that a Vice President and a Cabinet
might use tde powers conferred by the disability provisions of House
Joint Resolution 1 to intrigue against the President seems too foreign
to our system to be of real concern. Yet a reading of American history
makes this seem a more present danger than would otherwise be supposed. It is interesting, if unpleasant, to speculate on the uses to
which Salmon P. Chase might have put the power to question the
competence of Abraham Lincoln. The paralysis in Government that
could ensue from a cabal to depose the President could be more damagingto the national welfare than the President's personal disability.
ot the least of such danger is the loss of prestige of the Presidency
that could result from an abortive attempt to remove the President.
If a Vice President were joined by even a small fraction of the Cabinet
in an effort to declare the President incompetent, the news would soon
be public property and a dialogue would ensue that could sound like
an echo of "You are old, Father William"--I am sure, Mr. Chairman,
you remember how that refrain wenit:
"You are old, Father William," the young man said,
"And your hair has become very white;
And yet you incessantly stand on your headDo you think, at your age it is right?"
"In my youth," Father William replied to his son,
"I feared it might injure the brain;

But now that I'm perfectly sure I have none,
Why, I do it again and again."

If this disability portion of House Joint Resolution 1 is to be embodied in a favorable report by this committee, I hope, at least, Mr.
Chairman, that the phrase which is employed, "the heads of the executive departments" will be more accurately defined in the text, and
also that the grammatical propriety of referring to a majority of them
as "a body" will be given the committee's usual-careful consideration.
I thank you, Mr. C~lairman.
Mr. COnty. Mr. Celler, have you any questions?
The CHAIRMAN. I take it that in the event of inability in the function of the President or the Vice President, you have an election, is
that itI
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Mr. MATHIIAS. An election by the Congress. This would be in the

case of a vacancy, not of disability.
.
.
.
Tie CIIAIAN. That could likely happen within a short time
after a regular election or a short tine after an inauguration, and we
would then be confronted with the turmoil, excitement, and expense
of another election. Is that correct?
Mr. MATIIAs. No, sir; the election would be held by the Congress.
The Congress would elect a Vice President.
The CHAIRMIAN. I didn't read your bill. I was referring to the
statement that is on page 3.
Mr. MATHrAS (realfig):
Provides for election by the most practicable manner by the immediate represenatves of the peol)he.

That would be the Member of Congress acting subject to Presidential veto to take care of the situation when there is a President not
in harmony with the political views of the majority in Congress.
The Cim.t ALXN.
Do you dismiss rather cavalierly the idea that the
President usually selects his running mate prior to election, but you
feel he shouldn't have that right, as 1i were, after the election?
Mr. MA'rITAS. 1Well, sir, with all due respect I would say I haven't
treated that cavalierly. I have treated it, I think, in a ractical manner, because you can't properly analogize the position of the President
living in the White House, su'rrounded
( by all the panoply and power,
and who has a different outlook on life, undoubtedly-and history
I think sustains this-from the man who has jist received the reqisite number of votes in a great national convention and who may teel
some of the uplift of living in the White House, but he isn't quite'there
yet and still has the great hurdle to cross-that is, to get the requisite
number of votes from the people.
The man he chooses to run with him will be chosen from motives
which may be substantially different from those of the incumbent
President who is picking hs official heir and successor. I think this
is a question of human understanding.
Mr. CELLER. I apologize for the use of the word "cavalierly." I
think I was ill advised.
But suppose you liave a Congress with a majority of members of a

party different from that of the President, and the Congress would
have to elect a Vice President. They might conceivably elect a Vice

President of a party different from that of the President.
Mr. MATHIAS. this undoubtedly is not an easy question, and it is
one that we can't brook with any easy answers, )ut I think that we
have occasions within the Congress itself in which minority members
are elected to certain positions positions within the. structure of the
legislative branch, it is true. f think that experience would dictate
that the Congress could rise to this responsibility.
I also believe that we are practical men and, as the distlngtuisled
chairman of this committee knows from his long and honorable service here, practical ways of doing: things are developed by practical men.
Although my service during President Eisenhower's administration
was limited to a very brief period, the chai'iman will recall that there
was a practical working arrangement between the majority leadership
in the Congress and the White House during the Eisenhower days by
which the White House would indicate that certain alternatives were
44-261-65--14
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acceptable, and some were unacceptable, and within that framework
usually there was legislative success in discharging the responsibilities
of the Government toward the Nation.
I think that this is a much closer analogy to what could happen in
electing itnew Vice President than by saying that the prestdential
nominee is the same as the President, and the choice should e the same.
I believe that if we were in this kind of a situation where the President was of one party and the majority in Congress was of the other
party that the leadership in the Congress would have some informal
consultation with the President, and that there would be an understanding and a meeting of the minds as to the unacceptable kind of
people whom the Presil1ent would veto, and that the Congress would
make a choice which was good for the country as well as acceptable to
the President. But I think the important thing is that the initiative
comes from the representatives of the people.
The ChAIRMAN. Do you think if the President happened to be a
Republican and the majority of Congress were Democrat, even applying the criteria that you mentioned that the 1)emocrats in Congress
would elect a Republican?
Mr. MIATnIAS. Well, I thinkThe CHAIRMAN. Or vice versa?
Mr. MATHTAS. Or vice versa. I think, of course, they would, because this would be clearly the intent of the amendment which gives
the absolute veto on the choice to the President, and I have no doubt
that just as the Congress, during the Eisenhower days, accepted certain legislative measures which were identified with the Eisenhower
administration, and which had the Republican tagThe CHAIRMAN. You must remember it is a little different when it
comes to legislation, when it comes to the personality of the Vice President, because the Vice President conceivably is a potential President,
and the party in power might see a means by which they could take
over the reins of government if their man should become President.
Mr. MATHIAS. Iut there is an analogy that I think is true and which
takes into consideration the chairmanN thought. The Congress, seeing that it could not have a Democratic Vice President, would elect
a republican Vice President, because that is the only choice left to
them.
Mr. PoFF,. If I understand the line of the chairman's question,
what he is really saying is that this proposal, after all, may not be a
more democratic form of electing a Vice -President. In the first place,
whatever under-the-table agreements might be arrived at, t.he election
is going to occur in the Democratic caucus or in the Republican caucus,
and that is less than the Congress and certainly it is a minority of the
Members of Congress when you consider only the leadership of the
Congress acting in concert with the President, so I am inclined to agree
with the point the chairman is making that this would not be a more
democratic approach.
It would be, I am afraid, in practical application a more autocratic
form..
. Mr. MATIHAS. Well, I certainly would disagree very strongly with
give you the
that point of view, because I think to say to one man; ,1.

authority to nominate your official heir" is more autocratic than tosay
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to a committee of 5 or 10 or 50 Members of the Congress, however many
it may be: "get together as a committee and elect a Vice President."

Mr. POFF. I would agree with the gentleman if the bill did not also
provide that both Houses of Conress would have to confirm a nomination made by the President, anYwhile the gentleman dismisses the
parallel drawn with the present system of the presidential nominee
naming his vice-presidential running mate, I think the analogy is a
good one and ought not be dismissed lightly.
I repeat, perhaps the use of the word "autocratic" is inadequate, but
I say it would be less democratic in some respects than if the procedure were followed as outlined in the bill before us.
The CHAIRMAN. One more question, if I may, and I want to assure
the gentleman from Maryland I have the highest respect for his point
of view. I know that he s ways given grave and careful study to
whatever is said.
On page 4 you speak of the unhappy episode between Salmon P.
Chase and Abraham Lincoln.
If any mischief could occur, Congress would always have the checkrein because of its power of impeachment, is that not so?
Mr. MATHIAS. WYell, sir, the power of impeachment is there, but it is
a limited power. As I recall the words of the Constitution-and I
don't, have them before me-the power is in case of treason and certain other misdemeanors, high crimes and misdemeanors.
The CHAIRIMAN. That could mean almost anything. I don't think
Andrew Johnson was guilty of any crime or so-called misdemeanors
except as that term was. cegned by Stevens and his cohorts. It is as
broad as a barn door, and it is purely political in nature, so that Congress could move in or barge in almost any time it wishes under the
gise of so-called high crimes and misdemeanors.
Mr. MATHIAS. I am happy that in the course of the Republic we have

had so little occasion to further define "high crimes and misdemeanors."
It would be my feeling, though, that the precedents, such as they are,
would scarcely support impeachment on the ground of a d isa greenent

as to the state of health of the President, and this is what this would
come right down to.
A man could come in and swear on a stack of Bibles that he felt
the President was so unwell as- t be unable to discharge the duties of
his office. As long as thiat man kept his 6wn counsel, it would be pretty
hard to say he wasn't acting from conscience, and I think it would be
difficult to impeach him on tAis ground.
Mr. CHErF. Mr. PoffI
Mr. POFF. Just one or two-other questions.
I might say, parenthetically, I hoe nothing I said would be interpreted as being critical, because I think the gentleman has made a real
contribution to our thinking on the subject, and my repartee was intended to provoke further exploration of it.
Mr. MATITTAS. I think the gentleman from Virginia knows the high
regard I have for his able mind, and I am flattered that he is probing
in this way because, if I may say so, this matter has been handled with
great speed by the other body.
I notice' l'h)gentleman didn't use the word "cavalierly.
'Mr.
ATIIIAS. NOt (ei to the gentleman froml Virginia.
'MM PoFF.
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Mr. POFF. Seriously, I would like to inquire about your bill, House,

Joint Resolution 264. I see you use mandatory language, requiring tie
man who is acting as President to convene the House and the Senate
in joint session but you haven't indicated any time limit in which this
must be done. bo you think that might be a problem?
Mr. CitpuE. It seems that the gentleman has indicated by his language here the person discharging the powers and duties of the President shall have the right to veto any selection made by the House of'
Representatives and Senate acting in joint session, but such veto must
be exercised within 3 days.
He has a limitation on the veto, but, like you, I feel the other seems
to be dangling somewhat.
Mr. MATHIAS. As one of the witnesses said before the committee this
morning, it is unwise to load too much detail into the constitutional
language. Certainly the implication is that this be done as soon as
practicable, but considerations of wartime conditions or difficulties of
travel, or whatever the nature of the circumstance might be at that
time would affect the time limit, and for that reason I didn't specify
a time.
I would think that there ought to be at least an understanding in
the legislative history that the President or the person acting as President would move as promptly as was practicable.
Mr. POFF. As a matter of academic interest, why did you use the
time limit of 3 days instead of the customary 10-day ]hni ton veto?
Mr. MATMAS. Well, this is a matter of some urgency, and I thought
probably there would have been a considerable amount of consideration and discussion by the time Congress acted.
I think the gentleman from Virginia used the term "under the table."
I don't think it would necessarily be under the table, but there would be
a good deal of public discussion going on about the thing and the President, after all, isn't going to have to mull this over for an indefinite
amount of time. The 10-day limit for legislative vetoes comprehends
the necessity for some research on the part of the executive branch and*
the pressure of business and the pile up of a large number of bills, all'
those things which are not present in this situation.
I will be frank with the gentlemen, I picked 3 days as a purely arbitrary period of time. There is nothing sacred about it, but it seems.
to me you don't need as long for this as you do for the legislative veto.
Mr. POFF. The language you employ in connection with the newly
elected Vice President is always or nearly always "act" or "acting."
Do you intend by that to give some different status to a VicePresident-elect in this manner than to a. Vice-President-elect customarily, or would he enjoy the same status?
Mr. MATIAS. I think he would enjoy the same status as precedent
in history has given to successors in ihe exentive branch throughout
our whole national life.
Mr. Poiv. I think the gentleman has performed a very useful fnimetion, and I sincerely appreciate his help and advice.
Mr. CHtvAF. Mr. MacGregor?
Mr. MAOGRiFAoR. Noaiiestions.

Mr. CrmLF. Mr. Hutchinson?
Mr. Hnroomrsow. IMr. C(hairian, I would like to ask Mr. Mat hias
couple of questions.
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Mr. Mathias, how do you envision the candidates will be selected
from 190 million people out of whom this joint convention of Congress
is going to choose the Vice President?
Mr. MATHIAS. Well, let me say as a preamble to the answer that I

have suggested a joint session of Congress as the elective body, as the
group of electors. There is nothing magic about this. This could be
done by each House meeting separately in its own Chamber.
I think, however, that a joint session would provide a more normal
atmosphere for making the very choice that your question raises. The
atmosphere would not be unlike the situation in one of our great national conventions in which the convention has before it, so to speak,
the entire population, the entire adult population of the Nation, but,
as a practical matter, we all know that the choice is limitedto a relatively small group of persons who have qualified themselves by their
life and actions for consideration, and I think the same would be true
in this case, with the further limiting factor which the distinguished
chairman of the committee has mentioned, that you are going to be
pretty nearly bound to the political party of tle incumbent in the
White House.
Mr. HU'rcT(NsoN. Now, assuming that. the congressional majority

was the same as the incumbent in the White House, what you are saying
is that you think that his suggestions to the majority caucus would
,carry great weight in that caucus, and in effect perhaps he would be
nominating a candidate for consideration?
Mr. MAT1nTAS. I think history leads to that conclusion, and I certainly think the President would be a very weak party leader if he
weren't able to arrange that that were so. But the fact of the matter
is that the power to initiate the nominating and electing would be
with the representatives of the people. This would come from the
wellspring of the country. It would not come in whlt I conceive to be
the autocratic manner ot descending from the White House. It would
rise from the people to the heights of government.
Mr. HUTCmNSON. But the Executive under the l)present wording of

your resolution would have it within his own power to fix the time for

such a joint convention and, as a practical matter of politics, do you
suppose that he wouldn't convene the Congress until he had arrived at
some kind of an understanding with the majority caucus?
Mr. MATHIAS. Well, now, sir, I think that is entirely possible, and
I think you are getting around to the ver kind of consideration
that I
think we ought to be having on this bill, and that is that we ought to
probe the probable motives and actions of the people who will be the
rrindipal actors in this kind of unhappy drama, and I think that this
is possible. But I would say to you that I would prefer to take my
.chances with that kind of a situation than I would by simply giving
the President the autocratic power to nominate his successor and official heir, and I think that the very fact tiat he has to go through this
kind of manipulation, thievery fact that he is forced to deal with the
leadership in Congress, the very fact that he may have to tack on his
course will, in itself, be assurance that an acceptable and proper candidate will be forthcoming rather than the fact that he can merely sit in
the White House and send one name down to the Capitol and say,
-"Boys, take it."
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Mr. HuToHmNSoN, But under the provisions of Resolution 1,where

he would send a name down and say, "Take it," he would still hiave to
deal with the party leadership in Congress making sure that they
would take it.
Mr. MATHIAS. But let me say I believe that the range of the consideration that he would have to give to the opinions of others would be
considerably narrowed when he is the prime initiator of this movement..
Mr. Hui'oHi soN. Another question of just a practical consideration, Mr. Mathias.
Do you really think that the Senate of the United States would
happily support a proposition like this calling for a joint convention
approach in which it must be conceded that the relative weight of
4
every Senator is drastically reduced?
Mr. MATHIAS. Well, of course, under the existing provisions for
electing a President in case of vacancy by failure in a regular election
the Senate doesn't have any vote at all, so this is giving them. more
play than they would have in the contingency already provided by the
Constitution.
Mr. HuTciNsoN. Yes, but under the present revisions of the Constitution, in the election of a President, by the louse of Representatives, each State has only one vote, so the situation isn't, as I see it, just

the way you described."
Mr. MATHIAS. It is not entirely parallel, but the Senate does not
play a part. in that.
Mr. 1HUrCHTNEOsN. That is true.
The CHA MAN. If I might ask one question.
Mr. CELP. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I take it when there is an election by the Congress
of a Vice President by the majority of those present and voting, in the
Constitution wherever the Congress selects a President, the vote is by
States. You wouldn't have it by States, would you?
Mr. MATHIAS. No, sir; just, a siple majority.
The CHAIMAN. It is also in the States 1 y secret ballot. That is,

they have a ballot box, and they have blank ballots, as I understand it,
and each Member from each State votes but doesn't register his vote
because his vote is by States. You wouldn't have anything like that?
Mr. MATrIAS. No, sir. Let me say I have not gone into any of that
detail here. I think it could very properly be provided by the Congress in implementing such a provision, but my own view would be
that you could have-if a secret ballot, 'Were desired-one ballot box
with the votes for your partmiclar candidate and under rules that would
be prescribed by the joint session for its own conduct,
The CHAMMRAN. Suppose the Congres doesn't. give a majority to
the nominee of the President. Would the President then have the
right to offer another nominee?
Mr. MATHIAS. Of course, the President would not under this arrangement, strictly speaking, be having a nominee, but let us suppose
that the President has let it be known that, he .would prefer someone
would h, part of the
'tis
who would not receive a majority. Certanly
informal negotiation which I think would inevitably take place, and
there would be no limitation on the President,'s infti al suggestions
as to the people that lie would prefer to see bI-oiiie Vice President.
TIe ClirAh101.A,. 'lliihk y01u.
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Mr. Cimi.. Mr. St. Onge?
Mr. ST. ONGE. No questions.
Mr. CHLF. Mr. MCClory.
Al1'. MCCLORY. I

think tIe gentleman has made a clear distinction

between the motives which exist between when a President selects a
ruining niate in a convention and the motives which would be present
under circumstances such as we are considering here where there is
tvacancy in the office of the Vice President.
With regard to that part of the bill, would this veto be an absolute
veto, or would it be subject. to being overridden by the House?
Mir. MATHIAS. NO, it would be an absolute veto. I don't think you

would want to impose upon the President a Vice President who was
totally repugnant to him. I think you would have to give the President
an absolute veto in this case.
Mr. McCilony. With regard to your statement, on page 4 of your
testimony where you question the wisdom of the detailed provisions
in House Joint Resolution 1 insofar its the subject of disability is concerned, you indicate that if the selection of a Vice President is in
accordance with your recommendations that you are not concerned
about those details.
Mr. MATrIIS. Well, let me say again that I am somewhat inoti-

vated in the testimony I have given today by a rerea(ling of Madison's
"Journal of the Constitutional Convention," and by the very 1)robing
examination that was made by the members of the Constitutional
Convention into the probable human reaction to exposure to situations in which power was at sj ke, and I think we can l)rofit a great
deal by the example of the Constitutional Convention in being very
careful as to what we are doing here, because we are touching upon
the exercise of tremendous lower, probably in times of great emotion,
great national emotion, and I think we owe it to ourselves, both to
our ancestors and our posterity, to deal very deliberately with this
subject.
I am reluctant, of course, to attack or Ol)l)OSe a suggestion which
comes to this committee with such a fine pedigree as House Joint
Resolution 1, but I do feel that,in this situation we have got to examine
it very, very carefully.
Mr. MCCLOIIY. We have heard other testimony. We heard testimony this morning, for instance, with respect to the form of the Constitutilon and the advantages which occur with it
brief statement which
is then supplemented by appropriate legislation, and I would gather
from your paragraph that you would favor the shorter or briefer
statement in the Constitution, with the flexibility that would be present, then, through legislation.
Mr. MArHIAS. That is right. To be more specific in my answer to
the gentleman's previous question, I think that the combinatioll of
giving a President the power to nominate his heir and, at the same
time, giving the heir at least a part, of the power to depose the President, sets in-play some of the very classic situations which the franiers of the Constitution would examine most carefully for their analysis
of what the probable human reaction would be, and I think this is one
of the dangers of House Joint Resolution 1, that you are doing two
things which will have ol)posite reactions, and I think they could be
explosive, given the right combination of circumstances and personalities and conditions.
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Mr. MGCLOInY. In other words, if we recommended House Joint
Resolution 1 and the States ratified it and it didn't work the way it
was intended, then the problem of a complete new constitutional
amendment would arise instead of a simple amendment of a statute
which the Congress could take action on promptly.
Mr. MATirAs. That is precisely correct.
Mr. McCrony. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ci-ly. Mr. Tenzer?
Mr. TE,Nzn. The question was answered about the absolute veto, and
I understand your position on tlat.
When you selected 8 days within which to exercise the veto on the
part, of the person discharging the duties and functions of the President, you were thinking in terms of speed and dispatch for disposing
of the problem.
Mr. MATiTTAs. That is right.
Mr. TENzzn. Do you envisage any such delay that might be occasioned by the joint session adopting its own rules i
Mr. MATIII S. Yes; I think there could possibly be such delay and, of
cou.nse, us ti chairman of the committee has indicated, you might have
a further delay from the situation that the person elected by the Congress, by the joint session, might not be acceptable to the White I louse,
and yoi might have two or three go's at this Ihing before you arrived
at some candidate who was acceptable at both ends of Pnnsylvania
AVenue.
Mr. TmzEn. Might I ask a further question of the wit ness?
This question was raised with earlier witnesses, and I would like to
have your views on the question as to who would preside at such joint
session.
Mr. MATHIAS. The Speaker would preside. That had been my contemnplation.
Mr. TNzrn. So the statement is this is the legislative intent we are
developing here.

Mr. MATHITAS. Yes.

Mr. 'NZR. Would'you put that in the amendment?
Mr. CHE.P'. It is in the bill, in section 2:
The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall preside * * *

Mr. TENZER. I am sorry.

Mr. MATHIAS. Line 13 on page 2.

Mr. TFiwzEm. Would the problem of delay in the adoption of rules be
cured by the possibility that each of the Houses would meet separately?
-Mr. MATHIAS. Well, that could create its own delays, and I believe
that you would have a more efficient system, a more democratic system-notwithstanding the objections suggested to the Senate's participation-I believe you would have a situation that would be better
understood by both the participants and by the country at large in
having a joint session, which would be the electoral college for this
Purpose.
Mr. TwzNru. I appreciate the reply, because ifsession,
there were
to be a
myself.
selection by the Congress, I would prefer a joint
Thank you.
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Mr. Cnirtr. Mr. ConyersI
Mr. CoNYrn.s. Tlank you, Mr. Chairlnan,
I would like to inquire of our colleague how strongly he feels that
hils proposed resolution must look toward a constitutional amendment,
and whether or not through statutory legislation we might accomplish
the same thing?
Mr. MATIHAS. WellI I have examined the Const-itution closely on
this question, and I think that you can at least make a good argument
that we are already vested with the atuthority to supply this deficiency
in our system by statute, but. I am guided to some extent by the testirnony wviich we had the other day from the Attorney General of the
United States, and by other eminent, legal authorities that the state
of the law is such that. it. will be only a constitutional amendment
which will gain us tho universal kind o acceptance which would be so
necessary in this situation where the conimand of tle Armed Forces
dol)ends on this, and you must have the unquestioned obedience of the
Armed Forces to the unquestioned civil aitt iority. All of these questions are of such tremendous importance that if there is any doubt
expressed by eminent authorities , sue;h is the Attorney General, I
think we have got. to resolve those doibts in favor of certainty, and
certainty is only provided by a constitutional amendment..
Mr. (',i)Nymus. Thank you vely much,

Mr. Cimnmr. Mr. Grider?
Mr. GrDIWR. I would like to alt the gentleman from Maryland a
couple of questions.
It seems to be implicit in section 1 of your amendment that. in the
event, the President-elect were to die before his inauguration, that the
Vice-President-elect would assume the Presidency.
My question is whether or not that is the prescribed procedure and,
if so, where do you find that authority?
Mr. HtirrcisoN Isn't it in the 20th amendment ?
Mr. MATTITAS. I will ield to counsel for that..
Mr. CoPENrAVEn. Itsays in section 3 of the 20th amendment:
If, at the the fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the Pres-

dent-elect shall have died, the Vice-President-elect shall become President.

Mr. GiDFr. That sure answers that question.

Mr. MATHIAS. It shows you how dependent we are upon the very

valuable legal staff which serves this great committee.
Mr. GnIe. I would like to ask you oue other question. You have
become rather technical in setting forth the contingencies under which
the office of Vice President would become vacant-for example, in the
event of th assumption by the Vice President of the office of P resident.
I would liko to ask teigentleman wvhat the advantage is in delineating all the different, contingencies under which the office would become vacant? Why would it not be desirable to simply say when the
office of the Vice President becomes vacant?
Mr. MATrIAs. Perhaps the gentlemiui might refer to the line to
which you have reference.
Mr. CrENUAVEU. It is line 3; isn't it?
Mr. Gime. Beginning on the second page, line 3, "because of the
death or removal from office," and so on, ail the way down through
line 13.
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Mr. MATArIIAs. We adopted that language in drafting this proposal
which is fairly parallel to the existing language in tile Constitution,
and perhaps counsel might read from the Constitution the relevant
articles.
Mr. CormUAvER. Article 11, section 5, I believe talks about the
death or removal from office of the President,
Mr. MATTAS. I think the only intervention here would be the death
of a Vice-President-elect from the standard language of the original
portion of the Constitution.
Mr. CI ELF. Are there any other questions by counsel?

Thank you very much, Mr. Mathias. We certainly do appreciate
your interest in this matter. You have been a great help not only by
your contribution today, but by your previous diligent attendance and
the very searching questions which you ive propounded.
We were to hear next the Honorable Edward Roush from Indiana.
Is Mr. Roush in the room?
If not, will the Honorable Michael A. Musmanno, justice of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, come forward.
Let me say that we are glad to have you here, and appreciate your
attendance today. Your fame has preceded you in many parts of not
only this land but in many many others.
Mtr. MUsMANNo. Than you very, very much. May I proceed?
Mr. Ci-ir. Yes; please do.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL A. MUSMANNO, PENNSYLVANIA
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
Mr. MUSMANNO. Mr. Chairman, as a student of proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States for over 30 years, I prepared a constitutional amendment on presidential inability and succession, together with provisions on the office of the Vice President.
At my request, this constitutional amendment was introduced in the
Senate by the distinguished Senator Pastore, under Senate Joint
Resolution 34, and in the House by my friends, Congressmen Holland,
Fulton, and Moorhead under I-louse Joint Resolution 118, House Joint
Resolution 154, and House Joint Resolution 220, respectively.
I now formally withdraw these Senate and House joint, resolutions
from the consideration of Congress because I firmly believe that your
constitutional amendment, Mr. Chairman, House Joint Resolution 1,
which coincides with Senator Bayh's amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 1, ideally meets the situatin which has aroused the fears of the
Nation for decades.
What happens if the President is disabled to the extent that he ostensibly cannot perform the duties of his office? Under Senate Joint
Resolution 1 and Ilouse J'oit Resolution 1, the President may declare
his own disability or, if conditions make this impossible, the Vice
President, with the concurrence of the majority of the President's
-Cabinet, may announce the disability. When the President's disability ostensibly ends, he will, on his own declaration, resume his
presidential duties. If a majority of the Cabinet, plus the Vice President, believe the President still to be disabled, the Congress will decide
the issue.
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Under ly plan, now witl jrvawn, the issue would have been decided

in the first institnce--except, of course, when the President himself
(leclaredi a disability-wand throughout, by the Seiate and House Judiciary Committees, sitting jointly. After reading the Presidents message of January 28 on the subject, 1 saw at once how the plan he
recommends is far superior to mine and I so stated when. I testified
before Senator Bayh's committee, and withdrew Seiate Joint Resolution 34 from its consideration.

No one is better qualified to speak in this field than President Johnson. This subject deals (ireetly witi the office of Vice President
which lie has held, and the olice of President to which lie has been
elected by the people for 4 more years, after a year of presidential
achievements approved by the PeeoIle with a majority only rarely
.equalled in the history of the Nation). No one entered on presidential
duties more qualified by experience ind training in (hiverinent than
President Johnson. Ifiesj eaks now fronin 30 yeiars' loyal and extraor,dinarily able service in the Sihere of respionsib~ilily which you aro now
colsiderig., lie has faith tliat the Vice 1Presidelit. and the Presideit's
,Cabinet-and this is not restricted to the I)reselt, Vice ])resident, and
the )resent (,abinet, but.to all Vice Presideits wud Presidenits' Cabinets
in the future-will ably, conscieitiously, spee(lily, and justly resolve
:the questioii of presidential inability, should it ever arise.
I )elieve that the Prosiden, speaks wisely when lie says that the
matter of the Vice President tenlporarily acting its President should
he left to those who are closest to tihe I residetli, his own official family.
Who could be better informed on the President's condlitiont, his pro-

gram, pending projects, the State of the Nation, than those with whom
he works daily and those who enjoy his fullest confidence? Wile
therefore, would be in a better l)OSntioil to reassure the Nation ol
;a continuing fulfillment of the Presideit's lpians during a temporary
disability than those very persons who are his immediafe lieutenants?
It would be a bhnder, il ily view, to eitrist the problem of a, temporary presidential successor to any other body, as, for instance, the
judiciary, as las been suggested, or to a so-called ieutral commission,
is has been recommended, or, even to Congress itself, a l)lan which
has been advanced.
Nothing could be more distressir to the American people tlan
to have the question of presidential disAbility become what night
seem to be a.State trial with 535 persons sitthig as a jury. Of course,
if there should be a situation, which I cannot bring myself to believe
could ever happen, where there would be an impasse between the
Preside-nt and the Vice President, plus a majority of the Cabinet, as to
whether the President should or should not assume his duties after
a temporary disability, then Congress naturally would be the inevitable
body to ctit, the Gordian knot of any extended controversy between the
President and the Vice President.
Il.Vo have arrived at too mature a. state as a representtiive demo.ratic nation, staiidng before the world as the nlightiest republic
of all time, to assume that there could be such a. breakdown -in olur
executive department, where responsibilities reside in matters of this
eliaracter, that the contretemps would need to be sent to the legislative dehpartmelt. However, since we are now amending the Cons(titution, not only for the next 10 or 20 years, but for hundreds of years, it
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is well that even the most unimaginable contingency should be provided for, just in case it should happen.
Nor do I agree that the matter of temporary succession to the
Presidency should be regulated by statute rather than by constitutional amendment. I remember, Mr. Chairman, when I testified
before the late Senator Kefauver's committee on this subject in 1958,
there were those who opposed a constitutional amendment on the
ground that it would take too much time for adoption and ratification,
whereas a statute could be whipped through immediately. It is now
7 years since 1958 and that statute has not yet been whipped through.
We are dealing here with constitutional powers, the most serious,
solemn and potent of them all the Executive Office, and nothing
less than a constitutional amendment should effect a change which
could deal with the very destiny of the Nation.
Moreover, a constitutional statute no matter how carefully drawn,
could be attacked on constitutional grounds and its interpretation
would become a matter of judicial interposition. During the pendency
of such legal proceedings, the Ship of State, even in the midst of an
international tempest, which could threaten the very survival of our
Nation and its people, would be without a constitutional hand at the
helm. The very thought of such a possibility is frightening. Unfortunately, it is more than a possibility. In these days of almost
daily international crises, the dread ypothesi could be almost a
likelihood.
With regard to Senate Joint Resolution 1 and iouse Joint Resolution 1, I have but one suggestion. Section 2 reads that Congress shall
elect the Vice President nominated by the President, but there is
no time limit on this confirmation process. If Congress should informally disapprove the President's choice but not vote on it, the
vice-presidential office could remain unfilled indefinitely. I respectfully suggest for your consideration that there should be added to,
section 2 the following:
If Congress does not elect such nominee within thirty days, the Pre.-4dent

shall submit another nominee and repeat individual nominations until Congress
elects a Vice President.

In my constitutional amendment I took up the subject of the Vice
President's office per se. On another occasion I should like to be
honored with an opportunity to speak on that subject before this
distinguished committee. However, I believe that subject can wait
until this present more pressing issue is decided.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesies and consideration.
Mr. Ci irF. Judge, your statement has been most revealing and
soul searching, and I can say to you certainly as a listener you have
impressed me very much, especially on three points-all of it in particular, but specifically tie following three points.
On page 2 you said:
I believe that the President speaks wisely when he says that the matter of

the Vice President temporarily acting as President .4hol( be left to thiise wilio
are closest to the President, his own official family. Who could be better In-

formed on the President's condition, his program, pending projects, the stale
of the Union, than those with whom he works daily and those who enjoy his
fullest confidence?
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I think that that is, if not the crux, certainly a part of the fear that
most of us have had with respect to the designation of his successor.
Then again, Judge, on page 3 you stated inevitably if there was confusion, if there was doubt, if there was suspicion the Congress natu-

rally wo l be the inevitable body finally and lastly but certainly

,definitely the people's representatives to step in.
Mr. M US1ANNO. Yes.
Mr. CJWLF. Then again on page 4-and I was very much impressed
with this-you said:

I rfm(,nlhr that when I testifed before the Inte Senator Kefativer's ('nOniftt(o
oil this stulject in 1)58, M oere were those Who Opposed 11constitutional amtend-

ment on the ground that It would take too much time for adoption and ratiflca-

tion, whereas a statute could lie whipped through luiniediately. It Is now 7
years since 1058 and that statute has not yet been whipped through.

That is tio understatement of all time.
I personally want to thank you, Judge, for your kindness and con-

sideration in coning here. I knew that you would have much to contril)ute to this subject matter.
Mr. CEr,r.m?

The CnAIILMN. No questions.
Mr. Cim,F. Mr. MacGregor?

Mr. MAcGRE.o. No; but we thank you very much for your appearance, Judge Musmanno. I have no questions.

Mr. MUSMANNO. Thiank you, Congressman.

Mr. CTTELF. Mr. Hittehinson?
Mr. ulrciiiNsox. Judge, I take it in the last paragraph of your
statement you indicated that you are not withdrawing future consid,oration of your suggestion that the President have the power to assign
duties to the Vice President. In your proposal here, you say:
The Vice President shall assist tim President, alnd the President shall assign

to the Vice President such duties as he sees fit.

Mr. MUSUANNo. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. HTcIINso . Now, in withdrawing consideration of this

amendment at this time, you are not repudiathig that concept, are you?
Mr. MhsxiNo.
I am not rej)u(liatipeg that once)t, but being v'cry

realistic, I feel that. the Congress wouhl n'ot go into lilnt, subject a1t this
time. Probably the minority of Coitgress feels tlhtit it is ihIIpiortmit,
that the subject of presidential inability and succession be definitely
disposed of now, and I would not wat--no matter how passionItely

I feel on his other subject-to have the first l)art of the constitutional
amendment, jeopaidized by a lingering discussion ou the subject of
vice-presidential responsibilities and duties.
In a word, I believe it is a mistake that the Vice President shotild

be in the legislative department, because lie has no function there
except to preside over tie Senute as of course this conmniittee well
knows. Ie is a t imekeeper, a metronome, lie has no voice. Vice
President Nixon indicatedI that in 8 years lie only voted eight timesonce a yer--and with a Vice President of tremendous abilities and
energies such as we have, fortunately2 today, it seems to ne a waste
of great talent toliave him merely presidiig over tho Senate. I would
lIke to seo him in the executive departhiit,where he would be wOl
usod constitutionally, but. I say I have soe fears about the discussionn
.of that subject at this time.
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Mr. HuTcnlwsoN. Thank you, Judge.

Mr. CitnrLv. Mr. McCIory'?
Mr. McCionY. No questions.
Mr. Cxitnr.v. Mr. Tenzerl
Mr. TI4z~m. No questions.
Mr. CuE 4 F. Mr. Convers,?
Mr. CONYERS. No questions.
Mr. CITELF. Mr. Grider?
Mr. GRIDER. None; except to thank the Judge.
Mr. MuSTANINO. hankk you.
Mr. CIWIF. HOW about counsel ?
Mr. COPEN.irAVFI. Judge, on page 3 you make the statement:
It would be a blunder to entrust the problem of a temporary presidential suecessor to any other body * * *

With regard to this statement, are you again suggesting that in
I-ouse *Joint Resolution 1 we should not. permit Colgiress to have the
opportunity to appoint a body other than the Cabinet to pas on the
question of disability?
Mr. MUSMANNO. I do feel that way, and I am afraid that the resolution as drawn might 1)ermit. Congress to designate some. other body,
and I think that would be a big mistake.
Mr. COPFNiW.ER. Then you go on in the next paragraph and state
that it would be distressing to the American people, in a sense, if the
issue were to become a state trial with 535 persons-mtaning Congress-sitting as a jury.
Would you also thenmean to say that you would be opposed to the
provision in section 5 of House ,Joint Resolution 1 which gives Congress the final authority to challenge the Vice President's statement
which indicates that the President's disability remains after the President says it no longer remains?
Mr. WuSMANNo. No. You will find on page 3 that I do say that
if it becomes necessary, then Congress naturally would be the inevitable body to cut the Gordian knot of any extended controversy
between the President and the Vice President.
I do not believe that we will ever reach that state, because there is a
certain constitutional morality that is respected by members of the
Cabinet and those holding responsible. office under our democratic
republic. I don't think we 'Would ever get to thatpoint, hut if we
should, as .I said we are amending the Constitution not for 10 years
.or
hundreds of years, and we have that in reserve as
or 20 years, but
resort
in
the
last analysis to solve this problem.
the last
I don't think this problem will ever arise, but if it should, we have
no fear but that it will be properly disposed of in accordance with
the ideals of this great democracy of ours.
Mr. COI)NIIAmE. Now as a final question, keeping in mind your
statement about granting Congress the right to preclude any period
of too long delay in deciding ti is issue-your reference to cutting the
Gordian knot-and also on the fifth page whereyou sot out an alternative for filling the office of the Vice-Presidency, have you had an
opportunity to examine IHouse Joint Resolution 3 or House' Joint
Resolution 119, which were proposals which provided that Congress
be handed this issue of at contest between the President's statement
and the Vice President's statement on whether the President is or is

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

219

not disabled under section 5,that Congress must act within a. certain
period of thne, and if they do not the President automnatically ret urns

to the powers and duties of his office? Would you care to comment
upon that ?
Mr. MUSISMANNO. I don't think there should be any limitation placed
upon the time wit hit which Congress must act in the event we reach
that stage, but I though you were going to comment on my humble
suggestion that section 2 be amended, that if Congress does not, elect
such nominee within 30 days, the President. shall submit another
nominee and repeat individual nominations uint ilCongress elects a
Vice President. Here I do see perhaps a slight possibility of em-

barrassinent.
Suppose Congress informally is not impressed with the vice-)residential nominee, but yet does not wvant to vote him down. They simply
do nothing, and there is no way of compelling them to do anything.
Mr. CoPENIrVwE I. I might say as counsel sleakin
all I
feel much more strongly about the other situation, because I see too
many O)1)ortunities for political machinations occurring in section 6
of House Joint Resolution I whereby the Vlice President who has in
one way or another usurped the ofi ce of the President might fail to

reconvene Congress, or Congress delay for an indefinite period of time
in passing upon the President's disalility, so I feel strongly about the
need 'or a time limit there.
-I might say I 1)ersoilally agree there ought to be a time limit in
section 2. However, I would follow the same analogy wihereb the
Congress has 30d ays to pass u)on it. If it fails to pass ulpon it within
that 30-day period, then the nominee of tlhe resident shall become
Vice President.
Mr.

USMAN,,cqo.

I would say, Mr. Counsel, that constitutionally

under this )rol)posed resolution the Congress would he compelled to
conme into session even without the call of the President.
Mr. ComNrAV'Emi. There is no way they could be called in when they
liave adjourned. Ylou see, what I am trying to (1o is ('aw a sort of
reverse analogy of how it operates.
Going back to disability, I could see a situation arising where there
is real doubt in the Congr'ess as to which statement or set of fats to
accet-the President's that he no longer is disabled or the Vice
Presi(lent's that lie remais disabled-and there may be a (lose Pquestion. It is not a question of whether he is out, is unconscious, and
Congress very frankly not wishing to he a. buckpasser, lit Ibut.1 in
sincere doubt, anid respecting both mell, would instead of voting'and
upholding the President or voting and upholding the Vice Presideit,
say, "Since we have this, doubt, tIis doubt shall be passed 11favor of
the President by our refusing to vote within the time period," with
the Pi'esident returning to his office.

Mr. MUSMSANN O. It is your thought that the Acting President could
defer any I)ossibility of being ous'tedby not calling Congress in session. Is tlat tie fear you are expressing?
Mr. CoprPN ,rAVM. He could delay.
Mr. MUSMANNO. Well, my thlloilght is that-and I don't have the
wording of the resolution before me, but it indicates that Congress
shall then meet the issue.
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According to the ne wly revised Senate proposal
that says Congress shall immediately proceed to consider, which is
about as open as you could get.
Mr. MUSMANvo. And you feel that Congress could not, under that
Mr. COrENHAVER.

language, convene without the call of the President?
Mr. COPENIAVER. No.

Mr.

MUSTUANNO.

I would say that since this constitutional amend-

ment is complete in itself that it would necessarily amend any other
part of the Constitution which would call for the convening of Congress by the President. This would be one of those extraordinary
situations where Congress would need to convene automatically.
Mr. COPENIHAVER. Of course I might come back-aid I don't wish
to prolong this-I could come back and say naturally I am tryin to
envision a situation with a hostile Congress, and assuming that (Congress could prolong its discussion indefinitely. By the same token,
Congress may not wish to reconvene, even assuming your statement
was correct about the power to recall.
Mr. MUsmANNO. I feel that there should be some expression in the

amendment that Congress shall proceed within a certain chronological
time.

Mr. CUIELF. Mr. Foley, general counsel.
Mr. FOLEy. In the light of your comment with regard to the office

of the Vice-Presidency, I would like to call your attention to the language inserted in sections 4 and 5 as submitted by the Senate, tha,
whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments, or such body as Congress may provide,
transmits to the President of the Senate-and it goes on-and then in
5 we use the same language, whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and then goes on.
I would like to ask you this. In the light of that language, we
have only one President of the Senate and he is the Vice president
of the United States; is that not so?
Mr. MUSItANNo. That is true.
Mr. FoL Y. So that the Vice President would be writing to himself

as the President of the Senate in both section 4 and section 5.
Mr. MUSMANNO. When the President of the Senate is absent for
any reason, the President pro temporeMr. FOLEY. Ohl, but this constitutional amendment refers to the
President of the Senate, and article I, section 3, says:
The Vice President shall be the President of the Senate.

Mr. MJSMANNO. Very well. Even under that interpretation I see

no impediment, and certainly no constitutional obstacle because very
often an individual holds two offices raider our form o? government.
This applies to the State as well as the Federal Government, and there
is no reason why the Vice President .an'taddress a communication
to the President of the Senatewho physically happens to be himself.
Mr. FOLEY. You feel that that language doesnt need clarification
Mr. MUSMANNO. I don't think so.

Mr. COiELP. Judge, we had a similar situation on the Statelevel in
Kenfucy. Some few years- ago, the thon Governor of the State of
Kentucky saw fit to resign as Governor, so that the then Acting
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Governor of Kentucky, or Lieutenant Governor, could become Governor.
He sat down and he wrote himself a letter, literally wrote himself a
letter, "My dear Governor: I hereby tender my resignation," as of
such and such a date, and signed it by his name, and when he did
that he delivered it to himself from his left hand to his right and
it became official. Then the Lieutenant Governor became Governor,
was sworn into office, and promptly appointed my friend to the
Senate of thq United States" so it has been done-let's face it.
Mr. MiusrANro. And upheld constitutionally?
Mr. CEunF. Yes; it survived court test.
Mr. MusmAxNo. I might say in another department of government,

and then
sitsame
as a judge
law judge,
that
a judgeitmay
Congressman
speaking.
He
judge,
although
is the
sit as an equityChelf,
is acting as law judge, and then will say, from the bench, "I will now
sit in equity"--but it is always the same judge, the same knowledge,
the same office, but he is sitting in two capacities.
Mr. CmFuP. Exactly. Down in Kentucky, we have the county
judge who sits as county judge. Then he says, "I am now sitting as
juvenile judge," and he changes, literally changes colors right at
the same bench at the same time.
Mr. MUSMANNO. I think it is extremely well that we question all
these things as we go along, but I, myself, ao not see any constitutional
impediment or danger in Congressman Celler's proposed constitutional
amendment.
Mr. CHmL. Are there any additional questions by any of the members?
We will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, when the
Honorable Lewis Powell, Jr., president of the American Bar Association, will testify at 10 o'clock and the Honorable Herbert Brownell,
former Attorney General of theUnited States.
(Whereupon, tt 3:28 p.m., the committee adjourned until 10 a.m.,
Wednesday, February 17, 1965.)
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HousE or RErInESENTATIvWs,
COMA-I'IEE ON TIlE JUDICIARiY,

JlVihitigton,D.C.

The committee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 346,

Cannon Building, Hon. Emanuel Celler (chairman of the committee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Celler, Feighan, Chelf Rodino Donohue,
Hungate, Tenzer, Conyers, Grider, Jacobs, McCulloch, Poif, Cramer,
Lindsay, MacGregor, Mathias, Hutchinson, and McClory.
Also present: William R. Foley, general counsel; William H. Copenhaver, associate counsel.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order for further consideration of House Joint Resolution 1 and similar bills relating to
presidential disability.
We have two distinguished witnesses this morning, the Honorable
Lewis Powell, president of the American Bar Association, and the
former distinguished Attorney General of the United States, the Honorable Herbert Brownell, whio are both interested in the American
Bar Association's activities.
I want to say at the inception that I personally, and I am sure the
members of the Judiciary Committee found the brochure and the various other publications of the American Bar Association very enlightening and very helpful in giving us an understanding of this very difficult subject on presidential disability.
We are very happy this morning to welcome both of you gentle.
men. We Vil1 first-hear from President Powell of the American Bar
Association.
STATEMENT OF LEWIS r. PoWELr, TR., PRESIDENT OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Mr. POWVELL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, first
may I thank the committee on behalf of the American Bar Association
for the courtesy that the committee and its chairman have extended to
the American Bar Association, its officers, and its committee.
We have had a very close relationship which we have cherished and
appreciated very much.
This morning, Mr. Chairman, I will review briefly the interest of
the American Ba' Association in this subject. I have a prepared
statement which I think has been distributed to member of the coin.
inittee. I will summarize that, in the interest of saving time.
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I will be followed by Mr. Brownell, who is chairman of the association committee on this subject. Mr. Brownell will deal with the merits
of House Joint Resolution 1, and then we will both be available to
try to respond to questions.
I would like for the record to show that Mr. Edward Kuhn, who is
president-elect of the American Bar Association, is also here today.
He was a member of this committee last year.
The interest and concern of the American Bar Association and,
indeed, of this committee, go back many years. It finally became apparent to us 2 years ago that everyone was in agreement that there
was a need to do something about the problem of presidential inability
and vice-presidential vacancy. There was no argument as to the need.
The difficulty was that constructive action had been frustrated, since
the need first became evident in 1881, by diversity of opinion as to
theInproper solution.
the hope that possibly we could develop some sort of general
consensus in this area, the American bar assembled a conference in
Washington in January 1964 of persons who had demonstrated expertise in the field. The list of the conferees who took part in this conference is set forth on page 3 of my written statement.
We met for 2 days and 1 night. We had a luncheon which was attended by Chairman Celler and other members of the Congress. I
think it is fair to say that when we started out there were almost as
many views as to how best to solve this problem as there were conferees.
At the end of the second day, we agreed on a consensus containing a
statement of principles which we thought would solve both of these
problems. That consensus is set forth on pages 4 and 5 of my statement.
I should emphasize that the consensus is a statement of principles
rather than a definitive draft of a Constitutional amendment, and yet
the principles in the consensus of the American Bar Association have
been embodied in House Joint Resolution 1.
Following that conference in January, this matter was presented
to the house of delegates of the American Bar Association, which is
the representative body of the association, as I am sure all of you
gentlemen know' The house unanimously approved the consensus
and also authorized the creation of a special committee, which is now
chaired by Mr. Brownell.
The purpose of the committee was to try to educate the public generally as to the need and to develop support for action on these two
matters.
As a part of that program, we held a national forum in Washington in May 1964. Congressman Celler and a number of other distinguished leaders participated. Former President Eisenhower addressed the gathering, which included representatives oft leading national organIzations representing a broad spectrum of thought. Also
attending were representatives of the State bar associations from
across the country,.
*.FormerPresident Eisenhower's statement was quite a dramatic demonstratioii of the need f6i action.'
Following that forum, we went to State bars across the country, ai.d
as of today a majority of the State bar organizations have endorsed the
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American Bar Association consensus which, as I have stated, is conAistent in principle with House Joint Resolution 1.
I would like to add just a word, Mr. Chairman about the situation'in
the States. I am sure it is known quite well to members of this
committee, but there are some 47 State legislatures in session this year.
There will be only five in session hi 1966 that will not meet this year.'
Of course, a great many meet every year.
The legislative situation in the States suggests that unless we can
get an amendment to the Constitution on its way fairly early this
year, there will be no opportunity to consummate such amendment
through ratification by the States until, perhaps, 1967.
I would like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, if I may, by reading just the last page of my written statement
commencing atjpage 8.
As I have said, the vital need is for a solution of these grave prob.
lems of presidential inability and vice-presidential vacancy. There
have been extensive discussions whenever history has dramatized the
need. Indeed, no subject relating to our constitutional structure has
received more study. It. seems to us that the time has now come for
action.
It is not. necessary. as the distin wished experts assembled by the
American Bar Association agreed, tlat we find a solution which is free
from all reasonable objection. It is unlikely that such a solution will
ever be found, as the problems are inherently complex and difficult.
It is thi hoPe and strong recommendation of the American Bar
Association, Ihiclh we know is shared by this conunittee that past
differences can be reconciled and that a solution be initiated by this session of the Congress.
We urge that the solution be in the form of a proposed constitutional
amendment such as House Joint Resolution 1. We believe that the
principles of House Joint Resolution 1, which are supported by the
American Bar Association and by a considerable body of the most
knowledgeable scholars in the field, are sound and reasonable, and are
consistent with the basic framework of our Government. In short,
we think House Joint Resolution 1 and its counterpart in the Senate
is an acceptable solution to the grave problems of presidential inability
and vice-presidential vacancy.
We respectfully commend House Joint Resolution 1 to this committee, and urge that the Congress act promptly so that the proposed
constitutional amendment may be submitted to the States for ratification at the earliest practicable time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The ChAIAMAN. We will put your formal statement into the record,
if ou wish.
r. POWELL. Thank you.
(The formal statement of Mr. Powell reads as follows:)
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name Is Lewis F. Powell,

Jr., I am president of the American Bar Association and practice law in Richmond, Va. I appreciate your invitation to appear here today-as a representative of the American Bar Association--to discuss the problem of presidential inability and also the related question of filling the office of Vice Presi
dent when a vacancy occurs. I am pleased to have with me today Herbert
Brownell, of NeW York, former U.S. Attorney General, and now chairman of
the American Bar Association Special Committee on Presidential Inability and
Vice Presidential Vacancy.
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In my statement I will trace the history of tile Amnerlcan iltiar Association's
interest in the subject of presidential inability and vice-presidential vacancy.
Air. Brownell will discuss the substance of the pending legislation, House Joint
Resolution 1, which we strongly support.
I wish to commend Ciairman Celler and this committee for your long Interest
in the problem of presidential Inability and vice-presidential vacancy. This
committee has graplpled with these problems for niany years, and has been a
leading force iln developing public awareness of the need for solutions. The
study undertaken by your committee Ill1955 and 1i50 focused attention, not
only onl the diliculties inherent in the subjects themselves, but also upon the
difficulties involved In obtaining agreement upon any single solution.
We are pleased that you are now having committee hearings and intend to
act promptly. We believe the thne has cone when a consensus exists, and when
action by tile Congress is eagerly awaited.
The denth of President Kennedy directed the entire Nation's attention to
the vacancy iln the Vice Presidency and to the Chaos which night have existed
had the PresIdent been disabled seriously.
As in pnast years when (risis has occurred ili the presilentlal office, the Amerlan people became acutely aware of the necessity of assuring unintrrulited con]it this awareness may die down again, as it
tinuity in Executive leadership.
has following other crises, unless appropriate action Is take promfl,
Congressional leaders, constitutional scholars, and many others hlave long
i has always
been iln agreement as to tile need. The problem---wh lei I helt past
frustrated action-has been the diversity of opinion is to tile proper solutions.
III all attempt to develop a consensus anong scholars wid stu(ielts of this
subject, the American liar Association iln January 11104. convened a conference
In Wa.shington on presidential ilablity and vlce-presidential vacancy.
Attending the conference iln Washington were Herbert Brownell, president,
Association of the liar of tile City of New York, and a former Attorney Gen eral
of (lie United States; John D, Feerick, attorney, New York; 1 aul A. Freund,
professor of law, larvard University ; Jonathan C. Gibson, chairnian, Standling
Comnilttee on Jurisprudence and Lnw Ieform, Amerian Bar Assoelation
liehard 11. lansei, attorney and author, Lincoln, Nebr.; Janes C. Kirby, Jr.,
associate professor of law, Vanderbilt University, and a former chief collnsel
to thle suilwommit tee on Constitutlonal Anendments. Senate Jldleiary Committee: Ross I. Malone, past president of the Anerican Bar Association, and a
former Deputy Attorney General of thle United States; Charles B. Nutting,
dean of the National Law Center; Walter 10. Craig, president, American liar
Association, Sylvester C. Smith, Jr., past president, American Bar Association;
Martin Taylor, chairman, Committee on Federal Constitution, New York State
Bar Association; Edward I,. Wright, clhalrman, House of Delegates, American
liar Assoehition, and myself.
The 2-day deliberations of this exceptionally well qunlifled group were Intense
and thorough. Proposals of the existing and past Congresses were reviewed In
detail. At the conclusion of tile deliberations, a consensus statement was made,
Although there was not complete agreement by each conferee on all points of
the flnal consensus, there was general agreement of the statement.
The conferees conshlered both Inability and vice-presidential vacancy in terms
of broad principles. On the question of action to be taken In the event of the
President's Inability, It was the consensus of tile conference that:
1. Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next in
line of succession provide a partial solution, but not an acceptable permanent
solution of the p~roblem.
2. Al amendment to the Constitution of the United States should be adopted
to resolve the problems which would arise in the event of the inability of the
President to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
8. The amendment should provide that in the event of the Inability of the
President the powers and duties, hut not the office, shall devolve upon tie Vice
President or person next In line of succession for the duration of the inability
of the President or until expiration of his term of office.
4. The amendment should provide that the inability of the President may be
established by declaration in writing of the President. In the event that the
President does not make known his Inability, it may be established by action of
the Vice President or person next in line of succession with the concurrence of
a majority of the Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may
by law provide.
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5. The amendment should provide lhat the ability of the President to resume
the powers and duties of his ofl1ce shall be established by lils declaration in
writing. In the event that the Vice President and a majority of tile Cabinet
or such other body as Congress may by law provide shall not conuer in tile
declaration of tie President, tile conlnulng Inability of tile President may then
be determined by the vote of two-thirds of the elected Members of each House of
the Congress.
On tile related question of presidential succession, it was the consensus that:
1. Tile Constitution should be amended to provide that ili the evelt of the
death, resignllon, or reiloval of the President, the Vice President or tile person
next in lite of sucession shll sueced to the office for the tnexpired term.
2. It Is highly desirable that tile office of Vice President lie tltled at all times.
Ai aiuendlIelt to tit,, Constittion shotlld be adopted provihing that when a
vacaticy occurs in tile office of Vice 'resident, the I'resident shall nominate
a person who, upon approval by a majority of the elected mellnbers of Congress
nIleeting II johlit session, sliall tiiten become Vice President for the unexpired
terill.
Thle conselisuis was reviewed thoroughly by tile association's committee on
jurisprudence sand law reform. The committee nelmebers agreed unailimnously In
recomnendiiig favorably the eollsellsit.s to lte assoclalton's Iouise of delegates oil
February 17, 11111.The house of delegates thlerelpon adopted a resolotllon reeonnnlileldillg that tile Constittiion of tile United States be amended it accordance
witll theil'plel'ples of the Coliselslist.
Ill lit
Me past, tihe failure to reach acceptable solutions to these problems has
beenl due )rilmarlly to the fallure of exlierts to agree upon a shigle saltisfelory
thollo.
Widespread public apathy 1im1also Ieen a contributing factor. With
these thoughts in mind, mid llleving that tilts organized lar had a special
resmnsillility in al area hivolving tile continuity of government Itself, tile
Amerian lir
Assochtion estallshed it Special Committee on Presidential
llltliility and Vicre 1'resditlil Vanil3lc.
in May of 191t, the special comllittee sponsored a national forum on the
subjects of "'residentlnl Inability" find "Vice 1'residlentlal Vacanlcy." Tile prograin of theint ional forum featured a paniel discussmi( by einintt constitutiolial authorities. ilcluding Chairinan ('eler of this connlittee. Former Presi.
dent Dwight 1). Nisenhower addressed the forum, and emlhasilzCd the potential
serlousltess of the situations relating to his Illness.
This forum was attended by major national business, labor, education. civic,
and jIrofessional groups, as well as by Menibers of Congress and the news media.
As a result of tile national forun, many of the pIrtlcliating groups Informed
their members of tle problems which exist and helped focus national attention
on obtaliling a workable solution,
Tile American lar Association, In cooperation with State and local bar asso.
clations throughout the country, las ccnitnued an active educational campaign
to alltiulate public Interest and understanding.
having l)artlell)ated in tils
effort personally, I can assure this conitltte tlat tlere Is widespread Interest
and a genulne anxiety over tile present constitutional void.
We have studied the schedule of State legislatures and find that 47 of the
50 State legislatures meet In 1005. Thirty-eight States are required to ratify an

amendment to the Constitution. Since the legislative sessions of mnany States
are of lilmted duration, It is essential thnt nn amendment be sent to the .States

promptly If It is to le ratified this year or by early 190(16. Each day's delay
reduces the chances of early ratification, If the requisite number of States do
not have an opportunity to act this year, It cannot be ratified until 1007.
A majority of State bar associations has endorsed a constitutional amendment
embodying the principles of Iiouse Joint Resolution 1, and will actively seek ratification by the State legislatures.
The vital need Is for a solution of these grave problems of presidential in.
ability and vice-presidentiAl vacancy. There have been extended discussions
of these problems whenever history has dramatized the need for solutions. Tndeed, no subject relating to our constitutional structure has received more study.
I suggest that the time has now come for action.
It Is not necessary, the distinguished experts assembled by the Ameriant Bar
Association agreed. that we find a solution free from all reasonable objection. It
Is unlikely that such a solution will ever be found, as the problems are Inherently
complex and difficult.

228,

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

it is the hope and. strong recommendation of the American Bar Association#
which we know is shared by this committee, that past differences be reconciled
and that a solution be initiated by this session of the Congress.
We urge that the solution be in the form of a proposed*constitutional amendment such as House Joint Resolution 1. We believe that the principles of House
Joint ReSolution 1, which are supported by the American Bar Association and a
considerable body of the most knowledgeable scholars in the field, are sound and
reeasonable, and are consistent with the basic framework of our Government.
In short, we think House Joint Resolution 1, and its counterpart in the Senate,
is an acceptable solution to the grave problems of presidential Inability and vicepresidential vacancy.
We respectfully commend House Joint Resolution I to this committee, and
urge that the Congress act promptly so that the proposed constitutional amendment may be submitted to the States for ratification at the earliest practicable
time.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Mr. Hungate?

Mr. HUNGATE. I will pass.

The CHAnRMAN. Mr. Tenzer V

Mr. TENZER. I want to thank the witness for his contributions made
to our deliberations.
The CHA\MAN. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. Co yms. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jacobs?

Mr. JACOBS. I wish to concur in Mr. Tenzer's comment.
Mr. POWELL. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. PoffI
Mr. Popp. I take pardonable pride in the fact that the chairman of
the American Bar Association is from Virginia. I think we are indebted to him, and I am sure we will be able to call him later, if need
be, to help us in connection with any language difficulties we may
encounter in implementing the principles about which there seems to
be a general consensus.
Mr. POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Poff.
The CHAMMAN. Mr. LindsayI

2 LINDSAY. Mr. Chairman, I would just make this comment. I
Mr.
hope Mr. Powell does not think because of the absence of cross-examination that means that there is not keen interest in the work that you
have done, the memorandum you have prepared, and the legislation
that you are supporting. The fact is you have done such a good job of
advising the country and educating this committee, I think most members of the committee are very familiar by now with the particular
measures that you are sponsoring.
There will be disagreement in details and methods, of course, but I
do think the American Bar Association has done a service in pulling
this thing together and without the use of your good offices we would
be going 'in too many different directions, I fear.
I-think you have supplied the pole around which more people can
gather than not. Were it not for the efforts the ABA his made and
other bar groups, such as the Assocition of the Bhir of the Cily of
N .York, I am not sure we could really come to agreement ol a
definitive proposal here, or the language. It would be very dffidilet,
o
indeed.
Mr; Powi . Thank you, Mr. Lindsay. I certainly did not wish to
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leave the impression that the ABA is the only bar that has been quite
active in this. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
has made a conspicuous contribution. The New York State Bar Association has studied this at great length.
Mr. LTTNDSAY. I would be interested in hearing your comment on

the statement made by Senator Eugene McCarthy the other day in the
Senate in which he said he had studied this matter at some length and
had finally reached the conclusion that only the simplest general
statement should be made in the Constitution and the rest done by
statute, that the Constitution shouldn't be burdened-the old argument that the Constitution shouldn't be burdened with detailed, precise
instruction.
Mr. POWELr. I would be happy to comment on that, Mr. Lindsay.
As a matter of fact, at one point that was the position of the American Bar Association. Indeed, I myself testified in support of that
before the Senate subcommittee several years ago, and yet after we

came out of the intensive 2-day and night sessions that I have referred
to, I had been completely won over to the different approach.
I think reasonable men can differ on this, quite obviously. Yet in
view of having made the transition myself, as I have spoken on this
subject around the country, when I have had an opportunity to talk
to a member of a State legislature, I have asked him what he thought

about the alternate approach, whether the State legislatures had
rather see the package or had rather leave it to the Congress.
Everybody is in agreement you must resolve the basic question as
to whether the powers and duties or his office pass, but from there
on the question is whether you leave it to the Congress, or whether you
provide within the framework of the Constitution itself, the mechanics of dealing with the disability issue.
I think I can say, without any exception, that the members of State
legislatures with whom I have talked have preferred the approach
of House Joint Resolution 1. I think they would rather have a more
definitive statement of what is proposed to be done, what the solution
really is.
Mi. LTINDSAY. What was it that swung you over from your original

position? I take it your original position was that there would have to
be a constitutional language change but that it could be done with a
sentence or two, and from then on it would be statutory.
Mr. POWE.L. I don't think many people differ from the view that
an amendment to the Constitution is certainly desirable. There are
experts who will contend that it isn't necessary, but unless you have an
amendment to the Constitution to resolve what is briefly referred to
as the Tyler precedent, which relates to whether or not there would
be an assumption of the powers and dvties only rather than the office,
that issue would be unresolved and would be subject to legislation.
I haven't read Senator McCarthy's statement, but I assume he would
resolve that by constitutional amendment.
Mr. LINDSAY. I am not clear whether he was lending full backing
to Senator Dirksen's position.
Mr. POWELL. Which would leave to congressional actionthe details

as to who determines disability and how the end of disability is deter-
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mined, and the like, but it was on this latter point that we spent so
much time in the deliberations we had here in WVashington in the

January meeting. The fact that Congress had gone for all these years
without solving that particular problem caused some doubt as to
whether or not if it were left wide open Congress would reach agreement on it.
The CHAIRMAN. We had a distinguished judge here w'ho testified
yesterday to the effect that numbers of people feel that a simple congressional statute might be sufficient. He countered by saying he
heard that 7 years ago, but nothing was done with reference to the
passingof a simple statute, and therefore while he felt that a statute

mightbe sufficient 7 years ago, he has realized now Congress was so
slow in enacting to that little degree that it is quite essential a constitutional amendment be adopted.
In any event, I take it from your remarks that we have nothing
in the Constitution now which directly or impliedly speaks of an
Acting President.
Mr. POWELL. That is correct.
The C1hAIRMAN. To dispel any doubts, you feel that as to that at

least there should be a constitutional amendment?
Mr. POWELL. I certainly do, Mr. Chairman. I have heard very
little dissent from that view.
The ChAIRMAN. Mr. Lindsay.

Mr. LINSAY. In the State legislatures that you were talking to,

did you get the impression it would be more difficult to have ratification of a general simple statement rather than the omnibus language?
Mr. POWLL. Mr. Lindsay, I would put it the other way around.
My own judgment is that tate legislatures are anxious to have an
opportunity to fill this constitutionaflgap, and if I had to guess, I would
guess they would go along with the simple type of amendment.
Yet there is no doubt in my mind, from the conversations I have
had, and they haven't been comprehensive. I spoke on Presidential
inability in Michigan, in Oklahoma, in Florida, and several other
places-a typical comment would be that we would like to see the
ground rules laid down in the amendment so we know what we are
voting on, and that they thought that would be p referable and more
likely to receive enthusiastic support from the State legislature. I
have discussed this with my people in Virginia, also. They would
prefer to see the basic ground rule spelled out as to who determines
disability, how, and when it ends.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mathias?
Mr. MATHIAS. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Ar.Hutehinson?
Mr. HUrCniNsoN. No questions.
The CITAM AN. Mr. McClory.
Mr. McCLoy.There wasn't any particular form of proposed constitutional amendment that you discussed in Michigan, or with any
other State legislative groups-when you talked about the package?
You weren't talking about langua e, but about the structure of the
proposed constitutional amendment?
Mr. POW=lL. The way we have presented this around the country,
Mr. McClory, is in terms of the consensus that was developed during
the Washington conference and which was approved by the house of
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delegates of the American Bar Association. That is set forth oi pages
4 and 5 of my statement.
This consensus is expressed in terms not of legal language, precisely, but, in terms which ill sll)stlh1anco have been embodied more preciely in iouseJoint. Resolution 1.
In other words, this consensus did cross the bridge of spelling out
the procedure with respect to disability.
Mr. McCLony. Is the nmain difference for the alteration of your opinion from the short. form of constitutional amendment to tile more expanded form as contained in House Joint Resoltition 1 that it has a
btter chance of ratification?
Mr. PowF,,. That. is one of the reasons, hut I think I could fairly
say that the arguments of scholars whom I respected in fact won me
over a after a couple of days.
Mr. McCton-. What do you think of the proposition that by adding
detail, you encourage disagi'eeinent with regard to each detail that you
add? boyou think there is anvthingto that point'?
Mr. Pow.U,. Well, I think certainly that. is fairly arguable. On
the other hand, if you leave it in the posture of a blank check, I wonder
whether you don't raise even more questions.
Mr. lfcCtoir. Do you think that leaving the subject of commencement of disability and determination of commencement of disability
in the hands of (Oongress would be denominated a lblink check which
people would generally oppose?
Mr. PowErLr.1 That is my determination, and it may not be an apt
one. I think there is a real concern when you talk to thoughtful peopie, and the question that is asked me more often than any other
single question is in view of tie obvious need to do something about
this, why haven't we done something. Ti very fact that since the
Garfield illness for 80 days in 1881, the Congress and lawyers and
constitutional scholars have tried to solve this problem and never have
been able to reach agreement, I thinlc causes uneasiness that unless we
settle it now definitively the same state of disagreement as to how to
settle it might continue.
Mr. McCLoRY. You wouldn't question that if there is a simple
statement of constitutional authority giving Congress the right to
determine the commencement and the termination of the period of
disability that Congress would have legislative authority to embody
that in statutory law, do you?
Mr. POWELL. NO.
Mr. McCLony. So that actually the form of the constitutional proposal which you urged earlier is not objectionable from a constitutional
point of view?
Mr. POWELL. No, sir.
Mr. McCLony. I think that is all, thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Powell, have you got a copy of Houso Joint
Resolution 1?
Mr. POWELL. I think I have; yes, sir.
The ChArrMAN. On page 3, line 4, there was some question about

the use of the word "immediately," and some thought, some testimony
was taken to the effect that there might be some time 'i'mit there placed
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upon Congress rather than the use of tle word "immediately" which
might be deemed to be indefinite and it was thought by I think Mr.
McCullouch-am I right, Mr. McCulloch-that it might be changed
to 10 days?
Mr. McCuirLocH. That is correct. I am of the opinion that there
is no unanimity on the meaning of the words "shall immediately
decide."
The CHARMAN. Have you any comment on that, Mr. Powell I
Mr. POWELL. Mr. Chairman, first let me say that the American
Bar Association consensus does not deal precisely with this question,
so I think I could start out by saying that certainly this sentence in its
present form and some insertion of a precise time limitation both
would be within the spirit of our consensus.
Having said that, I would add my own thought which is that I
would prefer to leave it, I think, in its present form. I shy away a
little bit from an arbitrary deadline there. It might sometimes present difficulty.
The CHrAIRAN. Ten daysim an emergency may be very long, where
in an ordinary, peaceful time, in times that are not ruffled, it might
be short, and you think maybe "immediately" might be the better
term?
Mr. POWELL. I would prefer it, I think.
Mr. MCCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman, would the chairman yield a
moment?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MCCULLOcO.

I read in the press that the Senate Judiciary

Committee has further amended the language to some such words as
"immediately proceed to decide."
As I recall, we had some language in one of the most famous of our
most recent Supreme Court decisions where they say that political subdivisions shall proceed with all deliberate speed.
I think that the language of the Senate gives a greater possibility
of delay than the bill proposed by me. I am of the further opinion
that we should always keep in mind that any delay of any consequence
by any protracted debate denies, if the facts are as we presume them
to be, trie President from assuming his constitutional duties. He is
being denied the right to act during this period of deliberation.
The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman wilf yield, should not the thrust
of this constitutional amendment be more or less favorable to a President?
Mr. MCOULLOCH. Exactly, Mr. Chairman, because we withold from
the Chief of State in this country a right which is given to him by the
Constitution, and which has been further implemented by vote of the
people.
le CHAIRMfANq. With that preamble,, then, wouldn't it be better to
have the word "immediately" so that Congres would be compelled to
make a decision one way or another to relieve the uncertainty, which
would be to the advantage of the President?
Mr. McCurLocn. Mr. Chairman, I am fearful that I do not believe
that the word "immediately" has a fixed and definite meaning, and it
certainly doesn't mean to me in this text that it means today or toniorrow or the next day, if there is proper debate in both Houses of
the Congress.
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I have had Mr. Copenhaver, one of the staffmen, do a good deal of
research on this matter, and I would be glad, if the chairman please,
if he would make a comment or two at this time.
The CHAMMAN. Certainly.
Mr. COPENIHAVER. Mr. Powell, a question to you with regard to a
situation where the Vice President and the Cabinet have taken away
the powers and duties of the office of the President from him-for one
reason or another-assuming it to be a proper action.
We also must consider the situation whien we may have a Congress
hostile to the President.
Now, with an open ended provision as it now exists in House Joint
Resolution 1, are there not two possibilities for prolonged delay?
One is if the Vice President fails to recall an adjoutned Congress, and
the second is for a Congress-assuining it may be hostile-to prolong
the consideration of the issue of the President's continuindefinitely
in1IFurthermore,
disability.$ isn't there a possibility that Congress, receiving a
statement from the President that le is no longer disabled, and a
statement by the Vice President that lie remains disabled, could
actually become involved in doubt as to which is the more reliable or
accurate statement?
Doesn't the provision of Mr. Poff and Mr. McCulloch which includes
a time limit present a better out, because what it says is if Congress
does not act within -acertain number of days the office automatically
reverts to that of the rightful holder, the President?
This would require the Vice President to reconvene Congress if he
wishes to have his statement acted upon, but also gives Cjongress a
triple option. It can act and uphold the Vice President, but it must
within a certain period of time-L-it can't delay. It can act and uphold
the President within the required time or, if the Congress is honestly
in doubt as to which of the two statements to accept, it might rightfully remain inactive and permit the office to return to the rightful
holder under the Constitution.
Mr. POWELL. I think, Mr. Copenhaver, that those are all possibilities
that certainly could happen. I would suppose-and I think all of
us must have this in mina, that on an issue as vital to the welfare of
the country as whether or not a President has recovered from disability and should go back, that the whole structure of our Government would be under the most intensive public scrutiny, and I would
think it quite unlikely that the Vice President or the Congress would
in those circumstances fail to act responsibly. I do not-believe the
Congress or the Vice President would deliberately engage in delay
to keep the Vice President in power.
Mr. POFF. If I may pursue that line of questioning, Mr. Chairman,
this has been my line of questioning throughout.
I don't believe that counsel intended to suggest that delay would
necessarily be bad. Rather, I think, lie intended to suggest that delay
might be purposeful and proper.
Mr. PO ELL. Purposeful and what?
Mr. PoFF. And proper.
May I illustrate what I mean by citing an analogy. We now have
the Reorganization Act which was a departure in the field of government in many ways, which permits the Executive to present to the
Congress a plan for the reorganization of one of the executive agencies.
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After the receipt of that plan by the Congress, the Congress has a
specified time--nainely,60 days--within which it must act negatively
if it opposes the plan of reorganization, and if it fails to act negatively,
then
the plan of reorganization becomes effective at the end of the 60th
day.
d ow,the analogy, I think, is apparent. Section 5 of my bill to repeat in part what counsel has said, gives the Congress three alternatives. Itallows the Congress to act on the Vice President's challenge
affirmatively, in which case the Vice President will continue to discharge the powers and duties of the office.
Secondly, it allows the Congress to act negatively on the Vice President's challenge, which permits the President to resume the discharge
of the powers and duties of his office.
Third, it permits the Congress, if it considers itwise to do so for any

reason, to sit in an inactive state for 10 days, at the end of which the

President would resume the discharge of the powers and duties of his

office.

Now, I feel and I believe your testimony indicates you feel that the
effect of this amendment should be to preserve and protect the powers
of the President of the United States elected by the people of the
United States,

Mr. PoWvLL. Yes.
Mr. POFF. I suggest the procedure outlined in section 5 of my bill
does precisely that. It makes certain that if there is any congressional
delay, that delay will act in defense of the President.
Now, if that delay -is deliberate and proper, or accidental and improper, the effect is the same. It protects the President of the United
States.
On the other hand-and I am making this statement simply to pro-

voke a comment-House Joint Resolution I as it has been amended by
the Senate in section 5 permits delay.
. Now, is this a correct summary, and what would be your comments
concerning the philosophy in vol ved ?
.
Mr. POW-LL. Well, I certainly agree with your basic premise, Mr.

Poff, that this whole procedure ought to be-weighed carefully in favor
of preserving the office of the elected President of the United States,
and I think serious consideration should be given to any suggestion
that is directed toward that end.
As I stated at the outset in my discussion of this particular question,
the Amelican Bar AssociAtion hasn't given me any istructions on this
precise point, and I don't think I could fairly say that I myself have
considered it meticulously and maturely.
My disposition has, been however-I knew the point had been
raised-my disposition has been to wonder whether there might not
be some times when the issue of whether or not the President had recovered was a very'difficult one. For example, it might come up at a
time when the Congr'ess was not in session, and a iO-day period might
indeed be too brief 'nwhich to enable you to get everybody back hero
and get into the record what evidence you felt might be necessary to
enable the Congress to make a decision.
Mr. POFF. May I say', hfiresponse to that I recognize entirely tie
validity of the point 1yoi make, aid th 10-day period is an ar itdisry
per iod whieh might
It
onlyto-ine
debte.be lengthened or shortened. ••
it was
wits sugge;te(l
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In response to the other point you make, however, 1 call attention
to the fact that we are talking about a period of time in which the
Vice President is the-Acting President--Fie is in office discharging the
powers and duties of the office.
Now, if the Congress happens not to be in session during that period
of time, isn't the Vice President likely to call the Congress into session
if he knows, as he would know under section 5 of my bill, that the
Congress must act affirmatively in order to uphold his end?
I suggest that he, as a matter of self-interest, if none other, would
immediately call Congress into session, and if it takes 15 days to do
that, I would be glad to see the 10-day period changed to 15 days.
Mr. POWELL. I think it ought to be perfectly clear that there must
be a mechanism to call Congress into session immediately.

The

CJIAIMAN.

Under the Constitution, the President can call

Congress into session.
Mr. POWELL. It would have to be the President or the Vice President, if he were exercising the powers and duties of the President.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the Acting President would have
to call the Congress into session under section 5.
Mr. POWELL. Yes, sir.
Mr. POFF. Mr. Chairman, pardon me for interrupting counsel. He
had another question he wanted to put.
Mr. COPENHAVER. I just wanted to propound one more question
along the same line.
Assuming the'difficulty which we have to assume, the simple case
is clearly where there is no doubt where the President is able to
resume office, where there would be no objection to that, or the case
where the President is still unable to resume office and the Vice President, as the Acting President, makes his declaration and Congress so
acts.
Taking the case where there is sincere doubt, I ask, Mr.Powell which
is better for the welfare and the prestige and the respect of the Nation-a situation where Congress being in sincere doubt permits the
10 days to elapse and the President resumes office, or a case where the
Congress, being in sincere doubt, becomes involved in interminable
delay, which it could under the existing language of House Joint
]Resolution 1, going on for a period of weelts orlonger without coming
to a conclusion, because there is nothing in House Joint Resolution 1
which will force them to come to a decision.
Mr. POWELL. I thiihk the only thing I would add, Mr. Copenhaver,
is that what you are talking about is important, and I think reasonable
people can lave differences on these thoughts. I think I have exexpressed mine.
.
I would add, and this is the framework in which this entire discussion must be considered, that section 5 doesn't present this issue we
are talking about, inasmuch as the Vice President and a majority of
the Cabinet or heads of the executive departments conclude that the
President is still unable, and that is a very serious decision.
I think it must be assumed that the Vice President or a majority
of the Cabinet, who are presumably the people wlho know the President best and are the most intimate political associates of the President, would be extremely reluctant to invoke this issue unless the situatin were manilfestly serious.
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Mr. CoPEmnvu. I certainly agree with you, Mr. Powell. I might

just state in history there are no cases of this. In studying Wilson's
administration there was a period of 20 months or so when the President was completely incapacitated at times and at other times was
doing some business, peo le went in and talked to him and he seemed
quite able to carry on, so these periods occur.
Mr. PowzLL. They certainly can.
Mr. MoCuLLoom I should like to ask one question, Mr. Chairman.
What real objection do you find for listing a definite time within
which the Congress must act, otherwise the President resumes the full
powers and duties of his office?
Mr. Powmu. Mr. McCullochMr. MCOHuuo . For instance, 15 days, 10 days, any period we could
agree upon I
Mr. PowFu. I think the inflexibility of that worries me a little,
Mr. McCulloch, yet as I have stated earlier I think this point, while
important, is not a critical point.
In other words, I personally would accept a resolution of this point
either way. My preference would be in the language of the resolution we are discussing here, "shall immediately decide the issue,"
rather than try to pin it down because there is no magic in either 10
days or 15, and yet I think I have made it clear that so far as I personally am concerned, I would not regard this as an issue of principle.
Either way here would be quite acceptable to me personally, although I prefer the present language.
Mr. MOCULLmOH. If the resumption of the Presidency was under
such conditions that the President really wasn't able to carry on his
duties, there would be nothing under either House Joint Resolution
I or 3 or 119 to prevent the Vice President and the Cabinet from immediately thereafter taking the action authorized by the resolution,
is there?
Mr. PowzL. I think the answer to your question is yes but I am not
really sure of the references that you mentioned, Mr. McCulloch. You
referred to several other resolutions.
Mr. MCCULLOCH. The first, No. 1, is the Celler resolution, No. 3 is
my distinguished colleague's, Mr. Poff, and 119 is the resolution that
I offered.
I raise these questions because in talking with both lawyers and laymen there just is not real agreement of the meaning "shall immediately
proceed" or "shall immediately decide."
a
If I could anticipate the very distinguished witness, Mr. Brownell,
I would like to say I like this sentence:
The right of the President to resume the full powers and duties of the office
to which he was elected is basic to the Integrity of our electoral system and our
form of government. The absence of such a right clearly stated and beyond
reasonable dispute Is the basic defect in the constitutional provision on this
amendment,

Mr. Popp. If I might be permitted one final comment, I believe that
those who are worried about the 10-day cutoff period are concerned
primarily that a filibuster might develop in the other body which
might not be altogether pure in its motivation.
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Now, if
that is the
fear,
let Senate
me-speak
to thatcloture.
fear in this
It
Thisway.
happens
to invoke
vote
in the
two-thirds
requires
to be exactly the same vote that would be required to uphold the challenge of the Vice President, so I say that that fear is not well grounded.
The CI1AMAN. Mr. Donohue?
Mr. DONOHUE. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cramer?
Mr. CRAMEn. No questions.
The CITAIMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Powell. We thank you
for coining down here, and we certainly are very grateful to you as
head of the American Bar Association for your very splendid contribution to this subject.. We appreciate your coming.
Mr. PowwL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a great privilege to appear before this distinguished committee. Thank you all
vey much.'
The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is our former distinguished Attorney General, Mr. Herbert Bownell, who has always appeared here
with a great deal of profit to this committee.
Prior to your statement, I think Mr. Lindsay wishes to make a
statement.
Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Chairman and members of the Judiciary Committee, it is a reat privilege and honor for me to introduce to the
committee the distinguished former Attorney General of the United
States, Mr. Herbert Brownell, not only as a member of this committee
but also as a former executive assistant to Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, it is a personal privilege for me to do this as well.
Mr. Brownell -has served a recordbreaking term, or near recordbreaking term, I think, of 5 years as Attorney General of the United
States, from January of 1953 to November of 1957.
Thereafter, he resumed the practice of law, rejoined the distinguished New York firm of Lord, Day &Lord, and in the years 1962
through 1964 was president of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York.
Unless my recollection is wrong, it was under Mr. Herbert Brownell's leadership and personal direction that the first submission to
the Congress was made on the subject of presidential disability and
indeed the basic drafts that we are now considering are all modeled
after that first draft that was offered to the Congress by Attorney
General Brownell.
I think that the record is clear, also, that the excellent informal
written arrangement that all Presidents and Vice Presidents have
followed since the original agreement was entered into between President Eisenhower and-Vice President Nixon during the period of Mr.
Eisenhower's illness, was also the draftmanship of the witness that
we are now privileged to have before us, so it is a great honor, indeed
for this committee to have before it once again this distinguished
lawyer and public servant.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Browiiell.

44-261-65-16
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STATEMENT OF HERBERT BROWNELL, CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
INABILITY AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY

Mr. BROWNELL. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I nppre-

ciate those introductory remarks by the chairman and my own ('ongressman Congressman Lindsay, and if I may say a personal word,
some of tie most interesting hours of my life have been spent in this
room, in this chair.
Some have been lively, but always profitable to my way of thinking,
and I really am delighted to be back and appear this morning, as I
think has already been mentioned, as chairman of the Specia Corninittee of the American Bar Association on Presidential Inability and
Vice.Presidential Vacancy.
I know that my committee members would want me to say that they
on with me i expressing our appreciation of the opport unity to )airticipate in these climactic hearings on Chairman Celler's louse Joint
Resolution 1 and the other resolutimns on the same subject that are
presently pending before the committee.
I call these hearings climactic because they really, when you look
back, bring to a climax a 10-year study that has been made l)y this
committee and one of its subcommittees of a great unsolved constitutional Problem that faces the Nation-which ishow to insure orderly
transition of the powers and duties of the Presidency in the event the
President is unable to discharge those powers and ditties, and how to
insure that a Vice President shall be available at all times for that
purpose.
I thilk it is fair to say, too, that these hearings can be called climactic, also, because they were carried on during a period of such grave
and tragic occurrences affecting the Presidency. I refer, of course, to
(he heart attack and subsequent illnesses of President Eisenhower (luring his terms of office, and the assassination of President Kennedy,
so that surely no further argument is needed to demonstrate the
critical nature of the problem or the virtual necessity for its speedy
solution$
I recall that about the middle of 1955, 1 think it was, Mr. Chairman,
before the somber events to which I referred, Chairman Celer alerted
this committee to the advisability of a study and analysis ofthls Problem? and instituted a staff study in consultation with the Arnerican
Political Science Association which made a very constructive con rIbution. And then in January 1956, President Eisenhower instructed me
as Attorney General to make iastudy of the problem in its broadest
aspects, and some of you, I think, may recall-the older members of
the committee-the excellent research study conducted tinder the
auspices of Dr. Ruth Silva ith advisory assistance f rom lr. Corwin,
Of Princeton, and Dean 6riswold, of -larvard Law School, which
eventuated.
These tWo studies, tie one of this committee and tile other in the
Department of Justice, had been completed by the spring of 1957, and
the results were then distilled in hearings before a subcommittee of this
committee in which I was privileged to appear ill April of 1957.
I think it is fair to say that public concern for a solution of this
problem has steadily increased since that time, and is today evidenced
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on all sides as this committee brings to a close its orderly comprehensive
and sc holarly study tlutt began here 10 years ago.
As President Powell of the American Bar Association has indicated
our national forum on presidential inability and vice-presidential[
vacancy was held last May, with broad representation from business,
labor, agricultural, civic, patriotic and welfare groups.

It convinced

us that thoughtful public opinion favored submission to the States of
a constitut ional amendment.
Before commenting an(d responding to questioning on the specific

provisions of House Joint Resolution 1 and other bills before the
committee, may I state that the 10-year study of this problem in which
most of you committee members have participated from t 1ile to time,
and the concurrent discussions in the Senate and by private groups
have developed that there is very broad agreement on various aspects
of fle problem, and in particular four that 1 would like to mention.
First, that the need for prompt action is overwhelming and recent
tragic events have made it clear that failure to act would be recklessly
gambling with the stability of our Government.
The second point of substantial agreement I think is that modern
analysis of the history of the original Constitutional Convent ion has
produced substantial agreement among scholars that. it was in fact
the intent ion of the Founding Fathers that in the event of president hil
inability the Vice President should be only Acting President and only
during
thenoterm
that disability.
Third,
realofdifficulty
hais, in our history, attended the determna.
tio of when or whether it President is unable to perfornl the dutiess of
his office, but rather the crux of tie problem is to insure that, the Vice
President can take over with unquestioned authority for a temporary
period when the President's inability is not disputed. and that the
President can resume that office once he has recovered.
The fourth substantial point of agreement that has developed as it
result of these studies, is that a constitutional anlendnient, is needed
to solve the problem.
Now, with these four points having received such widespread
acceptance, anid since I have previously testified before your committee in detail regarding the history of paragraph t of section 1
of article II of tile Constitution, I think it might be advisable and
save your time if I confine my remarks at this point to the specifle
provisions of House.Joint Resolution 1.
As you know, these specific provisions have been endorsed by the
President. They are in substantial accord with Senate Joint lIeso.
lution 1 by Senator Bayh. As President Powell pointed out, they
encompass the substance of the so-called American Bar Assoclation
consensus and 'We believe that they apply tile proper constitutional
principles to the solution of.the problem under (iscussion.
Section 1 serves to place, In separate sections in the Constitution
the provisions about removal from office, death, or resignation of
the President, on the one hand, and disability of the Prc6sident, on
the other. And since the confusion and ambignity has resulted from
the original language of section 1 of article 1I treating them in one
section, this separation is clearly advisable. The provision in see.
tion'l for accession of the Vice President to the office of President
in case of removal, death, or resignation of a President is, I believe,
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really noncontroversial and follows the precedent set first by Vice
President John Tyler on the death of President Harrison and followed without exception at the time of the death of other Presidents
throughout our Nation's history.
If I may skip for a moment section 2, we come to 3 and 4, which
deal with the commencement of disability. There is apparently substantial agreement among those who have expressed an opinion on
the matter that the President should in any event have express constitutional authority to declare voluntarily at any time that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, whereupon
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.
htr
A typical situation that is covered by this section is one in which
the President is physically ill and his doctors recommend temporary
suspension of his normal governmental activities, to facilitate his
recovery. Other situations that have been visualized are those where
the President might be going to have an operation, or where he was
going abroad an might be out of reliable communication with the
White House for a short period.
In these cases the President's voluntary declaration, I believe
could cover either an indefinite or a specified period of time and
could specify a particular hour of commencement of the Vice President's role as Acting President. It is abundantly clear that the Vice
President in this case would serve only as Acting President and only
during the continuation of the disability, so that the reluctance we
have -ound in the past which has deterred Vice Presidents from
stepping in-notably in the Garfield and Wilson episodes-for fear
that they might be charged with usurpation of the Presidency is
very effectively diminished.
I might add, I think that section 3 would cover most instances of
inability which would be encountered in the future.
Section 4 is designed to cover the rare but dangerous situations
where the President is unable to declare his inability. Typical of these
would be a situation where the President was unconscious, or where lie
was mentally ill. When one considers the strong light of publicity
which surrounds every event at the White House, and certainly in time
of crises, the facts of such situation would undoubtedly be known to
the public, and action of the kind provided for in section 4 would not
only be condoned by public opinion but I think it would be welcomed.
Section 4 provides that the Vice President with the written concurrence of the heads of a majority of the executive departments or such
other body as Congress may by law provide, may transmit to congresss
his written declaration that, the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office and shall immediately assume such
powers and duties as Acting President.
Here again I think it is abundantly clear that the Vice President
would
step in only as Acting President and only for the period of disability.
My inter rotation of this is that two courses of action would be
possible. Fne, the Cabinet could notify the Vice President when a
majority of its members believes the President's inability was sufficient
for a devolution of power to the Vice President, and in this instance
I point to tlie fact that in the past Cabinet members have always noti-
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fled the Vice President when a President has died, so that this custom
would under this provision be extended to the case of disability, and
the Vice President must, under the plan, of course, have a concurrence
of the majority of the Cabinet. The other possible line of action would
be, alternatively, that the Vice President might take the initiative, but
in this case also written approval by a majority of the Cabinet would
be required.
Now, the reasons favoring the plan set forth in section 4 are apparent and have been detailed in previous testimony before this committee.
Briefly, they are, first, protection against usurpation. I have already mentioned that in the Garfield and Wilson cases, the Vice President hesitated to step in for fear of charges of usurpation of power if
he acted alone. Some scholars argue that under the present Constitution, if the Vice President stepped in, he automatically became President,-not Acting President-for the balance of the 4-year presidential
term, even if the President plainly recovered. This, of course, has
heightened the fear of charges of usurpation and of unseemly struggles for presidential power.
My own experience, I might intersect here, as a Cabinet member at
the time of President Eiseihower's heart attack leads me to the conclusion that the public rightly regards the members of the Cabinet
as strong adherents of the President who can be counted on in acting
with the Vice President, to help insure that no ill-considered action
to transfer the powers and duties of the Presidency, even for a temporary riod, would be taken. And, as a final check, of course, strong
Farable public opinion, as you gentlemen know from your own
experience, is requisite for the operation of any constitutional arrangement.
Now, secondly, among the reasons for support of section 4, the constitutional principle of separation of powers between branches of our
Federal Government is maintained, and no door is opened for undue
pressure on the executive branch from an, other branches of the Government. But you will notice that provision is made in section 4 to
care for any unexpected future situations where the Vice PresidentCabinet joint action night no loner be desirable, in that Congress may
provide by law for another type o machinery to achieve the temporary
transfer of power to the Vice President.
Since it is a constitutional amendment and not a statute we are considering, and thus must make provision for the long term and for unforeseen situations, I endorse the language giving Congress this authority and have little concern that Congress would in the future flout
public opinion which has through the years supported the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Now, there is a third pot that I would like to mention in connection with section 4, andthat is that certainty and prompt action are,
so far as possible, built into this proposal. You wi recall, of course,
that during the 10-year debate on presidential disability culminating
in these hearings, many plans have been advanced to have the existence
of disability decided by different types of commissions or medical
'experts, by the Supreme Court, orby other complicated ad hoc proldures. But upon analysis it has been found, I think you would all
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agree, that they all have the same fatal flaw, and that is that they would
b time consuming and divisive.
Now, what do I mean by that? We certainly would assume that

at any time where section 4is called into play, that itself would indicate that there is a national crisis, so that any substantial delay in
reaching a decision or any public airing of evidence before a deliberativo body which might, act with a split vote would at best intensify
the crisis and degrado the Presidency, and, at the worst, immobilize
the orderly functioning of out' Government with catastrophic consequences in time of a world crisis.
So in closing my comments on sections 3 and 4, on the commence-

ment of disability, I would just say this. I don't want you to understand that I think all conceivable situations are covered, or that. tile
solution adopted is in all respects perfect, because I don't think that any
mechanical or procedural solution will provide a complete answer
if you assMine hypothetical cases inwhich most of the parties are rogues
and in which no popular sense of constitutional propriety exists. 131ut
I do believe, and our American Bar Association consensus concludes
that the combination of the judgment of the Vice President and a
majority of the Cabinet members furnishes the most feasible formula,
in consonance with our basic constitutional principles.
An analogy that has crossed my mind is this, to say it in other words.
I visualize people sitting around trying to determine what is the cause
of airplane accidents at an airport where they have had some terrible
accidents and a lot of near-misses. They have called in all the engineers and the knowledgeable people and are trying to decide what to Lt
and they find out that most of the near-misses have come from one particular set of circumstances, and that they could cure 90 percent of that
by changing one runway, or by one particular procedure.
Now, I am sure there would be somebody in the group that would
say, "Well, what about this situation on another one of the runways?"
and another would say, "Well, let's not do it piecemeal, let's have a
long-term program that will cover every conceivable kind of accident
that can occur at this airport."
I think if you were sitting on that body you would say, "Well, let's,
for goodness sake, take care of that 90 percent of the problem and
do it right avay before the next near-miss or the next accident occurs."
That is what I think I would do, and how much more important it
is, of course in the situation we are discussing here for the orderly
transition of? the powers of the Presidency of tlhe United States. So
I say it doesn't cover every conceivable' situation, but I believe it
covers, in consonance with the basic constitutional principles, at least
90 percent of the cases we could reasonably foresee.
Now we come to section 5, dealing with tile termination of the disability. This section makes clear that the President may at any time
transmit to Congress his written declaration that no disability exists,
so with the exception of the extreme case that I will mention in a
moment, such declaration restores the President to the full exercise
of the powers and duties of the Presidency, and such declaration coo ld
terminate the period of disability whether it commenced by volunitry
action of the President or by action of the Vice President and a majority of the-Cabinet.
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I believe it could properly be interpreted to take effect either at the

end of a 2-day period or at a later specified date and Iiour. Of course,
if it was agreed upon by the President and the Vice President, it
could take effect at any earlier time specified therein.
Now, tie righ t of the President to resume the full. powers and duties
of te office to which hie was elected is basic to the interity of our
electoral system and our form of goeieiuont and the btenkC nof
deiospute, is the basic
and beyond reasonbie
such a right, clearly statedl
oilisabihit.
defect in te present constitutionlp'ovision
by section
to the nornial procedure
arsered
The extreme exption
5 arises when the Vice President and the majority of the Cabinet transmit to Congress within 2 dlays a written declaration that the President
dutieste of his office. I think no
dischnabletodichrge
wouldand
issue his declaration unless ie was
mind
i
in his r the; power
President
confident that he was able to function as President, and thegfaqt of
his temporary disability would have been well known to all, so that
only in the case of the President's mental illness can I visualize the

ext reme exception arising.

In sich event, the dilly elected representatives of the people in the

Senate aind House would immediately decide, as set forth in section 5,
thle outcome of thle Conlsti tution al crisis, and unless both Houses by

two-thirds vote taken separately decide that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the President shall

resume them, and I believe this means two-thirds of those Mlembers

of each

Iouse present and
s voting, a quorum being present.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you allow a.question at that point?

Mr. BROWNELr. Certainly.

Thode CAIRAn. This bothers me a little bit. The Constitution
provides that onl the President. can call t Congress into session.
that in the case of disability the Acting President who has
take ,it
alePresident who is A ying Presithe duties of the President-t Vice
dent, who has the duties of the President-could also call the Congress
into session. If he refuses to do so, our recourse, of course,would be

impeachment; but if Congress is not in session, hlow could we impeachI
Mr. BRovNE1,r. Well, I think as in so many other situations that

could be presented, we must rely on public opinion to force Government
officials to act if they are really recalcitrant.. I take it in two bites.
One is, I have always found in my seprtience that menwundei the
sbl b
prsure of national or international crisis do act res
the occasion arose when they didn't, I think public opinion would
force them to do it, or destroy their usefulness as public officials
thereafter.
Mr. TruzEn. Would the chairman yield for a moment and permit

a question at this pointI

Could that be solved by adding to section 5 a provision that when
Buchl a Message is transmitted to the Congress, Congress shall be
convened by the Acting PresidentI
Mr. BIIowNELL. I suppose he could still, if he were the kind of rogue
we are talking about for the moment, refuse to follow that express
provision, but such a provision certainly would make clear if he had
any doubt about his power-which I don't think he could under the
cases cited to this committee by Attorneiy General Katzenbach-but
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if that would in your opinion make it clearer, I would see no objection
to such a provision.
Mr. HuirOHIaSoN. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield for a question.
Mr. Brownell, could not the constitutional amendment itself provide

under such circumstances that the Congress would automatically convene within, say, 48 hours?
Mr. BRowNELL. It could.
Mr. HuTOIiziSON. And not require the Acting President to take any
action at all?
Mr. BROWNELL. It could.
The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Brownell.
Mr. BROWNELL. I have been asked to comment on a proposal to insert
in section 5 a specified number of days within which Congress should
act. The American Bar Association has not stated a position on
this point. I understand in this connection that Senate Joint Resolution 1 by Senator Bayh, which is identical to Chairman Celler's House

Joint Resolution 1-at least when the were introduced-has been

amended to provide that "Congress sall immediately proceed to
decide the issue."
If Congress is not in session at the time, as I mentioned a moment
ago, I beleve this language would operate to convene the Congress on
call of the Acting President, and you would have this implied power
to convene a special session to implement section 5.
Now, as I see it, in favor of leaving the time flexible-in other words
to use the word "immediately"-is the impossibility of coverin all
eventualities: Is Congress in session or out of session? Is it holiday
time, or the closing days of a political campaign ? Does a national
crisis exist? If the specified time is too short for proper action by
the Congress which will command public support, would unnecessary
confusion be created? All those questions arise, and perhaps favor
the flexible form. The argument in favor of inserting a specified
time, as I understand it is that it puts a termination date on the
period of uncertainty which would undoubtedly ensue if a conflict
between the President, on the one hand, and the Vice President-Cabinet
group, on the other, arose.
Before I state by own personal position on it, let me expand on that
a little bit more. There is precedent in the Constitution for putting
in a specific provision of this kind. I think the Constitution provides
that when Congress sends a bill to the President, he has 10 days within
which to act, and if he doesn't act the bill becomes law without his
signature, so there is nothing out of keeping with past practice in
this regard.
. The question comes to my mind as to what would happen if you took
11 days rather than 10, or 16 days instead of 15, to convince the public
that the right action was being taken: Suppose the President's doctor
said the President will be all right in 11 days. Probably the public
would want to wait for the 11 days before Congress acted, and Congress
itself would want to. There are all that variety of problems that are
involved, and of course in the Constitution--I fink it is in amendment
12-there is already provision that the Congress must act immediately in a case where it is beig called upon to elect a President because
of failure of the voters to cast a majority vote, a majority electoral
vote for one candidate, so you have precedent on that side in the
Constitution.
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I would express the personal view that public opinion would force
speedy action, as speedy as was wise under the circumstances, assuming
that Congress was obviously filibustering or delaying for some nonpublic reason, so that I would say the more flexible language, without
a specified time limit would be entirely adequate, but I add that the
insertion of a time limit would not do violence to the principles which
the American Bar Association consensus encompasses.
I deferred comment until now on section 2 of Chairman Celler's bill,
which provides whenever there is a vacancy in the office of Vice Presi-;
dent, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses. In my
opinion it is advisable to provide in the same constitutional amendment which deals with the question of presidential disability a provision that when the vacancy occurs in the Vice-Presidency steps shall
be taken
immediately
the manner to be
in the amendment
to
term. This
in the inVice-Presidency
fordefined
the unexpired
fill
the vacancy
would minimize the risk that our Nation will be faced with a situation
where neither the President nor the Vice President is available. We
are all familiar with the fact that at the regular quadrennial national
conventions of our political parties, it is the practice of the conventions
to turn to the newly nominated presidential candidate to ask him to
choose the vice-presidential candidate subject to convention approval.
Under House hoint Resolution 1 the President would likewise choose
his second in command, but subject to congressional approval. In
this way the public would be assured that the Vice President would be
of the same political party as the President and would be someone who
would presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the
President.
I am aware of the fact that suggestions have been made that the

new Vice President should be chosen by the electoral college and, in
theoryT, this plan has merit. As I point out in the written statementI don't think it is necessary to review it here-this solution has certain
practical hazards that I think make it distinctly unpreferable to the
procedure that is set forth in House Joint Resolution 1.
In closing, I merely say this: I want to congratulate Chairman
Celler and the members of the committee on the care and comprehensive nature of their 10-year study on this problem of presidential disability. I think the time has come to submit a constitutional amendment to the States, and that is the opinion of the American Bar
Association for whom I am privileged to speak today. As President
Powell pointed out, since the legislatures of practically all the States
are now in session, and only a small number convene in 1966 for unrestricted sessions, it might well save 2 years in obtaining the necessary ratifications if action in the Congress would be completed very
promptly, but I want to emphasize that I feel that deliberate action
in the case of constitutional amendments is always required, and I believe in this case that deliberate action has properly characterized your
consideration of the matter under discussion. We urge a speedy
culmination of your public spirited endeavors that you have exhibited
to date in meeting a most critical national problem.
The CHAMMIAN. Mr. Feighan I
Mr. FIGTrAN. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. ]RodinoI
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Mr. RODINO. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. DonohueI

Mr. DONOHiUE. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCullochf
Mr. MCCtLLOUI. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Poff?
Mr. POFF. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I have two lines of questioning which have previously been explored,
but which I think the witness should address himself to.
The first question deals 'with section 2, and the definition of the
word "vacancy." First, may I say that as an author I intended that
word should apply only to resignation, death, or removal of the Vice
President and that it should not apply to permanent disability of
the Vice President.
I will ask the witness, first of all, if that is his interpretation of the
definition of the Mord "vacancy" in that context?
Mr. BROWNEL.. Yes, it is.
Mr. POFF. Secondly, may I ask this hypothetical question? Suppose the Vice President were en route to London by air, and tle tirplane should crash in the Atlantic Ocean and the whereabouts of the
ico President would remain unknown for a season of time. Do you
feel that the period of time in which the whereabouts of the Vice President were unknown should properly constitute a vacancy within the
intention of section 2?

Mr.

BnOWNELL.

I am inclined to think there is a practical answer

Mr.

BnOWNELL.

You mean at a time when he is Acting President?

to that question, outside of the language of it, that you can imagine
what a search would Lo on, and in this age of instant communication
how rapidly the question could be solved-perhaps even more rapidly
than it would take for anyone in Washington to move-so that I don t
consider that that would be a serious problem.
Mr. POFF. Well I will pose one other possiblity. Suppose the Vice
President were kidnaped for a period of time, during which his whereabouts were unknown.
Mr. POFF. No, when he is acting as Vice President. That is what
section 2 contemplates, a vacancy in the Vice-Presidency.
Mr. BROWNELL. Oh, I see what you mean. No, I don't think that
would constitute a vacancy.
Mr. POFF. Well, suppb§e ]iis whereabouts remain unknown for a
month?
Mr. BiIOWNErL. I think that if the President felt that. there was a
national crisis that required action he could, under those circumstances,
take action.
Mr. POFF. What would happen if in a month and a day the Vice
President's whereabouts became known?
Mr. BRowNELL. I don't know.

Mr. Popp. Well, may I say that I think the gentleman answered the
questions as well as they can be answered. In your formal statement,
to cover all foreseeable contingeni possible
it is absolutely
you
must
with that 90 percent area of the spectrum.
have to deal
cies, said
and we
Mr. BROWNELL. Right.
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Mr. POFF. Now may I direct your attention to section 4 which has
been amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee to read in part as
follows:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the

executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmits to the President of the Senate * * *

In the testimony before this committee, the author of the Senate
bill, Senator Bayh, testified that the effect of this language was to
empower either the Vice President or a majority of the members of
the Cabinet, or a majority of the members of such other body as the
Congress may appoint, to initiate the action.
Now, contra istinguish the Jnitiation of the investigation, on the
one hand from initiation of discussion of a possibility of disability,
on the other. In your testimony you made reference to the fact that
truthfully any of the three might. My question, sir, is it wise to
Yrant this rather extensive power to Iagroup of people as distinguished
tom one Person?
In further explanation of the import of my question, I suggest that
the framers of the Constitution clearly implied that it would be the
Vice President who would initiate the action in the event of presidential inability.
Would you care to respond to the question?
Mr. BROWNELL. Well, I would have two comments to make on this.
One is based on my own personal experience at the time of President
Eisenhower's heart attacks. At that time it would be very hard for
me to say who initiated the discussions as to whether or not the President was able to act, there was such close working relationship between the Vice President and the Cabinet, and I would think that
same thing would be true at any time inthe future, and that it would
be a matter of little moment as to whether the Vice President telephoned the Secretary of State first, or the Secretary of the Treasury
telephoned the Vice President first. The people involved would be
acting in a period of national crisis. Probably there would be hourly
bulletins from the medical people, and statements would be made in
the press, television, radio, and whatnot, so that it isn't as though
someone were stirring up the problem-the problem would be present
in the minds of everybody in the United States, and I think that in
order to avoid any technical question as to who should start the discussions it is wise to leave it flexible so that either a Cabinet member
or the Vice President'could initiate discussion of the matter.
Mr. POFF. But I asked in the premise of my question to distinguish
between the initiation of discussion, on the one hand, and initiating
the procedure envisioned in section 4, on the other.
Mr. BROWNELL. In other words, who would sign with the fountain
pen first?
Mr. Poe. Who would prepare the document, who would sign it,
and towhom would he take it?
Mr. BizowWELL. I would think that that is a rather technical distinction. Undoubtedly the Justice Department would prepare the
papers, and the action would be taken at a joint meeting of the Vice
President and the Cabinet'members. It might not even be a matter of
publicknowledge as to who signed first. That particular point would
fade into insignificance in getting the group action.
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Mr. Popp. Well, this leads me into two subtitles of the question..
One is would your answer be the same as applied to "such other body
as Congress might ap point"?
Mr. BnOWNELL. Yes, I think so. I think we must assume that the,
Congress would act responsibly in the matter.
Mr. PoF. Now a next subtitle. Do you think your answer bears;
the full light of the searchlight if applied to the Lincoln Cabinet?
Mr. BROWNELL. Well, I think we must always realize that there is

the possibility in any Cabinet there would be a single individual or a
couple of individuals who may be out of sympathy with the majority
of the Cabinet, but I don't see that that would change the situation any.
In fact, I think that is why the House Joint Resolution 1 provides for
a majority of the Cabinet and not for unanimous action of the Cabinet,
just to take care of that kind of a situation where one particular member of the Cabinet might be entirely out of sympathy with the national
administration.
Mr. PorF. Well, I am not sure that I disagree with all you said
before you finished your last statement, but by the same token I am
not certain I agree with all you said in your lost statement.
Now, then, by way of summary, is it true that you feel, as a philosophical matter, there is really no great difference between the original
version of the Senate bill and the amendment of the Senate bill so far
as it applies to the question of who shall initiate the investigation, setting in motion the procedure envisioned in section 4?
Mr. BROWNELL. That is my opinion.
Mr. POFF. I thank the gentleman, and may I add I think the gentleman's testimony has been brilliant and has reflected an insight into
the problem which we have come to expect from the gentleman in his
long period of public service.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lindsay?
Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Chairman, I am sure Mr. Brownell would not

want to leave the witness chair without having one or two questions.
from his Congressman.
I have a feeling that when we get to executive session the sticking
point on this would be in this area that was being discussed by my
colleague from Virginia on the time period. Thatlincludes the possibility of filibuster, it includes Congress not being in session, and maybe
some other things.
House Joint-Resolution 1 goes off on the assumption that in the
event there is a disagreement between the President and the Vice President as to whether the President is disabled or is unable to perform his
functions, that should the Vice President assert himself and take over
as Acting President, he will continue in that status unless Congress
reverses him, in effect.
Now, this is the area where I think we are going to have the biggest
difficulty when we get down with a sharp penil to write this thing.
In House Joint Resolution 139, which is my own bill-you don't
need it before you, but tO;is la'ua'- woi'l bo familiar t yoi. I
think-the reverse is provided. Here it is immediately provided in sec.
tion 4 of my bill, asI is in House Joint Resolution 1, that as soon as the,
President says, "I am OR," that statement immediately bring back to
him all the powers and duties of the office. So far we are 0-ven in each.
of the bills on that point.
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The proposal that I introduced, which has been considered by others
before House Joint Resolution 1, then goes on to say, "But if the Presi.dent," et cetera, "with the written approval of the majority of the
heads of the executive departments", and so forth--"transmits to the
.Congress a declaration that in his opinion the President's disability
has not terminated, the Congress should thereupon consider the issue.
That is the language in tiLs particular one. It goes on to say if Congress is not then hi session, it shall assemble in special session on the
*call of the Vice President. Then it goes onIf the Congress determines by concurrent resolution adopted with approval
of two-thirds of the Members present in each House that the Inability of the
President has not terminated-

Putting it in. the double negative, as it were-,thereupon, notwithstanding any further announcement by the President, the
Vice President shall assume the discharge of such powers.

In other words, it is only in that event does the President lose power,
and our original objective, as stated by my colleague from Ohio and as
you stated in your opening remarks, is to protect Presidential power
at all cost, if possible.
Then in this saine bill there are three double-checks even on this
. step, should the Congress take it, which would put the Vice President
in a position of being Acting President. It goes on to say the Vice
President shall then assume the powers of the Presidency, assuming
.Congress reversed the President on two-thirds vote, unless one of three
events occur: (1) That the Acting President proclaims that the Presi•dent's inability is ended-in other words, the Vice President makes
his own decision on that-(2) the Congress determines, by concurrent
:resolution adopted with the approval of a majority of the Members
.present in each House, that the President's inability has ended, or (3)
-the President's term ends.
No. 2 is the significant one here, because here is the only proposal
that we have under consideration that gives any powers to the Congress to initiate in this area. In other words, if there is a wrangle
'between two power groups-one in the Cabinet and the Vice President;
on the other hand, the President--this proposal here would, first of all,
not allow powers to devolve upon the Vice President until Congress
decided that the President is wrong that he can act and the Vice President is right that he can't act.
Then, too, Congress reserves to itself a power we would never have,
unless we write it in, to later decide this question by itself, if it has to.
So that you may have full knowledge of where this stands with the
Attorney General, I put this question to him when he testified as to
-whether he would have any objections to this kind of reservation of
power by Congress, and I gathered that there wasn't any real objection.
Maybe I am overstating it, or perhaps I haven't stated it clearly.
It was one perhaps that he woul-d want to consider more--perhaps
.that is better stated. He did not see any immediate objection to it.

I am -wondering what is it that led the bar association people
•to reverse the original thinking of how Presidential power should
.moveintihis case.
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Well, first lot my say it is obvious from your reMr. Bnowxzmj,
marks that you have given very careful consideration to this whole
area of this problem. I am glad, first, that you brought us back to
this question of the insertion of a particular time, say a 10-day period
here,"because there was one thing that. I wanted to say that I neglected
to say in answer to a previous question, and that is I think that the
flexible provision that. Is in there now is in there out of careful consideration of the powers of Congress in the matter, that when you
put in the 10-day provision you really limit the power of Congress.
Now, if the Senate and Iouse decide that that is what they want
to do, as I mentioned before and I think President Powell of the
ABA also mentioned, it would not do violence to the principles we
support. I think that is the basic reasoning for the insertion of the
specific time limit in there.
Mr. LINDSAY. If I could interject there, the time factor becomes
rovelant only in connection with the importance of prewerving Prsidential power; correct?
Mr. Bi1owNi~mT,. Yes; that. brings it. to the other part of your
comment.
Mr. LINDSAY. This language overcomes that problem by retaininig
Presidential power in the absence of affirmative act, two-thirds of
the Members of Congress voting.
Mr. ]OWNELL. I think, myself, it is better to have that power of
Congress a reserved power in case of some unforeseen reason this

doesn't work out. I think it is a little more true to the doctrine of
separation of powers to leave the initial functioning here in the hands
of people in the executive branch, but that we should-as is provided
in all of these bills, I believe-have some residuum of power in the
Congress to set up another method if, in fact, this one doesn't work.
I would hesitate myself to give the initiating power to Congress
right at that point.
Ion't know whether that answers your question or not, but I think
there is a distinction in principle there.
Mr. LINDSAY. The key question that is troubling me is why is it

desirable, when the Vice President should make his declaration, to
rig this in such fashion thathe continues as Acting President in
power rather than-if there is a dispute between the President and

Vice President-retaining power in the hands of the President?
Mr. BROWNELL. I think that it could be done either way. I am inclined to thinc the reasoning back of the present language of House
Joint Resolution 1, and certainly was in our thinking, is there is a
presumption that the Vice President should continue during that
period because it has been proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that
the President was unable to act up to that point, and I would think
that the country would want to have some definitive act occur to he
sure that the President was able to come back, so that I think it is
perfectly reasonable to leave the Vice President inthat very brief
period.
Mr. LINDSAY. The only problem with that is it may not be proved,
because the only proof is the Vice President's say-so, backed by a
majority of the Cabinet, and that means that should the Congress get
into a hassle on the subject and filibuster, that means that the Presi(lent for all that period has lost power to control, and cannot take it
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back, when there is clear dispute between the President and the Vice
President as to the President's ability to function.
I would have thought, and the reason I stuck to this lanj1uaie here,
the reason I stayed with it was that I had reached the concusi'on that
if there was a difference between the President and tle Vice President
that the burden of proof should be on tie Vice President, and that the
Presidential power should be retained by the President if he says that
lie is in a position to act.
Now, the bills introduced by ti ehairinan t
o
by
Senator Bayh, following the American Bar Association's suggestions,
have reversed this, and ] am still not clear in my mind as to the reasons. I don't qiite get, it as to the reason for the reversal.
Mr.JACOBS. Would the gentleman yield
Mil. LINDISAY. Yes.
Mr. JAcoBs. Mr. Brownell, along the line of this inquiry, how soon,

in your opinion, would the Congress not have acted to support the
Vice President to the effect that, tie President will resume his powersI
Mr. llitOWNIL. You mean interpreting the word "immediately"?
Mr. JAcons. No; I mean in intrpretint rthe word "otherwise," the
12th from the last word in section 5: 1I the ojue in.tince, I assume
"otherwise" to imply two possibilities, (1) that a vote is taken which
did not produce a two-thirds majority, and (2) that no vote is taken.
My question is:. In your opinion, how 'soon would a vote not have
been taken to support the Vice President's contention to the effect
that the President would resume his constitutional powers?
Mr. B1RoWNELr. Well, there is no mathematical answer to that, and

that, of course, is one of the reasons the sutgestion has been made that
a definite time imit should be put in, andwe would have to give the
answer that lawyers so often have to give, and that is it. would depend
on all the circumstances of the case.
If the medical people, for example, had said no answer to this
question can be given for 15 days T think it would be reasonable to
say that certainly durin that Iiday period the time would not have
arrived, or something ofthat sort. .It is, however, impossible to give
a mathematical answer.
Mr. JAcons. If I may be permitted a further question, the only
problem I see is that the President of the United States sits in the
White House and says, "It has been 15 days, now, and Congress has
not decided, so I believe I should resume my powers today, or on the
20th, or the 30th."
Mr. iROWNE rL. That is conceivable.
Mr. JAcoBs. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Doxottuv. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. LINDSAY. Yes.

Mr. DoNommT. Assuming Mr. Brownell, Conress sustained the
declaration of the Vice Presdent that fle disability of the President
had not terminated, the Vice President would continue exercising the
Powers and duties. Then a month later the President again States,
1My disability has ceased."
Would you go through the same procedure again?
Mr. BRowNrLr. I would think so.
Mr. DoNOnvn. And that could go on from month to month.
Mr. BROIWNEL,. Theoretically that is possible.
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*Mr. LINDSAY. Well, I suppose that the single reason for placing
power in the hands of the Vice President on his declaration, supported by the Cabinet, even when the President disputes it is
that it assumes that commonsense and history would dictate that
there be no such major move within the Cabinet or on behalf of the
Vice President unless somethin is seriously wrong with the President, and if there is something that is seriously wrong with the President, he is not really in a position to say, "Well, I am OK," and therefore during this period of decision the Congress is debating, filibustering, or whatever they are doing on it, and in that period of the decision
the Vice President--as to whom there is no health question-should
act. I guess that must be the reasoning.
Mr. BROWNELL. I endorse that statement. I think there is more
continuity, in other words. It might prevent the offchance of jumping
back and forth.
Mr. LiNDSAY. I will be frank in saying it troubles me a little bit.
I could see how you could have critical periods where the President
was in an acute state of depression over world affairs or anything else,
where some people might conclude lie couldn't act, but he

is still the

President. He is still the President, and although there could be
argument as to his mental capacity, he should be able, I would think,
to declare his own ability to act and retain the power unless lie be
reversed by Congress rather than have the question decided in favor of
the Vice President and the majority of the Cabinet unless the Vice
President is reversed by Congress. I am troubled by this.
Mr. BROWNEL. If I may add one comment, I think that basic to
this whole discussion is the fact that in all the instances up to date in
our history, the fact of whether or not the President was unable to
act was never a real worry. That is even more so today perhaps than,
let's say, in Garfield's time, because in the white heat oppublicity on
the White House, on Walter Reed Hospital, so to speak, the facts in
99y, percent of the cases would be very well known, so that if anyone
tried to act irresponsibly it would be shown tip very soon.
I think that we really are talking about a question of mental incompetence,'because under any other set of circumstances that I can
*see, public opinion would be such that anyone who challenged it arbitrarily woullbe destroyed so far as his public career was concerned
and go down in history as a usurper, and everything in our history
indicates caution under these circumstances.
-1."think, b must come back to the central point that the problem
illustrated by history is not so much as to when the President becomes
unable to act, or whether he is able to act, but whether we have. set up
machinery that is workable to accomplish the-transfer under that
factual situation.
Mr. .LINDSAY. I wonder if I might put one final question on this
point, because itis goingto give me a good deal of trouble in my own
mind, and already has.,
D you.see any praacficl area of risk or danger in reversing House
Aiit Resolution I toretain power in the hands of the President where
there is a differencebetween the President and Vice President, as I
have it in my own bill'here? Is there any area of risk in .that?
Mr. BROW
WNF.L. I wish I could just say yes or -no, right off the
.handle,biW I really can't, because of this. House Joint Repolution 1
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provides that when tle Vice President and the Cabinet act, they must

do so within 2 days. lat to me would indicate that the President
would not come hack with his full authority during that 2-day period,
that there is a feeling that If he did act, irresponsibly that the Vice
President and the Caibinet; should have a short period there in which
to call tile question to the attention of the Con1gress.
Thft, ilother words, ildicates tHI; very serious doubts exist, about
the (hsability of the President. No (fiesti4on has been raise as to the
disability of t ie Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet has
sided with the Vice President.
urgingg the l)eriod while Cotgress lid the matter rider consideration, I would bo inclined, on l)alunce, to let tIe Vice President continue
during that time because it is always within the iower of the Cong0ress
to restore the President to the full exercise of the powers and duties
of his office.
Aft. LINDSAY. I would like to thank our distinguished witness. I
believe this was a brilliant perfornlice, and a very clear piece of
testimony.
Mr. Cii-.u,P. Are there any question, Mr. MacGregor?
Mr. MACGREORI. Mr. 13rown1ell, I would like to direCet your attention
for a few moments , if I may, to t hose port ions of section 4 and section 5
of House ,Joint, Resolutioul I which contain the language "such other
body as Congress may by law provide.'" Why do you feel this is
necessary ?
Mr. B tow.NELr,. Il my original test imony before this ('onunittee, or
sil)(omlnit tee, some yea iago, I tol tle )osit ion that. it was not lecessat'ry to have that expressed Ini
the (oiist itttion.
We had tle meeti ug w hith resulted ill
tie American Bar Associa-

tion consensus, an(i here was consi(lel'able view expressed at that,
time-antl I believe Senator 1)irksen, for one, has expressed it. recently-that the .whole matter should be left, to Congress, that constitit tonal ameidinelt should merely say that. this could be (lone ill such
manner as th1 Congress deenis adlvisable.
The discussion bild down to tihe fact that tie real reason for this
language whch
mention
11you is it. is conceivable that tie plan set forth
in the (onstitution might not. work, and that lere should be reserve
power in the Congress wit hout the necessity of going through the
l)rocess of anlot her const it lit ional amendieit t-o lhave some ot her system
set, UI) to replace the one set forth in tile constitutional amendment.
I was convinced by that, discussion that it is wise to have that reserve power there lii such maimer thht it,
would not be necessary to go
all though aiot her cost it utionul ameldilnent if the origiIal l)roposal
didl not work.
1'. MACGOT.oon. Should th(e Vce President-Cabinet joint action
proposal not; work,h
presently
have In
'it . body or
or bodies do
(1 . tVolt sir,
Sir,
. ,
ind that Congress might desimoitte to partHelpate il this
ance??~Itclaei
hsprom
Mr. BIIOWNELI1,,. Vell, I myself think it will work, and I have never
come to a point where I have (eveloped an alternate plan. I doubt
that t ile ever comes, but I think the principles that should governif the time does come-should be first that the initiation machinery
should beo
in the executive branch Inl Colnsonance withz ou0r prillciple of
solration of powers l)etween the branches of the Federal Government,
.
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and, secondly, that, i should have certaint y and be one which would
not call for a long period of tine in whi h to imike the decision, beCause,in)iUie(1 iacy wold be of major i 1 1'portanlice.
Within that framework, it- is possible another alte'hmato plan could
be developed.
Mr. MAWGriEmoit, My (Wst.ion was desigd to lead Ill) to l eveitlia
point,, Mr. Brownell, anl I am of course familiar %ithlthe fact that
there have beeo suggests that a colttiitissio) Ihe estallished, or that
tho line Inetmnl)ers of ile U.S. Slpreell Coiurlt, eolst it ute this ot her body,
but; the question that has bii in my m1ll( during the last couple of
days is one of hia uage, al if yoou have House Joint Resolution 1
before you, [ wouh like to direct. youir attitlOill to lines 14, 15%aod 16
on,• page 2, under sect ion 4, amnd to asi you whether or not, in your
opinion-under the language as now dira fted in H-ouse .Joint Resoluti-on 1-if the Congress did desigialte a another body, 1inan Inity would
be required, or only a majority?
Mr. BRioWNELL,. I think in such case the Congress could by law pro-

vide for iteither way.

Mr. MAcGMEA OH. I am wondering whether you feel that the lan-

guag, of tie constitutional anlllient. inhibits that1. power of Con-

gress 1li inwayy
Mr. BROIVNEHI,. No, I do not.
Mr. MAlCGIEot. I have reference 1o the fact that the langvuage on
line 14 refers to the written conference of a majority of the ieads
of executive depa rtm1ents. The next. word is"or", and then there is no
"of"-or of such other body. in other worls, it appea's from the
language as drafted here that we are precluding, or might,be thought
to be precluding the Congress from providing tlmit a majority of such
other (lesigniated body tiiighit act.
It aDpears to me here dat.. we Imlay be compelling unanimity of views
of, let s say, the nine mnen on the Supreme Court. This does not
as language is concerned ?
trouble you is lia
Mr. J.1i0WNk.,m. No, .I would be content to leave it as it is, but I see
no objection to the claricatioln that, you propose.
Mr. M:\(m.oomu. Thank you, Mr. Brownell. I, too, have found
your testimony helpful to lhe comnmiltee.
Mr. CIELF. Mr. Mathias?
Mir. MAvrnL- s. I have fomd in tim course of these hearings that I
have been playing the sonmewhaill utcongenial role of the Jeremiah, and
I am interested inl that yotir testimnon-y las relied to a great, degree on
the very healthy and happy relatiotiships which apparently existed
within the Cabinet during the Eiseniower administration, and upon
the fact that experience in 1)past history has given clear medical evidence of the existence of some disability on the part of the President
when it has existed.
But I have believed that we ought to follow the example of the
Constitutional Convention and .examine the hypothetical cases in
which the happy circiist ances does not. exist, and l)erhaps the unhappy
or unhefalthy c rcunstance would 1)revail, and I am reminded in connection with the colloquy with the gentleman from New York of several recent books that have been written about the illness of the late
Defense Secretary, James Forrestal, who apparently underwent a
rather long mental decline before lie fltially left office. I think it is
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entirely possible that in the context. of tensions in office todft' this
same sort, of debility could attack the President, so I would like to
plo a doulble-barreled question, tlie first. half of which is if there were
suh a long period of mental debility, such as Mr. Forrestal suffered,
in which sone of his collealgues observed eer'tail eccentricities which
others did not,, would there be it (hager-in your' judgment--of a
Clabilet intrigue, whiei could be dithgerous to the overall stability of
the Governlment, in View of the point made. by the gentleman from
,
.
Virginia that, any member of the CabInet has the opportunity
under
?
action
initiate
to
Ihls rovision
The i1.
l
would like to pit to yo the seconi luilf of the (luestiolin,
that if by providing in this single amendment for the fact that a Presidlent liomlinates Iis official heh ' nd sticessor who has the power to
initiate--you give that heir and successor lowers of deposition of the

man who is nonilnting him-are you not. creat ing some danger there
that the best, possible mal for t ie job may not be chosen?
These I plt to you together because 1 thilik you have to approach
theni ill the sile context,
MrP. BROWNE.Lb. Well, asto the first point, it is theoretically possible
for a.Cabinet member to e a misellief-makel, a Maehiavelli, a plain
overambitious office. seekerMP. MAT!M AS. 'l'hat. is not unknown i our hi ist-ory.
Mr'. BrowNH1 .J, (continuing). IRuthless nd unprincipled, hut I think

it, would be stretching things quite a hit to tthink that a nil jority of tile
Cabinet. would be ini that e(atego',, mid it,1111
tesi a m1ajority p1ls the
Vice President to act under tlie sect ion t Ntwe are talking lbout.
Mrv. MAT'miurs. If a single mebI)eP were to iitilate this kind of action

111id could persuade the Vice Presidet, thilt this was his golden op)ortunity, auNd they got one 01' two others to go along, it light, not Ibe a
majority, but you could develop a ellbil thlaiNt would l)e very dangerous
to the utility of the Goverililnt, it seeiis to ile.

Mr.
Y l1ITiivNi.m,.
tliink you ('oilld say i eohlinlist niight, start.
it, a. television (oliilientatol illigl, start it*, n Governor of a State
light start
jit, er
ialobbyist,
niglit.
stlarlpublic
it--thieil'e
e i,allbiut
sorts
ways ill
which
the mantt
coiidd coic
under'
d1iscuion,
theof
1)rotective
provlisioln is that there iiiist be i inajoiit y of tie members of tlie Cabinet,
aid the Vice President ider the white Ileat, of iiilulse lpublieity before
ally million, its distinguished from discussion, call be tuiken."
-

Mi'. MATiHAS. Of course, it. is trie thn anyone could start, it, but
tlie fact, is that this amendnlit. gives official san tiolu to I groil ) of

peolle who are defined ias the leads of execiiVe departments, which

not, only gives sanction but neti Ily laces them slider sonie resl)ii.ibilityMt.
to start,
if, andAs
thisto Wouild
l1ive lilte 01110 Cone1i.
BROWNEL.
the ottier
1)olit, now, that wias whether we

11ilihtl always expect, the man chosen or nomlinitied by the President
to be the bestiliil avililable-Mr. MAT'Itts. This is a.question where Tthinlcyou inve to look into
the presidential mid, ii( here you havle the anlalogy made that, we
give the President,this power )ecalise he had it. when lie was noinhiated
b) Ihis party, and because lie virtually had the Choice whel lie was
sitting ts )'residential nominee and being consulted ias to his wishes

before the convention nlom1inaites the Vice Piresident. Of course, there
you have a celrtail aecounalibility of his action, because lie has to im-
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mediately go before the country and sustain his choice of Vice President, and ho would naturally seek to complement his own strength by a
strong Vice President.
But in this amendment we are saying that, the President could not
only choose a man who in the event: of natural succession becomes his
lieir, but who by virtue of this machinery is charged with the responsibility actually to oust the President lnder certainn circumstances,
and ini the ease of mental disability-such as the Forrestal illness,he would oust him under conditions which- might. require very subjective decisions, and in which medical evidence might not, be clear.
Now, would not a President be somewhat itiflueneed by this possibilityfMr.
under
the circumstances
that.could exist?
BROWNmJL.
T think our
Government has come to a position in
modern times where it is almost, essential for a President who wants
to go down in history as a great President to have a Vice President
who is able, public spirited, and an effective public servant, the job
has become big. Tn each administration, more -iod more authority,
power, and duties seem to be placed upon the Vice President, so
that I think to counteract the points which you raised-and reasonably raised-you have a very strong self-interest on the part of the
President to select the best possible man, and we must keep that in
mind in weighing and trying to figure all the motives that would
go into such a clioice.
TWre have what I think is the sensible protective measure in that
Congress, in case an ilresponsible nomination is made, can block
it..
Mr. MATTnIms. T particularly appreciate the last. statement you made.
I think it. is a contribution to the political thinking of the country
and should stand as a landmark or guide for action of people who
might be placed in this position. I sincerely hope that the gentleman
is right and I am wrong in the judgment of history.
Mr. Cw,rr. Mr. I-utchinson?
Mr. trT'rcTmysoN. Thave only a.single question.
Mr. Brownell, is there any legal anffigiity in this phrase "heads of
the executive departments,"5 and should not the Congress be diroted
or authorized by statute to indicate-for instance, by Secretar of
State, Secretary of the Treasury, and so on-who is intended?
Mr. BROWNELt. My experience as Attorney General leads me to
think that this i's sufflciently clear to avoid any real risk.
I notice that the companion Senate amendneat has been changed to
read "principal officers of the executive departments." T see no objection to the use of that language, because either one of these is quite
clear when you take all of ti bIodies of Federal statutes into consideration as to who is meant.
Mr. HIurofirsxo. The modern Cabinet popularly is thought of as
consisting of such persons, perhaps, as the Ambassador to the United
Nations, and some others in addition to th6 heads of the old line
executive departments, but this language is intended to restrict this
function to those executive heads, as such, and not. the entire Cabinet,
in its popular sense?
Mr. BROWrVNELT. That is correct. It is not intended to include those
who let's say, are given Cabinet status although they are not. technicaily members of the Cabinet.
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Mr. HuroimNso. Thank you.
Mr. Cnimr. Mr. McClory?
Mr. McCimity. I want to add, Mr. Brownell, the fact that, you have
given a most. eowuineiig and helpful statement. You have answered
most of the questions I had for you. I would like to add this one
question, however, because it, has arisen here both with respect to the
earlier reeoiiolh&atiots of the American Bar Association, and a
qquestion which is flow arisin16I tle other body as to tile form of
the amendment. and(I would like your opinion as to whether or not--if
lie provisions for the (lelarat ion for the commencement and termination of the period of disabilitv wer enh)odied in the Statute, with the
constitutional provision iiielte-y 1111t horlizing the CongrOss to act in that

way--t here is any (onst it lit onal quest ion or objectfon to lhe office of
the Presidency, or the ex ,reim, of powers by whoever happens to be
in ant hority at that t inne. Is there any constitutional question or objection that, you have to thle alternat iv form?
Mr.come
BnoiwKNE,.
myself believe tlt the experts in the field largely
have
to the TconellsionI
that the alternative proposal to leave
everything to a statute would open the door to a plan which did not
protect prolwIrly tle cost itutional pilneiple of separation of powers,
and that in the original Cost itutiolnl Convention and tliroulghout our
history that. separlt ion of powePrs hms leen deemed so iml)or'tant that
it l)elongs in the Constitutionl.
Mr. Ciim'tv. Mr..I-ungate?
Mr. TuNOa,vE. General Brownell, I direct your attention to section
dealing
f
witl the question where, presidential disability has been
established and lie seeks to return to the duties of his office.
As I understand this. the Vice President and the majority of the
Cabinet might believe that lie was stil incompetent, anl lit could be
hat 65 percent of the Congress would believe he was incompetent and
yet lie would, with the concurrence of 35 percent of the body, resmne
is office.
I am just wondering about the use of the two-thirds rather than
the majority. T notice in House Joint Resolution 139, which has been
discussed before, Congress is giA'en some initiative. Tt is to be determined in that case by majority vote. I wondered what your
thoughts were on the distinction between the two-thirds requirement
as opposed to a,majority requirement.
Mr. BinowNnu,. I think the reasoning back of the two-thirds was
for the legislative branch to upset, the action of the executive branch
under these circumstances there should be very definite feeling in the
Congress that they should move into the situation. I think that is
the Iasic reasoning behind the two-thirds rather than the majority.
Mr. ITUNOATE. Thank you very much.
Mr. C01MP. Mr.,Tenzer?
Mr. TFzpNi. Would it be your view that the suggested instances of

irresponsible action and intrigue would fit into that area of 10 percent
that we would be unable to cover in a constitutional amendment, and
that perhaps these situations may never arise that call for immediate
action I
Mr. BRowNET. Yes.
Mr. TENZEI. I also would like to congratulate the distinguished
member of the bar from New York and the distinguished former At-
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torney General for the concise manner in which the testimony was
rendered, particularly tle clarity of his answers, and his patience as
well.
Mr. BROWNELL,. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cjirmi. Mf r. Jacobs?
Mr. JACOBS. I would simply like to thank Mr. Brownell for helping
us today.
Mr. C.hitux. We will adjournMr. BnowNmL. May I say, before you adjourn, I am delighted to
see you again. You were my first congressional conferee when I
came to Washington, and I remember very well the tremendous help
that you gave.
Mr. CHrELI0. I look upon it witi a great deal of pleasure, and it has
certainly been to my gain-I may say that. Our friendship, and the
fact you have come here today proves to me once again-if there was
any doubt, and certainly there has been none-that you are a great
American in my book. You made an outstanding Attorney General.
I want to apologize profusely for not having been here when you began your statement, but I have hurriedly read through it, and on page
83 I notice the four musts that you recommend there.
1. The need for prompt action is overwhelming and recent tragic events have

made it clear that failure to act would be recklessly gambling with the stability
of our Government.

I want to say I could never possibly agree with you more than that.
I think that is the crux of the whole thing, truly I do.
Mr. BROWNTTI,. 1 do, too.
Mf r. CH1WIL. There is no doubt about, it. Even if we act and do something that is wron g, we still ought to try; we ought to make an attempt.
Later we can iodi-fy, change or amedil, or orrect it. I think only time
will prove just, which method would be the right one and maybe do
the lob but, overall, I want to agree with you heartily and thank you
pro usely for coming. It is always a pleasure to see you, and God less
youi.
Mr. Bitowxi:i,t. Thank you.
Mr. CiiErF. We will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at
2 p.m.)
AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHARMAN. The committee will come to order.

Is there anyone else here beside Mr. Horton?

Mr. Hoirto. Mr. Robisoii is here, too.
The CHAIRMAN. We will hear you, Mr. Robison.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD W. ROBISON, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. RonwsoN. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I ain
pleased at the opportunity to be here before your committee in order
to express my strong support of your current effort, to find an acceptable and workable solution to the vexing problem of presidential
inability.
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During my 7 years of service inl the Coigress, the lack of any
formal procedure for dealing witi sucli an emergency situiaLtioln has
become of inereasig concern to me, and for |tie past. three Con-

grosses, I have introduced legislation to deal with theirol)lem.
As you are aware, the Congress has failed to act, to (late, in deaJ-

ing with this problem because of a contuinilg argumentt over two

points. First, whether article 11, section 1 of the Constitution now
gives the Congress the authority to deal with the 1)roblem 1)y Simple
statute or whether a consitiut ional amendment is needed.
Secondly, whether or not a constitutional aiTICielhdieeit is neeed,

what procedure or means should the Congress l)rovide for determliining presidential inability and its end of duration. Therefore, I
should like to speak to the nature of the action I believe we should
take.
Firs., to allay any possibility of challenge or illegality, 1 believe
a constitutional amendment should be enacted.
I believe, however, and favor strongly, that such an amendment
must be simple and clear in its intent and should not, include the
mechanism for determining presidential inability. Such an amendment is House Joint Resolution 294 w hih I have introdt( ed in this
Congress and which provides:
In case of the removal of the President from office, or his death or resignation,

tho said office shall devolve on the Vice President until the Inability be removed.

congress ma by1law n)rovi(h: for the CalIs of rlmoval, death, resignation,
or Inability, both of the lresilent and Vice Presihent, declaring what officer
shall then be lresi(lent, or In the (as' of Inability, act as lPresidelit, and such
oflcer shall be or act as President accordingly, until a President shall be elected
or, In case of inability, until the Inability shall be earlier removed. The commenceinent and terminatlon of any Inability 11all be determinedd by suc(h nethl(Ml
as Congress shall by law provide.
The

The language of this amendment, has been approved by the Amer-

ican Bar Association and many other interested organizations and,
in addition it is substantially the language which tHie then-Deputy

Attorney General, Mr. Katzenbach, strongly supported in hearingi&
before the Senate Judiciary Commit,tee in 1963 and 1964.
The CHAIMAN. Of course, he has changed his point of view now.
Mr. ROBISON. Well, I understand he may have, but he certainly
made a.strong statement at that, time pointing out to us the lack
of wisdom in loading the Constitution down-and I am quoting him,
now-"by
writing detailed procedural and substantive provisions into
it. )
The CHAIRMAN. Well, he takes the position now that from the
practical standpoint, in view of the fact there is such an overwhelming
consensus for a constitutional amendment, lie feels he has to bow down
to the inevitable and accept tle constitutional amendment idea.
Mr. RoisoN. I favor the constitutional amendment, too, Mr. Chairman. I want to make clear that I do, but I think the procedUres and
methods to determine inability and so forth- should be prescribed by
a separate statute, and I would like to speak to tlt,point now, If
As I said, I think that the specifics of tile method for determining
the inability y and its termination should not be "frozen" into the Constitution thus making them extremely hard to alter if in the future,
we find that a constitutionally provided method is faulty.
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Now, as to the method I believe worthy of consideration, I respectfully direct your attention to the provisions of House Joint Resolution
293 which I have introduced in tis Congress. My plan declares that
the determination of inability of the President or Vice President is a
political decision based upon the best, most impartial, and nonpartisan
expert medical opinion available an( that there should be an atfeny
or instrumentality of Government, in which the minority party s ould
have representation, created for the purpose of determi-ning the inability of the President and the termination of the period of disabitliy.
It proposes the creation of a Commission on Presidential Disability
composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, the
Speaker of the House, and the President pro tempore of the Senate,
and the majority and minority leaders of both the House and Senate,
with the Vice President., or the Speaker, if there is no Vice President,
being the nonvoting Chairman.
I shall not labor you with other details of my proposal, except to
say that it does, in my view, provide for nearly all of the contingencies,
including the presidential declaration of his own inability and of its
end, the power of the Commission to declare the President unable to
perform his duties, and it also empowers, Mr. Chairman, the Commission to issue a declaration that the President is alive in the face of
circumstances which might lead to a presumption of his death. I feel
the latter contingency is important in view of the perilous nuclearthreatened world in which we live.
Though I believe in my plan, I am not particularly wedded to its
details but I do strongly believe that congressional action on this subject should be in the form of a constitutional amendment plus a
separate statute, the first giving us the legal basis for acting and the
second outlining the methods for dealing with the problem.
There might also be a temporary benefit to this approach. The legislation setting up the Commission would take effect as soon as enactedit would be available for our use in case it was needed during the interim before a constitutional amendment was ratified 'by the necessary
two-thirds of the States. Though it would not, at this point, be based
on the authority of an actual constitutional amendment, its provisions
would have far more validity in the event of emergency than the present informal agreements between President and ice President which
have existed for the past several years and which have rested, I think
on an extremely doubtful premise that an emergency problem could
be so handled.
.Mr. Chairman, I deeply hope this committee will approve the constitutional amendment plus legislative method approach but whatever your decision, I expect to support it because I firmly believe that
we must take action this year to block the existing loophole in our
constitutional and governmental structure.
I thank the committee for permitting me to testify before it today.
The CiAIRA[AN. The main objective of your bill is to set up this
Committee on Disability of the President.
Mr. Ro~msom. Yes, sir. I think the difference in it as compared to
others is that it does bring into the decisionmaking process representation from the minority party, whichever party that may be at the time,
because I do think that what we would face would be not just a factual
or medical sit tiion, as I said, but also in the nature of a political
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decision in which the people of the United States ought to be able to
participate to the fullest extent possible through their representatives.
The CRAIRMAN. Who would be in control of this Committee so far as
votes are concerned-the executive or the legislative? I think the
legislative would be in control would it not?
Mr. ROBSO9N. Well, the Secretary of State, Treasury and Defense,
6 to 8, Mr. Chairman, the way I read it, with the legislative being in
control.
The CHAI MAN. You have 10 members, haven't you? Five legislative Mr. Ronisom. Well, the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense,
Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, majority and minority leaders of both the House and Senate-there is
the extra four-with the Vice President or the Speaker, if there is no
Vice President, serving as nonvoting Chairman.
The CHAIRIM.
Would the Chairman have a vote?
Mr. RonisoN. The Vice President would serve as Chairman, but as a
nonvoting Chairman to eliminate the possibility that his vote might be
questioned in certain aspects, as I am afraid we may always have a
problem here.
The CHAIRUAN. So that really is nine votes, and the legislative
would have five out of nine.
Mr. RoBisoN. In section 4(a), page 3, my bill says:
After so convening, the Committee may, by a vote of not less than five of the
members thereof, issue a declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office.

The same procedure would apply for determining the end of the
period of disability.
The CHIAIMAN. Of course, in our history we have had some very
peculiar situations develop, like in the Johnson administration where
the legislative branch was in absolute control. If you had this, they
would be in control of the Commission beyond any particle of doubt.
Mr. RoBisoN. Well, Mr. Chairman, in defense of that situation it
strikes me that these people are elected officials as compared to the
appointive representatives from the executive offices or of the Cabinet
as has been suggested in other plans, and I think there is something to
be said for this approach.
The CHAIRTWAN. Counting again--I am getting a recount-I think
you have six from the legislative branch. We left out the President
pro tempore of the Senate.
Mr. RoBnsoN. There are six, Mr. Chairman-there are six.
The CHAAIRAN. There are six, not five. There would be a predominance of the legislative branch of Government. There would be six
votes of the legislative branch and three of the executive branch.
Don't you think that is a rather strong preponderance in favor of
the legislative branch, in spite of the fact that those men are elected
by the people?
Mr. RoBrsoN. Well, as I said earlier, Mr. Chairman, I am not wedded
to this sort of a mix, but I do feel quite strongly that there sboild be
a mixture of legislative as well as executive officials serving on whatever commission or committee is eventually agreed upon.
The CHARIRAN. Don't you think that the members of the Cabinet
:are rather closer to the President than the members of the legislative
44-26I-05-- 18
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branch and because of the closeness would probably evaluate betterthe physical and mental condition of the President? They come in
more or less daily contact with him. We members of the legislative
branch only meet the President intermittently.
Mr. RoBisON. Well, you and I do, sir, but, on the other hand, the
majority leader of the Senate, for instance, the Speaker, the Vice
President-who would be a member of this Commnission even though
he wouldn't vote, he would be the Chairman, and as presiding officer
would convene it for purposes of discussion-these men are in presidential contact perhaps not as intimately as a Cabinet officer, but I
would suspect almost nearly so.
The CT-AIRMAN. It wasn't always the case that the Chief Executive

had weekly-as is the case now-dealings or conferences with the
leaders of the House and Senate. That has not always been the case,
so that members of the legislative branch were not. always in as close
a contact with the Chief Executive as the members of the Cabinet.
Mr. ROBISON. That is true, Mr. Chairman, but from where I sit I
would not foresee a change in the situation. I think it is going to go
on with even a closer association, probably, than we have now.
The CHAIRMAN. '17ou are more interested in the Commission idea
rather than those who compose the Commission?
Mr. RoBISoN. Yes, basically.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there an questions?
Mr. TENZER. Mr. Robison, you mentioned in your opening statement that the American Bar Association endorsed, or if I recall correctly, supported your proposal . I would like to call to your attention that this morning there appeared before this committee the
distinguished president of the American Bar Association, Lewis
Powell, Jr., and the former Attorney General, Herbert Brownell,
chairman of the American Bar Association Special Committee on
Presidential Inability and and Vice Presidential Vacancy, and they
both endorsed and recommended the principles of House Joint Resolution 1.
Mr. RoBIsoN. Mr. Tenzer, if I may reply to that, my statement says
the American Bar Association has endorsed my proposal. I did not
mean to imply that they have not perhaps changed their position.
Mr. TENZER. In order words, if they endorsed it in 1963 or 1964
and today have changed their view in the light of perhaps the fact that
they had this session in 1964 where they arrived at a consensus after
hearing testimony of distinguished con titutional lawyers and deans
of law schools and others who dealt with the question, and they
arrived at a consensus which was set forth in their statements before
this committee today.
Mr. ROBISON. I hope my previous answer will suffice. As I said,, I
did not mean to imply that they still endorse it now. They have in
the past, I think it still has merit, and I am here to suggest it to
you as being an approach which I for one still favor.
The ChAIRMAN. Mr. Copenhaver.
Mr. COPENLAVER. Mr. Robison, I might say that even if the ap.
preach is adopted as contained in House Joint Resolution 1, your basic
scheme could still be utilized.

Mr.RonIoN. Yes, it could.
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Mr. COPENJIAVEII. Since House Joint Resolution 1 provides tor
Congress to set up an alternative body, through legislation you could
still put forward your Commission.
Then two other minor points. I see from your bill that besides the
Commission proposal you provide that if a President himself declares his inability that he shall automatically regain that upon his
own declaration, which is different from the proposal in House Joint
Resolution 1 where that could be impeded or stopped by a declaration of the Vice President and the Cabinet.
Mr. RoBISOx. That is correct.
Mr. COPENHAVER. You must have some reason for that.
Mr. ROBISON. It stems, I would suppose, from my own thought

that if the President is going on his own to declare his inability,
which is going to be a most difficult personal decision to make in the
context in which we are thinking a bout it,then he ouioht to have
the same opportunity to declare that, in his ju(ldgnent at feast, the inability has terminated.
Mr. C('EIIAVEJi. The other point, Mr. Robison, is in reading overyour proposal, I gathered that you intended that this Commission
would operate to declare the disability, or the end of it, of not only
the President but someone acting as President.
Mr. RoBIsoN. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. FOLEY, If that were so, you might run into the problem, Con-

gressman, that under the Succession Act as it is today, it would be
the Speaker. If we had a vacancy in the office of Vice President, there
is one member of the Commission gone. The Speaker could become
Acting President, so there is the second member gone.
Mr. RoBIsoN. Well, Mr. Foley, I have not addressed myself to the
problem of succession which at least in my view, is a separate problem.
It is equally serious, and I hope you will take action on it, too, but
I assume what we are talking about here could be eliminated by whatever steps you take in that direction as well.
Mr. FoL y. You probably wouldn't have the problem with the
Speaker, because if he did accede to the Presidency, he would have to
resgn and the committee would elect another Speaker of the House.
Mr. RomsoN. Yes.
The CHAI MAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Robison. We appreciate
your coming. 'We need all the enlightenment we can get on this
problem. You have been very helpful. You have been very helpful.
Mr. ROBISON. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is the distinguished Representa-

tive from the State of New York, again my own State.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK 3. HORTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. HORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this op-

portunity to be heard on this very important subject. f,too, want to
take this occasion to commend to you, the chairman of this committee
and the other members of this committee, for taking this up as one of
the first matters of the 89th Congress.
Mr. Chairman, the wave of public concern about presidential inability and succession baes swel-led and subsided in past years with
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each real or impending break in Executive continuity. The necessity
of correcting constitutional and statutory insufficiencies in this area
appears to me to be self-evident.
Inasmuch as the committee already has heard considerable testimony
relating to these needs-testimony which I feel is cogent and persuasive--i shall conthie my comnnents to a brief discussion of the
constitutional amendment, House Joint Resolution 274, that I am
proposing. The resolution seeks to clarify the Constitution and to
minimize future uncertainty and confusion when a President becomes
permanently or temporarily incapacitated.
Leading the list ofimperatives is the necessity of keeping the VicePresidency filled. No more time should elapse between the vacancy and
subsequent occupancy that now prevails when it is necessary for our
Vice President to assume the Presidency. Events move too swiftly to
allow this important post to go unfilled.
We need to fill that gap with procedures that are immediate, uncomplicated, and self-implementing. Section 1 of my proposal provides that in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Vice President shall succeed to the Office for the unexpired
term. Section 2 authorizes the President to nominate a person who,
upon confirmation by a majority of the Congress, would become Vice
President for the unexpired term. I favor this technique as it assures
an unchanged administration and respects popular feeling through the
people's elected legislators. In fact, the combined action of the House
and Senate nearly duplicates our electoral systems since it parallels
electoral college composition.
Intimately connected with the subject of presidential succession is
the much thornier and less tangible problem of presidential disability.
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson have handled the
physical or mental incapacitation issue on a personal agreement basis
with the man next in line of succession. Thege private pacts have been
made necessary by the absence of statutory provisions and precedents
and the urgency of answering some basic questions not covered by our
Constitution.
What happens when a President is incapacitated for some reason
and is unable to perform his duties? Can the Vice President act in
his place? Under the terms of my resolution, the powers and duties,
but not the office of President, shall be assumed by the Vice President
in that instance.
Who determines whether the President is incapable of acting? My
measure provides that the inability of the President may be established
by a declaration in writing of the President. In the event the President fails or is unable to declare himself incapacitated, it may be
established by the Vice President with the concurrence of a majority
of the Cabinet or by such other body as the Congress may provide.
Who decides when the President has recovered? The ability of the
President to resume his powers and duties also would be established
by his declaration in writing.
This is an aspect of my measure I wish to emphasize. Section 3 provides:
If the President declares Inwriting that he is unable to discharge the powers

and duties of his office, such, powers and' dnties shall be discharged by the Vice
Presitient as. Acting Piresident until the President declares In writing that no
Inability exists.
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I have worded my proposal to provide that the President may re-

sume his duties and power immediately upon declaring his inability
at an end. With the assurance that the President may regain his role
as easily as he relinquished it, I believe he would be more inclined to
call on the Vice President when the necessity arises.
Should the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or such
other body as Congrcss shall provide not concur in the end-of-disability decision of the President, the matter would be resolved by the vote
of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress. If the House and Senate
failed to act promptly, the President would automatically resume his
powers and duties 10 days after declaring the termination of his
ability.
I also believe this aspect deserves special emphasis. By writing such
a 10-day rule into the language of t is constitutional amendment, we
can forestall any future possibility of a congressional impasse withholding the President from the powers and duties of his office. This
is a critical concern. If the Presidential powers and duties are to be
withheld from the President in the event of inability to discharge
them, then I feel the action would be affirmed by a two-thirds majority
of Congress in the most expeditious fashion possible.
Mr. Chairman, we are all aware of the human tendency to put off
seeking solutions of distasteful prospects. We realize, too, how fortunate we are that brief interruptions in Executive power have not
halted our democratic machinery. We should not and need not continue to press our luck. A sudden and potentially disruptive force
can strike unexpectedly at the heart of Government. Commonsense
and patriotic purpose demand that prompt and thorough action be
taken to deal with both presidential succession and inability.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. I notice that your bill is very much like the provisions contained in the bill of the distinguished gentleman from Ohio,
Mr. McCulloch.
Mr. HORTON. Yes, sir.
The CHAMAAx. And it only differs in substance from House Joint
Resolution 1 since you provide for the 2 days and 10 days.
Mr. HonTor. Yes sir.
The CHAMXAN. Are there any questions f
Mr. COPENHAVER. Mr. Horton, isn't there one other difference which
hasn't been mentioned, in that in yours-like Mr. Robison's-the
President's voluntary declaration of inability shall be overturned
purely by the President's voluntary declaration of the overcoming of
that disability., since section 5 of your bill only comes into action if
the Vice President and the Cabinet were forced to declare the PresiI
dent's disability
Mr. HORTON. That is right, and I commented, of course, in my
statement on that that in accordance with my resolution, the President, upon the disability terminating, could resume the office upon a
statement in writing unless the Vice President feels that he is not competent, in which event the Vice President woild then have the burden
cast upon him to so inform the Congress that the inability had not
ceased, and he would also have to have a majority of the Cabinet in
order for him to make this presentation. Then the House and the
Senate would have to pass on it.
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The ChAIRMAN. We are very gratef 01 to you Mr. Horton. We are
very happy to have had you 1ere, a1 we will itke deeply into consideratioin your views as well as tho views of the other Members of the
Congress.

jWe have two Members who have asked to appear but have not appeared today. They shall b permitted to submit their statements for
the record. Conressmain Randall and Congressman Edwards.
(Congressman Tiandall's statement is as follows:)
STATE MNT OF HONV. WILLIAM J. RANDA.L, A I ritsNTArIV', IN CoNotEss FRo
TIE STATE OF Missouitr, FILEI)
WITH THE HousE JUDICIARY COMi MITTEE ON
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 265 AND OTHER PRESIDENTIAL )ISAILITY AMENDIMENTS

Mr. Chairman, my presidential inabiliy aiendment, House Joiut Resolution

265, Is i odeled on that of tiegentleinati from ( )Iilo, Mr. McCulloch. Ratlir tian

dwell upon the exact wording of its live sections, I offer the following consideratLions which 1 urge the committee to take llo account as they perfect a final
constitutional amendllent.
First, the two sections pertalining to perainnent a(ceession of a Vice President
to the Presidency and to lWi'Oedures for filling a vacancy In the oll'ce of Vice
President should be reported favorably to the h101e for iniediate action.
The need for thew is clear and the procedures established seem equitable from
almost any point of view. Moreover, they are self-contained Improvements
which are desirable regardless of the disposition of any other proposals related
to presiential inability.
Second, tie section wlich l)ermnlts ti President to declare himself unable to
discharge his constitutional powers and obligations should be reported favorably,
but with some ih)ortatit quitilcations respecting the termination of such
inability. Either the President should have an absolute right to declare a selfprocilimed disability terminated and immediately resume the powers of his
office, or the procedures under which lie might be denied futher exercise of the
office should be specified in greater detail than in most of the proposals before
the coiniittee.
Third, if this committee decides it al)propriate to report provisions giving
some person or agency other than the President the irght to declare or to
terminate a presidential Iability, It should adhere strictly to one of two courses
of action.
One course would delegate the authority for promlgating precise procedures
for such declarations to a representative and responsible public body such as
the Congress of the United Stales. This approach would perniit adaptation to
changes in the structure and powers of government. without ratifying combersome additional constitutional amendments, yet it would give constitutional
sanctions to the principle that, from tiie to tine, Presidents may have to step
down from office involuntarily because of )hysical or mental Inability.
The other course would be to perfect a full set of procedures for use In disability proceedings. In my Judgment, if the actual procedures are to be establislied by constitutional amendment, they must, be thorough and comprehensive.
They must be meticulously designed to cope with every conceivable problem
which might arise In connection with presidential (isabillty.
The draft amendment reported to the other body by Its Judiciary Committee
does not meet this criterion of comprehensiveness. I would respectfully urge
the committee to adopt at least the nmodifeations proposed by a nieiber of the
conittee, the gentleman from Ohio, and incorporated in the provisions of my
resolution. They have the dual virtue of setting time limits within which
Congress must decide the Issue of who Is President and of avolilig a situation in
which two men could claim authority to act as President. Moreover, I would
urge the comnilttee to search diligenitly for additional modifications to the proposed anidilnht. A lengthy controversy i the conference committee in 1965
is preferable to a serious constitutional crisis some years hence.

'The CAIRMAN. This will toim'llnate the hearings Onl the presidential
inability hills. nho record will remain open for a reasonable time so
that fnliels ad others shall have an opportunity to submit their
CollihIlts.
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We still iave t he possibility tlfit the Att orney General, Mr.Kitzlnbach, may wish to appear. lie has agreed to subm it sotine suggested
u ileiditts Il purslitillce of the request made by certain of tle members of him.
Mr. Foley, vill you contit MIr. KtAtzeibach so thlat. lie will have
the benefit of those suggest ed amendlenis.

I Jllhss ('Ihore
isoe Itllii ihIn
else to cole before--Mfr. LINDSAY. As 1 recohect it-, ou' colleague, Mr. Poll, felt strongly
that lie had additional questions he wanted to ask the Attorniey General.
The CIAIs.
P'H, I used the possibility. If any iiietitbers want

to question hill 1''tllie', they will -havethe p'ivil('ge, of course, and
he stands ready. s )oke to him only the day before yesterday oil that
matter, and hi said iewould be very happy to appear if we wished,
ad woul(l await our call ifwe want hin.
Mr. McCiouit. Mr.(hail'ma, are yolU stating anytime, at present,
within wli'h writtell stat elments o Ilelrs or communications light be
received ?

The Cui.x11utMN. Yes, tile record vill remain open for that purpose.
Mit. MeCtoity. Xou are not ,stablishinlg a definite time now?
The C~l,\u.\1..t said reasonableI iie. You can be the judge of
that, and I will albi(le by your views.
We will noN\, adjoirI'l.
(Whereupon, at, :37 p.m., the (olnittee adjournedd)
(The following mat ter was receiv'ed for the record :)
'OPi'osi) LOISL.ATION ON RIEAPP01RTIONMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL DisRIc'rs
(By the Committee on Federal Legislation, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York)
TIM PROPOSES HILL

1.1. 2830, 88th Congress, Ist session (1003) (Representative Celler), would
amend section 22 of the Reapportionment Act of June 18, 1929, as amended (2
U.S.C. 2a), to provide In a recast sulsection (c) that, beginning with the 93d

Congress (1)'3),' each State shall have a number of congressional districts equal
to the number of Representatives to which the State shall be entitled (i.e., no
at-large representation), and each district "shall at all tilnes be composed of
contiguous territory, in as compact form as lpractlcable, and no district "11shall
contain a mmber of persons, excluding Indians not taxed, more than 15 per
centum greater or less than the average obtained l)y dividing the whole number
of persons in such State, excluding Indians not taxed, as determined under the
then most recent decennial census, by the number of Representatives to which
such State is entitled under the apportionment made upon the basis of Such
census.
The bill further provides tHat "any esnblislunent of congressional districts in
any State pursuant to the preceding subsection (e) shall be subject to review, at
the stilt of any citizen of such State, by the district court of the United States
for the district in which such citizen resides; and any court before which a case
Involving the establishment of such districts may be pending shall give precedence
tlretr) over all other eases or controversies, and if such court be not In session,
It shall convene promptly for the disposition thereof." 2
1After the decision In Weeborry v, Hatidere, 370 U.S. 1 (1904), diseusRed Infra, Reprefavor making his bill "effective 2 years from now," New
York Times, Mar. 19, 1904, p.17 col 4.
2 ll.I. 73413, 88th Cong.,' 1s sess8. (1003) (Representative Mathias) would permit a
20.percent variation from the average and wouid require at-large elections of Itepresentatives from a State If the Director of the Bureau of the Census determined that that
standard was not met In any congressional district therein.
sentative Celler was reported to
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HISTORY OF FEDERAL, LEGISLATION

Tite history of the Federal legislation on election of Representatives by districts is summarized (with citations to the statutes involved) in hearings on 11.11.
841 and others before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Comnultteo on the Judiciary (87th Cong,, 1st sess., ser. 9, at 68, 70 (1061) (memorandum from Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress), and in the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Harlan in Wosberry V. Sandors (376 U.S. 1, 20, 42-44 (11)4)).
The first act passed by Congress which called for election of Representatives by
districts was enacted in 1842, at which time, although 17 States were already
electing their Representatives by districts, the rentaiting 9 States elected all
their Representatives at large. In the act of 1842, Congress apportioned Representatives among the several States according to the latest ctquss and provided for the election of Representatives in States entitled to more than one
Representative by "districts composed of contiguous territory."
The act of 1050, which provided for the seventh census, omitted the requirement that Representatilves be'elected from districts, but a provision for districts
composed of contiguous territory was relnserted in the act of 1802. The act.
of 1872 repeated that provision and added tihte requirement that each (listriet
contain "as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitatnts." The last
provision was continued until 1901 when Congress added the requirement that
the districts be compactct" so that the law then provided that Representatives
"shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous and compact territory and
containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of ilnhabitauits." That provision remained in force until the Reapportionment Act of 1929, whleh omitted
It, and it was again omitted when the act of 1029 was subsequently amended.
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES

Although there appears to het a wide area of agreement among those without
partisan interest in the outcome of a particular apportionment in favor of reenacting some criteria for apportionment of congressional districts, for a long
time there has been stui)stantial disagreements as to the enforcement provisions
which such a statute should contain. Several possibilities have been suggested:
1. No enforcement provision and reliance upon the good faith of the State
legislatures to bring about compliance with the statutory provision.
2. Reliance upon private citizen litigation as in 11.11. 2836.
8. Enforcement by Congress by refusing to seat Representatives from a State
which violated the standards for apportionment specified by Congress.
4. Enforcement by Congress by giving Congress the right to redistrict when
State districting violated the standards for apportionment specified by Congress. See report of American Political Science Association, Committee on Reapportionment, reprinted In Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House
Committee on the Judlclary (86th Cong., 1st sess., 20-29 (1050)).
5. Requiring election at large where the congressional criteria were not followed by the States,
As far as congressional enforcement is concerned, the question of redistricting
has twice come before the House of Representatives in the form of contested
election cases. In DaioIson v. Gilbert (1001), (Rowell. "Digest of Contested
(1001),
Election Cases in the House of Representatives. 1789-1901," at (03-606 politic"
"not
be
to
It
held
Elections
on
Committee
the House of Representatives
him
to detty a seat to a candidate on the ground that tie district whithl elected
Conof
"Digest
(Rowell#
(1010),
Sanders
v.
Persona
In
was illegally constituted.
tested election Cases in the House of Representatives, 1001-17," at 43-49 (Moores
that
ed. 1917) ), the House took no action, despite a committee recommendationlaw.
reapportionment
the
violating
as
void
held
a Virginia redistricting act be
as
Wcsborry v. qaneders (376 U.S. 1 (1004)), has now eliminated any doubts the
rejecting
thus
districting,
congressional
review
to
courts
to the right of the
views expressed In Oolefrovo v. Green (828 U,.., 549 (1946)) (minority opinion),
that the courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction in congressotIal districting
cases either because districting is a "political question" or as a matter of equltable discretion. Wesberry has accordingly made it clear that the State legislatures and Congress do not have jurisdiction over districting matters to tile
exclusion of the judiciary. Finally, 1Vesborry established that there is a constitutional requirement thAt, within a State, congressional districts must be "as
the
nearly as is prncticable eq01 in population i ordOr to comply with what
Court concluded was the constituttional mandate that "one man's vote in a congressional election ts to be worth as much as another's" (378 U.S, at 7-8).
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11.11. 2830 attempts to provide an objective standard as to permissible variations in population to gide legislatures it establishing congress ional districts.
Tile Wcsbcrryl decisioll recognizes that "it may not be lmosslbl to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision" (Id. at 18). The GOurt might
well be disposed to sanction some variations between districts in order to take
account, for example, of such factors as area or natural boundaries an(l would
dobutless give considerable weight to a congressional deternltintIon of pIermissihle
variathlons, which might then have the salutary effect of forestalling litigation
over smaller variations. However, In view of tile pronouncements in Ws8berry,
it would seem ilghly doubtful that a variation of ats much as 15 percent from
tile average-which could mean a 30-ipercent variation between distrlts from
tile average--is permissible, As to review of congressional districts established
under the proposed legislation, we think that tile House of Representatives Comnmilttee on tle Judiciary, to which tile bill was referred, should consider making
It expressly clear whether or not the jurisdiction to review conferred on the
U.S. district courts Is Intended to be exclusive and to preclude review by the
State courts, See General Investmenwt Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. (260 U.S.
261, 280-88 (1922)); (Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
Systems" 373-74 (1953)).
CONCLUSION
We support the approach taken by H.R. 2,310 of providing standards for congressional districting, including a specified permissible variation In population
to operate as guides to State legislatures and perhaps Ilavilig tile effect of reducIng the ainount of litigation. In the first Instance, the legislatures, of course,
should adhere to the standards specified by Congress with due regard to the
11'csberrl/ decision. The possibility of Judicial review witiill the framework of
those standards may then produce a fairer overall result than if tile matter
remained entirely with the political branches of Government.
Respectfully submitted.
Committee on Federal Legislation: Fred N. Fishman, Cilnirmnan,
Sidney I1. Asch, Eastman Birkett, George 1-. Cain, Joseph Calderon, Donald J. Cohn, Louis A. Craco, Benjantin F. Cralne,
Nanette Denlbitz, Arthur J. Dillon, Barry 1I, Garfinkel, Eliiot II.
Goodwin, Sedgwick W. Green, I. Melville Hicks, Jr., Robert M.
Kaufman, Ida Klaus, Leonard M. Leiman, George Minkin, Gerald
Henry I. Stlmson.
JUNE 1, 1904, E. Paley, Albert J. Rosenthal, Peter G. Schmidt,
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A second report on this subject by tile Committee on Law Reform of the New
York Chamber of Commerce
The Constitution of tle United States leaves unsolved one problem, the proper
solution of which may be vital to the safety of our Republic. The problem is how
the presidential duties and powers are transferred in the event a President becomes incapable of carrying out the duities of its office, particularly in the case
where he does not understand that he hlas become incapacitated. Although
there has long been an awareness of tills problem, and although it iras brought
forth a multitude of studies and proposed solutions, it is as yet unresolved. It
came to the fore during the disability of President Garfield in 1881, and again
in 1919 and 1920 during tile illness of President Wilson. Most recently it arose
during the illness of President Eisenhower. In each case tile Vice President
was faced with a dilenma. There was a need to exercise leadership, yet a fear
of usurping Presidenital powers or even the office itself. These Instances pointed
out the need of a definite procedure and guideline by which the Vice President
s In big dissenting opinion In Wesberry, Mr. Justice flarlan commented upon existing
congressional districts as follows: "In the last congressional election, In 1902, itepresentatives front 42 States were elected from congressional districts. In all blit five of those
States, the differences between the populations of the largest and smallest districts
exceeded 100 000 persons. A difference of this magnitude fit tile size of districts the
average population of which in each State is less than 500,000 is presumably not equality
amon g tIst rlets 'as nearl-y as is practicable,' although the Court does not reveal Its
definition of that phrase" (376 U.S. at 20-21); see also Id. at 49' (appendix giving size of
largest and smallest districts in each State) (92 Cong. Q. 354 (1004)).
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might assume the duties of the Presidency during the President's incapacity and
thereafter relinquish such duiltes. It was also realized that there wits a need to
provide expressly that the Vice President, during any such disability of the
President, would assume only tile powers and duties of the oilhe of the President,
and not the office Itself, thus'perhaps permanently ousting the elected President.
The recent assassination of President Kennedy has agabi emphasized tile miportance of a Vice Preident's quickly and assuredly picking up tie reins of
government as they fall from the lands of a faltering President. The urgency
may be just as pressing in the case of a President's Incapacity as in the case of
death, but a Vlice President and the Nation have no guidelilnes in such a case.
IRAS1 QUESTIONS UNDER TI1E PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

The present constitutional provisions relating to succession to the Presidency
are found in section 1 of article II wlhlch states:
"Il case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for tile Case of R1emnoval, Denti. Re.silgnatlon or Inbility, botl of the President
and Vice President, declaring what Ollicer shall then act is President, and suich
Officer shall act accordingly, until fl Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected."
The basic questions which tile Constitution leaves unnnqwered are these:
"1. Who, or what body, Is to decide that a President is unable to disclarge the
powers and duties of his office?
"2. What Is the proper procedure for declaring that a President's hibility has
been terminated?
"3. Does the Vice President assume the Office of the Presidency intile event of
presidential inability, or does lie become Acting President, assuming only the
powers and duties of the Office?
"4. Does the problem of su(cession itnthe case of disability re(luire constitutional amendment, or can it be resolved by legislation?"
SPECrA,

AGREEMENTS

Recognizing the problem thus presented, President Eisenhower concluded a
meinoranduni of understanding w'ith Vice President Nixon as to the procedure
to be followed in case the President should become Incapacitated. Similarly,
President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson entered Into such an agreement.
These agreements were to be effective, however, only during the terms of office
of the parties concerned. In substance, these agreements provi(1ed that if possible,
the President would inform the Vice President: of any inability, and the latter
would serve as Acting President for the duration of the inability. If the Presldent were unable to communicate his disability, the Vice President, after such
consultation as seemed appropriate, would decide the qttestion and assme to
serve as Acting President. In either case the President would decide when the
disability had ended.
These agreements could serve as no more than an emergency device pending
a permanent solution. Not only are these agreements temporary in nature, but
they do not cover the case of a mentally ill president who insists that lie is well..
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

It is almost unanimously agreed that there is a need for a more permanent
solution, but there are almost as many proposed solutions as there are people,
considering the matter. The Committee on Law Reform has studied these alternate proposals, and the New York Chamber of Commerce on January 11, 1901,
adopted the first report of this Committee. The report recommended that the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to the death, resignation, removal or inability of the President, be amended to provide (1) that tie
Vice President, in case of inability of the President, shall succeOd to the powers
and duties of the office of the President, but not to the office itself; and (2) that
the determination, commencement, and termination of such presidential inability
be by such method as the Congress, by law, shall provide.
The recommendation of the Committee on Law Reform was preceded by, and
partially based on, work in the same area by the bar associations. Reports were
published by the Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the
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liar of the City of New York, tits New York State Bar Associatin, and tile
American Dar Association. The reconlmenditat(ils of till three were' 1stiiittanco
the same its the reconmltiond,,tlls of the Comiiittee oil law Reform.
in 1)02 the American Bar A.soelation reaillmed its prior stand iii sulport of
such ai niiendlitoiit, and rconmmi)ended Interini legisltion jetlling lldoption of
the proposed constttitoloml change. Later in 11)(12 the Commititee oil Federal
Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Issued a report
which took coglilzahl(e of tie fae that Its prior rec-onltn(lation was consistent
with tie position of the American and New York State Bar Assmoiatlols. It also
reaftlirmeld its ptlor stalld 011(d again elldorsed tile recollliended lflnioelIlinot.
More recently, on Janary 20 al(l 21, 19)1., the Amlorh(ani Bar Ass.ocifition convened tile co||ferenee on l reshenltil htllbility lind Slit cessiol. IIn addl(hin to
the, imiainy prOliniiellt lawyers who vOlliltittd the conlfe'reice', several Menlibers
of Congress 1)arleiipated Ili the discussion, icluding senators Kentlng, I-Iruskfa,
ind 1110yh, the first two being members of tihe Senate ,hdliliry Comunllthle, and
the lt ter bing chairman of the shboen|niilttle, ol (ConslIithlolmil Aimendt Iitlts
I tee, 1111d Iel)resentatives Cellor and Wyman, the former ieig
of that coi lt
('lriIItli otl the Judhchary Connilttee of tihe House. The eonfei(tice Issued a
report. stathig the general (omiseiIll8 of those attoinllig. The Amuericanl Bar
Asociation, through a speo'i.l eonnilft e, Is now working toward Ihe implenlentatioi of such consenus by a eo,,s itut honal allildllllt.
The proposal is to iiiliold the Colistitiltih)lI as follows:
"(M) In ti event- of the Inability of the Presilent, the powers and duties, but
not lirh oflhe, shall devolve li1)en tle Vice P'resilent. or person niext in line of
stwee.slon. for the duration of the Inability of tile President or mit il ex)lrathoi
of his t(rmn of office:
"(2) The inability of the President may be established by de(,laraton lin wrltIng 14 the President. In the evett that the President does not mlake known his
inability, It. 1my1)o established by nctlon of the Vice '1resilent or person next
In Hue of succession with the concurrence of a majority of the cabinet or by
aelion| of sch otier body as the Congress may by law provide:
"(3) The ability of the President to resutne the powers inld duties of his office
sl111ll be eslablished by his declaration in writlug. It the (veit lht the Vice
President, a1id it majority of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may by
low povido sIil not concur in the declaration of tle Presilent, tile con inling
disobillty of tile President may then be determined by the vote of two-thirds of
the eleeted members of each House of the Congress;
"(4) In the event of tie death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Vice President or tile person next ill lile of succession shall succe( to the office
for the unexplred term : and
"1() When a vacnney occurs it tile office of tile Vice President tile Pre.ident
shall noninate a person who, upon.lAprovatl by a majority of tile elected Meiberm of Congress meeting itn joint session, slall then become Vice President for
tile unexpired term,"
This proposal varies from the prior recotnlnlldations of tile bar nssoeiations
and of the chamber of commerce. The major points on which it varies are:
"(1) It would put into the Constitution the procedire, subject to any express
right of Congress to legislate In the area, for deterlilhing tile Incapatity of the
Presi('nt and the termintion thereof. rather than leaving this wholly to be
supplied by Congress In tile form of lealslntion : and
"(2) It provides tMat when the office of Vice President falls vacant, it shall
be filled by nomination of the President with the approval of Congress."
I1ECOMMENDATIONI

OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAW IIEFO1M

Except as to the provisions for filling a vacancy In the office of Vice President, this committee prefers Its original proposal, which would leave entirely
to Congress tile procedure for determining a President's Incapacity and recovery.
This would allow flexibility for any future changes and at the same time would
provide enough protection from pnrtl.nn politics, since any such legislation
would tieed either tile approval of the President or tho vote of two-thirds of Congress to override a veto. The Commit tee on Law Reform does not consider
this difference as vital, however, and It believes that tills more recent proposal
Is aceptable. The fate of all proposed reform In the past hns been that It
faltered when Its supporters disagreed on the form that the chnge should take.
It Is important that this proposal not meet the same fate.
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As to the second change concerning filling a vacancy in the Vice-Presidency,
the connittee agrees that this Is desirable and endorses it fully. At a time
such as the present, It is highly desirable to fill immediately the vacancy left
when a Vice President dies or steps into the Presidency. The second highest
office in the land should not be left vacant for any extended period of time.
In the opinion of the committee It is essential that there be a clearly defined
procedure and line of succession In the case of the incapacity of a President.
The committee also believes that a constitutional amendment is necessary in
this regard so that the validity of the procedure may not be called in question
at a time of crisis. The United States has been fortunate in the past, but in the
present day of instant communication and constant tension we cannot afford
a situation in which we would be without a Chief Executive. The committee
urges that tills matter be resolved with all due speed. The Committee on Law
Reform therefore, as an acceptable alternative, supports the plan recommended
by the American Bar Association. It is assumed that any ambiguity in the
proposal will be corrected in its ultimate implementation, and the form of such
implementation will make abundantly clear that the Vice President becomes
President in case of death, or resignation of the President.
The committee, therefore, recommends the adoption by the chamber of the
following resolutions:
"Resolved, That the New York Chamber of Commerce recommends that the
present provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to tile death,
resignation, and removal, or inability of a President, be amended to provide:
"(1) that the Vice President, in case of the inability of the President,
shall succeed to the powers and duties of the office of the President, but not
to the office itself;
"(2) that any determination of the commencement and termination of
such presidential inability shall be as the Congress, by law, shall provide;
"(8) when a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President the President shall nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority of the
elected Members of Congress meeting in joint session, shall then become
Vice President for the unexpired term.
"Fowther resolved, That the New York Chamber of Commerce recommends
that as an alternative to the above proposal the Constitution of the United States
be amended to effect in principle the proposals of the American Bar Association;
and
"Parthrtresolved, That interim legislation of the nature recommended by the
American Bar Association in 1902 be enacted pending adoption of the proposed
constitutional changes."
Respectfully submitted,
Churchill Rodgers, OThairman, C. Jay Parkinson, H. I. Romnes, H. B.
Farr, Jr., Orison S. Marden, Arthur B. Langlie, Thomas C. Lawrence, Wilkie Bushby, Harold J. Gallagher, Whitney North Seymour, Committee on Law Reform; New York Chamber of
Commerce, George Champion, Presldent.
Attest:
JonN T. GWYNNE, Scoretary.
(The above report was adopted by the chamber at its regular meeting on
April 10, 1064.)

Tur PROBLEM OP PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
New York Chamber of Commerce, New York, N.Y.
In at least one respect the Constitution of the United States is inadequate in
that it does not clearly provide for the orderly transfer of the powers of the
President in the event of the inability of a President to exercise the responsibilities of his office.
This problem has been the subject of concern on several occasions in our
country's history. It was brought to the fore in 1881 because of the disability
of President Garfield. It was the subject of discussion, and hearings, in 1919
and 1920 as a result of tlielllness of President Wilson.
More recently, the illnesses of President Eisenhower focused attention on the
possibility that a President may become incapacitated for some length of time,
andthat there was no clear and specific procedure in the Constitution, or in law,
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for the determination of presidential inability, or for the temporary assumptlon
of the presidential powers and duties by the Vice President, or for determining
when a President's Inability had ended.
During the past several years a number of resolutions have been introduced In
the Congress aimed at establishing a procedure for the orderly transfers of presidential power In the event of his inability. Congressional committees have
studied the problem, and public hearings have been held.
To this (late, however, there have been no concrete results. Perhaps this can
best be explained as a reflection of the reluctance of Congress to pursue the
matter during the term of a President, and in the absence of a speciflc crisis
demanding action.
Yet the issue remains, and it becomes increasingly serious because of the growing importance of the Presidency and also, perhaps, because of the greater
hazards to which a President is now exposed.
It Is quite imperative that the United States have a clearly defined pattern of
succession to the powers of the President so that, in the event of the inability of a
President, this Nation is not without duly elected leadership. We should avoid
the possibility of having to decide Important constitutional issues at the time of
some future crisis. This is an opportune time for the Congress, and the people,
to resolve the question.
THE DASIO PROBLEM

The present constitutional provisions relating to succession to the Presidency
are found in section 1 of article II which states:
"InCase of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Dei th, Reslgnation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and tiess of the said Office, the Same
shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected."
The basic questions which the Constitution leaves unanswered are these:
1, Who, or what body, is to decide that a President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office?
2. What is the proper procedure for declaring that a President's inability
has been terminated?
3. Does the Vice President assume the office of the Presidency in the event
of presidential inability; or does he become Acting President, assuming only
the powers and duties of the office?
4. Does the problem of succession in the case of disability require constitutional amendment, or can it be resolved by legislation?
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PROORAM

Following his serious illness, and in the absence of a formal, legal procedure
for the devolution of presidential power, President Eisenhower announced that,
in the event of his permanent disability, he would resign as President, and the
Vice President would then assume the powers and duties of the office.
To cover other instances of possible temporary inability, the President and
the Vice President concluded a memorandum of understanding in March 1058,
which provided that, in the event of his inability, the President would, if possible, so inform the Vice President and he, in turn, would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended. If however, the disability was such as to
preclude the communication of the fact of inability by the President, the Vice
President himself, after such consultation as seemed to him appropriate under
the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties,
and he would serve as Acting President. In either case the President would
determine when the inability had ended, and when he would assume the full exercise of the powers and duties of Ills office.
This memorandum of understanding was intended to apply only to the terms
of office of President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon. The President directed the Attorney General to study the problem further, and to recommend a
permanent solution.
THE PROPOSAL OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

In thluI report to the President, which the President approved and transmitted
to tie congress. the Attorney General recommended amendment of the Constitution to proolde--
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1. That, in case or the removal, the death, or tile resignation of tle President, the Vice President shall become Presidenit for the remainder of the
termh.
2. That, when a President declares in writing that he is unable to perform
the duties of his office, those duties shall be assumed for the period of the
disability by the Vice President, who shall have the title of Acting President.
3. That, if a President does not make such a declaration, and the Vice
President Is satisfied as to tie disability of tie President, the Vice President,
with the approval in writing of a majority of the Cabinet, will become
Acting President.
4. That the Vice President step out of the office, and the President takes
over, when the President declares in writing that be is able to resume his
duties.
This administration program, as well as other proposals which had been
offered, failed of enaetm0t in the Congress., Principal points in despite were
whether a constitutional amendment was required, or whether the Issue could
be resolved by legislation; and over the determination of which Individual or
body should have the final power to determine if a President were disabled and
unable'to performn his duties, and, conversely, when, after disability, a President
is again able to assume his office.
ACTIONS OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION

Expressing great concern that there Is a defect in the Constitution relating to
presidential succession, particularly in these times when a possible )residential
Inability might result in profoundly serious consequences, the Conmittee on
Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the
Committee on the Federal Constitution of the New York State Mar Association,
and the Committee on Jurisprudenc(e and Law Reform of the American Bar
Association have all undertaken studiespresented.
of the problem and have published reports in which similar conclusions are
The associations have all recommended that article II of the Constitution be
amended to provide1. In case of the inability of the President, that the Vice President should
succeed only to the powers and duties of the office, and not to the Presidency
itself ; and
2. That the commencement and termination of any inability should be deternined by such method as Congress shall by law provide.
These recommendations seek to remove the constitutional ambiguity presently
existing as to the status of the Vice President; and to provide that the proce.
dures for determining the commencement and termination of inability shall be
established
by legislation, thus retaining the broad character and flexibility
uf the Constitution.
The committee of the State bar association
endorsed as "second best" the proposed constitutional amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 40, which would
specify in detail the procedures for determining inability, or termination of
inability. Time city bar association similarly endorsed the procedures outlined
in this measure, but it believes that these should be spelled out In a statutory
enactment. The bar association presented a proposed bill which would, by legislation, provide a method for determining the commencement and termination of
presidential inability.
In essence, the method suggested provides that, if the President Is unable to
declare In writing that he Is disabled, and the Vice President is satisfied that
the President Is unable to discharge the powers and duties (if his office, he shall,
with the written approval of a majority of the heads of tie executive departments, assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Subsequently, the President would be able to resume his office if he makes
a public announcement in writing that his inability has terminated. However,
If the Vice President is not satisfied that the President's disability h'is terninated, lie may, with the written approval of a majority of the heads of the executive departmienits, transmit this deelaration to the Congress which shall ,then
make the deternitnatoti. If by concurrent resolution, approved by two-thirds
of fheM0mbers preseiit in each House, the Congress upholds the Vice President,
he shall thin cottfinue to serve as Acting President until he procfiiiWs tlle 'Prestdent's Inability to be ended.; or the Congress, by concurrenft r esolilon, determines
that the President's inability has euded ; or the Presidenit's term ends.
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RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM

The offleo of the President Is unquestionably the most Important office In the
United States, anid, perhaps, in the world today. This has been increasingly
apparent li recent years, particularly in tie area of foreign policy where the
President, In his person and in his actions, has assumed such critical and public
Importance.
In the opinion of the committee on law reform, It is essential that the United
States have a clearly defined pattern of succession to the office of President so
that, in tile event of the Inability of the President to perform his duties, this
Nation will not be without daly elected leaderslhlp. This will require clarification
of now vague consilutionm lprovisions.
Ti recommendation of tile cohimittee is designed explicitly to provide that
the Vice President, in the case of presidential inability, becomes Acting President,
assuming only the powers and duties of tile Presidency. He does not succeed to
the office of President, in which case the devolution of the office would be permanent for the remainder of the term. The recommendation would clearly
delne in .the Constitution the status of the Vice President and would guarantee
that there will be no question concerning the resumption of power by the
President at tile terlihnation of his inability. 'The present language of the Constitution leaves grave doubts on tills matter.
The committee on law reforin believes that it is desirable that these constitutional questions be resolved at the earliest issible date. Tile committee suggests, moreover, that tis Is a most appropriate inoment for the Congress to
Initiate s11h a resolution by way of a proposed constitutional amendnient,
Ina. nuch as a new administration is about to take office.
The committee therefore recommenlds the following:
Now, therefore, be it
Resulted, Thai. the New York Chimlber of Commerce recommends that the
present provisions. of the Constitution of the United States relating to the
death, resignation, removal or inability of the President, be amended to provide
(1) that the Vice Presideit, in case of the inability of the President, shall succeed
to the powers ald duties of the office of tie President, but not to the office itself;
and (2) that the determination, commencement and termination of such presidential inability be by such method as the Congress, by law, shall. provide.
Respectfully submitted.
COMMITTEE ON YIJAw REFORM,
RALPM T. REED, Presidenzt.
Attest:
JOH1N T. GWYNNE, Secretary
NEW YORK, N.Y., December 14, 1960.
Tile above report was adopted by the chamber at Its regular meeting on
January 11, 1961.
STATEMENT BY HON. ,TEFFEY COHELAN, OF CALIFOUNIA, IN SUPPORT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REGARDING PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION

Mr. Chairman, the problems of presidential succession and presidential disability have long needed constitutional clarification and I appreciate tills opportunity
to testify in support of the constitutional amendment which I have joined you In
sponsoring.
IThe facts themselves speak persuasively to the need for soundly based but
Immediate action.
Eight of our thirty-five President have died In office. On 16 different occasions,
totaling more than 38 years in the brief history of our country, we have been
without a Vice President. Eight Vice Presidents succeeded to the Presidency,
diedPresidents
during their terms of office, and one resigned.
while
seven
Iof the
foufr
who served the United states from 1932 through
November 1903, two (Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy) (lid not
live out their terms; one (Dwight D. Elsenhower) suffered a serious heart attack;
and one (Harry S. Truman) was the object of an attempted assassination.
In past years the office of Vice President has been subject to more ridicule than
respect. But such is not tile case today. The Vice President is not only the everpossible successor to the Nation's highest office, he has become a highly important
ambassador, t raveling thousands of miles on behfllf of the President. lie is a
memberof ili (alih ,et -iMid of the National Security Council. Ie is Chairllaln
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of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and he has major responsibilities
in our wars on poverty and discrimination.
There is ample evidence that the United States needs a Vice President at all
times; that this person must be fully acquainted with both foreign and domestic
policy and prepared to assume the Presidency on a moment's notice. Yet there
is no provision in our Constitution for filling this office when there is a vacancy.
The problem of presidential disability poses potentially greater and more
difficult problems.
On two occasions, either as a result of tragic accident or illness, we have had
Presidents unable to carry out their duties for prolonged periods of time.
President Garfield lingered between life and death for 80 days after he was
shot by a disgruntled officeholder. During this period he performed only one
official act-the signing of an extradition paper. There was a crisis in foreign
affairs, but only routine business was transacted.
President Wilson's serious illness of nearly 2 years presented the country with
even more serious problems. Following his stroke in 1919, some 28 bills
became law without his signature. The Cabinet met unofficially from time to
time on the call of Secretary of State Lansing, but when President Wilson
learned of the meetings he forced Lansing to resign, believing that Lansing
was plotting to oust him.
In both of these cases of disability, the Vice Presidents were urged to act
as President. But both Arthur and Marshall declined fearing they would
deprive the President of his office should he recover.
Without clear authority, provided by law, it cannot be expected that future
Vice Presidents will act differently if a President is disabled, yet clearly the
leader of the free world must have a healthy, sure 'and steady hand at the
helm of state.
On at least two other occasions, we have had Presidents unable to carry out
the full duties of their office for shorter periods of time. President McKinley
lived for 8 days after lie was shot, during which time the business of government
came to a standstill. President Eisenhower's heart attack hospitalized him
for 6 weeks, during the first week of which he was able to make few If any
decisions.
It is a strange irony indeed that we are prepared and amply so, for a President's death or impeachment, but that we are defenseless against his injury,
illness, or senility. The events of the last two decades alone, however, show us
all too clearly how quickly disability can strike.
Mr. Chairman, this constitutional amendment which I have joined In sl)onsoring is both practical and effective. It recognizes that total protection against
all conceivable situations is not possible but it guards against the most serious
and striking omissions of our present system. It establishes a firm framework,
grounded as it should be In the Constitution, but it leaves certain final decisions
which must be based on the facts of the time to the elected representative of the
people.
My bill also provides, MNfr. Chairman, for a return to the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 whereby in the horrible possibility that both the President and
Vice President should be disabled or killed, succession to Acting President
would be from the Cabinet, beginning with the Secretary of State.
This is in no way a reflection against the present distinguished Speaker of the
House, It is rather a recognition of certain critical problems.
Would the Speaker resign his position to act as President if the President
were temporarily disabled? Could he then return as Speaker?
Couldn't the Speaker be of an opposing political party? What effect would
this have on the continuity of an administration's policy? After all, during
8 of the last 18 years the House of Representatives has been controlled by the
party oiosing that of the President. Succession could thus result in changed
party control of the entire executive branch.
Does the Speaker have the constitutional authority to assist the President as
the Vice President does? Can the Speaker properly prepare for the awesome
responsibilities of tle Presidency while fulfilling his own major responsibilities
as Speaker of the House of Representatives?
I earnestly hope, Mr. Chairman, that your committee will act favorably on
returning t lielne of succession to the Cabinet where it resided for 61 years.
I also hope you will act fuvora9bly on President Johnson's thoroughly merited
proposal for reformrof the electoral college.
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But most important, Mr. Chairman, I urge that your committee correct the
blindspots-the avoidable risks and hazards-that have impaired our Constitution for nearly 176 years, I urge that tills constitutional amendment be adopted
so that Presidential disability and vacancy in the office of Vice President will no
longer threaten our future. I urge that this amendment be adopted to assure
the orderly continuity in the Presidency that is imperative to the success and
stability of our country and our form of government.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY B. GONZALEZ, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, I am deeply appreciative of this opportunity to express my
views to your committee on a matter of profound constitutional significancethe absolute necessity for keeping filled at all times the office of the VicePresidency of the United States.
This office is the second highest in our land. Its occupant stands constantly
on tie threshold of the most responsible, most powerful, most respected, and
most difficult Job in the world-the Presidency of the United States.
Tile Vice President must, like the President himself, be a man of great
character, experience, and ability. He must have the capacity and the stature
to carry the dreadful burden which may be thrust upon him at any time by a
wholly unforeseen, unpredictable, and uncontrollable tragedy.
There is no need to labor this point. Surely in these times it is obvious
enough to every citizen that the Vice-Presidency is an office of enormous
importance.
What is not so obvious is why we as a people, so justly proud of our free Government, our constitutional system, and our political commonsense, have done
nothing for 1% centuries about filling this office when it becomes vacant.
This is not some refilled constitutional abstraction to be debated only by
political philosophers. It is not some technical flaw to be corrected to cover some
remote contingency.
Nor is it a controversial issue. There is no need for a pro and con discussion
about the need to fill the office. Everybody agrees there should be a Vice President at all times.
Yet, in the 176-year history of the United States, the office of Vice President
has been vacant on 16 separate occasions. Eight times the Vice President has
moved into tile White House to succeed a President who died in office. Seven
Vice Presidents have themselves died in office, and one vacated the office through
resignation.
For more than 37 years-over one-fifth of the total span of our national history-the second highest office in the land has been unoccupied.
The purpose of House Joint Resolution 53, which I introduced, is to make certain, through an amendment to the Constitution, that tills office is never again
left vacant for a long period of time. My resolution provides a method for filling
this great office whenever a vacancy occurs. It eliminates the necessity of waiting for the next presidential election.
President William Henry Harrison died 1 month after taking office. For the
next 3 years and 11 months, there was no Vice President. For more than 3 years
and 10 montils there was no Vice President after the assassination of Abraham
Lincoln. William R. King, elected Vice President as running mate to Franklin
Pierce, lived for only 6 weeks or so after his inauguration, so the Vice Presidency
was unoccupied throughout virtually all of tie Pierce administration. For 3
years and 9 months, President Truman had no Vice President. On two occasions,
after the assassinations of Presidents Garfield and McKinley, there was no Vice
President for almost 3 years.
These are not new statistics. They have been cited many times.
But I do not hesitate to refer to them again because each time we think about
them, they become more frightening, indeed, more terrifying, and we are reminded anew of the fact that we have taken no steps to prevent tile recurrence
of these conditions.
Many times, too, we have thought about and talked about the fact that the
country has never at one time been deprived of both its President and Vice
President.
I do not know whether this has been Just blind luck or the hand of providence.
I do know that we have tempted fate long enough.
44-201-05-
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Joint
to tile Constitution
The proposed
tIhe UnTed
ifHouse
to the peopleiln
to guarantee incorpornted
53 hasamendment
just one purpose:
Resolution
States that the office of Vice President will at all times be occupied.
Tills resolution does not go beyond this single objective. It thus avolds sucll
related but much more controversial and complex issues as presidential inability
and electoral reform. These are extremely vital matters, but in the Interests of
absolute clarity, I think they should be considered separately.
Despite the Importance of Its substance, my resolution Is easy to understand,
our
straightforward, and uncomplicated. Furthermore. the change it proposes lin
fundamental law would assure the use of thoroughly democratic procedures in
filling the Vice Presidency when a vacancy occurs.
My proposed amendment states that if for any reason the Vice Presidency is
nmde vacant more than 30 days prior to the expiration of ie term for which tite
Vice President was elected, the person discharging the powers and duties of
President shall nominate someone to fill this vacancy. The appointee must then
be confirmed by a majority vote of Members of the Senate alid House of IRepresentatives meeting In joint session, with each Member having one vote.
As. we know only too well from our own experience, a vacancy may result
from several causes. The President may die, be removed from office, or resign.
in which case the Vice President would vacate his own office to serve as Chief
Executive. Or, of course, any of these things may happen to the Vice President
himself with the same result as far as his office Is concerned.
My proposed amendment would cover all of these contingencies. It would even
cover the possibility of something happening to the Precldent-elect or the Vice.
President-elect.
Like every other conscientious Memher of Congress. I try to be as objective
as possible in reaching decisions about the flood of legislation whieh always coniam sure, are inclined to be especially thoughiful. even
fronts uq. Many of u,
critical, about any measures we ourselves introduce and for which we are therefore directly and solely responsible,
I have gone through this highly personal mental process with reference to
House Joint Resolution 53. I have no reservations whatsoever about it. The
reasons for Its approval are overwhelming, and I cannot think of a single
rational argument that can be directed against It.
It is not enough to hope and pray, as Ave all do, that this amendment, if adopted,
will never be used. More strongly than any mere words or arguments, our
political history attests to Its past need, and our sense of prudence warns us
that it may be needed again.
I strongly urge prompt and favorable action by this committee on House Joint
Resolution 53 so that Congress and the several State Legislatures may move with
all possible speed toward its final enactment.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND SECTION 2 OF 11.T. REs. 1 VACANCYY IN THE
OFFICE OF TIHE VICE PRESIDENT)

Statement by Laurence G. Kraus, Belvedere-Tiburon, Calif.
The presidential succession anmendlment (Ii.J. Res. 1) projects the illusion
of flexibility. The thesis of section 2 is that after the amendment Is effective,
Congress
can legislate controlling procedures; meanings are purposely left
open.
But In the pursuit of flexibility., principles have been forgotten, Likewise,
too litle attentin lhas been paihl to existing constittfonl restrlc'tioiis.
There are several issues.
First. Are the principles that underlie the historic American use of the secret
ballot by elected Representatives (Congress) "minutiae"? Does abiding by theil
Ilati cluttering up the amendment with details? The answer is simple,
The framers put these principles in tie Constitution. They specified votllg
by secret ballot in congressional elections of executive branch leader's a. a
necessary safeguard. Yet section 2 reverses these prineilles; it drops their
precedent.
Second. Section 2 merges "'.onfrniatlon" and electionn" to Ihe office of tlhe
Vice President. Selec(tion of executive briancl leadership, it) eflect, is treated
as a matter of legislative branch "advice and consent," In Ihe blilrrlig of Iill
distitlw6ou, e iit mi1tiommal prece(lents on the Ipimrtmiee of voting method (vistimil tlio ) arae, ligitin, mligh, t-td.
d (omm
a-vis elections mllm

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

279

Third. The theory of section 2 that decisions on procedures should be left
to future Congresses Is dangerous. The framers were alert to the peril thot
would prevail if procedures for election of executive branch leaders could
ie changed. Political disturbance might charge through this loophole.
There are but three choices In the treatment of these issues.
One is the choice, I believe mistaken, of section 2. It excludes, essentially,
the secret ballot (though this devastating omission is, perhaps, not meant).
Nevertheless, section 2 overlooks the Interlocking cheeks atnd balances of the
Constitution, particularly in the provisions that control separate House and
Senate votes.
The sec od Is a compromise of sorts. Section 2 vould require that Congress
vote iII joint session. In it Joint session, the Constituthion wol( not restrict
rules or statutes (as it does In the House and Senate when they act as separate
bodies). This would keep open the possibility that even if the secret ballot is
not mentioned speclilcally, tie prece(lents of IlIeI(Constitution which treat secret
ballot voting in congressional (leetlos of executive branch officers might be
followed. Yet, this would be no more than a possibility. Moverover, tile
political pitfalls In establishing rules for a joint session are numerous. Tius,
this choice only leads to a question. For what reason Is "substance" being postponed
If the answer is "flexibility," section 2 does not provide it.
Tile Ihlrd requires revisig section 2. It should be chlangd to read "by a
majority vote by secret ballot of both Houses of Congress." This Is the line
the framers took.
Tile following develops the facts that underlie these choices:
A. Article II, section 2, paragraph 2 limits legislative branch "advice and
consent" to "officers of the United States whose alp)oiltnientls are not herein
otherwise provided for." The office of the Vice President is therein excepted
from congressional votes of confirmation. The Vice President Is elected.
B. There are constitutional and congressional precedents that apply when
Members of Congress vote on electing someone to presidential or vice-iresilential
otilce. 0t1'en essentially tie same set of eircunstflan(es that will be covered by
the presidential succession amendment (vacancy In executive branch office, and
final word on the election of a new offlc(holder by Congress), the framers set it
a requirement of voting by secret ballot in article II, section 1, paragraph 2.
This speciflcatlon was repeated in the XIlth amendment of 1804. These provisions are touched off by the failure of the electoral college to produce a
majority.
(Exhibit A hereto 1s a report by the Legislative Reference Service of the
• library of Congress on the procedures followed when lthe llouse elected President Adnis in 1825. This report proves the use of the secret ballot.
C. Article I, section 5, paragraph 3 says "the yeas and the nays of the Members
of either House on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those preselt,
be entered on the Journal," This provision refers to "each House" (not to a
joint session). It should be noted that by specifying wotling by seeret ballot
In article II, section 1, paragraph 2 (item B above), the framers made this 20
percent clause Inoperative in said election. Yet, when as in section 2 of house
.Tolint Resoultlon 1 voting method is not spelifled, the 20 percent clause applies.
qThe secret ballot, per section 2, would be, in fact, excluded for purposes of
voting InI either' the House or the Senate. Ilicontested decisions, 20 percent or
more of a division is expected.
1). The fontitders of tills Republic w ere realists. They knew where to set the
balainees that made the Constitution wit it Is. They were iot. piliqsts who
1linthed at. tile hard ('oliiiftilioni of power, In their rules fo, opel voting And
iic,tountAlillty. I tfilnlible lssu .,t
they were qliite sati-sfled tlIitt bIlls and resolutions be resolved by coitttervO lung pressures.
But on decision of 1eadersllp-no.
The intifl'gibles of leadership were, they sold, too .senslsive. When polley
and directions are iea to persomlltty and iustum'ictvo jillguieilt, Vo'llug 1u1114
be accurate iIIterms of conselence, not the weigihing of power nor' representative

Te secret ballot mean that when the totals are aliinouuleed, no one, c.in Ie(
sure
how 1111yolie (+,e li:8 voled, spitee llt,
ltlons 1tIlilOllie('d beforell(h veteI ig. It
Inlc is til
e Iolie'olli'lli
td Oell
'or,tie ei'vsel. it native illtie Iiih(llle whos e vote
•willgs Ilie loetihn, voles fi'oly.
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fl, A new President taking office as the successor to a dead President is
politically exposed. Rather than rallying to his leadership, Congress might
seek to dominate hih (President Andrew Johnson, Senator Thaddeus Stevens,
and Ilmpeachnent). In leaving each successive Congress free to establish its
own procedures on how section 2 should be implemented, House Joint Resolution
1 preys on this weakness. It forces a quick slowdown on a newly elevated President's nomination for Vice President (or even before that in deciding in both
House and Senate on a joint session, and then it establishing Joint-session rules).
Section 2 of House Joint Resolution 1 makes the procedures for selection of a new
Vice President either meaningless or divisive, If the section Is changed to specifying voting by secret ballot, the selection will be meaningful.
1. The circumstances of meaningless confirmation are clear. Unwilling to
risk presidential disfavor, Congress might play tile part of a rubberstamp in
passing on the President's nominee. Yet, tile Vice President Is a potential
world leader.
2. The circumstances of divisiveness are varied. For pnrposo of specific
Illustration, presume House Joint Resolution 1 was tile law of tile land. Then
presume that:
(a) The Democratic Convention of 19060 nominated a Xennedy-Humphrey
ticket instead of a Kennedy-Johnson ticket. This ticket was then elected.
() Vice Iresident Humphrey, with a political base it tile liberal wing of
the Democratic Party, succeeded to tile Presidency on President Kennedy's
death. The election of 1904t was 11 months away. The most pressing national
Issue was civil rights (a sectional issue).
() With the new amendment operative nnd the Vice-Presidency vacant,
President Humphrey would he obliged to make an almost instant decision
whom lie should nominate. He could not wait for consensus to develop.
(d) Anticipating tile coming national election, the Republican leadership would
recognize that If Congress refused to confirm President Humphrey's nominee,
tile new President would be significantly discredited. Enter motivating factor
No. 1.
(M) The southern democrats would be quick to recognize that they could reverse the momentum for passage of the Civil Rights Act by likewise discrediting
President Humphrey. Enter motivating factor No. 2.
(f) President Humphrey would recognize that the outcome of the congressional
showdown would control tile character of his Presidency, as well as his prospects
for reelection. He would be forced Into immediate and drastic use of presidential power. Enter motivating factor No. 3.
(g) A coalition would form. Tile showdown would become a transaction In
power. With "viva voice" voting, deals can be made. Votes can be bargained
for and delivery can be checked.
(h) Tile tactical advantages of the showdown would lie with the congressional
opposition. They need never announce their true objectives.
() Conclusion-House Joint Resolution 1 (see. 2) makes a political effort to
discredit a newly elevated President at the onset of his Presidency eminently
practical. The dangers to tile national Interest that underlie such divisiveness
at a tine of changeover in the Presidency are not hard to imagine.
3. A firm requirement of voting by secret ballot will reverse tile circumstances
cited above. The selection can be made meaningful. Voting method controls
the underlying forces in any election.
(a) President Humnplthrey will nominate as Vice President n Demoerntle leader
who can win soeret ballot confirmation. The spefleati of a secret-bnllot vote
requires that tle nominee be a man of superior qualities and unasailablo
character who staids4 to win a majority of the votes, freely given, of Menlbers
of both the I-hMse and hie Senate.
() Coalitions will not form because of tile secret ballot. Party or regional
loyalties cannot be policed. No one can be sure how anyone else has voted.
Votes cannot he ba rgahtied for because delivery cannot iechecked.
(e) Elndorsenents and commitments will be made touch as lopel buttons or
bumper strips are shown in any public election. But the secret ballot grants
Independence to those in the middle. It frees the judgment of those who flild
it hardest to choose.
Tile ultimate issue of section 2 of House Joint Resolution 1 i.American confldence in the secret ballot.
Section 2 does not need flexibility. It needs a restatement of tile ('onfidelne
that Nmis existed itt tile ,ecret i)allof since Its lrinliple was incori)orhted In the
Constitit ion by the framers.
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In part this is an issue of awareness. For the use of the secret ballot In
American politics ils had its ups and downs. Of late, the curve Is in a strong
uptrend (specifically, the independent use of secret ballot voting in leadership
decisions In the caucuses and conferences of both Republicans and Democrats,
and in )oth the House and the Senate).
Voting iliethod its been debated iii Congress. Exlibilt "'" hereto Is a partial
transcript, taken, front Gales & Seaton's Register of Debates in Congress, of a
debate Il 1821) on the lssue ol' confidence in the secret ballot, and on the nieaning
of constitutional provisions on voting method. The dialog of 1829 can be helpful
in directing the dhialog of 1905.
The following is taken front the remarks of Congressnan Bartlett of tIe
21st Congress: (Gales & Seaton's transcriptions are in the third person.)
"The possibility of * * * on the one side * * * while no evil Is shown to
exist on the other, was, of itself, a good reason against altering the present
mode of election. Ile should therefore vote against the resolution and against
every other which, like this, went to alter what exereuee had proved to be
attended with no evils, for the sake of Introducing new-fangled and untried
expldint~s, which carried mischief in their aspect."
For soine, It appears, the congressional use of the secret ballot, and the prin'clples behind it,o ive become tile untried and tihe s515)ect.
Congress has no grounds for being suspicious of the secret ballot.
EXI1urT A
TimH JAIBRARY OF CONORESS,
JAOISI.ATIVE REFERENCE SnERVICE,

1ashinglon, D.C.
IPROCEI)URE FOLLOWED BY TlE UNITE) STATES IloUsn OF REPRESENTATIvES IN
CioosiN.
riiE PIRESIIENT IN EVENT NO CANDIDATE IIhAs RECEIVED A MAJORITY

OF TUlE EIECTOAAI, VOTE
Aniendinent XII to the U.S. Constitution provides that in case of a tie or if
no candidate has a niajorlty, the House (if Itepresentntives chooses the President
by ballot from tile candidates, not exceeding three, having the highest uallbers
of electoral votes. A majority would he at least 2U1, since the total electoral
vote is 531.
Only once since adoption of amendment XII in 1804 (and once under the
original Constitution, article II section 1--electll of ,Jefferson In 1801) has
the (Ity devolved on the Iouse to elect a President. This occurred In connection wih tile election of 1824. On February 9, 1825, when tile electoral votes
were counted by tile President of tile Senate in the presence of tile Senate and
1-louse in joint session), the vote declared for President wns as follows:
Electoral
votes
For Andrew Jackson, of Tennessee
------------------------------09
For John Qilincy Adams, of Massachusetts
-------------------------84
For Willian U. Crawford, of Georgia
----------------------------41
For Henry Clay, of Kentucky
----------------------------------37
_Total
-----------------------------------------------21
Majority or vote necessary to elect
------------------------------131
The IHouse then, on February 0, proceeded to elect a President from among
the three highest calididates. Each State hadone vote and the result Was as
follows:
Votes
For ,6Ihl l Quilly Adamis, of Massach.etts ---------------------------12
For Andrew Jackson, of Tennesse ----------------------------------7
For William It. Crawford. of Georgia. ---------------4
John Qiney AiinIs was Iha elected Preslent.
The following rules of procedure In election of tIle President by the Hou1se
had Nen lpreviolsly adopted l)y tle House on Febriuary 7, 1825:
"1st, In tlhe event of Its aj)l)earing, on opening all the certificates. and counting
tile votes given by the electors of tile several Sft es for P'resident, flint. noXrson
has a Illajority of Ihbe voles of the whole mulinber of the electors alp)lointed, and
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journnls
the result shall have been declared, the sano Hlitill he entered on the
house.
tills
of
"Old The roll of tle Rouse, shall then lie ,ailed,by States, and, o Its appearthe
Ing that a imemler or nietbers front two-thirds of the States are present,
the
from
President
a
choose
to
ballot,
by
Iroceed,
shall Inunediately
0ouse
1
tlos.
of
list
the
oil
three,
exeeediig
not,
persons having the highest numbers,
reelve the
voted for as President; and ilnease neither of those persons shall
(onlt lle
shill
llitse
the
ballot,
first
the
on
States
the
votes of a majority of all
a Presito ballot: for a President, without interruption by other Musiiness, until
dent lie chosen.
963rd, The doors of the 1nll shall be closed diriing the ballothig, except igilist
members of the Senate, Stenographers, nud Ithe Otleers of tile Il1ouse. niade, Ito
"40th, From th eoninlencentn of the balloting, until an elect io is
ate,
ti
proposition to adjourn shall lie received, unless oil the motion ofSt o(e
The
lates.
by
deelded
W)0
slll
qwslion
the
alld
State:
another
by
seconded
same rule shall be observed iitregard to inly lotiont to ellinge tit( ustial hoilur
for the meeting of the House.
''5th, Ill balloting, the following iiode shall blobserved, to wit
together,
"Tie Representatives of each state shall be arranged id1(1 seated with
Ih
eliair,
Speaker's
tMe
of
hanad
right,
the
all
seat
the
with
begitiig
from
members
the
with
proceedflng
thence,
nieibers flroll the slate of Maine:
the states In tie order the sales are usually naled for receiving petitions,
around the Tiall of theIhouse, mtll all are seated;
"A ballot box shall he provided for each state :
the first instanep, ballot atnong
"Tile Representatives of each state shall. itn
sante, nd Ihey may, If necestheir
of
vote
the
aserlain
themselves, iliorder to
sary. alplont tellers of their ballots,
"After the vote of each slate Is ansertlned. duplicats tiereof shall be mnde
lmthet loie(, is to be made, shall
In ease any one of the persons from
out, fill(1,
receive a majority of the votes given, oi any one ballotlug, by Ihe Repnresetia ties
of a stale, the nit me of that person shall be written oil peih of the duplleaes:
and, lit ease the votes so givell shall he divIded, so that neither of saidlirsotis
shall have a majority of the whole number of voles tven ly suielt state ont finy
one balloting, then the word 'divided,' shall be written on each dupliente:
"After the delegation from each state shall have ascertained the vote of thoir
for
stale. the Clerk shall name the states in tie order tltey are usimlly hnaiied
Sergeant-at-Arms
the
called,
Is
each
of
name
receiving petitions; and, as the
shall
shnll present to tie (delegation of eadh two ballot Ioxes, i each of which made
(hdllicates
tile
of
one
state,
tle
of
RepresenlatIve
som4e
be deposited. by
tile examtinaas aforesnaid, of illvoe of said state. In the preseiee, and subject to there
is more
where
:
and.
present
then
state
said
front
members
the
all
of
tion,
deposited
be
both
not
shall
ditipllates
the
state,
n
front
than one Repre.sentatlve
by tte mine person.
"WIhenI tile votes of tile states ar(' thus all taken in, t, Sergennt-at-Arms

shall carry one of tihe said ballot boxes to one table, and the other to a separate

and distinct table:
"One person from each state, represented Ilitie balloting. shtall ho alu)linted
by its Representative to tell ofr said hniotg: but, in ease the Representatives fall
to apmoifit a teller, the Sieaker shall ppolint:
"Tile said Tellers shall divide Tlemihselves Into l.wo sets, as nearly equal hi
number as can be, and one of the said sets of Tellers shall proceed to, count
the votes in the one of sald boxes. and the other set tie votes In tile 0etbr box;
"When the votes are coumted by the different sets of Tellers, the result shall be
reported to the HIouse. andf ifhe reports agree. Ilie saiie shal bol accepted As;
theatre votes of tle states: but, If the reports disagree, the states shall proceed',
InI t same mn ier as before, to a new ballot.
"th, All questions arising after thle balloting commences, reqirIng the doelpo of the Holise. wileh shall be d,elded by the House votit.Iper cpilta, -to
be inilentlal to the power of choosing a President, shall be deelded by states,
wltli6itt dehate: nnd, lt ease of an equal division of the vote'v of states, the
question shll be lost.
"71h, When either of the persons from whom the choice Is to be iliade shall
have reeelved a nuajority of all the states, the Speaker shnll declare the samie,
and that that. person Is elected President of the United States.
"8th, Therestult shall be immediately comnttilented to the Senate by Message:
and n committee of three persons shall he aiointed to Inform the President of
the Untited States, and the President elect, of said election."

PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Te'

283,

I-llIIes of protdetlre adopted by the Iioue In 1825 wolid not necessarily

control such oi1 electiont

toly, but ihey eertinthly are precedent.
SAM11I1J 11. S'rlTL,, Jr.,
A w ican Late livialsin.

ExirIaTr 11
Oil Jiilnry 1 IIIid 17, 1,21),
artlelnit dehal , oe the Ibo4iie

th Ihlt, of tlire n(tit tlves elillg(,l III Its most
(f Iow elected representlives should elect their
officers. The follioviig
tRe'slilt
was Iprolosed hy Ui'presnltittve WldIffe:
Ilesolved tha1t: It, follow tig he liddd to the St1111(lllg lllihs of tie lHouse:
All electbits of' tie Ile se lio' Represillllivis shall he by rina roec, by it call
of tilt lil.4
of the u1t'ters, iIlllinholleailly front the roll."
'Tli it(,0
oil fhl
lItsoltllh 1:15 yta'ns ago I. of t imeless signitficnme and
Elu11tlity. 'rt wo'ds tilttl spolkenl olh
te floor of tie hlouse of 11 l'eskinleitives
cold well i, slolC of tlit(e floor of filly representative body today, They are

of Iiesl ltlllllil,
Viltile to niyolie %wito\Vlltl4 to tIIIl'rstlilid ftit.
Allieri'lli sv.yste(ll of
polItics.

Tihe lilsot, of ]eireseiiti tlves reJeeted flit' ltsollt l
by i vote of t7 to MI.
holl
II. I(Pltlm thet'
htl ollsel or lie few sirv'iitig itit'ili'rs or Tlitiitl,, .*lt'flerson's
polit l
geiterallon mid1uphl
nt
lile estbllished defl'trsonim prilncilles of wothig

Iptoee dtire.

Steltcted parts of Ih' dlt'hte, which Is reported In full Ihi (Tles & Seaton's
lRetister of Dehbates in (Yolqwress, follow:
"Mr
r. Whcklltfro of Keht ueky, I lie sponsor of til' Resolutio.

sald a Representa-

tive 'te'xirelses a dhlegntel ftmist. for which lit' Is reslpoisihlt, to those wio, have
clotled him withi tle power of volflug. In voling, by the members of is lotIuise,

Ii, tilt,
thole, of its ufllhers and ageilts, fhth hltliwe of pullic oplliilln is a, liilorlnnl, and It should be its resllectfully obeyed, by if(l0l1re.Ut'lllive, its pon
the expeihtney of ftly 1ct of lt'gislntton. distance the election of n Speaker,
to preside over tilthdeliherations of this House, with tile power to appoitt Its
commitltees, iild h111arged with the (ishllrselnlet: of two or three hundred tholul
sand doll-irs of Iublic money, hi tie ptynivnt of the mttlErs, and other ex)Imt's,.
h(lel(it to our legishltion, withl Ito re.sjouisiblliiy to the (lov'ernment but
his high chiarneter. A vote ii his elation inity be of mnteh more importance to
the eollItilltty, to tie dlgtitfy and chnrnitehr of our Govermient, than tin the passitgt of it hlw or resolitlloil. The Constitution t(lluder which we leglslate has
sectirtd to tiltpeople, upon te retesi of om-Iiftit of their Reipresventntives, the
Iuportait right. of having tile votes of their Representatives spread upon the

JourlHnl, (il illy qllestioll, however mitiiportmlit li Its effect or emitSemhtimlCes.
Yet, (shid Mr. W.) we, by tie rule or practhice of our House, choose to shihld our-

selves front resolnsilillty, for tht' voles we give, fit flh elections of Imtportant
Iliblh oflh'ers 1li(1 agents. hy hiding fronm our volistutlents within the lids of the
ballot box.

"What are the objections to the proposed change? I have heard, In conver-

sation, blut onte. There may be others: more, I have no dotlit will e urged. It
Is alleged thlt, by a viva voce vote, the lieihts
will give offence, or may incuro

the dlislleistr
ir of the Spenker, or tile eanildile for office, gahlist whom lieemay
vote. I will not allow myself for n motlifit to sttlplost' that a Representative of

forty thousand freeuen, or ole wio is fit to rellresonit forty thoustild freemen,
les inot posse.ss hiudependenee and ioril firnmess enough to avow for anil against

Whoni ie votes; and the man who IS elevated to the dIgnitfled station of presldingover the dellberatlifns of tle ilots of Relwesentatives of tie United Staltes,
who Would permit hIs Indignation or revenge to he exerted against a ntember, beause ihe preferred nothelir for the station, is unworthy the conlidOnce or respect

due to the offlc lie fills or the claims of gentlemen. The member who would,
from the dreoid of suel Indignation, sacrifice his Independence, Is defstitute
of tMat

manly feeling and moral courage whitlh ought to charactr-ize, antid I trust ever
will clharacteize, tile memiiers of this isise. I will, therefore, dismiss this ohjeetion as one which cannot prevail, or find an advocate otn this floor.' "
Representative Barringer of South Carolina, In opposing the Resolution, said:

"Sir, the gentleman from Kentucky presumes mueh uipon the perfection of

human nature when he maintains that a gentlemnan would be unworthy of a sent

In thnt chnir, who would cherish anythilng like unkind feelings towards those
who would oppose his elevation to it. We are men: fortunately for us we are
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all but men: and while we continue such, we shall remain subject to the passions
and infirmities which belong to our being. The gentleman might just as well have
asserted that an elevation to that chair does ipso factor annihilate all feeling and
passion in the human breast, as to have asserted that it is impossible a suuccessful candidate should feel anything like unkindness towards those whom he
knows to have been his opponents. The fact is not so. God forbid that it should
be so. God forbid that any station or honor should render its possessor Insensible to kindness, and dead to friendship and gratitude. Suppose, for a moment,
that everything like political party were utterly annihilated, (and there is much
ground to hope that this will, ere long, be literally the case; that we shall lay
aside our emulations and animosities, and all coalesce into one great party for
the public weal) and suppose further, that, at the opening of the next Congress,
there shall be two candidates for the chair, perfectly agreeing in their political
principles, equally well qualified for the station, and so evenly balanced in attainments and in intellectual and moral character, that even their friends are
scarcely able to draw a distinction in preference of one or the other-under these
circumstances, the House proceeds to elect viva voce. I as a member of it, and
one whose duty it is to exercise elective privilege, feel perfectly friendly to both
candidates, believe that either of them would make a suitable and accomplished
presiding officer, but fancy, after much reflection, that I can perceive in one of
them some quality which just inclines the balance, and, when called to vote, I
name him in preference to the other, and a single vote turns the scale. Will the
gentleman from Kentucky tell me, or will he try to persuade this House, that
the unsuccessful candidate who, by the change of a single vote, would have gained
the election, will feel no secret unkindness towards me, when, through my vote,
he lost so great an honor and distinction? No, sir, I know human nature better.
He will feel my vote as all act of unkindness ; or if, notwithstanding my vote, one
of the candidates shall succeed in his election, will he forget who voted against
him? No, sir, he will not forget it; and, when distributing tie honors of the
House, he will show that he has not, by giving every important and prominent
station to those who were his friends, and casting those who opposed his election,
so far as his appointing power shall enable him to do it, into the shade of oblivion.
If this is not so, I have, greatly miscalculated the nature of man; but it is so,
and it ever will be so; and I, for one, am ready to risk everything rather than
advocate an arrangement which will place both the officer and the members in
so unhappy a predicament. Yes, sir, I say that the plan will, in practice, be an
unhappy one to the officer whom we elect, to us who elect him, and ultimately to
the nation at large."
Mr. Barringer continued.
"For what purpose such a plan can be urged upon us God only knows; for I
Will not willingly presume there is any hidden design in it. But, sir, we are not
left on this subject to our own imagination. We are not under the necessity of
guessing, and supposing what is the will of our constituents in tlis matter.
They have fully manifested their view of this subject; they have indicated it by
action; they have acted toward us on the supposition that we were men, and
would continue to be men of like passions with others; that we are not now,
and never in this world shall be, perfect beings, and, therefore. they have given
us a written rule to govern our proceedings; they have laid down the great
charter of their will and our duty-an instrument provided not for one limited
period, or one set ofi m li ll e srvailts, but extending to all the, and controlling
an unlimited succession of their public Representatives. Now, I have to ask
the gentlemen who advocate this resolution, which of the two they consider the
more Imlportant, the election of a Speaker of this House, or the election of a
Chief Magistrate of these United States-that distinguished public officer, who
holds In his hands the destinies of this country, except where tile operation of
this House shali present a harrier to his power? Sir, I need not n1lt the question:
it can receive but one answer. Yet, what have the people said respectinig the
election of such an officer as that? They have expressly said that he shall be
chosen by ballot. They, it seems, have not that confidence in human n attire which
tie gentleianf from Kentucky possesses in such a very liberal neasiire,
"Sir, the gentleman should have taught the people better. They have sidd that
the President, whether chosen by electors or chosen in this House, shall be chosen,
not viva voce, but by ballot; they have said to us, we, the people, have so little
-confidence in the prfections even of you, our Representattives, that, although we
give you the election in the last appeal, we will place you in the same situation,
and bind you by the same restrictions, as the original electors. We have no sort
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of faith In the doctrine that your feelings and passions are all annihilated as soon
as we clothe you with legislative authority; and, therefore, we order you to elect
our Chief Magistrate by ballot. Whether they have done this with a view to our
Independence, or to their own security, it matters not, so they have spoken. Nay,
sir, they have gone even farther than this; tiley have said, even to sovereign
States, that they, too, when they vote in their collective capacity, shall vote by
ballot, and by ballot alone. I refer to the election of a Vice President, Such,
sir, is the chart which the people have laid down. That chart I mean to take
for my guide. They have spoken their will in a manner not to be misunderstood ;.
they have erected a barrier which it does not become any man whom they have
sent here, and who professes to revere their authority, to attempt to break
down."
Mr. Il:rringer then concluded:
"I feel unwilling even so much as to hint, that there is, under this resolution,
any design which does not appear, or that it is brought forward merely with a
view to a special purpose, not openly avowed. To hint that, sir, would be to
infringe on the motives of honorable gentlemen; but this much I will say, that,
if this resolution is not urged for a particular purpose, there is no reason why
we should adopt it; and if it is urged for such a purpose, its adoption is unworthy of us, and of the station which we hold. Sir, the measure, if it goes into
effect, will fix a stain upon this country, through the act of her Representativesa stain which will remain on the page of history, though he who records it may
blot it with a tear. Sir, we have read the history of another assembly, which
called itself free, and we do know that, when a miscreant, for the promotion of
hbityrannical purposes, sought to overawe its freedom, this very measure was the
instrument he employed. Let that fact stand as a beacon for our warning, and
withhold us from the commission of an act so suicidal."
Mr. Barringer's prediction was born out, at least with respect to the Speakership itself, much later, by the House revolution of 1910.
It remained, however, for Representative Bartlett to make the comment that
is most intriguing now, when, many years later, a different political generation
looks back on the acts and words of its precedessors.
Mr. Bartlett said that"He would vote very manfully for the resolution if any reason could be shown
why the present mode of election was not a good one, and why the mode proposed
would be better. From the commencement of the Government the practice of
electing by ballot had been uniformly observed; and le had listed with attention to the mover of the resolution to hear what evil attended it; but he had
listened in vain, He was opposed to hasty changes in legislation, and never would
adopt them without a strong probability of some benefit to follow. In the
present case, the mover of the resolution had not been able to state a single evil
or inconvenience arising from the existing practice. He had, indeed, placed the
matter upon the ostensible ground, that the votes of every member would, by this
means, be known to his constituents."
Mr. Bartlett continued :
"But gentlemen had contended that, as the power exercised here is a delegated
power, it is, therefore, proper, that those who gave it should know how it is exercised in the election of the officers of the House. Now, on this subject, he considered it fair to consult the expression of the people's will as contained in the
Constitution; and there he found that, when the people themselves are directing
the mode of holding, by the members of this House, an election of far greater importance viz: the election of a Chief Magistrate for the whole Union, they expressly say it sball be by ballot, and not viva, voice. He would ask gentlemen
whether the authority to elect a Presidentis not a delegated authority? Whether
it is not a more iniporthiit election than that'of the 6ffiers of this House? And
whether it was not of more consequence that the people should know how every
member voted in that case than in this? And if gentlemen object to thfis case as
an extreme one, he would ask whether, in the regular election Chief Magistrate
by the electors, the people have not as plainly said that they shall ,hoose by
ballot, and not viva voice? Did not this clearly show what was thelr view of the
matter? Did not this provision fully establish and sanction the principle on
which the present' practice is founded? If it holds in the greater case, should it
not in the less? Can it be right in the one case, and Wrong in the other? What
case had gentlemen brought forward where any evil could be shown to have
arisen? If none, where can be the necessity for any change?"
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remarks with this striking observation:
Mr. Bartlett then concluded isl
"Tie possibility of embitterment on the 1iteside * * * while no evil is shown
to exist on the other, was, of itself, a good reason against altering the present
mode of election. le should therefore vote against the resolution, and against
every other which, like this, went to alter what experience had proved to be
attended with no evils, for the sake of itroducing new-fangled and untried
expedients, wlohic carried mischief in their aspect."
The vote i Congress in 1R29 supported the principles of secret-ballot election.
However, in 1,S38, tie result was reversed. Substitute principles, ones untried
and unheralded, came as Interlopers to the American political scene.
Tito "untried expedients which carried mischief in their aspect" that Mr.
B artlett warned against, that 1q, the use of open voting in leadership determinations, became, for a time, the feopted and the expected inpolitical life.
Contrarily, the Constitutional and Jefferisonlan eicep-s which experiencee
had proved to be attended with no evils." that Is.tie priniiples behind the use
of the secret ballot, became the untried and the suspect. Moreover, in the
ul timiate of reversals, they were regarded with susplcio.
The curious facts of this topsy-turvy sequence, make this a true folklore of
our times.

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN JACOR IT. 0Ira1ERMT. OF 'NEW YORT. ON PIESTIIEN'TTAL
INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN TuE OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT

Mr. Chairman, because of the grave national risk mlnd gamble Involved, the
problem of presidential Inablility and succession should he dealt with at once.
Tlere Is little disagreement its to the need to fill Ifhis dangerous void in our
system of government ; the diffleulty has been in reaching agreement on how best
to do It. I am firmly of the opinion that a conttullonal iamendllment. as proposed in house Joint Resolution 1, is the proper and niost adelitate way to meet
this need.
I urge immediate action by our committee and the Congress oti tills resolution
so that the long process of ratification by our States might proceedsas rapidly
as possible.
We are concerned with two problems: (1) the lack of a constitutional provision assuring the orderly discharge of tie powers and duties of the Presi(lent in tie event of liabilityy or incapacity, and (2) the lack of a constitutional
provision assuring tile continillty of the office of Vice President, an office which
Itself is provided for the primary purpose of assuring continuity.
Problems have existed Inthils country for almost two centuries so far as continuity in tie executive branch of our Government is concerned. President
Johnson said In his message a few days ago: "It is truly astonishing that over
this s)1anAwe have neither perfected the provisions for orderly continuity in
th executive brIaneh. nor have we had to pay tie priee our continuing inaction
so clearly Invites and risks."
We bave been without a Chief Executive during several periods In our history
during which the President was unable to perform his duties. It could happen
again uiiless our Constttiitton i clarified and amended to define procedures for a
successor to assume 1l1e powers nd duties of the Presidency.
Since the 1ill of Rights, the first 10 amendments to the Constitution, was
written. 9 of the 14 subsequent aeindibnts have related directly either to the
office of the Presidency and Vice Presidency or to assuring the respolsivoness
of our vol Ing processes to the will of the people. The Americannpeople have not
'es has (lictated It-our
h1esitI ted to aeln1d their- Consttitution when cololubsoi
most recent anendllent was in 1064-and certainly cominlonense an(d deep cobicern for -tile welfare of oir coiitftry dictfe it now. In such perloims flinies as
doubt about whose hlnd is responsible for the running
these, there should I)eno
of our otiitry. We are prepared for the possibility of a Presdet' deat It. but
-we are not prepared for the probability of a President's Incapacity by injury,
Illness, or other aflictiont.
On at least two occasions In our history American Presidents have been disabled for long periods of time and were incapable of discharging their presidential
duties. On 16 occasions the office of Vice President has been va(,ant. During
two perilous decades since World War II, that office has been vacant.
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The problem of presidential disability Is more serious than that of presidential
succession I)(,tlluse it President could lie disabled tilld iot adtiit It, iresIdent
Garfield was disableld for over 2 months prior to his death fromn an assassin's
bullet In 1881; President Wilson was disabled for 17 months from Septemler
191) to March 1921 ; President Mlisenhower was distabled on two oeenslolis. We
have In tile plist been iII the position of having to get along without deVisive
leadership fromn the Presidency due to illness.
When President Garfield lay unconscious those 80 days, the Cabinet, wit hout
constitutional authority, ran the Government as best it could. Our country
was actually without a President, even though the Constitution provihes tlat
when the President Is unable to carry out his duties, the Vice President is to
take over. But the Constitution does not say whether he Is to become President
or merely net as President; it does not say whether he is to take over Uif 11l
the
end of tle term or until the President becomes able. And the Constitution does
not say who shall decide when such a disability begins and ends. The Co4titution does not define what Isa state of l)resilentilnl disability. It does not slielfy
how or by whom a dleelara
lhio of presidential disability Is to lie tiltihltd or
declared, and It does not specify how and by whom it shall be decided vhien tie
period of presidential disability has elided. These omikslons make It entirely pos.
sible for a President vhlo has lecomne hiompeit-piyshcally, or mentally, or
both-to retain his powers until a successor is elected. And conceivably flits
period (ould last from tile time he takes the oath of "fltce until ils ,1-year term
has ended. The -nly remedy the (onstitution provides Is tile inlpeachniolit of the
President on ehirges submitted by the House and Senate and sustained by twothirds of the Senate.
House Joint Resolution 1 proposes a constitutional amendment to provide that
If tile Presilent declares his Inability in writing, the Vice President shall become
Acting President until the President recovers; he assumes the duties and
powers-not the office. If the President does not declare his own inabilityIf lie Is unconscious or too ill to do so--the Vice President, acting with the concurrence of the majority of the Cabinet, call determine the President to be
disabled. If a dispute should arise between the Presilent and the Vice President
and tie Cabinet, Congress would decide the Issue. itf the Congress determines
by two-thirds Vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of the office, the Viee President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers
and duties of his office.
Mr. Chairman,- I. strongly recommend tilat the situatonuof presidential Inability be clarified by constitutional amendment to avoid alny confusion about
when and to what extent the second in command shiouldl assume the duties
of President.
Mr. Chairman, tile Constitution should 1)e amended to provide that in the
event of a vacancy In the office of the Vice Presilent, the President slall nominate
a successor. Our proposal here would give tle President the power to nominate
the Vice President, subject to congressional a)l)roval by a uiiajority vote of both
Houses. It is desirable that the President and the Vice President enjoy harmonious relations and mutual confidences, and that the President be granted
the generally accepted prerogative of choosing his Vice President. On the other
hand, this aniienditient would recognize the right of the peol)ie to have a choice
in the Vice President's election through their elected representatives in Congress.
Our traditional system dictates that the people, through tieir elected representatives havea volce in the selection of the Vice President.
Under (ur Constitution, Congress could call for a special election. So far In
our history, this has not been dove, Tile tie of great inti ill tragedy when
we have lost a President Is hardly a time condiitve to the wei-reasoiied selecting
by popular vote. Congress, on the other hand, is tile body eittusted with niaking
•injor olecislois. ,Congress declares war; Cngress Iimyx elect or remove Preside its
under certain elroilmstaiices. I feel that Congress can best represent the
wishes of the pople and is, therefore, the prbper body to eleet a Vice President
upon ile nomination Inv the I'resident.
Tle office of Vice President hars become one of great ill"6i tahice. It is no
longer simply 'an -honorairy position, It carries specific and fir-reaching re•*sponsibilities in the executive branch of tile Government. It is essential that
there always be a presidential successor fully conversant with domestic and
world affairs and prepared to step Into this high office on short notice and work
harmoniously with the President.
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Vacancies in the office of Vice President have occurred on 16 different occasions
for periods totaling more than 37 years. Seven Vice Presidents have died in
office and one resigned; eight Vice Presidents lhave taken over the office of
President upon tile death of the incumbent President since 1841.
Under our present law, where the Speaker of the House would take over
tile duties of the Presidency, it is conceivable that the successor would belong
to a different political party from the deceased President. Such a change in
the highest levels of tile Government could hardly be conducive to the smooth
and uninterrupted conduct of our country's affairs. Someone chosen for another
office should not be elevated to the Vice-Presidency automatically. The office
of Vice President is of such importance that we should have a man who is chosen
for that specific purpose. He should not inherit this office because he happened
to be chosen as the best man to fill another post. A man should be closen who
can work with the President, and ie should be a member of the President's own
political party. In a time of crisis, or any time, we should n)t have a quick
change of philosophy or change of direction. During the Garfield, Wilson, and
Eisenhower illnesses, we were fortunate that we did not have an extreme international crisis, although we did have many important problems during these
disability periods.
I am of the opinion that the best way to fill the the office of the Vice President
In the case of a vacancy would be as proposed in our resolution to amend the
Constitution to permit the President to nominate a new Vice President and the
Congress to elect him. This is close to the present system in which we find the
President of the United States having a definite voice in deciding who the vicepresidential candidate will be-and I feel that the Congress should ratify the
President's nominee because it best represents the wishes of the people. It is the
body that comes closest to being able to determine what the people want.
Without proper constitutional provision, we face the risk of a nation in danger
of confusion and chaos in the event the President is removed by death or isincapacitated by illness of accident, and we are faced with a vacancy in the
second highest office of our land.
There is an urgent need for a constitutional amendment to permit the President and the Congress to fill the Vice-Presidency whenever it becomes vacant.
I urge prompt approval of House Joint Resolution 1.

STATEMENT BY CONOREMSMAN J. EDWARD ROUSE, OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, within the past month our attention
has been called again to tile need for a clearly established policy relating to
presidential disability.
All of us are most gratified by the prompt recovery of President Johnson
from his minor illness. But this should not minimize the importance or the
urgency of the issue.
The danger inherent in our failure to make this necessary revision to the
Constitution are known to all of u,3. Even when the oceans provided buffers
of time and space the need existed. The passage of the years has only served
to emphasize this need.
At the same time we make this revision we can also make certain the office
of Vice President will be promptly filled if any vacancy should occur in the.
future. During the past two decades this office has been vacant for 5 years.
During the history of our Nation the office has been vacant on 16 different occasions totaling more than 37 years.
If we act promptly on tills matter it Is possible tills most necessary amendment to our Constitution eiiild be affected within this year, Forty-seven of our'
State legislatures are either in session or will be in session during 1965. I am
certain the members of those legislative bodies also are aware of tile urgency
of the issue.
If there are those who do not believe there is a need for such an amendment
they have been silent. And I am certain those who share the belief there Is
such aiioweindtire in a great majority,
The prolimis recognized. The solution is clear. Action is demanded. The.
time to net is ripen us.
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STATEMENT OF lION. EDWARD R. ROYDAL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as the sponsor of House Joint
Resolution 812, an identical resolution to House Joint Resolution 1, I am most
grateful for the opportunity you have afforded me to express by strong support
for this proposal.
The committee is to be congratulated on its fine work in taking up this Important matter and for your commendable effort to clear up some 175 years
of constitutional uncertainty. Nothing less than the safe and sure continuity of
the legal government of the United States is at stake. This essential continuity
has been endangered many times in the past, and in some instances only good
fortune has prevented possible disaster. I am sure that the members of this
committee fully realize that we can no longer afford, In this nuclear-space age,
to leave the fate of or Government to the whims of chance.
For more than a year after Lyndon Johnson became President, our national
luck held out, and we were all witnesses to an impressive demonstration of the
true inner strength of America's democratic traditions.
After the tragic assassination of our beloved President John F. Kennedy, the
new President firmly and quickly took up the reins of leadership, to assure
continuity of the Government in the midst of a great constitutional crisis, to begin
to heal the Nation's wounds, and to reinstill in our people a sense of unity and
brotherhood and faith in the future.
This experience has again focused public attention on the critical issue of
Presidential and Vice-Presidential succession, as well as the related, and in
some ways more difficult, problem of presidential disability. And I believe there
has developed a strong national consensus in favor of resolving these issues in a
positive way, so that there will be no doubt concerning the constitutional provisions for handling such problems in the future.
As an affirmative response to the need for a solution to these problems, House
Joint Resolution 312 proposes to amend the Constitution in three respects: First,
it confirms the established custom that a Vice President, succeeding to a vacancy
inI the office of the President, becomes President instead of Acting President;
second, it establishes a procedure for filling a vacancy It. the office of Vice President; and third, it deals with the problem of presidential disability.
Section 1 of the proposed amendment provides that in the case of the removal
of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President
shall become President,
Section 2 provides that in the event of a vice-presidential vacancy, the President can nominate a new Vice President, who will take office when he has been
confirmed by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3 enables a President to declare his own disability to exercise the
powers and duties, of his office, thus voluntarily turning over those powers and
duties, but not the office, to the Vice President who then becomes Acting
President.
In the absence of a Presidential declaration of disability, section 4 permits
the Vice President to make such a declaration, and with the approval of a
majority of the Cabinet. or such other group as Congress may indicate, assume
the presidential responsibilities as Acting President.
Section 5 permits the President to reassume the powers and duties of his
office when he declares that no disability exists. It also provides for immediate
congressional resolution of any dispute over the President's ability, by authorizing him to resume discharging the powers and duties of his office unless twothirds of both House and Senate agree with the Vice President and a majority
of the Cabinet (or such group as Congress designates) that the President is unable to perform those duties.
Tlhis proposal, though not perfect, represents a sincere effort on the part of
many persons who have studied the admittedly complicated issues tnvolved to
offer a workable means of solving df 6iclt and delieiiie prbleins affecting the
continuity and perhaps even the life of our Governmnit. Several suggestions
have been made to improve this proposed andiphment. I trust the committee
vill give full and thorough consideratibn to all these suggestions.
But I also urge the committee to act without unnecessary delay, for the subject is important to the filture stability and peace of this Nati6i, and we cannot
afford the risk of further delay in this vital matter."
As President Jolitson stated in his recent message, "Favorable action by the
Congress. on the measures here recommended will, I believe, assure the orderly
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continuity in the Presidency that is imperative to the success ald"stalilhity *or
our system.
"Action on these measures now will allay future anxiety among our peopleand among the peoples of the world--i the event senseless tragedy or unforeseeable disability should strike again at either or both of the principal offices
of our constitutional system.
"If we act now, without undue delay, we shall have moved closer to achieving
perfection of the great constitutional document on which the strength and success of our system have rested for nearly two centuries."
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. HEAIBERT TENDER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK

I submit for the record relovant correspondence on the problem which we have
discussed in these hearings.
HOUSE o

REPRESENTATIVES,

Was ingtov, D.C., February10, 1965..
Mr. NICHOLAS KATZENBAOII,
Attorney General, Department of Justtoe,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR M. KA'zFNBAOR: Due to limitation of time, I was unable to pose a
question on the record at the Iouse Judiciary Committee hearings on presidential succession and disability on Tuesday, February 9, 1905, when you appeared and testified.
During the luncheon recess, I Inquired of several members of the committee
as to whether there was an executive policy or Secret Service requirement
which prohibits the President and the Vice President from riding in the same
plane or any other means of transportation. None of my colleagues with whom
I consulted were aware of any such policy and suggested that I pose tile question to you for the record.
I would appreciate a. reply, to this question In order that your response may
be made a part of the official record of the committee hearings.
Thank you for your attention and cooperation.
Sincerely,
HERBERT 'TENZER,

Member of Congress.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEE,

Hon.

Washington, February18, 1965.
HERBERT TENzER,

U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
I DEAR CONGRESSMAN TENZER: The Attorney General. has referred to
me your
letter dated February 10, 1905, inquiring whether there is "an executive policy
or Secret Service requirement which prohibits the President and Vice President
from riding'in the same plane or any other means of transportation."
We are not aware of any such policy in the form of a statute, regulation, or
formal
order.
. Insofar
as you wish to know whether there is any Secret Service "requirement'"
in this area, I have taken the liberty of referring your Inquiry to the Secret.
Service.
Sincerely,
NORBERT A, SOHLr,
Assstant 4ttomeyGeneral,
Of*e of Legal Counsol.

TuIsuRY DhiPARTME1VT,
|

UNrrED STATES SiCni SERVICE,

Washington, D.C., February85, 1965.
Hon. HERBERT TENZER,

11oue
of "RQpresentatives,
Wa~gton,
D.C7.
DEAR MR. TENZrF: As indicated in his letter of February i, 1905, NorbWrt A.
SchleL, Assi6tant Attorney General, has referred to this offive your inquiry as to.
whether there is a Secret Service requirement which pr-hi6its the President'ahd
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the Vice President from riding in the same plane or any other means of
transportation.
The Secret Service, despite the lack of an executive policy or Secret Service
requirement, has succeeded in preventing the President and Vice President from
riding in the same airplane or helicopter on the infrequent occasions when such
procedure was contemplated. The Secret Service made its objections known to
the President and he has always agreed with our decision.
The Secret Service has always discouraged the President and the Vice President from riding in the same automobile. On the occasion of any public function, our wishes have prevailed. However, there have been occasional off-therecord movements on which Presidents have spontaneously invited the Vice
President to ride In the same car with no opportunity for objection on our part
or where the objection would be impracticable or considered discourteous.There have also been instances where Presidents and Vice Presidents have been
passengers aboard the same boat.
Sincerely yours,
JAMES J.ROwLEY.
STATEMENT OF HON. HERMAN

TOLL, REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA
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SChAifBER

OF COMMP,ROE OF THE UNITEt) STATES,

Washtngton, D.C., March i,1.906.
Ron. EMANUEL CELLER,
Chairntan, Hosoe j-dtotarty Oom-nlttee,
U.S. Hotse of Representatfives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MN. Ch*n: The Chamber of Commerce of the United States supports
adoption of a constitutional amendment settingupprocedures for handling cases
of presidential inability and for keeping the office of Vice President. filled,
The national chamber approves the method embodied in Senate Joint Reqolution 1 and House Joint Resolution I and believes that any proposed constitutional amendment dealing with the above matters should clearly Apecify, as the
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aforementioned bills do, the precise method by which cases of presidential inability should be handled.
One improvement should be made in section 5 of the measure passed by the
Senate. Instead of allowing 7 days for the transmittal of a comnufitcation from
the Vice President and the Cabinet to the Congress disputing a presidential
declaration that no disability exists, a shorter length of time would appear
preferable in order to minimize the period of uncertainty.
The interval of time should be kept to an absolute minimum to permit the
speedy clarification, if challenged, of a President's assertion that his disability
has terminated.
We urge prompt action by the House Judiciary Committee so that adoption
of a constitutional amendment on presidential inability and vice-presidential
vacancy may be ratified by the States in this calendar year.
Sincerely yours,
THERON J. RICE.

BELLEFONTE, PA., February 11, 1965.
In re constitutional amendment concerning presidential inability.
Hon. EMANUEL CELLER,
Chairman, House Jtdiciary Committee,
U.S. Hou8e of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SIR: Enclosed please find a copy of a resolution which was unanimously
approved by the Centre County, Pa., Bar Association supporting the BayhCellar amendment, House Joint Resolution 1. We hope that this may be of some
use to you in your efforts to secure passage of this important piece of legislation.
Sincerely yours,
DELBERT J. MCQUAIDE,

Member PennsylvaniaBar Association Committee on PresidentialInability
and Vice-Presidential Vacancy.
RESOLUTION

Be it resolved, That Centre County Bar Association, Pennsylvania, recommends
that the Constitution of the United States be amended in accordance with the
following principles:
(1) In the event of the inability of the President, the powers and duties, but
not the office, shall devolve upon the Vice President or person next in line of
succession for the duration of the Inability of the President or until expiration
of his term of office;
(2) The inability of the President may be established by declaration in writing
of the President. In the event that the President does not make known his
inability, it may be established by action of the Vice President or person next
in line of succession with the concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet or by
action of such other body as the Congress may by law provide;
(3) The ability of the President to resume the powers and duties of his office
shall be established by his declaration in writing. In the event that the Vice
President and a majority of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may by
law provide shall not concur in the declaration of the President, the continuing
disability of the President may then be determined by the vote of two-thirds of
the elected Members of each House of the Congress;
(4) In the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Vice President or the person next in line of succession shall succeed to the
office for the unexpired term I and
(5) When a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President the President
shall nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority of the elected Members
of Congress meeting in joint session, shall then become Vice President for the
unexpired term : Be it further
Resolved, That Centre County Bar Association, Pennsylvania urges the Congress of the United States to initiate an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this resolution.

